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ABSTRACT
In tliis diesis I investigate the nanative rendeiing of inban experiences and the place of 
agency witltin these renderings, looking in paiticular at the personal stories of urban 
dwellers. Grounded in anthropological fieldwork in Britain -  in the town of Romford 
(Essex) to tiie east of London -  but also relying on wiitten sources on Britisli social 
realities, this tliesis challenges the idea and practice of a traditional place-based 
ethnography, calling in turn for an anthr opological appreciation of the individual writing 
of himian experience. This I define as the considered ordeiing of the forms in terms of 
which individuals experience their lives. I recognise that such ‘writing’, conceived as a 
cognitive pursuit, is possible within speech and not, as some may have it, the exclusive 
preserve of literary culture. In allowing that individuals may exercise authorship over 
their lives in this way, I find it is possible, as well as potentially illuminating, to compare 
individuals’ writings, their personal accounts of then lives, with other geiues for writing 
the reality of urban and peri-urban milieux in Br itain. 1 hear significant correspondences 
between each story-geme, especially as regards the impacts of town planning on urban 
space for the populations tlrat inhabit it, and discuss the possible theoretical implications 
of this correspondence. 1 focus extensively on two such geiues in addition to personal 
stories: the sociological -  examining Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s sociological 
classic text Family and Kinship in East London -  and the literary -  a reading of the work 
of English poet and journalist Jolm Betjeman. Running tluough tire thesis is also an 
appreciation of the figure of the amateur, both as a real actor and as a metaphor for the 
postmodernist approach to culture to which I also subscribe.
Rubbish, detritus, debris, scraps, fragments, it is certainly of such like that tliis book can 
be seen to be composed.
Nigel Rapport, The Prose and The Passion
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: The textual analogy of lives
In this introductory chapter I discuss the grounds on which ideas about writing in 
socio-cultural anthropology are exportable, balancing this against the view that 
ideas about writing can only ever reproduce a partial, and thus unrepresentative, 
view of an other’s socio-cultural reality (partial in the sense that ‘writing’, in some 
of its uses in social science, assumes that all subjects share the same relations to 
writing and its products). I then go on to explain how an anthropological approach 
to the city, a key theme in this thesis, imparts its own distinctive perspective on 
current theoretical debates concerning the self and language. To introduce these 
debates, I will firstly turn to what I wish to call the ‘textual analogy of lives’;
‘Even more than the use of language in and of itself or other systems of 
symbol management, stoiy-telling is an ability that defines the human 
species as such... Thiough story-telling, an otherwise unexceptional 
biological species has become a much more interesting thing. Homo 
narrans: that hominid who not only has succeeded in negotiating the 
world of nature, finding enough food and shelter to survive, but also has 
learned to inhabit mental worlds that pertain to times that are not present 
and places that are the stuff of dreams. It is through such symbolic 
mental activities that people have gained the ability to create themselves 
as human beings and thereby transform the world of nature into shapes 
not known before’ (Niles 1999:3).
This passage from Niles’s book Homo Narrans: The Poetics and Anthropology o f  
Oral Literature is an apposite place from which to begin an investigation into ‘the 
textual analogy of lives’. Here, in Niles’s choice of phrases, is expressed much of 
what may be understood by this construal of human lives: the expression of 
narrative, or story-telling, as a pre-eminent cultural act, re-working the natural 
givenness of things to thereby transcend the imprint of our immutable inheritance, 
and, through narrative acts, for the human species to come into its own; moreover 
it does this through employing its imaginative faculties, ‘to inhabit mental worlds 
that pertain to times that are not present and places that are the stuff of dreams’ so 
that the human subject may become the creative author of his or her own worlds, 
‘create themselves as human beings’ as Niles expresses it.
These insights notwithstanding, by the term ‘the textual analogy of lives’ 
I intend to refer to all those pronoimcements, post -  literary and linguistic turns, 
that we are the stories that we tell of out lives, that we ‘live in’ worlds that we 
ourselves have spun from our own narrative acts ‘from breakfast to bedtime’ 
(Robertson Davies; cited in Mitchinson 1991; cf. Hardy 1968). The particular 
position that I wish to take is one which asserts that ‘such mimetic assumptions 
are as flawed as the sociological view that stories embody the form of society’ 
(Jackson 2002:18). In short, it points to the tendency among many in the human 
sciences to grasp human worlds, in particular the self and its world, through the 
lens of literary and linguistic concepts imported into disciplines from their various 
literary and linguistic turns, terms such as story and story-telling, author, text, 
fiction, writing, aesthetics (insofar as these have displaced an earlier set in social 
anthropology including status, rule, order, position, structure, system, group, 
causality). It is this set of new conceptual tools which now provide tlie privileged
interpretive keys to the hiunan world, which open up onto an understanding of 
universal human nature and experience. It is perhaps with the growth in the 
influence of henneneutics on the discipline that the appositeness of literary and 
linguistic metaphors for describing human worlds begins to take hold. As Geertz 
famously sets out this position:
‘Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (1993:5).
With this ‘doctrine in a clause’, Geertz reverses a positivistic conception of 
human worlds, whereby they were seen to confomi to the laws of a natural 
science, accenting, rather, their affinities with the sphere of aesthetics. This shift 
led Anthony Cohen to a different conception of the anthropological enterprise, as 
he writes in his volume on the nascent anthropology of rural Britain, Belonging 
(1982):
‘Our motives are not those of obsessive empiricism, of a squeamishness 
about generalisation, or of academic sensationalism. We seek to strip the 
body naked, first of its clothes and then of whatever is required to reveal 
its physiological intricacy, not to show how it is assembled (as in the old 
organic analogy) but to display the artwork o f its component organs, to 
see how they are articulated with and infonn the nature of the whole 
(rather than being determined by it) and, thereby, to suggest its
marvellous complexity, which, usually, is rendered unimaginable through 
being concealed by its outer covering’ (1982:2; my italics).
As the passage from Niles indicates, much interest lias recently been placed on 
narrative as a cultural tool, perhaps above other literary or linguistic terms with 
which it shares a semantic domain, and so its relationship to (human) nature bears 
consideration. At its most basic, narrative can be defined as:
‘the telling (in whatever medium, though especially language) of a series 
of temporal events so that a meaningfiil sequence is portrayed -  the story 
or plot of the narrative’ (Kerby 1991:39; cited in Rapport and Overing 
2000: 283).
More precisely, it can be described as that mode of apprehending the 
world that characteristically provides coherence and continuity through time', as 
story-telling represents culture’s incursion into nature in Niles’s comments, so 
here the structure of naixative works at natural time, operating its mastery over 
inchoate ‘humanly-felt’ time to produce a sense of meaningful order. Thus, 
narrative has even become seen as basic to human consciousness, without which it 
would be impossible to generate sense. As Mary Wamock writes:
‘If we have a blackbird who sings outside our window, perhaps for 
several years in succession, it is almost impossible not to hear its song as 
a time. We recognize it, identify it and re-identify it, perhaps become 
irritated by it because, not being originally constructed according to
human aesthetic principles it ends ‘in the air’ with no proper cadence. 
But it becomes a rememberable feature of life, in so far as we hear in it 
an identifiable shape. Without such a sense of order, intelligibility and 
memorability in our own lives we become helpless. We absolutely need 
plans and intentions by which to project into the future experiences and 
principles derived from the past. The notion of ourselves as people, self­
directed, motivated, responsible for what we do and say, able to 
assimilate and order what happens to us by accident or apart from our 
own will, all this derives from our ability to interpret events according to 
a ‘plot’. This does not mean rewriting histoiy, but simply writing it, or 
telling it to ourselves without writing it down. Stories, then, are central to 
our ability to manage and understand the world’ (1994:93).
More than this, Niles has linked story and story-telling to a theory of 
human subjectivity, seeing narrative as one possible cultural means for beings to 
‘come into their own’. But what is meant when it is said that narrative presents 
beings with a means to ‘come out of themselves’ -  to rise out of their unconscious 
immersion in life and to recognise themselves as an independent subjective 
existence? For Hegel, whose allegorical tale of subject-formation will be 
mentioned again in a critical context below, it is precisely through these means 
that his primordial beings could hope to attain tlieir proper subjectivity. The being 
‘coming out of itself from within the immediacy of life does so not through self­
narration but through the sensing of a physical threat from and struggle with an 
other outside itself. But so too do acts of self-narration provide that external 
perspective on the self that would not be possible were the author still immersed
in the ‘flowing continuity of lived-in time’ (Rapport and Overing 2000; 260). 
Stories are important resources for subjects to resist the imprint of their immutable 
histories and natures, and, as will be seen later, this has given onto a normative 
perspective in contemporary postmodern existentialist anthropology; stories are 
the source of an individual poesis.
The intellectual question remains now whether the self that comes into its own 
within narrative can be traced to an entity tliat is ontologically prior to the 
narrating, acting as the source of meaning, or the reverse: that it is the narrative as 
a fonn of public discourse that itself is tliought to act, that ‘interprets’, not the 
putative ‘author’ and ‘subject’ of the self-narrations. Such a perspective on 
narrative has gained popularity among the vanguard of post-structuralism in the 
human sciences, a la Foucault and Derrida, and has been critiqued for its effective 
reduction of individuals to tokens of the collective within accounts of the socio­
cultural, the enslavement^ of an inner, private consciousness to the operations of a 
public language. I will outline in the sections below my position on this debate, 
which informs the thesis as a whole, while also wishing to scrutinise the claim of 
those who seek to view hmnanity through the lens of literary and linguistic 
concepts. That such an approach is capable of giving onto universal understanding 
of human nature and experience is considered by examining the standpoint of 
social groups characteristically associated with and located in ‘the city’.
 ^The words of David Brion Davis seem prescient here; ‘Above all Hegel bequeathed a message 
that would have a profound impact on future thought. ..we can expect nothing from the mercy of 
God or from the mercy of those who exercise worldly lordship in His or other names; that man’s 
true emancipation, whether physical or spiritual, must always depend on those who have endured 
and overcome some form of slavery’ (1975; cited in Gilroy 1993:51) -  where enslavement and 
emancipation relate to the hegemony of social structure and the decolonisation of the subject.
Narrative as a public discourse and the individuality of world-views
Recent post-structuralist/deconstructionist arguments have stressed that the 
individual can only achieve self-awareness through language as a collective 
institution; that there can be no other means a ‘subject’ can attain awareness of 
itself, come into itself, other than through a web of language provided for it by 
culture. Thus, when Freeman caricatures the position of post-stracturalism - ‘with 
the exception of our preverbal years, everything we do, everything we are, is 
bathed in language to begin with, isn’t ‘life’ itself another link in the chain of 
texts?’ (1993:8) - he is echoing a position that also makes narrative complicit in 
the process of defining what a ‘life’ is. If a life is the very form in which it is 
expressed, a story with a beginning (birth), middle (maturation) and end (death), 
then what does it mean for post-structuralists for our most intimate being, our 
private selfhood, to hang on the fragile threads of the webs of significance 
provided for us by our cultures? Does this not easily do away with an author 
altogether as source of interpretation or world-views in favour of the institution of 
narrative which thinks, acts, interprets on our behalf?
A post-structuralist interpretation of autobiographical narrative would 
locate the site of interpretive activity within language or text itself, rather than 
attribute a separate authorial agency to the ‘author’ of the text. The analytical shift 
required to produce this position came with the paradigm shift in linguistics 
heralded by the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, whose theory of language as a 
‘system of differences without positive terms’ -  a synchronic rather than a 
diachronic system -  would allow later theorists studying literary works to re- 
construe the text as a site of production rather than referentiality (in other words,
it was aided by the breaking of the ‘covenant’ between word and world (Steiner)). 
The challenge posed here to a realist epistemology in the social sciences, 
particularly anthropology, is captured by Spiegel:
‘What literature offers is an index of socially construable meaning rather 
than an image of reality; it is to the construction of social meaning, rather 
than the transmission of messages about the world, that the exercise of 
literature is directed’ (1997:5).
The erstwhile intimacy between word and world, between language and 
the order of things, that was always assumed to have been fixed and immutable 
was now radically altered; as the above quotation indicates, literature could no 
longer be relied on as the transparent record of an external reality but the site 
where that reality, quite literally, is ‘constructed’. The same can be said to be the 
case for an interior consciousness, a sense of the private self, which, according to 
Kerby, can never be reached except through the linguistic activity of self­
narration. Thus, the experience of an interior subjectivity, the feeling of there 
being ‘epistemic transparency of the self to itself (1991:5), is merely illusory, in 
that it fails to take into proper accoimt the ubiquitous mediatory presence of 
symbolic artefacts such as nanative. Thus, a postmodern hermeneutics as here 
described, and as advocated by Kerby, does violence to tlie unquestioned 
assumptions of a realist epistemology.
But if this raises problems about the reliability of knowledge of the world 
and things in it, then from the post-stmcturalist’s point of view, there can be no 
less secure epistemological grounds than the subject’s attempts to assume a
vantage point on their own lives. All attempts to reach the truths relating to the 
self, by accounting for the personal history of the biological organism, must take 
place at a necessaiy, and often quite distant, temporal remove. Insofar as attempts 
at reaching the tmth take place in this vacuum left by the removal of the 
ontological presence of the self to itself in its acts of self-reflection - an intuitive 
but fallacious view it is claimed - it becomes increasingly plausible to the post­
structuralist that we ourselves are little more than the stories we tell about our 
lives, the narrative we employ to ‘speak ourselves’. We are present to ourselves as 
mere stories, and in the words of Kerby ‘I am, for myself, only insofar as I 
express myself (1991:41). ‘[H]ow are we to escape the conclusion that we 
ourselves are ultimately fictions?’. Freeman also questions, leading him to further 
speculation on the self as author: ‘Is it therefore no-thing, save what we ourselves 
conjure up in those moments of reverie when we wish to make sense of 
experience?’ (1993:8). Further, Freeman argues, the theme of development that 
we often imbue our life stories with, almost as isomorphic with what we know as 
the self, takes on a rather misplaced concreteness in our lives. A sense of 
purposeful development gets mistaken as an essential and inevitable attribute of 
our lives (a la Sartre). On the contrary, he summarises, it is nothing other than a 
story we like to tell about ourselves; it is bound up with, inseparable from, the 
process of narrating our lives. The problem here is that, if these narratives are 
established as fictions, then so too must the notion of a developing subject. The 
notion of there being meaningful direction to our lives, a plot or development and 
eventual denouement, is something we, speaking through discourse, intennittently 
or routinely use to ‘delude ourselves’, to salve the pains of knowing that life is 
inherently meaningless.
In short, for the post-stmcturalist studying autobiographical narrative, the 
self accounted for in the story is an ‘effect’ of the layers of signification, the 
discourse, that ‘speaks’ it, and this entails the anti-huinanistic view ‘that 
“persons” are primarily the result of ascribing subject status or selfhood to those 
sites of narration and expression that we call human bodies’ (Kerby 1991:4). The 
key problem is the subject’s inability to achieve direct and immediate knowledge 
of itself, and its imaginative attempts to fill in the gap left by the removal of the 
subject’s ontological presence from a prior discursive stock available within a 
particular culture. Narrative, in short, fills that ontological gap left by the death of 
the author. The self only becomes aware of its subjectivity insofar as it speaks the 
narratives that a culture has made available, which, in effect, means that analytical 
priority is to be placed on institutionality (of narrative) over personal agency (of 
the speaker). The effect is always to see the personal and private as a token of the 
collective (the discursive, the institutional, the structural). In this post­
structuralist/deconstructionist view, I feel, the self is mistaken for the discourse 
and genre that supposedly speaks it -  the diary, the autobiography, the life story. 
And here is also found a clear expression of what I began by calling the textual 
analogy of lives -  that a post-structuralist/deconstructionist view fully collapses 
the self into the story, denying that the real self can be reached througli the 
labyrinth of signs that enwrap human realities.
This position has provoked resistance among some anthropologists 
interested in the relationship between self and narrative, not only for the 
impoverishment of subjectivity in poststructuralism, but for what amounts to a 
veritable negation of it. These writers would wish for there to be far more that can 
be said about narrative than its fixity, institutionality, and uniformity, its finally
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circular meaning; far more that can be said about the languages in which we write 
our lives than the over-determination of meaning by certain immanent structures 
of signification, far more interesting things that can be said about the author that 
employs the language than how that language succeeds in employing the author 
(Rapport 1994:25). This is why I turn in this thesis to theories that endorse the use 
of aesthetic idioms to describe the human universe, but trace the provenance of 
these semiotic worlds not to cultures as reified wholes but to individual authors 
who enshrine themselves, give voice to their own individuality, in their own 
‘writings’ of reality. There is a traceable lineage for such views on the relations 
between self and language world. Rapport has explained, that reaches back to the 
pronouncements of Harold Bloom (1975) on ‘strong poets’, an idea through which 
human agents could be constmed as admittedly situated in universes amidst forms 
that are not of their own making, but nevertheless through their efforts always to 
describe and re-describe their situatedness in their own terms are able to rise 
above their immutable inheritances. But neither is this insight original to Bloom; 
indeed, Rapport finds it also expressed in the existential situation of humanity as 
conceived (as lived out) by Nietzsche. If recent anthropological description and 
theoiy has encouraged the impression that narrative acts dominate human cultural 
life, that it is through story that individuals come into their own, then it is perhaps 
due to anthropologists’ recent inspirational following of Nietzsche and, in 
particular, his own bias toward the aesthetic idiom of ‘writing’ and ‘art-works’ for 
describing human life. For Nietzsche, writing is the privileged cognitive act and 
the pre-eminent one in all human culture (cf Niles 1999). In his perspective on 
writing and the human condition, furthermore, there is a mirroring of many of the 
key terms of contemporary antiiropological theory, the phenomenology of
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individuality, the mind, language, writing, found logically connected together. 
Rapport summarises the reasons why writing provided an attraction for Nietzsche,
‘[t]here was nothing more powerful or important than self-redescription, 
then, because it demonstrated the notion of a single ‘true’ world, of 
access to an essential ‘reality’, was a fable, and that the world, our selves, 
and the most important part of ourselves, our minds, were constructs of 
our languages and our individual use of them in our acts of 
writing...’’recreating all ‘it was’ into ‘thus I willed it”” (1997c;50).
These ideas of self, its world and language (narrative, writing, text) have 
thus been re-formulated so that individuals can be put back into possession of 
their human worlds in the account that anthropologists produce to describe human 
life, worlds previously colonised in socio-cultural accounts by impersonal 
‘Cultures’ and other manifestations of the collective. Here, then, is the means for 
accounting for a personal ontology and identity.
I will register throughout this thesis my broad acceptance of the tenets 
underlying the liberal, and literaiy, existentialist approach. However, I would also 
wish to point out that such liberal himianism (from the pronouncements of 
Nietzsche above) draws its own intimate connections between individuality and 
text-making, that liberal humanism fetishises the novel as a close cultural 
expression of individuality (cf. Rapport 1994). What I wish to discuss here is not 
the purported universality of the liberal and literaiy existentialist approach, its 
giving onto an understanding of universal human nature and experience, but what 
might be its potential loadedness and subsequent lacunae. For recent studies of
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subaltern groups in Western cities expose among these gioups a different 
linguistic universe to that which it is assumed must surround the literary and 
liberal existential subject. These linguistic universes, which I introduce in the 
subsequent section, either posit subjects that are actually limited by their 
impoverished forms of linguistic capital, or who exist in expressive universes 
where gioup experiences are kept vital through messages that can only be 
conveyed pre-figuratively, througli mimesis, gesture, kinesis or costume, rather 
than through the form of a literary gem e such as the novel Here are accounts of 
social life that call for a phenomenological hermeneutics, not for an approach that 
neither privileges the figurative nor the asocial transcendent subject.
Subalterns and their linguistic universes
The question I would begin by posing here is, precisely whose conditions for 
acquiring subjectivity are tacitly being expressed when a certain philosophical 
system attempts to pass off their account of subject-formation as, implicitly, 
imiversai? This is a question of some philosophical importance and longevity, but 
its most recent expression has been in critical standpoint theories. If those who 
have considered the question of subjectivity have set certain conditions for 
achieving this valued form of human existence, the state of transcendent 
subjectivity, then do they necessarily pertain to all groups in hiunan society? For 
this is indeed the problem according to contemporaiy critical thinkers: that there 
are certain social conditions surroimding specific categories of people, and certain 
cultural conditions shared among them, that militate against meeting the universal 
human standards set by philosophical paradigms of subject-foraiation.
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It is here that I intend the social life of the city to enter into the debate. Is 
there a critical urban standpoint on notions of transcendent individuals that may 
lead to its cautious application to the social fields of the city? Take, for instance, 
the post-colonial British city: what distinguishes the ‘urban’ from the ‘rural’ 
milieux also found in Britain is the diversity of the type of groups that can be 
found to trace a cultural and historical relationship with it. I am thinking not only 
of the historical pattern of its settlement by diaspora populations but also of the 
changing relationship of an industrial working class to the contemporary city. Do 
these characteristically urban groups offer routes to a critical standpoint against a 
liberal and literary existentialist approach?
There are some sources of evidence to suggest that they do. The last of 
these groups cited here, the (post)industrial working class in Britain, is the centre 
of focus for Simon Charlesworth in his work A Phenomenology o f Working Class 
Experience (2000), a work which will provide an implicit point of reference in the 
forthcoming analyses^.
Insofar as the arguments of this work will intermittently engage in 
dialogue with Charlesworth’s A Phenomenology o f Working Class Experience, it 
is necessary to provide here a brief, overall summaiy of both his methodology and 
his substantive thesis (though, he makes clear, the two cannot be entirely 
separated). Indeed, we cannot expect taken-for-granted divisions to be allowed to 
stand for Charlesworth, who states early on in the book his methodological aim to 
‘use philosophical ideas ethnographically’, showing how philosophical ideas -  
which are frequently accused of being esoteric or empirically unverifiable by 
many outside of the discipline of philosophy -  are more than adequate interpretive
 ^All references in tliis section to Charleswortli will relate to liis work A Phenomenology of 
Working Class Experience. Likewise, all references to Gilroy in the preceding discussion will 
relate to his work, The Black Atlantic.
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tools with which ‘to lay open to view a version of human life’ (p. 11). Rather than 
just an attempt to use philosophical ideas ethnographically, which might make the 
text read much more like an abstract treatise than a careful ethnographic 
investigation, it is equally an ethnography of philosophical ideas as they are used 
to consolidate the position of the scholar in ‘tlie social universe’ and to validate 
the kinds of knowledge-claims they habitually make, which, despite appearances, 
have inscribed within them the position of the scholar within ‘social space’. Much 
of the book, then, is a tirade against the abuses inherent within the scholastic point 
of view and what Charlesworth believes is the current tendency among a 
privileged middle class elite of knowledge-brokers to de-realise the importance of 
‘class’ to contemporary British society. For Charlesworth, tlie baby of class is 
being thiown out with the bath water of essentialism in the contemporary moment 
in the academy.
Yet, looking around him, both at his field site of Rotherham in South 
Yorkshire and his personal trajectory out of that working class former mining 
town where he grew up and attempted to lead an existence, he continues to 
perceive the effects of his and others’ working class being at the pre-epistemic and 
pre-discursive level. He believes that to construe their social universe as 
logocentric, as one of text-centredness, even spectral observation, is a misguided 
use of academic conventionalities. For, according to Charlesworth, ‘The damage 
done to individuals through the processes of subjection and demoralization [which 
has replaced the valuable experience of a world built around industrial labour for 
the working class] leads to the construction of subjectivities around a fatal shrine 
of silence, around a sense of the body as unable’ (p.276). Their class experience 
has instigated a ‘fall into inwardness’ (Jackson 2002:71-2), with their bodies
15
exhibiting the signs of pain behaviour (Jackson 2002:45), This sense of the retreat 
of the working class into the muted body has also inscribed itself into the social 
and cultural contexts of the working class, into the kinds of lives they lead in 
private spaces such as the home, as well as their public realm of impoverished 
capital. It is symptomatic of a malaise that has come to characterise working class 
spaces such as Rotherham, and can be characterised in terms of the falling away 
of those grounds which once ensured the working class the pre-industrial values 
(‘ethos’) of dignity, honour, and a measure of ontological security. Indeed, the 
fractured grounds occasionally protrude into consciousness and are verbally 
articulated in working class utterances, making the actors aware of the 
circiunstances of their malaise. As Charlesworth explains in relation to the speech 
of one of his male informants, using the phenomenological ideas of Merleau- 
Ponty,
‘the ‘habit-body’ carried forward the sense of the world as it has been 
lived in, in the past; and this entails certain responses, ways of relating to 
that world; and this habitual setting is presumed around the subject in the 
encountered present. But, in this case, in these conditions, this presumed 
background of habits and responses and the practical sense of value they 
make manifest has changed. What was ‘expected’ to be there to 
reciprocate the practically projected schemes of gesture is no longer 
always there, and he is thrust into a future in which he must contemplate 
new schemes for existing, a different way of being because the old habit- 
world, the ‘ethos’ that he grew up with has decayed. So this man’s 
speech is objectifying a change in human responses, and is registering his
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sense -  in the feeling of his somatic responses, his practical, immediate, 
sensuous awareness, his embodied understanding, his comportment -  of 
the falling away of the moral relations of people around him’ (p. 83).
The genuine symbolic violence that Charlesworth believes permeates 
working class lives thus requires a phenomenological-hermeneutic idiom to 
render it explicit; it has damaged the working class in ways that they are no longer 
capable of rendering their world explicitly through language. Class has become an 
ontological phenomenon, something that the working class carries as part of their 
being-in-the-world, a ‘humiliation done to the flesh’ (p. 85); and he accuses the 
British social order of succeeding in generating ‘an economic based racism, which 
marks the flesh of individuals as profoundly as differences in skin pigment’ 
(p. 15). This is why he finds the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu such a useful 
interpretive resource. ‘The thought of Bourdieu is unique in the quality of its 
insiglits into the suffering of working class people in modem capitalism’, he 
explains, and also sees his own analyses along with those of Bourdieu as being 
‘an appeal to conscience on behalf of these people, for their plight to be 
recognised’ (p.27). Like Charlesworth, Bourdieu believes that the phenomenon of 
class, an objective social structure, extends itself into the intimate realm of private 
subjectivities, teaching the flesh of the working class the lessons of class injustice 
by forcing ‘a closure in their being to what, at birth, they might have become’, as 
Charlesworth asserts (p.68). Clearly, here is more than just an abstract reading of 
inequality in British society:
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‘Class is not just a socio-economic cum political-cultural category, but a 
space of being whose contours are forged in processes that demand a 
psycho-analytic treatment, an understanding of class as a psychic space 
resonating with terror and anxiety’ (p.289).
It is easy for Charlesworth to see why class manifests itself in brate being 
when so many of his infonnants have witnessed the extent to which ‘their culture 
has tended to collapse into a morass of confused and fractured forms’ (p. 159) 
following the de-industrialisation of the 1980s and 1990s, leaving only 
communities with ‘a quality of life so bleak that it confines being to a pathological 
degree’ under ‘conditions that encroach upon sensory deprivation’ (p. 159).
With class so confined to its signification on the body and to its 
subsequent closeness to the elementary and the natural, it seems that to describe 
the relationship of working class subjects to their world as one of a constant and 
creative linguistic mediation, where the mind is taken as the seat of such verbal 
linguistic acts, is already to view this social reality through a loaded set of 
concepts. It is already to prejudge the nature of their human experience. For the 
relationship of these subjects to their world to be of the kind that Nietzsche 
presupposes -  a kind of art-work - tliere must be, argues Charleswoith, a primary 
relation to certain kinds of linguistic practices and techniques that are simply 
absent from the social lives of many working class subjects which precludes their 
adoption ‘of forms of linguistic use aimed at the generation of self, other and 
genealogical descriptions’ (p.287). I am more sceptical, however, of 
Charlesworth’s claim that a narrative relation to the world relies on a distinctive 
‘vocabulary’ that must be socially acquired before being able to harness certain
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kinds of perceptual possibilities, and that the working class are unlikely to be 
successful participants in the kind of milieu where they can adopt this ‘second 
order language’. I do not believe that the ability to think of the world as a 
narrative relies on a ‘second order language’ but that perfectly formed narratives 
can be created from ordinary vernacular language. There is perhaps a tendency in 
Charlesworth’s work to over-emphasise the uniformity of the working class; this 
compares unfavourably, for example, witli Jenkin’s Lads, Citizens and Ordinary 
Kids (1983) which offers a far more nuanced view of a working class community 
in Britain^
Nevertheless, for me, Charlesworth’s thesis is one source for potentially 
critiquing a liberal, and literary, existentialist approach to the city. Besides this, it 
provides a powerfully reasoned account of the continuity of body-subjects, 
speech, place and community under conditions of contemporary social change in 
Britain, suggesting how each mirrors tlie conditions of contemporary society into 
the others. In using it to think through the relations between communities, places, 
subjects and their speech in a different region of Britain from Rotherham,
 ^Charlesworth’s sociology of working class experience, I accept, is abundant in logical aporias 
(Crook, pers. comm.). The linguistic impoverishment of liis working class informants clearly 
contrasts with his own use of a complex linguistic code, that of the academic genre, a usage that 
ought not to be allowed given his explanations of the rigid social detemiinism of class habitus, the 
total institutionality of those social sites through which working class lives must pass (school, 
social security office, factoiy, prison). Are liis arguments, latent with a social determinism, borne 
out in his own personal experiences? Indeed, his own personal experience does, to some extent, 
come to stand for his social explanation; he does recount in the Acknowledgements his own course 
from tlie trauma of school, to the freedom and light of Rotlierham Tech., to the suffocation of 
another educational milieux, this time the elite miiversity education of Cambridge. Yet, as the very 
opening line of the Acknowledgements testifies, he manages to come tlirough all of this with his 
agency intact, as least as far as being able to document his experiences, to write his way out of the 
social morass of working class life. This, then, is in contrast to much of the argument presented in 
the book; that post-industrial working class life leads individuals to adopt a form of life wliich they 
accept ‘for want of any other way’ (2000b:48), so tliat, explaining away subjectivity, Charlesworth 
can argue that ‘the possibilities for self-realization and recognized existence are the prevalent 
simulations offered as subject-positions by the multitude of media that surround’ (2000b:51). On 
agency and total institutionality a la Goffman see Rapport (1998).
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Romford in the north east of London, I feel it is important to bear these 
continuities in mind such that each provides a hermeneutic clue to the others.
Working class subjectivity, then, for Charlesworth, is not predicated on 
the ability of agents to mobilise around themselves the linguistic tools to describe 
their world; indeed, they cannot if, as Charlesworth believes, they exist in the 
world only as members of a group ‘dispossessed of their own instruments of 
expression’ (p.287) by the trauma of their social circumstances. Rather;
‘when one belongs to a group which is denied access to the instruments, 
as well as the forms of comportment that in our society mark the 
accomplished person; that mark intelligence and one’s belonging to the 
realm of the mind; when one is consigned and consigns oneself to the 
realm of the body; when one’s livelihood is dependent upon one’s 
practical, habitual, generative capacity to learn competencies rooted in 
the motor-skills; then it is little wonder that the body should become the 
‘seat’ of personal identity to oneself, when these very conditions instil 
forms of comportment that refuse euphemization and which signify to 
others a condition of mindlessness and crude physicality that is 
disgusting’ (p.250).
Here, Charlesworth confirms for his working class informants what is implicit in 
tlieories of subjectivity above; that these are beings consigned, and resigned, to an 
existence where they are incapable of ‘coming out of themselves’, of imagining 
current circumstance, life chances, as other. Whether it is in the local gym, where 
they work at the musculature of their bodies through weight-training or boxing, in
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the workplace where hard labour is endured, or among friends where they 
celebrate a culture of the senses and the pleasures of the flesh, the working class 
for Charlesworth are forever imprisoned with tlie realm of the immanent, the life 
of the body and of nature; and, in contemporary Western cultures, this is the 
inexorable sign of their inequality.
Exploring another social group historically and culturally wedded to the 
metropolis, Paul Gilroy in The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double 
Consciousness (1993/ is interested in uncovering the relationship between the 
experience of slavery under the plantation regime, occidental philosophical 
notions of subjectivity and the vernacular aesthetic cultures of black diaspora 
populations in the modem city. While aesthetics may now be the key to 
understanding socio-cultural experience, a la Nietzsche, it is not an aesthetics 
modelled along the lines of the discursive literary text that is capable of unlocking 
the door to the human worlds of the slave, but the alternative, compensator, and 
more phenomenal cultural form of music, along witli the kinetic form of dance. 
The slaves’ culture under the plantation regime was not so much an oral culture, 
grounded as if by choice in the musically expressive medium of oral performance, 
as an extra-XiXQmry culture. In parallel with Charlesworth’s working class 
infonnants, the black subject too was excluded from a representational universe of 
literary, written, expression. Oral peiformance, the paralinguistic and the 
communicative mediiun of music are subsequently, Giloiy argues, imbued witli a 
political significance for those who find within these fonns expressions of the 
social experience of slaveiy, and is why, for Gilroy ‘[t]he expressive cultures 
developed in slavery continue to preserve in artistic form needs and desires which
 ^And we also know that Charlesworth himself was influenced by a reading of Gilroy’s Tim Black 
Atlantic.
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go far beyond the mere satisfaction of material wants’ (p.57). But unlike the 
working class, which Charlesworth saw as a group dispossessed of its instruments 
of expression but who nevertheless could have achieved access to the language- 
world of bourgeois speech were it not robbed from them by the symbolic violence 
of class injustice, the black slave and their metropolitan descendents are in 
possession of an expressive culture. However, it is one that nevertheless still 
‘reiterate[s] the continuity between art and life’, in opposition to that expressive 
culture which cultivates a ‘dispassionate and rational evaluation of the artistic 
object’ (p.57). It is important to bear in mind, in considering the provenance of 
certain aesthetic idioms, that one particular kind of idiom, that belonging to the 
transparent representational universe of the Western bourgeois reader, is not 
automatically capable of describing the whole of the human experience.
Precisely the same situation as Charlesworth identifies among the 
working class is here in operation: that both the working class and the black slave 
(and their descendants within what Gilroy classes the ‘Black Atlantic’) share a 
common sign of oppression, their shared immanence^. Once again, with Gilroy, 
transcendence is blocked, and so a virtue is made of immanence which is left to 
the slave as their only and final resort (‘a gmdging gift’ (p.76), as Gilroy describes 
the musical legacy of slavery).
Thus, the point that Gilroy’s arguments is making in analysing the hidden 
histories of black cultural expression is that aesthetics is not a neutial idiom; 
indeed, it would be a mistake to assume that this were the case. The view that 
aesthetics offers a vantage point over universal human conditions is questioned.
 ^I see ail obvious parallel here witli the position of woman. In recent feminist scholarship, 
patriarchy has been seen to be achieved by woman’s consignment to the category of the natural or 
the immanent in Western systems of metaphysics (see for example Bordo (1987)). She is 
consistently defined as ‘being in itself, while only man can achieve being ‘for-itself (Beauvoir 
(1949); for discussion of the writing of the self in de Beauvoir see Pilardi (1999)).
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for it only begs the question. Perhaps it is necessary to ask ‘whose’ aesthetic 
idiom are we using when we talk of human experience as amounting to an ‘art 
work’ (Nietzsche)? Unequivocally, for Gilroy, reference to textuality in the study 
of human lives has been insidious:
‘Urged on by the post-structuralist critiques of the metaphysics of 
presence, contemporary debates have moved beyond citing language as 
the fundamental analogy for comprehending all signifying practices to a 
position where textuality (especially when wrenched open through the 
concept of difference) expands and merges with totality. Paying careful 
attention to the structures of feeling which underpin black expressive 
cultures can show how this critique is incomplete. It gets blocked by this 
invocation of all-encompassing textuality. Textuality becomes a means to 
evacuate the problem of human agency, a means to specify the death (by 
fragmentation) of the subject and, in the same manoeuvre, to enthrone the 
literary critic as mistress or master of the domain of creative human 
communication’ (p.77).
What Gilroy is warning against here I would also echo, indeed so would 
existential anthropology. But it is important to bear in mind the often implicit 
covenant between models of human reality, aesthetics and the text. At the least, it 
takes for granted the ubiquity and importance of verbal language as a mode of 
cornrnimication for all subjects (even for those, above, who do not instinctively 
live within a transparent representational universe). At the most, there is a danger 
that the analyst is holding up a mirror to their own subjectivity, seeing, reflected
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in the human cultures they study, a reflection of their own ontological security. 
Insofar as the mind is the seat of verbal language, it tacitly introduces into 
analyses a Cartesian mind-body dualism that is unlikely to adequately serve those 
actors whose lives are likely to be rooted in (consigned to) the body and nature to 
a far greater extent than those of the ideal subject of the hegemonic discourse; 
Charlesworth and Gilroy give an illustration of two such groups. There is a 
concentration of both of these groups in the city, contrary to the country where a 
rural working class alone, not combined with a substantial black diasporic 
population, may be foimd in significant settlement. I take on board all of these 
critiques of existentialism as a guide in anthropology, and, where appropriate, try 
to grant them their proper dignity in my analyses. This is why a methodological 
eclecticism remains such a valuable approach, whether it is the phenomenology of 
Charlesworth, or tlie critical standpoint theory of Gilroy, that is combined with a 
literary anthropological perspective. Nevertheless, I feel that the ‘writing’ of 
social reality remains vitally relevant to the imderstanding of urban lives.
Individuality and stories of the city
As I have argued above, language has tended to bespeak a sense of unifonnity in 
discourse on the socio-cultural. This need not be the case, however, if the 
imderstanding of culture is shifted toward diversity through construing cultural 
forms (such as language and narrative) as ‘equivalence structures’ (Wallace 1964) 
rather than structures demanding cognitive unifonnity among its adherents. If 
stnictures are to result at all from social interaction, then this is as a result of the 
coming together of diverse cognitive intentions, not something that can be
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assumed to exist prior to exchange and interaction, or something that over­
determines interaction. In short, in Wallace’s words, culture comprises ‘an 
organisation of diversity’. This is in line, then, with the terrain on which culture 
has recently been reinscribed. While the orthodox definition of culture up until 
recently was that penned by Geertz, who wrote, to repeat, that ‘man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs’ (1993:5), now antliropologists are far more likely to accept a definition of 
culture as a ‘system of interlinking equivalence structures’, and on a broader level, 
‘a consummate equivalence structure over the diverse whole’ (Rapport and 
Overing 2000: 399). Still there is a tendency to conceptualise culture in terms of 
semiotic structures, but a cast of diverse selves now makes its arrival into the 
script.
I have intimated above that an urban anthropology is capable of 
imparting its own distinct perspective on the theoretic debates I have so far 
discussed surrounding the self and language, language and the world. Firstly, 
despite the critiques that I have levelled at the existentialist approach from an 
urban perspective, I wish to stress the extent to which urban anthropologists have 
upheld a credible support for the active experiencing individual (consistently a 
theme in the writings of Ruth Finnegan, predating her interests in British urban 
life, as well as A. P. Cohen and Fukui, Matsuda and Rapport); it is a support 
which I hope to continue in this thesis. The city is tlie analytical home to the 
individual interpreting person, but this has not always been the case^. For 
example, in Humanising the City (1993), Cohen critiques urban ethnographers of 
the past, especially the Chicago School sociologists, for locating selves only in an
 ^For an overview of the anthropology of the city see Hannerz’s comprehensive discussion (1980). 
Cf. also Southall (1985).
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‘organic matrix’ where ‘a purely functional inter-dependency prevailed over 
individuality’ (1993:204), or saw selves as the ‘representative of a structural 
nexus’ (1993:203), and anthropology in general has tended to follow their lead, he 
argues.
There have also been efforts by anthropologists in tlie city to take as their 
ethnographic focus the ‘phraseological community’, and thereby to account for 
individual agency within urban milieux. The manifestation of individual creativity 
through stories and story-telling surrounding the theme of the city may be 
approached from either of two angles, according to previous ethnographic 
treatments of narrative in the city. Both are commensurate accounts of the 
creativity of urban narrative, yet the idea of creativity is accented differently in 
each. The first account is from Ruth Finnegan’s work on gemes of story-telling 
about the British new town of Milton Keynes, Tales o f the City: A study o f  
narrative and urban life (1998), the companion volume to her earlier investigation 
The Hidden Musicians (1989). Here the emphasis is on the artistry of story-telling 
which transforms each individual act of story-telling into an irreducible and 
unrepeatable perfonnance, the adept fashioning of words into a momentarily 
unique bricolage (cf Jackson 2002:22-3). Thiough their acts of narrative 
virtuosity, each individual story-teller makes of the received forms of the story 
something never before told:
‘[it is] more illuminating to look to people’s practiced and accomplished
arts for enacting stories’ (1998:177).
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‘The artistries of verbal genres and their conventions regularly prove 
much richer and more flexible than outsiders at first appreciate. So do the 
art-ful ways that people create change and manipulate these complex 
resources’ (1998:178).
Nevertheless, there is a lingering sense of the social about her account of personal 
story-telling in that she is concerned with how people both enact and react to 
stories along conventionalised lines.
For an eschewal of the social, I turn, again, for tlie second account to 
Rapport and his work Talking Violence: An anthropological interpretation o f  
conversation in the city (1987). He too sets much store by the use, that is the 
performance, of language as a means of locating its polyvocality, though this time 
the context is individualistic and asocial, concerning cliches of violence in the city 
rather than narratives addressing the city (though, of course, there are occasions 
when the two overlap). For Rapport, meaning does not inhere in abstract linguistic 
fonn {langue) but in fluid contextual use {parole). This contextualisation of 
language, however, is not situated in a dialogic social relationship between 
speakers but is found to be a private cognitive event internal to the individual. The 
same verbal form, he found, nevertheless performs very different cognitive work 
for each of the speakers engaged in conversation. The emphasis here is not so 
much on the social exchange of verbal forms as their private, multiple and diverse 
cognitive enactment, on stories rather than story-telling; and yet, it is still the 
dependence he emphasises (often overlooked) of social interaction on individual 
cultural construction. Here, as Rapport puts it, is urban ‘culture as potentiality’ 
(1987:188), a set of resources for making meaning, rather than urban cuJtuie as
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oppressive institutionality, and here is a view of the actor accommodating the city 
to his or her own ends rather than succumbing to the harshness or the constraint of 
urban life (Cohen and Fukui 1993).
These, then, are two ways of accounting for individual subjectivity 
through stories that travel the complete gamut of the social spectrum from, on the 
one hand, the private and asocial, to, on the other, the public and relational. In 
short, the cognitive importance of cities seems to have grown in direct proportion 
to the physical and demographic growth of cities (Finnegan 1998:1).
The truth of movement and movement as truth
Whether individual self-consciousness is regarded as relational (Finnegan), or as 
something that arises from our own resourceful efforts ontologically outwith 
social interaction (Rapport), the importance of narrative to the process brings into 
focus the ubiquity of movement in human socio-cultural lives. I do not just mean 
to indicate the movement of individuals seeking to transcend the fixity of their 
pasts, but also the way tliey have been recognised to bring this about through 
narrative as a kind of movement, one that is essentially temporal. One recent 
approach ‘locates the source of narrative fonn in the elementary structures of 
movement in the human lifeworld’ (Jackson 2002:32; 1996:38-43), taking on the 
fonn of tlie everyday routine of setting out, an adventure, and finally the return, 
offering a denouement, whence the story is told.
As hiunan subjects, we realise a sense of self, of creative agency, through 
movement. The struggle against fixity is taken as the sign of our acceding to a 
dignified human existence. Hiunan life is at its most authentic when it is on the
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move. This has given onto an implicit morality in liberal anthropology at present 
which asserts that nothing ought to get in the way of individuals aspiring toward 
and achieving this life of movement, least of all the categories that anthropologists 
have conventionally used to describe socio-cultural phenomena. There has been a 
tendency in anthropology, beginning in the 1980s, to recognise tliat the fixed 
description of social and cultural actors amounts to a diminishment of their human 
subjectivity, an undignified portrayal of their authentic humanity (cf. Jackson 
2002), Alongside this implicit morality has been a widening of the research 
agenda so as to attend to the facticity of movement in the human world, a reality 
which previous anthropological interests have conspired to disguise.
I wish to adopt a method in relation to the object of study that seeks to 
register the reality of movement, from economic flows (Chapter 2), to the 
temporal journeying of story-telling (Chapters 4 and 5), to migration (Chapter 6) 
to physical and mental journeying (Chapters 7 and 8). The reality of movement is 
important, however, as is its opposite, discontinuity, which threatens to make 
movement problematic. Indeed, it will be seen that there is a surfeit of 
discontinuity in local luban lives; these are lives that have been witness to much 
paradigmatic shifting; they have stood witness to familiar environments vanishing 
beneath them, the waning social and economic fortunes of the town played out in 
the concrete surroundings; the unnerving otherness of new types of urban space 
and tlie imagined otherness of new social groups; palpable changes in social scale; 
they are lives that have found themselves prey to the anxiety of risk in public 
space and the threat that this anxiety will spill over into generic danger; they have 
been witnesses to, and sometimes participants in, increasing opportunities for 
establishing social connections outside of the community; and, what is more, the
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need to make sense of changing regimes of governance for towns at the fin  de 
siecle that are not only new but anti-paradigmatic, neither exclusively ‘public’ or 
‘private’ (Tonkiss 1995/. Perhaps none of these features is unique to the people I 
engaged with and the urban area I studied, but tell of a more general set of 
changes to die socio-cultural life of British cities during the twentieth century.
Insofar as I take movement as an important point of focus in this thesis, 
while also granting significance to discontinuity, I present in the chapters that 
follow not a series of reflections and analyses of social discontinuity in British life 
from a singular paradigmatic perspective, but from the viewpoints of a diversity 
of integral ‘ language-worlds ’, each representing the creative product of a specific 
individual or partners working within the conventions of their respective genres of 
writing. The chapters seek to present a view of British social reality as multi- 
perspectival; the materials presented in this thesis are not brought together imder 
the governance of any single paradigm^.
Anthropology is the most suitable ‘discipline’ through which to attempt 
this, some commentators have noted. They have recently sought, somewhat 
paradoxically, to stabilise anthropology as an inherently unstable discipline.
 ^Tonkiss (1995) writes of the ‘hybridisation’ of the public and the private in current urban 
governance, for example P.F.I. (Public Finance Initiative) schemes. That is, these new forms of 
governance ‘represent a way of bringing market activities into the field of government’ (1995:14), 
as opposed to complete deregulation as occurred in Britain during the 1980s; skill, knowledge and 
expertise from private sector actors have come to be instituted within urban policy in such a way 
that the resulting forms ‘do not reside easily within a conventional distinction between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres’ (1995:2). One hybridised form of urban governance to directly affect the 
lives of townsfolk in Romford has been the recently instituted practice of Town Centre 
Management. This is one form in which management structures from the private sector -  the out- 
of-town shopping centre -  are incorporated into the sphere of urban governance, aiming at the 
improvement of the economic vitality of town centres through the manipulation of their physical 
appearance and their proper management and promotion (Oc and Tiesdell (1998), Forsberg 
(1999)). As a result, town centres are now sites to be properly managed tlirough a mixture of 
private and public sector expertise, and not only significant places to their traditional inhabitants. 
See Conclusion for An ther discussion of the impact of new urban space, engendered tlu ough new 
approaches to urban governance, on the lives of townsfolk in Romford. On the rhetoric of 
governance in the ‘global age’ see Giddens (1998:32-3; 144-7).
 ^Cf. Rapport on the methodology of listing and zigzagging (1994:30-6).
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uniquely given over to a metaphorical search for truths; or, as Rapport puts it, ‘the 
routine need for Anthropology to be non-routine: through comparison and 
critique, to step outside its own symbolic constructions so as to contextualise and 
evaluate its relations with other disciplines’ (1994:253); precisely, that is, the 
notion of truth-as-movement radier than movement as truth. In following this 
lead, I hope for this metaphoric movement to shed its own light on British social 
worlds; more will be said on this topic below. But each chapter may also be read 
paradigmatically, as discussions in their own right on problems found within their 
respective fields, rather than just as discussions of the anti-paradigmatic problems 
of a field like ‘literary anthropology’. In other words, I also hope for them to stand 
alone.
Having discussed here in some detail the particular philosophical and 
theoretic programme behind the treatment of the ethnography, I now wish to 
develop in more detail the particular disciplinary focus that guides this thesis, an 
anthropology ‘at home’ in Britain, detailing why mine is an approach to the 
‘writing’ of British social realities.
Anthropologies of Britain: positivism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology 
and visual anthropology
When it comes to an anthropology of Britain, there is little here which ought to be 
taken for granted by its domestic practitioners, despite frequent accusations to the 
contrary: that what is there in Britain must already be known; that it is incapable 
of harbouring ways of life that are ‘other’, ways of life that are not merely 
straightforward, unlike the opaque cultures of ‘real’ foreign others; and that.
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subsequently, there cannot be any knowledge produced about Britain that goes 
beyond the banal. I would argue to the contraiy. Yet, if an anthropology at home 
in Britain could only ever reproduce a taken-for-granted mindset, as these critics 
would have it, then the first stumbling block would be found in trying to highlight 
what is denoted by the heading ‘Britain’. It is necessary to be mindful of how we 
now tend to talk of Britain as though it were an essential entity, arriving into 
language already fully formed and ‘out there’. Rather than seeing it as an essential 
fixity, ‘Britain’ is the product of a complex history resulting from millennia of 
internal and external dynamics (Robbins 1998). Despite the relatively recent 
provenance of its apparent fixity and archaicism, ‘Britain’ can trace an unsteady 
and processual course back to the colonisation of its islands by the Angles, 
Frisians, Jutes and Saxons in what was to become ‘England’, the Celts in 
Cornwall and Wales, while the nascent nation of ‘Scotland’ was held by the Piets, 
Scots and Vikings. The Roman project in ‘Britain’, beginning with the invasion in 
AD 43 imder Claudius and effectively terminated under Magnus Maximus, left its 
pei*vasive cultural influence on a nation that was also to witness invasion from 
Nonnandy in the 11 '^ century. Britain may also be defined by the dynamics of its 
external relations, such as with the Irish and Jews, in particular with the Asian and 
African states that it colonised and indentured; indeed, it was said of Britain 
during this colonial period that it was more an Asiatic than a European nation. 
Despite this, an anthropology at home is still expected to be beset by problems of 
givenness.
There is also a sense in which an anthropology at home in Britain rubs 
uncomfortably against the grain of traditional social or cultural anthropology as its 
conventional and ideal object, the foreign ‘exotic’ other, continues to wield power
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in the discipline^. What for a British sociologist like Charlesworth is a travesty, 
that so often ‘things that are closest in being are furthest away in analysis’ 
(2000b:72), is for anthropology part of its institutional history. Put in this way by 
Charlesworth, an anthropology at home practiced by those like myself who grew 
up in Britain and in the same areas that they later revisit anthropologically, ought 
to have a valuable corrective or revisionist function by placing under 
anthropological scrutiny realities that are too often ignored by the discipline 
insofar as the people who practise the discipline are themselves not explicitly 
cognisant of tliem. It is perhaps that the investigator is too close ontologically to 
the object of scrutiny not to take too much for granted and thereby not to gain an 
effective understanding of the milieu. This transparency of ‘home’ to the 
investigator has tended to follow the general pattern in anthropology of ignoring 
‘home’ in favour of an explicit focus on markedly ‘other’ peoples and places.
The anthropological gaze is thus conventionally fixed on the distant. But 
here there are also problems. What is ‘distant’ and what is ‘near’ is no longer a 
matter of absolute fixity, and the same can be said of that other valuable marker of 
anthropology’s disciplinary identity, to which the two notions above are tied, the 
‘other’. The task of the ethnographer-at-home is to defaniiliarise themselves with 
the field site, less they fail in their objectivity, perhaps by investigating a group 
‘other’ than those with which they have personal experience or whose practices 
require some decoding, for example amateur historians, or rock bands (Finnegan 
1989), wliite magicians (Luhrmann 1989), or new-agers (Prince and Riches 2000). 
Defamiliarisation, or abnormalising the circumstances of ethnographic 
investigation, may be achieved through the epistemic displacement of using new
 ^See Caputo (2000) for discussion of this and some of the practical difficulties of doing 
anthropology at home.
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technologies to record ethnographie experiences, such as the video camera used 
by the visual anthropologist. Indeed, it is from the nascent field of visual 
anthropology, especially where it has been practiced by those looking to test out 
their skills on field sites close to the academy in British cities such as Manchester, 
that much useful discourse on the anthropology in Britain is now issuing. For 
example, visual anthropologists from Manchester University working on The 
Child in the City project in the 1990s have sought new ways of defamiliarising 
themselves with a milieu that is recognisably ‘home’ through the reflexive 
medium of the video camera (Harris and Grimshaw 2000). The emphasis here, 
driven by phenomenologically-inspired ideas, is to achieve a break with an 
ordinaiy (adult) mind-set; it is aimed toward re-skilling, methodological re­
membering, re-enacting forgotten routines, re-capturing lost habituses, entering 
into the lived worlds of others through close scrutiny of your own comportment as 
the camera-wielding pai ticipant in others’ lives. A captivating example of this is 
offered in the Child in the City volume by Amanda Ravetz (2000) who 
demonstrates the flexibility of the visual anthropological method in recording and 
analysing the lives of groups in British society who are consistently ‘othered’, in 
her case single working class mothers on a council estate, ‘Barclough’, in the 
north of England, seeing the streets of their estate through their eyes. But tliis 
could only achieve its effects -  the investigation of ‘other’ ways of knowing in the 
city -  if tlie diversity of British lifeways can first of all be admitted.
Furthermore, there has been a sea-change of late in the nature of 
etlinographic placement. Fieldwork in general now need not be a physical 
displacement but a mindset that abnormalises and ironically remoulds a given 
taken-for-granted reality (Rapport: ‘[the study of culture] is not an esoteric pursuit
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so much as an exercise in concentration and wiU’^^  (2002:7); and ‘[w]hat 
characterizes the professional anthropologist, in short, is not something counter­
intuitive so much as super-intuitive’ (Rapport 2002:8)). Here is anotlier academic 
discourse on the ethnography of Britain but one tliat borrows not from the 
theoretic contributions of phenomenology, as do the ideas of visual 
anthropologists working on ways of knowing in Britain, but from assumptions 
within the field of ethnomethodology. This is the idea that ethnography is not so 
much a break with, as a continuation of, an everyday mindset, as Rapport avers 
above. And insofar as the ethnomethodology of everyday sense-making of 
humans is regarded as a universal, anthiopology is a science that can be practised 
with equal validity in any location. That this is sometimes not deemed the case, 
that anthropology’s ‘proper’ domain of investigation is the geographically distant 
other and its ‘proper’ time is that of extensive fieldwork, then can be traced to the 
naturalisation of certain norms which in reality are artefacts of anthropology’s 
own particular historical trajectory, not the confirmation of some absolute reality.
As some anthropologists have begun to argue, there is no better place for 
applying the recent shift toward liberal humanistic antliropology of the kind 
outlined above than in Britain, a milieu that is still approached through a set of 
concepts that stress its monolithic nature. Anthropologists, then, have also begun 
to realise that there are normative as well as factual reasons behind wr iting against 
homogeneity, essentialism and absolutism. Insofar as these are applied to Britain 
in the form of entrenched myths such as those above, of unifonnity, taken-for- 
grantedness, and banality, then there seems an opportunity in the practice of 
ethnography to ‘write against’ not only these myths as they apply to Britain but, at
Indeed, this is how I always sought to define to myself the experience of doing field-work 
within the milieu in which I grew up.
35
a more general level, the concept of ‘Culture’ per se (Abu-Lughod 1990). By 
holding these myths about Britain as an object of ethnographic investigation, the 
anthropologist is blinded to a more general truth. The value of recent insights into 
an anthropology at home, as anthropologists have pointed out (e.g. Cohen, 
Rapport), has been to make ‘diversity’ a keynote of an anthropology of Britain 
and of the wider anthropological project.
Even before Cohen’s pioneering efforts at envisioning the hermeneutic 
study of Britain at the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, social scientific 
studies were already being carried out into British institutions and milieux that 
may be described as ethnographic and anthropological (e.g. Banton (1955), 
Cunnison (1966), Bott (1964), Okely (1987), Frankenburg (1957), Williams 
(1963), Littlejohn (1963)). Studies conducted by researchers with training in the 
social sciences have been directed for some time now at filling in the empirical 
gaps on aspects of the social and cultural life of Britain, that is, they have been 
engaged in a collective project which may be defined under the unifying rubric of 
‘the ethnography of Britain’. The part played by trained anthropologists, and those 
fi“om related disciplines which have borrowed the ethnographic method of the 
anthropologist as a refinement to their own disciplinary methodologies, in this 
project is significant. A good example of this contribution to an ethnography of 
Britain comes from Raymond Firth et al. (1970), whose study in question happens 
to have been conducted in North London among middle-class families. He sees 
the value in an ethnography of Britain as an empirical and scientific one (in other 
words, positivist, in contrast to later hermeneutic efforts) with kinsliip 
contributing to this knowledge of the whole:
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‘The results of the study [of kinship] are a contribution to the 
ethnography of Britain -  to understanding in a more scientific, systematic 
way, the customs and institutions of ordinary people in a sector of 
metropolitan society. There have been still many gaps in this 
ethnography -  we know much about families, sometliing about friendship 
and neighbourhood relations, a very great deal about economic, legal and 
political institutions; there is also much material of uneven quality about 
religion. Studies of kinship such as these help to fill a gap in our 
knowledge which is wider than we often realize’ (1970:27).
Through the gathering of empirical data on certain aspects of British 
socio-cultural life. Firth hoped to see a ‘comparative theory of social systems’, 
envisioning the cultivation of links between schools of metropolitan research, 
such as that between London and Chicago. The aim was to produce and promote 
wider generalising structures from particular ‘ethnographies at home’. This 
represents a third kind of effort at an anthropology of Britain, one that was 
historically earlier than tlie phenomenological, hermeneutic or visual 
anthropological versions. While phenomenologists would be seeking in an 
ethnography at home a corrective to the lacunae inherent in adopting the loaded 
concepts of the scholar, where ‘home’ means the tacit yet divided fabric of British 
society that is ordinarily too close to show up in our analyses (Charlesworth), the 
hermeneut would stiive for an ethnography at home to engender a greater 
sensitivity toward diversity-cum-individuality, while the positivist sociologist or 
anthropologist would promote an ethnography at home for its comparative 
significance, viewing the exclusion of Britain from such a study as the neglect of
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proper scientific duty. Here is the ethnography of Britain not so much omnifonn 
as plural. Interestingly, the premise that ‘all that can be known about Britain is 
already known’ is not even one that positivist sociology {a la Firtli) finds itself 
subscribing to.
Ideas and methods: ethnography in Britain as an occasion for reflecting on 
the ‘writing’ of social realities
As for the nature of this thesis, it is a thesis of ideas: it is not primarily about a 
particular people, or cultuie and geographical area -  indeed, if  anything, it is 
about individuals, their consciousnesses and their bodies, and how each relates to 
a social environment. The particular geographical or cultuial area in which 
anthropological fieldwork is carried out is of less importance to me, for the 
reasons which I give here. Indeed, despite voices to the contrary, there is now a 
strong case for eschewing both physical placement and displacement as an 
absolutely necessary condition of anthropological fieldwork. That is, I do not 
think that specific knowledge is to be gained from the ethnographer necessarily 
immersing him- or herself in a world which is either culturally foreign to them - 
where language and social practices are of overt foreignness - or known. Rather 
for me, antliropology has always been a sensibility, a mind-set even, that may be 
brought to bear on any kind of social environment, irrespective of the 
investigator’s prior contact with it. It seems to me that for a proper ethnographic 
experience the only necessary requirement is that a mental and emotional journey 
has been had, not a physical one necessarily, and this journey does not need to end 
when the fieldworker leaves ‘the field site’ after a year-or-so of investigation, but
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can continue long after the fieldwork period (as it is conventionally understood) 
has ended through, for example, encounters with discourses, genres, texts, 
individuals, as these may be put to novel personal use. This is what I have 
attempted to do in my thesis and this is largely what I mean by a thesis of ideas. In 
a sense, every period of fieldwork, every piece of ethnography, is a personal 
journey, just as it was originally for Malinowski. But, if there is one overall idea 
linking the various chapters of tlie thesis together it is the idea of the ‘writing’ of 
urban social reality. It focuses on the logic involved in individuals’ constructing 
their experience of their lives in the social situations of the city, in my case 
London, and here I would reference Nigel Rapport’s definition of writing merely 
as:
‘the orderly use of symbolic forms (that is, forms which carry meaning 
for their user) for the making of orderly worlds; writing conceived of not 
as a technique of commimication but as ‘a mode of cognition which 
makes experience meaningful”  (2000:406).
For it is here that my concerns over text-making (particularly narrative) and 
anthropology ‘at home’ in Britain meet: that an anthropology of Britain has 
proved itself less concerned with the specific kinds of fonns found (or indeed not 
found) within Britain, than with the cultural construction, the writing, of 
individual orderly worlds from tliem. That, as Rapport writes:
‘Fonnal behaviours may statistically vary; there may be more ‘bed-and- 
breakfast’, rugby football, and discrimination on the basis of accent and
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skin colour in Britain, and, contrastively, there may be more female 
purdah, communitarian touting of the common good, and worship of 
supernatural artefacts, ancestors and spaces elsewhere -  in sociocultural 
milieux in Africa, the Middle East, Asia or wherever. These, however, 
are surface phenomena... and do not go to the heart of what the science of 
anthropology endeavours to elucidate’ (2002:8).
And so it seems that the emergence of an anthropology at home in Britain, of 
anthropological research in British milieux coming into its own, is also an 
opportunity to explore the saliency of writing social reality.
‘Writing’ as a textualising practice at the very least implies a moment of 
awareness, a ‘considered ordering of experience’ and the ‘conscious production of 
meaning’ (Rapport 1994:19)^^ It is that moment of standing back from 
experience, interpreting ourselves inteipreting: a meta-experience. This is why the 
concept has become associated in recent liberal anthropology with an ‘ironic’ 
attitude toward social life, a literary trope that (along with metaphor) has received 
much anthropological attention of late (Austin-Smith 1990; Fernandez and 
Taylor-Huber; Amit and Rapport 2002:97-102; Torres 1997), for in irony are to 
be found those ‘in order to’ motives that are essential for a humanistic 
appreciation of the individual subject. Such an attitude or practice has not only 
been identified as endemic in human socio-cultural milieux: in particular, it may 
come from a sudden rupture in the taken-for-granted routines of the world, a 
sudden disturbing of a habitus. As recent ethnographic studies carried out in
Cf. Augé (1994:100); ‘Anthropology has traditionally linked the question of otherness (or 
identity) to that of space, precisely because tlie symbolizing process carried out by social groups 
itself signifies that they set out to understand and master space so as to understand and organize 
themselves’.
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critical situations have shown, profound political change is capable of throwing 
the artificial and constructed nature of entities such as 'nation-state', ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘culture’, even ‘society’, in sharp relief, such that people are now forced to 
actively work at a social order in their lives in place of one that has been shown to 
be illusory; these actors are forced to write social reality anew. As Greenhouse 
wiites:
‘[during critical situations] people cope with uncertainty by reaching out 
for some sort of theory of social order or process and then attempting to 
live tliat theory. In turn [the ethnographer considers] how we might 
continue to do ethnography now that we know how our terms of art -  
such as “culture”, “ethnicily” and “society” -  double, in other 
circumstances, as the lexicon of fatal triage’ (2002:10).
It is this logic of imparting sense to experience, under the different circumstances 
of twentieth century urban Britain, that I wish to examine here; the conscious 
making, and re-making, of British urban worlds. It is thus an investigation of the 
symbolic ordering, and re-ordering, of experience in a modem urban context, 
across different genres of writing - in other terms, a personal metaphoric exercise 
and one aimed at edificatory apprehension ratlier than systematic explanation, as I 
outlined above. Its aim is the bringing together of separate, even some would say 
antithetical, genres and disciplines and their various recordings, each of which 
tells me something about British social reality, and enabling them to converse in 
my mind; it is an attempt to explore what can be known about British worlds 
through their conversation.
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I do not wish to grant a different status to the written materials in the 
thesis, the writings of the sociologist and the poet, from the seemingly unwritten. 
The written accounts are themselves, in a sense, part of the ethnographic field to 
be examined, their word is as ‘real’ to me as any informant’s utterance. I do not 
see these written recordings as possessing less reality for their being written down 
rather than immediately encountered; indeed, it is the encounter in their written 
form, and their subjective unification by me, that is of most importance.
A metaphor for postmodern versions of culture: the amateur
I have chosen ‘the amateur’ as a key leitmotif of this study. At first glance, the 
amateur is an esoteric and marginal figure, someone who confuses the work- 
leisure scheme of industrial society through the compulsive application of a work­
like routine to their leisure pursuits (Stebbins 1979). While ascribed a privileged 
status in the ideological imagination of the nation to which it most 
characteristically belongs, (Great) Britain^^, this privilege, nevertheless, has not 
successfully translated into an equivalent importance accorded to the amateur, and 
to leisure in general, in the reproduction of Western industrial and post-industrial 
lives (Finnegan 1989). Rather, greater emphasis has conventionally been given by 
social theorists of Western industrial societies to economic and political 
institutions -  in short, the public world of work as opposed to tlie domestic world 
of leisure. This thesis, however, is concerned with elucidating the general 
implications, for anthropology as a whole, of a particular and insignificant 
category such as the amateur. Specifically, through the mediatoiy figure of the
Samuel (1989;xxxviii-xxxix).
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amateur, it can be seen how academics and locals, the anthropologist and the 
anthropologised, are abandoning their conventional occupation of mutually 
exclusive positions both epistemically and, to some extent, politically. One way of 
putting this is that the importance of the amateur in anthropology increases in 
direct proportion to the decline of professional metanarratives in the discipline, 
post-Writing culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986), 
whereby there has been considerable effort to de-mystify the relations between the 
production of anthropological knowledge, the textual forms in which it is 
rendered, and the political relations in which both are involved -  in other words, 
concerns which belong to what is now recognised as the ‘postmodern’ moment of 
the discipline (see Chapter 3 on the amateur in anthropology; also Chapter 5 on 
the informant-as-sociologist).
My first sortie against the scheme of hierarchical dual opposition 
between the local actor and the academic professional comes from the side of the 
local. It takes as its casualty tlie putative epistemological privilege of professional 
understandings of the world compared to those of the locals. It makes of the local 
actor themselves an ^amateur anthropologist’, someone who is increasingly seen 
as adept at the symbolic constmction of their own social realities. As Auge puts 
into perspective the epistemic privilege that surrounds academic antliropological 
knowledge:
‘[the places that anthropologists examine are the] symbolized centre of 
tlie imiverses of recognition...from which all knowledge proceeds -  
universes that are therefore not in themselves, by themselves, objects of 
knowledge. Those who inhabit them, however, know them in detail
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(ethnographers have long remarked upon the excellent knowledge local 
specialists have of their natural milieu, or rather than painstaking 
attention and keen sense of observation that are reflected in the 
taxonomies they used and transmitted)’ (1998:103).
If anthropological knowledge is not counter-intuitive to everyday sense- 
making but is a super-intuitive version of it, then previous hierarchical divisions 
between the anthropologist and the anthropologised are more fragile than once 
expected. A measure of specialism must too be recognised among ‘die folk’ who 
are themselves amateur anthropologists of their own worlds.
This is not necessarily to allow in a problematic postmodern relativism 
which, in my view, could only bring fiirther incredulity to the contemporary 
professional scholar whose tenure within the academic insitution is continually 
exposed to external and internal audit; formally by govermnent bodies and 
quangos, and infonnally by the public. But neither is this to accept an absolute 
distinction between two kinds of knowledge, local and scientific, which belong in 
an order of hierarchical opposition. Rather, anthropology is best served by finding 
a middle way between the two poles. One suggestion could be that the categories 
of scientific knowledge (ideally, though not always in practice) are always open to 
re-evaluation as to their usefulness in accurately describing or explaining an 
empirical reality. While this is not, generally speaking, a feature of the ‘popular 
mind-sef, it is, in a sense, a unique feature of the scholarly culture. I am thinking, 
for example, of the inflexibility of popular categories of understanding the world 
such as stereotypes, which academics generally tend to look on with incredulity. 
That the world is not just constructed through stereotypical categories is a positive
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contribution of scholasticism. Furthermore, only scholars, in general, can enjoy 
that cultic time and space that enables them to develop more refined categories 
and to gain a holistic perspective that is beyond that of the ordinary, while 
ordinary actors are often too immersed in the business of everyday life to extend 
their practical and conceptual generalisations into wider structures, if this is a 
desire at all of the ordinary actor. Thus, postmodern relativism does not entirely 
obviate the possibility of seeing the ‘scholarly mind-sef as in some senses unique 
(and valuable).
The reason for choosing the amateur as a leitmotif of the different worlds 
depicted throughout the study originated from my dissatisfaction with aspects of 
the professional paradigm in anthropology^^, with that mode of thinking that has 
come to be critiqued in the wake of feminist theorising that orders reality by way 
of a hierarchical scheme of dual oppositions (by which ‘the amateur’ is regarded 
as inferior to ‘the professional’), and the failure to think through attempts to recast 
the amateur and amateurism as a romantic resort against the entrenched 
conventions of enlightenment reasoning (while tacitly reproducing the fixity that 
ought to be antitlietical to an amateurish ethos). I show that, contrary to the initial 
impressions of triviality and obscurity which images of the amateur tend to 
promote in the western world -  ‘the amateur’ can be shown to produce revealing 
and even paradigmatic insights into the everyday social reality of modern 
complex societies. It seemed to me surprising that a moment in the discipline that 
privileged movement over stasis, fluid over essential identities, and, conversely, 
mobile individuals over cumbersome ‘Cultures’, would find so little to say about a 
figure whose distinctive characteristic is that it has made these kinds of traits its
Cf. Grimshaw and Hart (1996); for an extended discussion of their work, see Chapter 3.
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second nature, that may be effortlessly at home in a world that remains 
untrammelled by the absolute strictures of conventionality and eschews the 
cognitive straight-jacket of governing paradigms '^^. Not to take up movement in 
this world is to be seen to give way to specialisation and professionalisation, and 
it is against this that the amateur, ‘the free-ranging generalisf, finds himself 
tuming^^. There is also a timeliness to studying and evoking the amateur in 
anthropology given the cuiTent incredulity, among both the informed public and 
anthropologists themselves, toward the nairatives of the professional in 
anthropology, indeed an incredulity toward metanairatives in culture per se. I 
refer here to the scrutiny of the moral and political questionableness of practising 
anthropology in its professional guise as instigated by the ethnography of 
Malinowski (see Hart and Grimshaw (1996)). But writing of what the amateur 
could be made to represent in this way is, of course, to reify the amateur and to tie 
it down to an ideal type. Things are never like that in the real social world but 
nevertlieless the amateur, I feel, remains a figure that is good to think with during 
the current moment in the discipline oriented to the edifying apprehension of 
complex socio-cultural milieux.
Outline of the chapters
In Chapter 2, following, I set about detailing the urban space (Romford, Essex) 
that my local acquaintances, in particular ‘Lucy Jones’ and ‘Les Moore’ (both
See Tester (1994), on the flaneur, and Harris (2000), on the trickster, for commensurate projects; 
and, of coui se, there has been mileage made in anthropology fi om the bricoleur (Le\d-Sti*auss 
1966); in addition, Nietzsche’s description of subjects as ‘wandering encyclopaedias’ also bears 
resemblance to the above.
Wilcken (1994).
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amateur local historians), re-made in the course of their ‘writings’, highlighting 
various local themes of socio-economic significance.
Chapter 3 considers some of the recent literature in anthropology which 
adds to the current modishness of the amateur as a potential resort against the 
constraints placed on individual creativity by bureaucratic controls in scholarly 
institutions and the pressure toward disciplinary specialisation. Going beyond the 
academic world, I also wish to consider what shape an anthropology or sociology 
of the amateur might take, and its possible relatedness to the theme of the city.
Chapters 4 and 5 introduce my key acquaintances, Lucy and Les, as they 
storied their lives in conversation with me. In Chapter 4 ,1 examine the personal 
artistry in their speech, a poeticism that sets about transforming a fund of verbal 
forms (narrative pathways) into a personal collage. In Lucy’s story, awareness of 
a language of place and self is evidenced; and in Les’s story, it is his individual 
agency that is highlighted through his speech. Chapter 5 focuses on informant-as- 
sociologist: the deployment by locals such as Lucy and Les of plot-lines, models 
and categories to make sociological sense of the developments that are going on 
in the social milieux around them. ‘The 1960s’ have just such an epistemological 
usefulness; as an identifiable ‘moment of being’ it enables locals to locate 
precisely the beginning point of current circumstances in the town and in British 
society as a whole.
The material focused on in Chapter 6, Michael Young and Peter 
Willmott’s classic sociological text Family and Kinship in East London (1957), is 
a story set in the same region of England as Romford, and it speaks of similar 
themes to those which I found in the stories of my local acquaintances. In Young
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and Willmott’s work too there is individual poetry in their writing of social reality 
-  the movement of sizeable populations from the urban village of the inner city to 
the peripheral housing estate. While this move is a real one, here is also set up an 
allegorical journey, indicated as such by the self-conscious conception of the work 
by its authors as a literary project aimed at an audience of non-specialists.
Turning then to another writer of English social reality, John Betjeman, 
in Chapter 7, there is evidenced a similar personal inventiveness. The 
inventiveness of his word came to be seen as an anomaly by the literary critic, 
though he was someone who, with possible camivalesque playfulness, spoke 
vernacular meanings through the constrained tones of a poetic register. Further, he 
built (wrote) orderly worlds of peri-urban Englishness out of the fragments of 
material around him -  places, people, voices, all of which stiuck Betjeman as 
characteristically English. Finally, he was a writer who was waiy of these 
fragments coalescing into a coherent or singular whole. If this were to happen, 
then it would surely be a victory for the planner, the bureaucrat and the expert for 
whom English urban and suburban realities were open to standardisation, 
measurement and generalisation.
The discussion and summaries in the Conclusion, Chapter 8, turn to the 
topic of the performativity of language and the imagination in the city, picking up 
once again on the debate with which this Introduction began. What I wish to argue 
is that ‘writing’ is more endemic in society than is often assumed, that numerous 
varieties and ontologies of this privileged practice exist.
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CHAPTER 2
Romford (Essex), its history and ethnography: ‘the town that has the lot’
Romford, the ‘wide ford’ where the Colchester-London road crosses the river 
Beam, owes its early existence to the settlement patterns of a group of Saxons, the 
‘Haveringas’, from which the royal estate surrounding the then village derives it 
name.^ Prior to the establishment of the Saxon settlement, the area of present day 
Havering shows archaeological evidence of Roman settlement and it is thought 
that the Roman town of Durolitum occupied the site of present day Romford. 
However, the details of the early history of Romford, and Havering, are sketchy. 
By the early 1 1 century. Havering was already part of the Anglo Saxon royal 
estate, with connections to Earl Harold of Wessex, an auspicious status from 
which the tenant population of the royal manor were later to benefit under the 
accumulating rights of the ancient demesne; though it seems the benefits of royal 
patronage were not always to be reciprocated by the local population when they 
felt their autonomy to be under threat. The manor boimdaries were extremely 
irregular, consisting of 251 square miles, from I mile wide at its southern-most 
point where it touched the river Thames, stretching northward for 8 miles and 
extending for 5 miles east to west in the north. As noted above, the main Essex 
road cut through the manor with Romford situated at the point where the road 
intersected with the Beam. Romford was thus situated in relatively close travelling 
distance to the capital, London (only 14 miles to the east), and this enabled
 ^I owe much of the liistorical information here to Marjorie K. Mclntosli’s study of Havering from 
the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Community and Autonomy (1986). It is a history that 
presents late medieval social and moral life as it is revealed through the social structure that arose 
in Havering around the political and legal organisation of a manor that was exceptional for its 
autonomy.
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patron-client relationships to be set up centred on the local agricultural, trade and 
craft economy. A commercialised local economy soon flourished under these 
conditions during the medieval period, encouraged by a climate of bureaucratic 
neglect. It is said that the tenant population of Havering was, for these reasons, 
distinctive among the medieval English peasantry according to the usual historical 
emphasis. Their privileged position meant that they were modem in terms of their 
cultural outlook toward tlie economy, as McIntosh writes;
‘The pragmatic response of Havering employers and workers to the post­
plague demand for labour and the active participation of women in the 
economy focus attention on adaptability. The conspicuous individualism 
and enterprising approach of Havering people, clearly tied to their 
economic freedom, highlight the absence of ‘peasant’ characteristics 
within this manor’ (1986:4).^
Economic individualism was flourishing and resistance to outside 
influence in economic affairs was entrenched. The types of goods and services 
exchanged locally, for which Romford was to become well known, depended on 
the natural resources of the area. Geological studies show that the north of the 
manor lay on London clay, particularly suited to woodland and grasslands, while 
the southern part of the manor (including Romford) consisted of glacial gravel 
which was low in fertility and thus unsuitable for arable farming. This seems to 
have set a pattern of production of wood and animals which were the main goods 
supplied to tlie London market. Among smallholders, the service economy
As in England as a whole (Macfarlane 1978).
50
provided opportunities in a diversity of trades and crafts including brewers, ale 
sellers, bakers, butchers, fishmongers, cobblers, and especially tanners and 
tawyers, among whom there were complex systems of credit in place, and 
economic activity from these occupations could also be supplemented with wage 
labour on the larger farm estates to meet the modest amounts of capital 
households required for economic survival. It is little surprise, then, that this is 
referred to by McIntosh as Havering’s period of community and autonomy.
If the accounts of conspicuous individualism are to be accepted, perhaps 
it is the case that there never was such a thing as a ‘moral community’ in the 
Durkheimian sense among Havering’s populace. It did not possess the kind of 
social structure that could foster community in this sense, rather contractual 
relations arrived earlier than Durklieimian/Marxian accounts would usually allow, 
as McIntosh seems to indicate:
‘By the mid-fourteenth century the manor’s residents appear to have been 
making rational decisions with the aim of improving their economic 
condition. They sought profit and advancement rather than the 
satisfaction of minimal or short-term needs...Havering people treated 
their property in an essentially instrumental fashion, as they did their 
employees. They were willing to gamble and take risks, and they were 
prepared to accept tlie tensions within their community which arose from 
fundamentally self-interested behaviour. There is no sign of what has 
been described as a ‘moral economy’ within a Southeast Asian village 
setting, in which the values of the community are directed toward 
assuring the survival of all of its members. Nor did Havering’s leading
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families contribute to the ceremonial life of the area in a fashion which 
would have reinforced community solidarity at the expense of their own 
personal wealth...individualism in Havering did not preclude political 
and legal cooperation. On the contrary, the sense of institutional 
community within Havering was exceptionally strong...An assumption 
that individualism and collectivism are diametrically opposed is 
obviously incorrect’ (1986:177).
Not only in economic matters, but also in law (the setting up of the 
Manor Court), the local townsfolk can be seen coming together, and forming 
organisations, in the pursuit of what was in their interests, not out of obligation to 
fulfil the demands laid down by an elementaiy solidarity (McIntosh 1986:4-5). 
Havering also maintained its legal and administrative autonomy to deal with the 
conflicts arising from flourishing economic activity and provide moral regulation. 
The manor court ran local legal and administrative affairs, consisting purely of 
local dignitaries, and its jurisdictional effectiveness was later improved when the 
manor was upgraded to a Liberty in 1465, the name of which still remains present 
in local toponyms, with the Liberty finally coming to an end as late as 1892. The 
manor court became the instrument through which the poor were made 
accountable to the morality of the leading establishment families. Many of these 
moral improvements appear to be directed at poor incomers, though Romford 
always seems to have had at least a section of the population that was fluid: as an 
indication of some of the diverse origins of Romford inhabitants, by the later 14^  ^
century, land was held in the manor by merchants and tradesmen from London 
and careerists from the Midlands, royal officials, London citizens and lawyers
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wishing to own estates close to London; Romford was also home to immigrants 
from Holland, Flanders and Germany who arrived in the town during a period 
stretching from the 1380s to the 1450s. In addition to this influx of population, 
there was the migration of rural workers from outlying areas to towns between 
1730 and 1900 with the collapse of the rural economy.^ The area saw two LCC 
(London County Council) initiatives in the twentieth centuiy: the building of the 
Beacontree Estate near Dagenham in the 1920s and 1930s, housing workers at the 
Ford production estate, and, in the 1950s, the Harold Hill estate on the outskirts of 
Romford, meeting the housing needs of populations from inner London during its 
post-war redevelopment. Nearby Basildon, in Essex, was designated a 
development area under the New Towns Act of 1946.
In sum, the community of Havering, with Romford developing as a 
distinctive urban centre, was governed by a social structure consisting of a small 
number of leading families who saw their function as maintaining the public 
morality of a changing society and preserving the status of Havering as a 
protected and self-regulating ‘institutional community’.
And this is in many ways the central point made in the local narratives to 
follow in this thesis: arguably, many of these historical circumstances (lack of 
mechanical solidarity and conspicuous individualism) continue to have a powerful 
shaping effect on the communal life and economic ethos of contemporary 
Romford. It is a legacy that is not lost on contemporary locals, especially the older 
generations who have strong recollections of what in local rhetoric is dubbed an 
‘older Romford’, prior to the town planning of the 1960s, when they reflect on 
how life in an institutional community was nevertheless made liveable by the
 ^Finding employment in the major local industries, such as the Brewery, Romford Gas and Coke 
Company Ltd., and the South Essex Water Works Company.
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strength of elementary social relations. However, as will become clear, they have 
also noticed the occurrence of a sea-change during their lives which has meant 
that even the elementary social relations that substituted for a Gemeinschaft 
community now seems to have dissolved, as relatives die and friends pass on, 
leaving many people feeling lonely and isolated. What is more, as so often 
characterises the discourse of nostalgia, these feelings of loneliness and isolation 
take on more tlian their individual experiential dimension, and are seen by the 
same actors as diffuse or generic; they are characteristics somewhat symptomatic 
of ‘these times’ and ‘society as a whole’ (see Chapter 5). History is no longer 
there to identify with symbolically, as anthropologist Marc Auge would put it\  
only in the odd toponym for a shopping centre (the Liberty Centre^ The Brewery 
shopping complex) used by a population too young to remember the objective 
correlates behind the name; these days, people are noticing, there is no need for 
history when the outside now brings trade to you (an unusual but perhaps 
inevitable change in direction of economic relations given Romford’s commercial 
past).
Romford is rich in significant history, but not that you would know this 
from visiting its traditional core, the town centre. According to a recent 
classification of heritage areas, Romford’s heritage is fragmented in a way 
common to areas in what is known, by the local heritage officer, as London’s
 ^Auge (1994:109-10; my italics): ‘Place, then, is triply symbolic (in the sense that the symbol 
establishes a relation of complementarity between two beings or realities): it symbolizes the 
relation that each of its inhabitants has to liim- or herself, to the other occupants, and to their 
common history. A space where neither identity, relation, or history are symbolized is a non­
place’. Importantly, Auge does go on to qualify: ‘but once again, we must be careful to note 
whether the definition is being applied to a precise empirical space or to the representation that 
those within that space have of it. What is a place for some may be a non-place for others, and vice 
versa’. For a useful summation of Augé’s ideas on place, space and supermodemity see his A 
Sense for the Other: The Timeliness and Relevance o f Anthropology (1994), pp. 103-9.
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‘heritage fringe’ .^ Much to the chagrin of local heritage officials, the area in and 
around Romford has been under-appreciated and under-utilised of late due to its 
apparent lack of conspicuous historical interest, despite much inconspicuous 
evidence to the contrary. Such is the nature of the heritage fringe which loses out 
in terms of funding and visitor interest to the heritage core, for example, areas 
such as Covent Garden in central London.
Even today, Romford is continuing to develop as a regional centre of 
commerce, and successive local authorities and the business community have 
ensured that it remains on the cutting edge of the retailing sectors, going out of its 
way to provide for the satisfaction of the consumer who it subsequently defines 
through its discourse (see Conclusion). This has meant the construction of the 
thiee major shopping centres. Liberty {One) in the 1960s, Liberty Two in the 
1980s and The Brewery development in 2000. A high proportion of the retailers 
within these shopping spaces operate nationally. According to figures provided by 
the town centre manager for September 1994, Romford is the 53"^  largest centre 
nationally in terms of the presence of national non-food multiple retailers (the 
fourth largest London suburban centre for the same categoiy after Croydon, 
Kingston and Bromley), including the stock examples of BHS {British Home 
Stores), Boots, Debenhams, J  Sains bury. Living, Marks and Spencer, W H Smith 
and Woolworths, while CdA closed down their flagship building in the centre of 
town while I was carrying out fieldwork. The market does a good business on its 
market days (Wednesday, Friday and Saturday), and, in addition to the retailing 
space indicated above, there are over 100 retail units in Romford Shopping 
Arcade in a central location off the market plain. In all, this amounts to 1.5 million
Cf. Smith 1997.
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‘Barking’ to the west of Havering.
square feet of shopping floorspace in the town centre as a whole, with the former 
Romford Brewery site itself comprising 23 acres^. However, the potential for 
retail space development has not yet been exhausted, as the report boasts:
‘The North Side of the Market Place, a site on North Street and land on 
Western Road were identified as retail development sites in the first 
Unitary Development Plan. These total some 12 aces. A 2 acre site where 
the old post office was situated is also vacant on Angel Way. A number 
of other peripheral sites also have development potential’.
The impression this gives of relative prosperity and modernisation is further 
buttressed by the census statistics for the London Borough of Havering for 1991. 
Even when compared to its most proximate neighbour in Outer London, the 
Borough of Barking and Dagenham, with which it would be expected to have 
much in common, Havering still has a unique profile for a part of London, the east 
end, that has a reputation for multiple forms of deprivation (figs. 2.1 and 2.2). The 
profile for Havering, rather, is perhaps typically reflective of a more affluent 
suburban dormitory. In terms of the type of dwellings in Havering, only 0.1% is 
shared, and the majority of the housing stock consists of semi-detached property 
(39.5%) and terraced housing (32%), with detached houses comprising 10.5% of
 ^According to recent figures, the biggest employers in Romford Town Centre are the comparison 
retail sector (that is, non-convenience retailers), with 3512 employees, and the office sector, 
employing 3665 workers. 504 people were employed in civic and public administration in the 
town centre. There were 422 jobs in convenience retail and 236 in seiwices retail. Restaurants and 
licenses premises account for 932 jobs in the town centre and the arts, culture and entertainment 
sector comprise 110 workers. In terms of floorspace, the same figures give the highest 
concentration in (off the street) retail at 147,627 sq. meters, offices (63,357 sq. meters) and the 
category A1 space, or shops (128,293 sq. meters). The otlier categories of space have less 
significant space, with A2 space, or financial and professional services, comprising 8325 sq. 
meters, and A3 space, or food and drink, making up 5656 sq. meters in the town centre [figures 
commissioned by the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister, and collected by CASA (Centre for 
Advanced Spatial Analysis) and URBED (Urban and Economic Development Group)].
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overall dwellings. In Havering 78.8% of dwellings are owner-occupied, while 
14.9% are recorded as rented from the local authority; 1.7% of dwellings are 
described as having over 1 person per room, and 26% of households in the 
borough did not own a car in 1991, with 27.5% possessing two or more cars. This 
compares with Barking and Dagenham where 51.8% of dwellings were owner- 
occupied in 1991, while nearly half (43.3%) were rented from the local authority 
housing stock. 4% of dwellings recorded over one person per room and again 
nearly half of households (42.9%) did not own a car, compared with 14.5% who 
owned two or more. Returning again to Havering, the majority of dwellings (59%) 
fall within the council tax band C and D, that is between a value of £52,001 and 
£88,000, with only 6% in band A (less than £40,000) and 10% in band B (£40,001 
- £52,000). At the other end of the scale 3% of dwellings come under band G 
(£160,001 - £320,000), and just 0.25% under the highest band, H (in excess of 
£320,001). In comparison with dwellings across the border, in Barking and 
Dagenham, there is more diversity in the value of the housing stock in Havering. 
As the figures for Barking and Dagenham show, however, housing tends to be 
concentrated at the lowest end of the property market with 60% of dwellings 
under band C, 15% under band D, and just over a tenth of overall dwellings (11%) 
worth £40,000 or less. This is extremely low in the present context of the housing 
market for Outer London and the South of England. Compared to 6% of housing 
in Havering worth between £120,000 and £160,000, Dagenham has just 0.5% of 
its total dwellings within this band (F).
The social class composition of the borough’s workers in employment in 
1991 shows a majority who are either skilled or managerial and technical, but 
with a low level of professionals (3%). These figures are thus reflective of the
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kind of work that was available in the local economy in 1991, concentrated 
mainly in the distribution and catering sector (18.9%), banking and finance 
(22.7%) and ‘other services’ (23.9%), rather than in the heavy industries of 
energy, water and mining or industries that require some sort of ecological 
specialisation such as agriculture, forestry and fishing. 7% of the working 
population are employed in manufacturing metal, however, and 5.7% in other 
kinds of manufacturing, 8.5% in construction and 9.4% in transport (figures 
including self-employed). Employment rates remain good in relative terms to the 
rest on London, according to 1997 figures, with an unemployment rate of 4.8% 
among men and 2.3% among women, averaging out at 3.7% for the borough 
according to official figures. This places Havering at sixth position in a London- 
wide ranking of rates of unemployment, improved on only by the boroughs of 
Sutton, Hillingdon, Richmond-upon-Thames, Kingston-upon-Thames and the 
City of London. A closer examination of the statistics for economic activity, 
however, reveals that in Havering 8.1% of the economically active male 
population was unemployed in 1991, and 10.8% were economically inactive 
(eitlier in education, permanently sick or retired below the age of 64), This 
compares with the figures for economically active women out of work at 3.6%, 
and 32.3% economically inactive. The figures, again, are higher for Havering’s 
neighbouring borough. Barking and Dagenham, with 12.7% of economically 
active males imemployed, and 11.7% economically inactive, comparing with 
37.6% of economically active women out of work, and 35.6% economically 
inactive. This is partly reflective of the Indices of Deprivation rank given to 
Barking and Dagenham in 2000 which revealed it to be the 24^ ^^  most deprived 
local authority out of a total of 354; Havering, on the other hand, was ranked 233^ **
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out of 354. Below I will give more ethnographic form to the conditions which 
these official figures point to, especially for Dagenham at the turn of the 
millennium.
It would be wrong to assume from the official figures that Havering is a 
unified whole that enjoys a position of relative affluence within Outer London. 
Such an assumption would be misleading and is not borne out in the statistical 
record gathered at the ward level. Indeed, what is immediately apparent from the 
figures compiled by the Office for National Statistics on the individual wards 
within the borough is the unevenness with which affluence is spread. The borough 
contains some of the poorest wards in England, according to data compiled from 
the national census and used to configure the IDR (Indices of Deprivation Rank), 
alongside some of the least deprived wards in England. There are some parts of 
the borough where only 2 or 3% of the population over the legal working age 
claim income support, and this is below average for Havering (7%, compared with 
8% for Great Britain); however, there are some wards, such as Chase Cross, 
where 10% over the age of 16 claim income support, and, in Hilldene, the figure 
is as high as 15%. According to these figures, Hilldene is the 972”*^ most deprived 
ward out of a total of 8141 English wards, yet it lies within the same 
administrative boundary as Gidea Park, with a rank of 7454 out of 8414, and 
Cranham West, which is one of the least deprived parts of the country ranked 
8269 out of 8414. In Barking and Dagenham, again, the percentage of families 
forced to rely on Income Support is higher than that for the nation as a whole. The 
borough has an average of 13% of families on income support, while the nation 
average is 8%, though it is higher in some wards within that borough, such as
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Manor at 16% and, in Marks Gate, 17% of families rely on this kind of welfare 
payment.
This data gives some indication of social patterns at the general level in 
the north-east corner of London. However, wedded as this kind of analysis is to an 
explanatory paradigm in the social sciences, it can only provide an official 
objective picture but cannot exhaust the full meanings behind the forms of human 
existence that the area fosters. Its methodological and epistemological limitations 
are too many. In other words, they can tell us little about the human worlds, the 
worlds of meaning, that individuals in these places inhabit. This, of course, is the 
province of the ethnographer.^
Turning to the ethnography of Romford, I am reminded of an opinion I 
heard while in the field that there is no longer any anthropological mileage in the 
concept of identity as it applies to places such as Romford, that is, as an 
investigative method, a place-based ethnography of the town would be 
redundant^: there is nothing here approximating the traditional subject matter of 
anthropology^. My encounters with the literature of governance in Romford 
writing about the town as a place later came to strengthen the position from which 
this lady’s opinion came. It does bring on the question, relevant to many 
contemporary towns: what comes to fill the space left after ‘identity’, as people 
have traditionally understood it, vacates a ‘place’? Are we left, rather, with an 
antliropology of vacuity?
 ^Charlesworth’s work on Rotherham has been most concerned to engage in a sustained discussion 
of the incongruity between official statistics and human meanings, objective structures of 
inequality and the embedded processes by wliich power is devolved and inequality is lived and 
reproduced in bodily practices.
 ^See Appendix.
 ^My view, of course, would assert the opposite. That is, echoing Auge, anthropology is a 
discipline which has always been ‘conscious that it obseiwes a world whose evolution requires it, 
too, to move and change’ (1994:39), and I hope for my anthropology to aspire to such a project.
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Fig. 2.3: Views of South Street, Romford Town Centre, late 
1990s. Photographs courtesy of Phil Steer.
Romford town centre, the town’s historical heart and the focus of so 
much of the social energy put into the public sphere, is that island of 
uninteresting-looking buildings closed in by a ring-road that circumscribes the 
limits of the town with a busy stream of transport traffic. At first glance there 
indeed would appear to be little of anthropological significance to describe in 
Romford beyond the common architectural forms and textures, commercial 
outlets and social activity familiar to other British town centres (fig.2.3). Indeed, 
there seems to be a lack of something, a vital essence perhaps, that is all the more 
conspicuous for its absence. It seems to comprise an ‘organic solidarity’ without 
the solidarity -  a community that seems to work but with no great urge to 
symbolically define itself through attaching value to its differences, unlike some 
of the remote mral communities earlier studied by anthropologists in Britain^^.
Locals who remember an older Romford often talk about their town in 
terms of its vacuity, of something that was once there in the town but is now 
missing, of something that was traditionally vital to a social existence which has 
now dissolved, leaving intact a landscape that is banal and vapid. However, it is 
also a familiar theme of the academic commentary on contemporary urban 
experience; if urban places are not boring and empty, void of purposive activity, 
then they have ‘had their heart tom out’ by de-industrialisation, gutted and 
winnowed by rampant neo-liberal tendencies, are traversed by the unemployed 
lacking meaningful temporal regimes through which to realise a valid social 
existence, and have had their land repossessed for the building of housing estates 
described as little more than empty shells of places; the place only seems to 
become possessed by vitality when the night clubs and large bars and restaurants
E.g. Cohen (1987b).
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open up after dark, especially at the end of the working week. Local popular 
historical narratives seem too to carry a sense of a vital essence, of a Tife going 
on’, which has now been largely replaced by that vapid void somewhere between 
the poles of rigorous alienated work and relaxed personal leisure. As one narrator 
reminisces of the 1920s and 1930s, a time when Romford was a semi-bucolic hub 
of activity:
‘North Street was not so much a shopping centre, but more residential. 
The picturesque row of almshouses was destroyed by fire in World War 
II and, where the London Transport Garage now stands, the Essex Show 
was held on open land: that must have been about 1924 or 1925. I 
remember going with my father and seeing the farm implements and 
cattle and those great shire horses. These were the farmers’ work force. 
Also powerful steam engines used for ploughing the fields. One engine 
stood on one side of the field, the other at the opposite pulling the 
massive plough blades on an endless wire rope fi-om one side to the 
other, but, despite this method, most of the ploughing was done by the 
horse and plough. At harvest time the barley, oats and wheat were cut 
and put into sheaths by a horse drawn cutter and binder. The sheaths then 
stood up in the field (this was known as stoking), before being carted and 
stacked to await the threshing machine and gang. How different today 
with the corn cut and threshed in one go by the combine harvester. Of 
course, in 1920 Romford was just a country town quite a few dairy and 
agricultural farms. It was not a borough or even in the metropolitan area. 
The London area ended at Chadwell Heath and therefore all tradesmen
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and labourers living and working in Romford were paid county rates that 
were less than the London rate. Hence in 1920 Romfordians could have 
been termed country bumkins’ (see fig. 2.4).
Urbaiioid environments
In terms of the division introduced by industrial time’ in western societies, the 
weekend is a time when such a iife ’ might go on, as it has come to define itself 
against the time and space of iabour’ (for those, of course, who belong to the 
adult working popu la tion )B ut what some object to is the paucity of the forms 
of leisure on offer in the town centre through which to have a life. This is not a 
comment on the number of national multiple retailers in the town centre, 
circumscribing the range of goods that can be bought, or on tlie quality of the 
products on offer, such as the low level of designer stores that are found in greater 
abundance in out-of-town shopping centres. At a weekend there are plenty of 
opportunities for buying goods, window-shopping or meeting up with friends over 
a cofifee, a pint or a meal, perhaps in Costa^^, Global Café^ or Yates' Wine 
Lodge^^ (fig. 2.5). But, walking through the town centre at any time, it is 
impossible not to be struck by the paucity of civic space, and the concomitant 
absence of an active civic culture which may be equated with the cultural life of 
Romford. Of course, there are civic organisations in Romford, and these cany out 
their activities in sites which cannot be seen from the vantage-point of the High 
Street or shopping precinct. But they may remain invisible to that section of the
"  Ingold (2000:326-8).
A national coffee chain. 
An internet café.
A national pub brand.
63
« w t
M L E
^ 1
Fig. 2.4: South Street, Romford, early twentieth century.
TtU‘ i  ,.caB3
. , ,  t r
n PI pn <
Y A T E S t -  .> •
Fig. 2.5: New urban spaces: Yates’s Wine Bar (top), Global Café (middle). 
The Brewery development, c. 2001 (bottom). Photographs courtesy of Phil 
Steer.
population for whom the town centre is the whole of the life of a town. But for a 
town built around its commercial enterprises, and made distinctive by its 
conspicuous economic individualism, this is historically no small part of the town 
nor a small part of its day to day practice, and, as is evident from talking with the 
town centre management, a civic culture was not designed into the form of the 
town centre by those who gave it its present shape^ .^
This is very different from the ‘void’ that characterises the experiences of 
such ‘non-places’ as major out-of-town shopping complexes such as Lakeside in 
Thurrock and, recently, Bluewater in Kent, both emergent from quarries carved 
out of disused land and well-serviced by motorways on a busy transport con idor. 
This type of consumer environment was blamed for the decline in vitality of 
traditional town centres during the early 1990s and, with a re-orientation back 
towards the town centre of late, the priority which the mall enjoyed for a time 
among planning authorities has now ceased. But the out-of-town centres continue 
to attract people on a night out. In the case of Bluewater, it is an environment that 
evokes real places within its geographical locations, through the map of the River 
Thames etched into the floor, but the customer can have their complete consumer 
fantasies fulfilled without ever having to come in touch with the real thing in an 
incarnation of Baudrillard’s postmodern consumer socie ty^The consimier is 
further buffered from contact with the concrete or the denotative as soon as they 
enter the space of the evocatively-named ‘Bluewater’, or indeed ‘Lakeside’,
The absence of a conspicuous civic culture in Romford is what marks out this kind of town, in 
the south east of England, from those, for example, on the edge of Glasgow; as Morton and Morris 
write, ‘The importance of civil society comes from the realisation that Scotland’s national identity 
has been institutionally sustained rather than culturally led... Scottish national identity has not been 
missing, but has, for good or ill, been sustained in civil society in the centuries since that Union’ 
(2001:171). It has also been said that Romford ‘just consists of houses after houses’, ‘nothing but 
grey buildings’, and this can be unsettling to the visitor. But it is a comment that points up the 
immediate association between the town and the lack of any easily identifiable focal point of civic 
culture, despite the obvious presence of a centre in the shopping area.
Baudrillard (1989).
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place-names without the hint of a historical etymology, and this seems to be the 
premise of the whole experience. Advertisers for these sites seek through multi- 
media campaigns to find new ways of conveying their shopping-experience. Such 
spaces ‘seir themselves as total sensuous ‘Experiences’, encouraging us to 
immerse ourselves in them phenomenologically, in contrast to the cold inspection 
by the aesthetic eye encouraged by the architectural forms of their older concrete 
counterparts.
But the distinctions that formerly separated the two are gradually being 
removed. Interestingly. For these are the same strategies that are now applied to 
the promotion of the town centre in Romford, the centre that ^has the lo f 
according to its recent advertising slogan. There is an argument among local 
officials that urban change in Romford does not originate from within but is being 
driven by a broadening of peoples’ horizons as consumers, as they travel to out- 
of-town shopping spaces or even come into contact with foreign urban cultures 
while abroad on holiday. It is thought that consumers will expect to find these 
experiences replicated in their own home environments. Routine journeys across 
the boundaries between local towns and village, perhaps as part of childhood trips 
to use services or visit relatives, or as a worker making the mundane journey to 
and from the workplace, make us deeply familiar with a personal network of 
places other than those in which we dwell and call ‘home’, and these are places 
which we can empathetically enter into by viitue of their seeming to be part of the 
same social and cultural universe as that to which we belong.
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Dagenham: a neighbouring town
Romford is not a hermetically-sealed place, and part of what it means to live there 
is lent by experience of locations outside it. It is for this reason that a brief 
description of the town of Dagenham, lying just to the east of Romford across the 
borough boundary in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, is relevant 
to this account. I have already compared some of the social and economic aspects 
of Dagenham and Romford statistically to illustrate the experience of a gulf 
between these two closely related towns. There is much sense that Romford and 
Dagenham share a ‘common culture’, but less sense that they share a common 
‘destiny’ (Charlesworth 2000b:36), with the possible exception of those pockets 
of the most deprived in Havering. There is a distinct physical appearance to 
Dagenham that makes you aware that you have crossed over into it; more 
industrial development of the landscape, a monochromatic grey, much of it built 
for industrial workers in the 1930s and much smaller and more compact, and more 
large open spaces of greeneiy that are ill-kept and strewn with what appears to be 
industrial and household waste kept in with wire fencing. The presence of 
industry also becomes more conspicuous. In short, the atmosphere is colder and 
more oppressive. The places, and even some of the people, are clearly the product 
of industrial capitalism, and so it is easy for the visitor to slip into a Marxist- 
inspired nairative of an area and people downtrodden by the local presence of the 
machinery employed to fuel this mode of production. The major industry in this 
town -  the industry for which it is most famous -  is car production, centred on the 
vast Ford production estate. Many families in the area have at least one or two 
members who have worked for Ford at some point in their working lives, and
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others have had multiple generations working for it. The conditions inside the 
production plant were legendary, and what Henry Ford inaugurated is now 
considered to be more than an economical regime of assembly, a process of 
putting parts together, but a mode of human organisation. Indeed, Huw Benyon in 
his controversial study Working For Ford (1984) bemoans the effects of this 
mode of human organisation, brought on by machine automation in the assembly 
plant, which is based around a state of extreme alertness in the body and the 
concomitant suppression of cognitive awareness as a mere encumbrance and 
potential danger. It is worth quoting Benyon at length here in a passage which 
captures well the work regime through a description of the Dagenham production 
estate;
‘Few men see the cars being driven off the line. While an assembly 
worker Is always dealing with a moving car it is never moving under its 
own steam. The line -  or ‘the track’ as some managers who have been 
‘stateside’ refer to it -  stands two feet above floor level and moves the 
cars monotonously, easily along. Walking along the floor of the plant as 
a stranger you are deafened by the whine of the compressed air spanners, 
you step gingerly between and upon the knots of connecting air pipes 
which writhe like snakes in your path, and you stare at the moving cars 
on either side. This is the world of the operator. In and out of the cars, up 
and over the line, check the line speed and the model mix. Your mind 
relentlessly alert, because there’s no guarantee that the next car will be 
the same as the last, that a Thames van won’t suddenly appear. But still a 
blank -  you keep tiying to blot out what’s happening. ‘When I’m here
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my mind’s a blank. I make it go blank.’ They all say that... If you stand 
on the cat-walk at the end of the plant you can look down over the whole 
assembly floor. Few people do, for to stand there and look at the endless, 
perpetual tedium of it all is to be threatened by the overwhelming 
insanity of it. The sheer audacious madness of a system based upon men 
like those wishing their lives away I was never able, even remotely, to 
come to terms with’ (1984; 119-20).
It is difficult to imagine that the historical presence of these kinds of 
working conditions in the town is entirely divorced from the phenomenal impact 
of the town, even on people who have had life-long knowledge of and connections 
with the place. The genesis of the town as an adjunct to the car production 
industry, and in particular an American firm producing a globalised commodity 
such as motor vehicles, means that those who participate in its social and cultural 
life, the local workers and their families, have an immediate knowledge of many 
of the favoured topics of the academic discourse on globalisation, post- or late 
modernity, topics which others may perhaps apprehend only in a different mode. 
Issues which seemingly belong to the sphere of abstract debate are made vital by 
the angered speech, and the worried comportment, of those for whom they are not 
intellectualist concerns but ‘matters of life and death’ (Jackson 1986;4), the life of 
having a livelihood and the death of being imemployed with few prospects in a 
deprived area. You often find, then, that the very proximity to the affairs of global 
capitalist production means that the workers themselves and their unions become 
adepts at understanding their own condition, and indeed are forced to become so. 
They are capable of lucid articulation on topics that may often require fonnal
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academic training. This was brought out very clearly in the controversy 
surrounding the closure of Dagenham Body and Assembly plant in the Spring of 
2002. As a union document^^ explains, on May 12* 2000 a decision was made by 
Ford Motor Company, in their European Review, to close Dagenham Vehicle 
Operations with the loss of 3305 jobs; however, the unions argued, further job 
losses would probably be incurred as the second and third tiers of the supply chain 
to Dagenliam were effected by the decision, and unions had been notified of 
redundancies at Arvin Exhausts, GPG Linpac and Johnson Controls (Automotive) 
among others companies which had contracts with the plant. The London 
Chamber of Commerce estimated that 20,000 jobs were at risk, with an estimated 
loss of £255 million per annum in tax revenues to the treasury as a result. The 
reason behind the decision, it has been widely mooted, was the lack of legal 
security surrounding the ‘Blue Book’ agreements between the employers and the 
unions in Britain, relative to its European neighbours, which has meant that 
promises made under these agreements, such as the promise for increased 
company investment in Dagenham and a further contract to produce the new 
model Fiesta at the plant, may be more easily broken by employers in Britain than 
elsewhere. It was announced, furthermore, that with the closures in Dagenham its 
sister plant in Germany, Cologne, would produce the new model Fiesta. The 
unions were quick to point out the incongruity between continental Europe’s 
small market share in sales of Ford cars and the proposed increase in their 
capacity for producing vehicles; this means that Britain will now have to import 
cars to meet its demand which is the largest in Europe. This has enhanced feelings 
of vulnerability, an increased consciousness of their place in a global economic
TGWU [Transport and General Workers’ Union] pamphlet, Ford Workers S(^ No To The 
Closure o f Dagenham (c. 2000).
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order, among both the British workers and the unions who increasingly have come 
to realise their weak legal protection, when, as may happen, a foreign employer 
seeks to move around capital and labour to resolve their economic difficulties. 
The intrinsic awareness of the problems involved in producing a globalised 
commodity such as motor vehicles comes out in passages, from the imion 
document, such as these;
‘The truth is that the United Kingdom is seen as the cheap and easy 
option by many companies planning to relocate or restructure their 
operations within Europe. British workers have become the underclass of 
Europe with less protection from closure and relocation and cheaper to 
make redimdant’ (ibid; 17).
And;
‘that the company have a social and moral responsibility to produce and 
support employment in the countries that buy their product [i.e. 
especially Britain] (ibid; 21).
Involvement in the kind of economic processes described here means that 
debates over issues which distance is capable of reifying, such as financial 
sovereignty or ‘keeping the pound’ in Britain, take on a vital and affective 
dimension among communities such as those in Dagenham; they are in a sense 
‘brought to the dinner table’, debated over endlessly, and thus are a different kind
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of phenomenon from those which are apprehended through the prism of formal 
economic logic.
Insofar as the economic decisions bearing on Dagenham reach out 
beyond the town and touch the lives of those who are employed in Ford sites 
across the region, or work for companies contracted to the car production 
industry, the socio-economic reality of globalisation is a further instance of the 
importance of ‘movement’ in the contemporary social life of Romford too. 
Indeed, Anthony Giddens has written on how, in high (or post-) modernity, the 
influence of global forms on ‘intimacies of the self becomes ever more 
commonplace (1991:4); and that through structures of mass communication, just 
as much as the economic arrangements that tie localised workers to global 
markets, selves are continually exposed in their day-to-day lives to those realities 
which, in a previous era, would be kept globally distant. What for Charlesworth is 
‘a life touched in all its moments by...the icy-presence of economic necessity’ 
(2000b:23) in post-industrial society, is for Giddens the realisation that in late 
modernity the ‘interpenetration of self-development and social systems, up to and 
including global systems, becomes even more pronoimced’ (1991:4). It is in this 
way that the global (or one of its manifestations) makes itself known in local lives 
in Romford, and it is to issues of self-development in Romford that subsequent 
chapters will turn.
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CHAPTER 3 
The hidden amateurs^
In the discussion to follow, I set out to explore a series of contemporary issues 
concerning ‘the amateur’, its apparent modishness at a time of perceived ‘crisis’ in 
the production of knowledge and the ways it may be analytically apprehended. 
The questions, then, will be posed at two main levels. I begin with the amateur as 
a distinctive kind of intellectual. Under the section titled ‘Is there tenure for the 
anthropological amateur in the post-historical University?’, alluding to recent 
attempts to re-imagine and critique the University as the conventional site for the 
production of knowledge, I take up one of the questions being posed in the context 
of this debate: If the University is a bureaucratic system, does it foster space for 
the expression of individual passion? And, tied to this particular question, it is 
relevant to raise further speculation as to what extent the amateurism is one of the 
modes of dwelling in the ‘ruins’ of the post-historical University, to borrow from 
the language of Bill Readings (1996). Indeed, I suggest that this may especially be 
the case among contemporary socio-cultural anthropologists, belonging as they do 
to a discipline that is in the business of re-assessing its past, especially its past of 
amateur participation.
Next, I move beyond the debates sunounding amateurs in anthropology 
to examine attempts, however fragmented, to gain some analytical purchase on the 
amateur, looking at the work of sociological and anthropological researchers such
' The title to this chapter is, of course, an allusion to Ruth Finnegan’s study of local rausic-makers 
in Milton Keynes, The Hidden Musicians (1989). The theme of the hidden, or the tacit, is an 
appropriate one for this chapter which hopes to present an ai gument for the abiding significance of 
the anthropological amateur in narratives of the discipline.
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as Ruth Finnegan, in Britain, and Robert Stebbins, in North America, asking the 
question: ‘What shape would a sociology/anthropology of the amateur take?’. It is 
true that unitary theories of the amateur in sociology, but especially anthropology, 
are few and far between and this may be attributed, I go on to suggest, to its socio­
economic marginality and cultural specificity, situated as it is between work and 
leisure. But this is not to say that academic discourse has nothing to say about this 
theme. Indeed, I believe that it cannot be approached in a imitary way but through 
a collage of different perspectives from sociological pronouncements on work and 
leisure, to old age and dependency, to the time and space of suburban life, all of 
which have had fairly wide treatment in the social sciences. It shall be one of the 
continuing threads running through this chapter that, contrary to amateurism’s 
apparent marginality compared to the paradigms of the professional, the amateur 
is an important tacit figure within much academic discourse, sometimes 
identifiable as the gi ounds of these discourses.
I: Is there tenure for the anthropological amateur In the post-historical 
University?
In a recent timely volume on anthropology and the popular. Popularizing 
Anthropology (1996), MacClancy and McDonagh have argued that the reality of 
relations between the professional and the amateur antluopologist is actually one 
of complementarity and coevalness, arguing that ‘[pjopular anthropology is not 
some unlikable distasteful appendage to the main body of the subject, but an 
integral part of i f  (1996:46). Their argument lends support to the conclusions of 
many historical studies of colonialism and its scientific legacy that the distinction
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between popular/amateur and specialist/professional is an arbitrary one. Such 
studies suggest that, contrary to the contemporaiy ‘popular’ conception, amateurs 
were not always peripheral to the creation and accumulation of valuable scientific 
knowledge. In actuality, the quasi-trained enthusiast, or amateur, had a central part 
to play in the uncovering of new groimd in the eighteenth century, both in terms of 
knowledge and imperial domain (the two, following Foucault, are intimately 
connected). For example, popular metropolitan interest in the world’s natural 
resources and human organisation greatly expanded alongside improvements in 
the technology of travel during the early colonial period. The itinerant amateur 
with some training in systematic knowledge was in a position to bolster the status 
of the professional as scientific authority through their access to the sites of the 
exotic. In the field of botany, people from a diversity of occupational backgrounds 
sent natural specimens back to the metropolitan centre from a wide range of 
places throughout the global peripheiy, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes 
contractually. The career success of the botanist Joseph Banks would have been 
impossible without his ability to mobilise a global network of amateur collectors 
for his own, his profession’s, and his nation’s ends. The amateur in the field of 
scientific taxonomy was also a useful facilitator of colonial exploitation, a source 
of the masterful ‘colonial gaze’ of the eighteenth century imperialist. In other 
words, knowledge was not accumulated, compiled and applied by a single 
scholarly source working from within the academy or professional society but 
rather emanated from a wide diffusion of activities including those of the amateur. 
As Mary Louise Pratt writes of the epistemological ‘messiness’ of this period, 
‘[n]o more vivid example could be found of the way knowledges exist not as static 
accumulations of facts, bits, or bytes, but as human activities, tangles of verbal
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and non-verbal practices’ (1992: 26).
From amateur to professional as thematic narrative in anthropology
These early forms of scientific investigation aside, the search for the pristine 
moment of professionalism in anthropology has become the focus of a particular 
thematic narrative in contemporaiy socio-cultural anthropology as practitioners 
look back from the current fin  de siecle over a century that saw the emergence of 
anthropology in its modern guise. The beginnings of the professional paradigm of 
scientific ethnography is elusive, I shall go on to suggest, if only for the reason 
that, amidst this ‘tangle’ of knowledge about the exotic foreign ‘other’ attracting 
attention in the West, the two poles of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ cannot be 
unambiguously separated. There is perhaps a spurious concreteness about the 
‘amateur’ and the ‘professional’ anthropologists that is encouraged by the stories 
that the discipline tells itself about its own origins (selecting some elements, while 
repressing others). Thus, Thomas, for example, has argued that:
‘Radcliffe-Brown was the first ‘real professional’ in British social 
anthropology, because he was professionally trained, paid to be an 
anthropologist, taught and trained others, conducted his activities within 
institutional frameworks, and wrote for an academic audience of 
professional colleagues rather than the lay public’ (1989:19).
However, this attempt at a definition of the professional anthropology 
only serves to beg further questions. Who were the ‘lay public’ and who ‘the
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professionals’, especially given the opportunities detailed above for the public to 
develop quite a sophisticated knowledge of ‘other’ cultural areas; it further 
assumes that only one type of ‘lay public’ exists, or indeed one type of 
‘professional’ (why not many?). There is, in addition, the use of the concept 
‘professional’ to define the meaning of ‘professional’ -  the term itself, to echo 
Gusfield (next chapter), is less a descriptive term than a value-laden one open to 
local perception. Even Bronislaw Malinowski himself -  possibly regarded as the 
founding figure of modern anthropology -  was not averse to engaging in popular 
discourse or literary showmanship (MacClancy and McDonagh 1996:10-14) 
However, Thomas does go on to identify (roughly speaking) a professional 
moment in the discipline, and this came with the shaping of anthropology as a 
distinct field of study along positivist lines. This entailed the eschewal of history, 
the stock-in-trade of the amateur annchair anthropologist, as too ambiguous a 
basis on which to found a positivist discipline. At the time, this also combined 
with the wilful exclusion of the scientific findings of the amateur fieldworker or 
armchair anthropologists, depicting their works as imprecise and lacking in 
clarity. This began a long exile for the amateur in anthropology that would even 
last into the interpretive moment of the 1970s when Clifford Geertz began 
producing as, according to Thomas, ‘Geertz inhabits an anthropological world 
which is already professionalized, from which amateurs are already excluded’ 
(Thomas 1989:25). Thus Geertz’s implicit position, that only the professional is 
capable of the meta-experience of fieldwork by which patterns of signification are 
elucidated, was taken for granted. To this extent, the amateur’s exile is 
incomplete; they are still there as a figure, a tradition, an ethos against which 
professionals find it useful to distinguish themselves. For heuristic purposes.
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however, the amateur will be identified below as all those scholars pre-dating 
anthropology’s positivist dispensation (roughly, the 1920s) who dealt in spurious 
(and not so spurious) historical theories, as well as popular generalisations about 
foreign cultural exotica.
Many other heroic amateur figures, then, have been included by latter- 
day historians under the loose rubric of ‘amateur ethnographer’ (Stocking 
1989:209). Among tliem could be found the travel writer, the missionary, the 
journalist, the colonialist and the adventurer through whose inaugural 
representations of the cultural Other the project of colonialism was actively 
realised as well as popularised among a wide literate audience in Europe. The 
amateur ethnographer marked a ‘vaguely temporal preprofessional phase’ in 
anthropology’s prehistory (Stocking 1989:208-9), To some extent, these early 
discourses of cultural others were themselves colonised by a new generation of 
specialist anthropologists, working, not for the institution, but for personal benefit. 
The early ethnologist as comparative synthesiser of cultural material was willing 
to exploit the collections of data and eye witness accounts of the amateurs and, 
like the natural scientists, build a career from this global division of labour. 
Though separate in terms of profession and geographical distance, the 
ethnographer and anthropologist succeeded in maintaining a mutual relationship. 
There was a certain shared identity between the early ethnographers and 
anthropologists, one based on freedom and creativity. The anthropologist of this 
period himself reported as a kind of amateur intellectual, a creative, if solipsistic, 
scholar passionate about his field and enjoying the intellectual freedoms of his 
institutional privilege but nevertheless someone still dependent on the knowledge 
of tlie amateur etlinogiapher. Such figures include, according to the historian of
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anthropology George Stocking Jr., E. G. Tyler and J.G. Frazer. But this was only a 
temporary phase in the development of anthropology as a specialised enterprise, 
as the era of professionalism moved onto the horizon. It is this era which is now 
coming under much scrutiny and critique for reasons set out, among other 
commentators, by Bill Readings in his famous work The University in Ruins 
(1996).
The critique of professional anthropology
Critical commentary on the contemporary academic institutionality of social 
anthropology has recently tied in with the critique of the University as a 
bureaucratising institution. In The University in Ruins, Readings’ analysis 
identifies the current climate of incredulity that surrounds the modern University 
as a grand narrative. There is a deepening decline of the modem social function of 
the University as an institution such that it can now be seen to be entering into a 
‘post-historical’ phase; it is now becoming ‘other’ to what it was historically 
conceived to be by its different historical advocates (such as Kant and Humboldt). 
In an argument that is tied to the perceived decline of the nation-state, of which 
the modern University was a key ideological arm, and the challenge of 
globalisation/Americanisation, Readings believes that Universities are beginning 
to register these global economic changes under the sign of Excellence rather than 
Culture. The model of Culture on which Universities originally relied has now 
become obsolete along with the surpassing of the nation-state. While once 
considering itself an ideological contributor to the nation-state, a major centre for 
the production of national culture. Universities must now be conceived as
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autonomous bureaucratic corporations, an institution the internal regulation of 
which is entirely self-interested (1996:40): ‘Accountability is a synonym for 
accounting in “the academic lexicon”’ (1996:32). The other side to this discourse 
of academic bureaucratisation has been increasing discussion of the 
proletarianisation of the intellectual workplace which, according to Halsey (1992), 
can be measured in terms of a reduction in three areas of contemporary academia: 
the autonomy of working activity, security of employment and chances of 
promotion. For Halsey it is as a consequence of university expansion during the 
twentieth century:
‘that one important aspect of adaptation...is indeed the gradual 
proletarianization of the academic professions -  an erosion of their 
relative class and status advantages as the system of higher education is 
propelled towards wider admission of those who survive beyond 
compulsory schooling...Managerialism gradually comes to dominate 
collegiate cooperation in the organization of both teaching and research. 
Explicit vocationalism displaces implicit vocational preparation -  the 
Victorian distinction between training and education -  as degree courses 
are adapted to the changing division of labour in the graduate market. 
Research endeavours are increasingly applied to the requirements of 
governmental or industrial demand. The don becomes increasingly a 
salaried or even a piece-work labourer in the service of an expanding 
middle class of administrators and technologists’ (1992:136-7).
Given the prevalence of such rhetoric, it has become pertinent for
79
anthropology (with its own distinctive history on these matters) to ask of itself to 
what extent such a bureaucratic system fosters a space for the expression of 
individual passion (as a characteristic quality of the amateur)? Thus such debates 
as outlined here have begun to filter into the stories anthropology tells itself, its 
own self-portraiture, concerning the decline of anthropology in its specialist and 
bureaucratic guise. In particular. The Prickly Pear Press has picked up on attempts 
to consider the shape of anthropology beyond its current institutional confines. It 
is to their publications that I next turn, looking in particular at two pamphlets 
which directly address the currents outlined here, Anna Grimshaw and Keith 
Hart’s Anthropology and the Crisis o f the Intellectuals (1996), and Patrick 
V I % Anthropology, The Intellectuals and the Gulf War (1994)^.
The marginalisation of the amateur, with their irreverent style and 
influence within the sphere of public discourse, entailed a process that critical 
commentators such as Anna Grimshaw, Keith Hart and Patrick Wilcken have 
identified as closely involved in the public world of the twentieth century. All are 
committed to charting the shifting career of the intellectual through the changing 
historico-political currents of the twentieth century, in particular the complicity 
between the anthropological intellectual and the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
State and the Universities in which they established tenure. Where their 
approaches diverge is in the emphasis they place on the interrelated threads of the 
argument and I shall attempt to consider below both of their argiunents as a
 ^It is to previous intellectual archetypes that the Prickly Pear Press in general turns in seeking to 
restore an earlier union between thinking and doing. As they advertise themselves: ‘The inspiration 
for the series is the eighteenth century figure of the pamphleteer. We emulate the passionate 
amateurs of history who circulated new and radical ideas to as wide an audience as possible; and 
we hope in the process to reinvent anthropology as a means of engaging with society. Essayists 
will be free of formal convention as they seek to give expression to the new content of our world’. 
For a review of the series see Rapport in Critique of Anthropology (Vol. 18(1) 97-104); cf. Hart, 
Critique of Anthropology (Vol. 12(2) 229-32 and Vol. 17(1) 99-102) and \ûsAnthj'opolog^ Today 
editorial (Vol. 12(5) October 1996); wliile Grimshaw has jokily set up the ‘aaa’ (amateur
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whole. In his analysis, Wilcken evokes a dichotomy between ‘the specialist’ and 
‘the generalist’ and attempts to show how shifts in modes of discourse, the 
impoverishment of die public media for academic communication, have affected 
the way in which the two figures have been evaluated. This approach stems from 
his specific interest in the intellectual and die construal of the Gulf War of 1991, a 
military campaign which was unprecedented in its mass coverage through the 
media.
For Wilcken, this was a campaign that highlighted die redundancy of 
intellectual understanding symptomatic of a quietism imposed by the institutional 
framework in which the specialised intellectual is forced to operate;
‘While the ‘experts’ or specialists are now the primary definers, the 
‘generalist’ whose position has been eroded by current institutional 
arrangements is an intellectual who is prepared to comment on and 
critically analyse issues which fall outside his/her area of expertise’ 
(1994:10)
He argues that benign forces of change in the twentieth century, such as 
those governing the means of commimication between opinion formers and the 
public, moved away from favouring the maverick, dissident figure of the lone 
generalist, or amateur. Rather, the only outlet for the opinions of the intellectual 
was narrowing and specialised, better suited, that is, to the voice of the specialist 
or professional; this is the case, for example, with newspaper or television media 
coverage. All this has lead to a crisis in free-thinking generalism: the silence
anthropological association) whose slogan is ‘amateurs do it for love’,
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surrounding dissenting voices during the Gulf War can be read as indicative of a 
structural crisis in the production of intellectuals, the failure of the generalists to 
reproduce themselves outside of the academy and the gradual leaching of their 
efforts to the formal University sector. Indicative of this has been the expansion of 
academic tenure. Figures quoted by Wilcken support the idea of a rapid expansion 
in professionalism among the intellectuals of Britain, France and the U.S. In the 
U. S. for example, Wilcken records tliat ‘while between 1920 and 1970 the U.S. 
population doubled, college faculty numbers rose tenfold, from 50,000 in 1920 to 
500,000 in 1970’. (citing Jacoby; 1994:12). The intellectual had little choice but to 
adapt to the increasingly restrictive set of circumstances within which they could 
produce knowledge. The blunting of their critical faculties is finally 
consummated, Wilcken believes, with their interest in building intellectual 
edifices (post-structuralism, deconstructionism) that eliminate the possibility of 
serious political dissent.
A similar story is told by Grimshaw and Hart whereby the creativity of 
the free-thinking amateur intellectual is surpassed and rigidified into the forms of 
bureaucratic office, their narrative of social anthropology taking on a particular 
personification. Their analysis focuses more on the emergence, and subsequent 
waning, of the professional paradigm of scientific ethnography. The writers hint at 
malign motives underlying the emergence of the professional intellectual such that 
anthropology must be linked to the emergence of new forms of political control 
among leading nation states. Incorporated by the expansion of professionalism in 
the universities and no longer entirely free of voice, the intellectual anthropologist 
sought validation for their specialist enterprise in the climate of political control 
that had emerged, by which bureaucratic states sought to replace the nascent
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collective agency of ‘the people’. As an implicit part of this political process, 
professionalism in general ‘has marked for many commentators a deeply negative 
turn among that class of people who they regard as having a highly valuable 
contribution to make to informed, enlightened discourse in society, the 
intelligentsia. As such, professionalism has engendered suspicion among those 
now revising the histoiy of anthropology and the putative neutrality of the 
‘classic’ period beginning in Britain with the generation of Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown.
According to Grimshaw and Hart, the malaise of the discipline in the 
1980s had its roots some sixty years earlier in the moves to give social 
anthropology recognised standing as a profession. In their drive to gain 
recognition and tenure, the first generation of professional antlnopologists are 
accused of deliberately obscuring the foimdations of the new academic discipline, 
the science of ethnography, such that the means through which anthropology 
could be practiced in a paradigmatic way were protected by an exclusive circle of 
individuals. Successive blame has tended to point toward Bronislaw Malinowski 
in his seminal piece Argonaults o f the Western Pacific (1922). This protective, 
obscurantist logic was highly useful to the burgeoning imperial and statist 
bureaucracy. In the words of Grimshaw and Hart (1996:23), ‘the twin “founding 
fathers” [Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown] were merely scientific poseurs, 
peddling second-rate fiction and statist propaganda as a gloss on shoddy 
scholarship’. Later, for the intellectual economist and socio-biologist, Wilcken 
adds: ‘[t]hese pseudo-scientific theories are ideological in the sense that they use 
the authority of science to cover their manifest inadequacies’ (1994:27). Thus, 
according to these radical critiques, intellectuals had an interest in protecting their
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positions within the expanding academic institutions which played into the hands 
of those at the levers of power in the world. It also comes to Grimshaw and Hart 
as little surprise that the ‘crisis among intellectuals’, of which anthropology had 
its own manifestations during the 1980s and ‘90s, coincides with a shifting 
relationship to the state; in this case, the decline in political significance of the 
welfare state and the state’s supportive position toward the intellectual are 
instrumental. One implication of the relationship between the intellectual and the 
political is that, in their blind obedience to the state, intellectuals, including 
anthropologists, have not only reproduced the repressive authority of bureaucracy 
over the individual but alienated the public in the process which in turn developed 
a deep suspicion of the overly-compliant professional. Anthropological 
intellectuals, in their gradual alienation from the public world and an empirical 
field site, have retreated into cultural abstraction, effectively blimting their critical 
powers.
The amateur emerges from these critiques of professionalism as a guide 
to a new form of critical engagement for the anthropologist and also as a means 
for opening up a new relationship between anthropology and other disciplines. 
Again, Grimshaw and Hart:
‘The amateur, a person motivated by ‘affection and genuine commitment 
rather than by the goals of professional reward and recognition, becomes 
a potential source of rejuvenation, injecting a new radicalism into the 
restriction and routine of the academic world’ (1996:41).
Here is a programme for an amative anthropology that avoids the
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fonnulaicism, the stultifying rigidity of bureaucratic fonns, that threatens to 
overcome disciplinary practices. It is a programme that is aimed at injecting a 
renewed vitality into the discipline by creating new voices for the anthropologist. 
As Wilcken argues, the influence of anthropology has been held back by an 
impotent, specialised discourse and the radical opinions of the ‘free-ranging 
generalist’ have been muted by the media age, as was shown clearly during the 
Gulf War. If the professional has been too dispassionate, specialist and amenable 
to mediated forms of mass communication such as television, then the amateur is 
to be evoked in an effort to reinstate passion, diversity and immediate modes of 
communication - i.e. the academic pamphlet. The media-compliant intellectual is 
to be replaced by the figure of the eighteenth century pamphleteer.
The twenty first century intellectual must combine the professional with 
the amateur as they search for new ways of theorising and expressing an 
increasingly shifting world while ‘on the move’ (1996:49). The intellectual must 
exile themselves within the academy, as Said has demanded in his 1994 Reith 
Lectures. It is the amateur within the discipline which concerns Grimshaw and 
Hart, the inherent potential for anthropology to provoke inter-disciplinary 
dialogues to reach its creative ends in a world characterised by experiential 
complexity; and in this sense, ‘academic anthropology has never succeeded 
completely in eliminating the early ethos of the amateur from its professional 
practices’ (1996:49). It is from the ranks of anthropology that they wish the 
amateur thinker and critic to emerge.
In siun, the negativity of the popular in academic anthropology which I 
have attempted to discuss, in actuality disguises a history of close involvement 
between the opposite poles of the specialist and the popular, the professional and
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the amateur, and ways have been discussed for the continuing fruitfulness of their 
mutual relationship as well as reasons for specialists to dissociate from generalists. 
Such discourse in anthropology may be interpreted as a release for the amateur, 
giving both it and anthropology renewed vitality. In effect, it amounts to a 
renaissance of the amateur. The amateur is not seen as locked into a specific phase 
of anthropology’s prehistory, a frozen archetype of anthropology pre-Malinowski 
(Stocking 1989). Rather, I will go on to discuss the interrelationship between die 
amateur and the professional in the next section.
Amateurism and nostalgia
If the public has grown distrustful of professionals, as Grimshaw and Hart argue, 
then it is to the amateur that they have turned to, in nostalgic mood, as an 
alternative source of moral values. Indeed, Grimshaw and Hart’s revisionist 
arguments, the reasons for their preference for Boas, Haddon and Rivers^ over the 
likes of their disciplinary successor Malinowski, can themselves be seen to be 
inspired by a nostalgia for aesthetic modernity:
‘much of the inspiration for our projection of anthr opology into the future
 ^This is ironic, and a little short-sighted. The Cambridge Torres Straits Expedition of 1898, of 
which Haddon and Rivers were participants, has been regarded as one of the starting-points of 
scientific ethnography (Herle and Rouse 1998), the point at wliich anthropology properly became 
an empirical discipline not a study-based one. But the scientific agenda of this Expedition could 
hardly be regarded as untainted by contemporary standards. As Kuklick writes a century after the 
Expedition of one of tlie major participants: ‘Haddon had promoted field study as the means to 
resolve the problems posed by armchair anthropologists -  which ftinctionalists would declare 
meaningless. Plotting variations in social structure among Torres Strait Island societies on a 
geographical gradient of degrees of exposure to Anglo-Australian colonialism, the researchers 
sought substantiation of laws of human evolution; they traced such changes as the shift from 
matrilineal to patrilineal kinship systems, and weighed the relative importance of the factors of 
independent invention and difftision in social progress’ (1998:162). On the frontispiece to Herle 
and Rouse’s Cambridge and the Torres Straits (1998), Alfired Haddon is pictured looking down on
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stems from the early days, when it was remade in the brilliant moment of 
modernism. It was a moment ftill of creative possibilities, as all old 
structuies and habits of thinking were fast giving way to new 
developments in world society. If today’s anthropologists are not to be, 
as Leach put it, “petrified observers of a runaway world”, then we have 
to rediscover that spirit of open, eclectic experimentation and expansive 
social connection which briefly flourished at the beginning of the 
century, before it was banished by Malinowski’s counter-revolution’ 
(1996:53).
The ideas of loss associated with the amateur in English society have led 
to attempts to contrast a contemporary era of professionalism with a ‘golden age’ 
of amateurism from the nineteenth into the early twentieth century (for example, 
in the nostalgic British film Chariots o f Fire centred on the figure of early 
twentieth century amateur athlete Eric Lidell). Outside academic circles and in 
some areas of popular culture, the amateur and their associated values are held in 
higher esteem than the professional and their collective ethos. Indeed, political 
change during the last century has led to the much lamented decline of a specific 
personification of the amateur, ‘the gentleman’. As Wilkinson has written, the 
gentleman amateur was the construct of the Victorian public school system which 
was geared to reproducing the social and moral superiority of the landed gentry 
(as opposed to the then new bourgeoisie). That the public school produced many 
of the nation’s public leaders was an effect of the deliberate cultivation of the 
upper class leisurely ideal, Wilkinson argues:
Jimmy Rice, a Murray Islander, who sits at liis feet.
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‘The [English] gentlemanly figure was one who didn’t have to work too 
exclusively or too obviously for a living; he had leisure and means both 
to pursue culture and to seek relatively remunerative public office. This, 
at any rate, was the image that the British gentleman elite presented. It 
linked an amateur ideal to tire spirit of public service and classical 
attainment which were useful adornments for the man who wished to feel 
himself a leisured gentleman, free of the need to work solely for the 
bread it won’ (1963:12).
This passage suggests tire fragility of the gentleman ideal: that it was the 
‘symbol’ of public office, and thus class status, and also a subjective feeling of the 
would-be civil servant. It is not surprising then that the ideal, and with it Victorian 
public school discipline, contained inherent weaknesses that endangered its 
continuity. Again, here is the in-built inability of the generalists to reproduce 
themselves, as Wilkinson asserts: ‘loyalty-indoctrination by aesthetic device 
inhibited rigorous questioning, and the amateur figure showed little sympathy for 
technological innovation and expert method’ (1963:26). In short, the ethos of the 
amateur offers respite from involvement in a professional world, a nostalgic 
remove from a crisis-ridden present (thus its cuixent modishness in some circles in 
anthropology is indicative of a wider crisis in the professional paradigm).
However, it is to an analysis of the real amateur in contemporary society, 
rather than to the amateur of the distant ‘mythistory’ of anthropology, that I now 
turn.
88
H: What would be the shape of an anthropological approach to the amateur?
Three sociological studies of amateurs: Bourdieu, Finnegan, Stebbins
As I hinted in the introduction above, sociological or anthropological studies of 
the amateur have, in any kind of sustained form, been thin on the ground. In his 
own contribution to this area. Photography: A Middle Brow Art (1965), Pierre 
Bourdieu makes his particular case in characteristic style:
Is it possible and necessary for the practice of photography and the 
meaning of the photographic image to provide material for sociology? 
Weberian thought has lent credence to the idea that the value of an object 
of research is dependent on the interests of the researcher. This 
disenchanting relativism at least allows the illusion of an element of 
choice in the encounter between researchers and their objects. In fact, the 
most rudimentary techniques of the sociology of knowledge would show 
that in every society, and throughout history, there exists a hierarchy of 
legitimate objects of study. Inheriting a tradition of political philosophy 
and social action, must sociology abandon the anthropological project to 
other sciences and, taking as its exclusive object the study of the most 
general and abstract conditions of experience and action, can it reject any 
meaningless types of behaviour whose historical importance is not 
immediately apparent?’ (1965:1).
Photography is a case in point: here, Bourdieu conceives in the
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seemingly most banal and ignoble of activities a project of potentially wider 
significance, finding in the taking of photographs the expression of an entire class 
habitus and ethos. It is the structured nature of amateur photography that Boui dieu 
identified as significant, the discovery that ‘while everything would lead one to 
expect that this activity, which has no traditions and makes no demands, would be 
delivered over to the anaichy of individual improvization, it appears that there is 
nothing more regulated and conventional than photographic practice and amateur 
photographs’ (1965:7). The same concern to elucidate structure amidst seemingly 
‘fonnless’ practice animates Ruth Finnegan’s ethnographic investigation of local 
amateur music-making in Milton Keynes, The Hidden Mmicians (1989). This 
work is significant in that she eschews the familiar assumption of an unambiguous 
dividing-line between the ‘professional’ music-maker and the ‘amateur’ music- 
maker, such that the two simply collapse into a continuum. She deconstructs such 
apparently straightforward expressions as ‘earning one’s living as a professional 
musician’, arguing that even this expression is fraught with interpretive difficulty: 
an amateur/professional musician is simply a musician.
Further, part of the reason for the lack of sociological treatment given to 
the amateur has been the tendency to view leisure as an empirically messy field 
making the sociologist’s tftsk of delineating the activities of the amateur from 
those of empirically similar practitioners of leisure especially difficult. The 
problem of analytical precision has dogged the study of the amateur despite 
academics’ continuing interest in leisure and pastimes. However, a study of 
amateurs conducted in the 1970s by the North American sociologist of leisure 
Robert Stebbins titled Amateurs (1979) attempted to open up the subject to 
sociological interpretation. His aim is to explain why ‘modem amateurs’ are
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marginal to the world of leisure.
If anthropology has recently come to re-evaluate the amateur at a 
moment when the scientific paradigm of ethnography is at its least credible, then 
the approach of Stebbins toward the amateur seeks to assert a scientific precision 
into analysis of the phenomenon. Social scientific analysis is here the privileged 
tool designed to cut through the tangle of contradictory meanings surrounding the 
amateur in modem life to reach ‘the essential nature of [tins] phenomenon’ 
(1979:22). His belief is in the ability to capture the essence of modem 
amateurism. Like Stocking’s insistence that by the second generation of modem 
anthropologists ‘the distinction between amateurs and professionals was an 
accomplished historical fact’, Stebbins is writing about the essential differences 
between the amateur and the professional with erroneous certainty, compared with 
Finnegan’s incredulity toward any efforts to separate them absolutely.
It is the essence of the ‘modern amateur’ that Stebbins seeks 
sociologically to depict in his study, a figure who, as a participant in a certain 
amateur field increasingly dominated by professionals, begins to take on the 
participatory regime of that professional; in other words, he or she becomes 
serious at their leisure. The dominance of professionals within an erstwhile 
amateur-dominated field has led to a wholesale gradual change in the discourse 
sunounding the amateur: amateurism no longer stands for privileged social 
standing, a respectable practice in its own right, but takes on the meaning of sub­
professional, a lesser fomi of participation. Here, Stebbins defines a process that 
mirrors that designated for anthropology by which the amateur ethnographer was 
gradually marginalised in their field by a growing generation of trained 
fieldworkers who felt they could do the work of the amateurs with a trained clarity
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and precision. The purpose of Stebbins’s study is to understand what the modern 
amateur now means in relation to the modern professional focusing on three fields 
representing the arts, sport and entertainment.
Ordinary language is, for Stebbins, an important repository of meanings 
about the amateur who seems to be closely wedded to their counterpart, the 
professional. From his survey of this language, Stebbins discovered that it still 
revealed several layers of conflictual meaning about the amateur, registering tlie 
traces of an earlier discourse about the amateur as well as its modem, less 
vaunted, equivalent - on the one hand, the old-fashioned gentleman of leisure and, 
on the other, the modern, inexperienced ‘player’ at a pursuit. Thus, proper social 
scientific definition and analysis of present-day amateurism requires a more 
reliable, less contradictoiy form of discourse according to Stebbins. He writes;
‘In such an undertaking it is incumbent on the theorist never to lose sight 
of the central themes, of common-sense usage of the notion to be defined. 
Still, a certain arbitrariness necessarily creeps in since precision is being 
striven for, which common-sense usage normally lacks when assayed 
against scientific needs. That is, common-sense usage, as in the case of 
“amateur”, is often contradictory and ambiguous’ (1979:22).
The problem of Stebbins’s innovative approach to the amateur stems 
from his efforts to attain for it an impression of sociological credibility: 
unavoidably, he invents the amateur as a rigid and abstract social type. Through 
placing such an emphasis on scientific definitions, Stebbins mns the risk of 
causing confusion through over-precision. To discriminate between historical
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fomis of amateurism in everyday discourse is itself to distort popular meanings of 
the phenomenon for the scientific purpose of imposing uniformity and analytical 
clarity on the concept. Such an approach says more about the scientist’s own 
desire for coherence than the social reality of amateurism itself.
Nevertheless, his formulations produce some interesting and relevant 
insights into the social identity of the amateur within modern society that are 
pertinent for the contemporary anthropologist. Having sought to establish 
amateurism as an empirically messy field, the starting-point for Stebbins’s 
identification of the amateur in its essential form is the model of the functional 
relationship between the amateur, the professional and the public (or audience). 
The amateur occupies a structurally unique position within this essentially patron- 
client system. However, I would once again turn to Finnegan to identify the 
inadequacies in this definition, or such definitions per se\ what I continue to find 
in Stebbins’s enterprise is a fetish for clarity in his categorical distinctions. For as 
Finnegan observed among local music-makers and their aficionados, there are no 
absolute distinctions between amateur, professional or audience such that the 
‘audiences too are treated as in a sense active and skilled participants -  even 
themselves ‘musicians’ of a kind’ (1989:15). The same may be said of other 
amateur fields.
However, Stebbins notes that participation within this framework is not 
sufficient to identify ‘the amateur’ for his analytical purposes. Instead, a range of 
supplementary features must be taken into account pertaining to both the 
individual and their position within the societal structure. One such range of 
features pertains to the socio-psychology of the amateur. The amateur’s individual 
passion and seriousness with regard to their chosen field underlie the specialised
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skills and knowledge which they accrue during years of dedicated practice. The 
amateur is sustained in their pursuit by a high level of perseverance, sometimes 
against the odds, bordering on complete absorption in an activity. But possession 
of skill, knowledge and perseverance is not sufficient to define the amateur; 
Stebbins’s argument is interesting in that it seems only certain types of social 
persons with such skill and knowledge are liable to be recognised as amateurs. 
The amateur lifestyle is most likely to be confined to adults, as Stebbins explains:
‘One implication is that amateurs are people who engage part-time in 
other activities that, for other people, constitute a full-time work role. It 
follows that amateurs are normally adults, though in some fields they 
may include late teenagers. Children’s activities are described, not by 
“amateur”, but by other adjectives; for example, youth orchestra, peewee 
hockey, children’s art and so forth’ (1979:28)
Further, within the context of the functional relationships as described by 
Stebbins,
‘[t]he professional who falls within a P-A-P [professional-amateur- 
public] system inevitably starts out in the amateur ranks and, unless he 
abandons his pursuit entirely or dies in his role, he returns to those ranks 
again at a later stage in his career’ (1979:27).
And again in relation to the characteristics of the amateur’s life-style:
‘[The amateur] can never gain total entry to the professional world and 
remain an amateur. He is consigned by his overall life-style to a 
peripheral role in the activity system of his significant othei\ the 
professional’ (1979:42; my italics).
The amateur is usually someone with more than one expertise; as such, 
they must maintain a balance between multiple social commitments within a 
plurality of ‘activity systems’, both vocational and avocational Similarly, 
Wilcken’s definition of the generalist is someone who crosses boundaries of 
expertise and the specialist someone who is confined to their own disciplinaiy 
boundaries. This point is again made in the assumed distinction by Stebbins in 
relation to the entirely different context of ‘ordinary’ American life in the 1970s: 
‘professionals are committed to the activity and amateurs to some livelihood 
outside it’ (1979:43). Conversely, of course, it could be argued from the 
etymology of the term that amateurs are driven by passion for an activity while 
professionals are weighed down by it.
As the above statements of Stebbins’s suggest, amateiuism only makes 
sense in terms of the socio-culturally-specific Western constructs of age as these 
are defined by participation in the sphere of work. It has attained a specific 
meaning in the context of present expectations of age participation in the 
workplace and in this sense may be interpreted as a social construct of Western 
industrial society. Amateurism is open to the individual once old enough to 
engage in the adult world of professional employment and the station to which 
they must return in later adulthood. The above reference to amateurism as a 
‘career rank’ occupied at a specific phase of the life cycle suggests a hierarchical
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mode of thinking inherent to the way in which, as anthropologists have shown, 
work and leisure are classified in relation to specific groups in modern Western 
societies. There is an inherent tension between individual and society in the 
Western concept of amateur as described by Stebbins: ‘the status is theoretically 
open to all individuals of all ages providing they have the requisite capital and 
motivations (skill, knowledge, passion), yet its social construction necessarily 
prevents equal and unrestricted access to all members of society. For some fomis 
of amateurism, such as local history, access may be restricted to age on the basis 
that an individual has the requisite amount or type of knowledge (for example, 
memories of the 1920s or the sinking of the Titanic),
The amateur as (marginal) man of leisure
A further indication of the construction of the amateur in Western society lies in 
the public perception of, and attitudes to, the amateur. As the post-war leisure 
industry expanded in North America, ‘the nation began to debate the newly 
emerging forms of play as a hindrance to the very process of modernisation that 
facilitated their expansion. Writing at this unique historical moment, Stebbins 
comments on the Western construction of the individual as driven by the desire 
for self-gratification in pleasure that is linked to these historical developments. 
This depiction of the Western individual is set up in counter-distinction to the 
productive self of the workplace. So, for example, as workplaces became more 
specialised and production increased, people changed their patterns of relaxation, 
seeking new ways to lose themselves in leisure - amusement parks, television, 
drive-in movie theatres, family centred activities, or gardening, where
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interpersonal contacts were probably limited to the neighbours or service 
providers. Many of these activities were commodified and were available for the 
individual’s convenient consumption. It was the effect of these activities on the 
self, the moral being that concerned many commentators of this period and some 
of these voices, I suggest, are echoed in Stebbins’s thought about the amateur. 
Thus, in the context of post-war America, argues Stebbins, a serious, work-like 
commitment to leisure such as that shown by the modem amateur is perceived as 
something highly abnormal, possibly even amoral, to the ordinary consumer of 
self-gratificatory fonns of play:
‘Seriousness at leisure sets the modem amateur off from the majority of 
other people who find such an orientation foreign, possibly a bit quaint or 
snobbish, and rarely, even admirable’ (1979:41).
By eschewing the idea of leisure through consumption, the amateur elects 
to marginalise his- or herself socio-economically. Rather than purchasing their 
leisure, they prefer to be actively engaged in the fashioning of their own creative 
forms of play:
‘Our amateurs are marginal in the sense that they have chosen a marginal 
form of leisure; one that is closer to being work than any other. They are 
not, in other words, participants in popular leisure - in non-serious 
leisure... they are neither dabblers nor professionals’ (1979:260: my 
italics).
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In Stebbins’s own gender-specific words, the modem amateur is a 
‘marginal man of leisure’. This phrase, in that it connotes the earlier gentleman as 
‘man of leisure’, suggests that it is the social situation of marginalisation which 
separates the modern from earlier forms of amateur and thus also his sociological 
work from earlier historical and autobiographical work on the amateur. It also 
confirms the view of the amateur held by Grimshaw and Hart, or the generalist 
discussed by Wilcken, both of whom present a description of a figure 
marginalised in their field.
The value of Stebbins’s contribution to debate, however, is his 
recognition of the amateur as socially anomalous, or out of place. Modem 
amateurs are people who ‘fall between’ (1979:41), suspected for tlieir behavioural 
uncontrollability and unreliability in balancing their amateur commitments with 
their commitments in other areas of life. They are people who inexplicably refuse 
to engage consistently in acts of mass consumption to fulfil the desire for self­
gratification produced as a coimterpart to the economic necessity of work in 
industrial society. This is the antithesis that sets the ordinary consumer apart from 
the. modern amateur. As such, the amateur is seen as an anomaly and provokes 
feelings of ambiguity among their fellow actors.
The ambiguity of the amateur is, in part, accentuated by the accelerated 
processes of institutionalisation in modern complex societies, such that new forms 
of institutional practice and new identities are continually being fonned, 
engendering doubt as to proper social engagement. Thus, Stebbins can point out:
‘the amateur is more accurately conceived as occupying a marginal 
status, or “marginal role”.. . A marginal role is one that is incompletely
98
institutionalised. There is ambiguity among its incumbents and in the 
wider community as to what the former should do and how they should 
behave. Such roles are in the process of crystallization. And they are a 
common element in industrialized societies, where rapid change spawns 
new occupations and new forms of leisure’ (1979:270).
Amidst such rapid historical change, the ambiguity of the amateur would 
seem like an ideal nostalgic focus for commentators who fear the increasing 
mutuality of leisure and work - for in a ‘work society’, are there not also 
increasing, equally vigorous, possibilities for respite -  a hedonistic ‘leisure 
society’? A solution, says Stebbins, may be found in amateurism:
‘Maybe if we work seriously at our leisure as amateurs do (in those 
activities where serious work is possible), our leisure will be less likely to 
be described as a malady of contemporary Western civilisation’ 
(1979:268; italics in original).
In some aspects, Stebbins’s argument for the marginality of amateurism 
coincides neatly with current discursive territory in anthropology. It gives 
confirmation to the narrative put forward by Wilcken, Grimshaw and Hart in the 
field of anthropology that the amateur, while formerly in sovereign control of a 
particular activity, finds their hegemony challenged and eventually surpassed by 
the professional newcomer. It is the introduction of professionals into the 
amateur’s field that led to the circulation of ‘amateurism’ as a term of 
disparagement, in anthropology no less than other fields. It must be
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acknowledged, however, that Stebbins’s concern is largely with social structural 
frameworks (publics, professionals, amateurs) rather than the content of 
classificatory systems, such as work and leisure. It is to the body of literature on 
marginality in anthropology, and to just such cultural contents, that I now turn to 
contextualise further the understanding of the amateur within discussion of classes 
of activity in Western industrial society and thus build on the sociological insights 
of Robert Stebbins.
Amateurs, old age and dependency
Ambiguous forms of work and leisure have recently been associated in the 
anthropological literature with those gioups situated at opposite margins of the 
western life course, in particular children and the dependent elderly; I will return 
to the issue of ambiguities in work and leisure after an anthropological description 
of these age groups.
In the work of Hockey and James (1993), there is a focus on the social 
construction of states of old age and dependency in terms of the symbolic 
associations actors make between those at the margins of the human life couise. 
Like childhood, old age only came to be understood as a distinct stage in human 
life by Westerners during the nineteenth century when scientists first discovered 
morphological and psychiatric changes in the elderly. Writing from the point of 
view of western societies, Hareven (1995) has observed that the demarcation of 
developmental stages in the life course begins with identification of specific 
biological characteristics within the context of a specific social class which are 
then popularised, and later socially institutionalised and politically enshrined in
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law. Like sexual meanings, age meanings are not factual but processual.
The cultural comparison between children and the elderly is not a 
straightforward one. Neither can the elderly be unproblematically classified as 
akin to other liminal figures in society. They pose a distinct problem in terms of 
their return out of a condition of liminality. There is a certain redundancy about 
the aged which makes them especially problematic. As Hazan contends, ‘the 
country of the old is a no-man’s-land devoid of the educational messages 
embedded in other dissolved cultural categories’ (1994:81).
As a distinct and feared stage in the human life course, old age has 
associations with the loss of cherished personal autonomy to institutional regimes 
of dependency and with death itself; for Hazan it is a zone of danger, the ‘buffer 
between life and death’ (1994:81). As this phrase suggests, old age is a 
contradictory cultural construct in the West in that it is that category which is 
regarded as both fearfiil and protective; it marks a cultural barrier between adult 
vitality and the threat of mortality and is feared for its subsequent associations 
with that which will eventually negate the vitality of adulthood. It is this which 
gives old age its untouchable quality for many Westerners; similarly, the 
Untouchable caste in India absorbs the dangers of pollution from social activities 
which would be threatening to others and are themselves regarded as culturally 
polluting.
The argument of Hockey and James is that the fear of bodily and mental 
decline in old age, a pervasive ideology of ageism, finds subtle expression through 
everyday social discourse leading eventually to the legitimisation of acts of 
practical discrimination toward this socially constructed class of ‘dependents’. 
Expressions of old age and dependency are thus more than verbal aberrations or
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even the neutral acknowledgements of objective changes in the body; akin to 
patriarchal modes of speech, they enforce an ideological strategy of 
discrimination. The coherence of these expressions of everyday speech is 
dependent on a ‘powerful compass of metaphoric language’ (1993:15) continually 
pointing toward the negative experience of old age. Old age is frequently 
summarised in directional terms that connote descent and distance from the centre.
Comparisons with old age run throughout the canon of western symbolic 
expression, for example, the associations between the aged and the night-time 
hours in W. B. Yeats’ poem ‘When You Are Old’ (1893), or between the aged and 
the natural cycle of the seasons; the aged are people who have passed their ‘salad 
days’, are no longer ‘spring chickens’ and who will, in Christian doctrine, return 
to earth, ‘ashes to ashes’; in terms of Shakespeare’s theatrical metaphor of life- 
stages as theatrical acts, the elderly have reached their ‘final act’ before the 
‘curtain closes’ on their life story. The jaded and declining body here is 
interpreted through a powerful set of cultural metaphors, in the same way as the 
black body is similarly codified and interpreted as having negative associations, 
again with reliance on an opposite, white : black, for example, is evocative of 
other metaphoric pairs, such as day : night, light : darkness, purity : evil. In the 
same way as the aged, the metaphors applied to the black body go deeper tlian 
skin; they define black individuals as inferior persons. It is thiough such potent 
metaphors as those described that inferiority of the person is made culturally 
meaningful.
Cultural conceptualisations of the movement through life, phases can be 
powerful ideological tools. Age schemas are manipulable and thus can be used to 
disguise, convince, eliminate, obfuscate for a multiplicity of different ends. The
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cultural impulse in the West, argue Hockey and James, is to conceive of the life 
‘course’ as an ellipsis; that is, as beginning in an infantile state of dependency, 
building up to adult personal autonomy, and then falling away again to 
dependency in old age. Dependency is thus a powerful mediating concept between 
childhood and old age such that there is set up in Western society a continual 
metaphoric exchange between these two stages in both verbal speech and public 
visual imagery. Speech about old people often evokes characteristics derived from 
the world of the infant (through commonplace expressions such as ‘the old boy’s 
going ga-ga’), and in pictorial representation the twimiing of the aged and the very 
young is a common motif Such an exchange naturalises comparisons between 
these two marginal life phases and effectively legitimates the forms of humiliation 
that elderly people, alongside those with physical or mental disabilities, 
experience routinely througliout society and in the designated marginal spaces on 
edges of society.
It is here that the debate over modem forms of work and leisure can be 
resumed. If these vulnerable gioups have come to occupy a marginal position in 
the human life cycle and non-dependent adults the central symbolic position, tlien 
their marginality will also be reflected in their relation to a major social institution 
such as work, and so also its mutual opposite in industrial societies, leisure. The 
work and leisure pursuits available to members of vulnerable social classes. 
Hockey and James argues, is a measure of their symbolic discrimination by 
society. Marginalised groups have unequal access to jobs as statistical evidence of 
types of employment among the elderly and disabled show. Entry to well-paid 
jobs appears to be predicated on an ideal model of employee characteristics. Thus, 
participation in leisure among the socially vulnerable is underscored by a concern
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with busy-ness as a strategic response to their marginalisation from the workplace. 
Studies of leisure, among the elderly, and play, among children, suggest 
similarities in their interstitial relationship to work and leisure. Both work and 
leisure have been historically defined in industrial society as the necessary 
conditions for a sense of value, integration and achievement in the social sphere, 
for, in a word, ‘personhood’.
Personhood is understood as the socio-culturally variable source of 
recognised existence. In modern industrial society, a sense of personhood is 
specific to the adult and independent phase of the life course in that it is seen to 
derive from the active part played by the individual in the sphere of work. As a 
result, those unable to follow and sustain the pattern of work and leisure are 
excluded (actually, symbolically) from the sites of human fulfilment and social 
value. Such have been the consequences of the active cultivation of a ‘work ethic’ 
over recent decades in Britain and other industrial countries.
In a depiction which Stebbins would no doubt find resonant and 
convincing, Simon Charlesworth has described the situation whereby workers in a 
post-mining town are forced into demeaning and crass fonns of leisure 
consumption as an escape from a life governed by the materialist presence of 
heavy industry or the ardour of life without work. These are workers and ex­
workers who endure the rhythms of the working week, which is the reason why 
tliey enjoy ‘the bonhomie of nights out paid for by the earnings of its sweat-filled 
toil’ (2000b:55):
‘Unlike the world of work that was Rotherham for an older generation, 
those who haven’t worked in the mass industry, Rotherham is the town
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centre: that network of pubs, clubs and take-aways that form the 
reference points of the experience of the night out, that highlight of the 
week that takes place on Friday and Saturday...772e Shive^ Feofees, the 
Cross Keys, the High Bar, Elliots, New York Rock Cafe, Jazz, The 
Emporium and Yates and on a Sunday, The Masons Arms these are tlie 
places that must be visited; and a night out means going to one or more 
of these, except for a weekend which means going to all of them, and 
then going to a nightclub like The Zone and Fifth Avenue - or else to a 
pub that will carry on serving late and have music, such as Feofees, New 
York Rock Cafe, Emporium, The Travellers or Shipmates' (2000b:57).
These workers, low earning as they may be, and impoverished in terms of 
the routines available to them, nevertheless have a place within the system of 
value offered by the mutuality of work and leisure. But this is not a universal 
experience. Dependents then lie outside this pattern of work and leisure captured 
ethnographically by Charlesworth and, as a result of their cultural anomaly, come 
to sutler from the construction in Western societies of an explicit social 
‘problem’: the problem of the aged, of the unemployed, of those not yet fully 
adult. Further, argues Hazan (1990), they represent a problem for an ‘ageocentric’ 
functionalist social theory: in other words, such a theory is fine to study those who 
occupy a structural position from which can be conceived society’s progress and 
functioning, but how is it possible to analyse the static and socially functionless in 
terms of sociological concepts such as career mobility and status? The problem, 
according to Hazan, has been one of a ‘lack of fit between raw data and the 
analytical tools’ to tackle age (1994:183).
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To the extent that work and leisure have come to form mutually separate 
spheres, as Stebbins concurs (the collective sphere of work as against the personal 
sphere of leisure), amateurism may be regarded as higlily ambiguous in that it fits 
neither ideal in practice. The forms of ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ of socially vulnerable 
groups is then the appropriate context for the discussion of amateur activity.
While the adult realm of work and the child’s realm of play have become 
sharply divided over the past two centuries, commentators have recently noticed 
how children’s play has taken on some of the characteristics of work in its more 
purposive expressions within childrens’ institutions, for example, through the 
ideology of structuring learning experiences into play times. One view of the 
child’s milieu is that it is aimed at the reproduction of adult social identities 
through ‘constructive’ activities which nevertheless are actively appropriated by 
the individual child. Similarly, at the other end of the life course, studies of 
institutional care have pointed to the way that the leisure time of elderly people in 
homes or clubs is frequently filled up with work-like activities engineered again 
by adults to keep the elderly in an ideal state of continual mental and physical 
engagement. Often these activities are actually or metaphorically linked with 
ittfanthood, such as making things with bric-a-brac or the holding of infant-like 
birthday parties. Even games are neutralised of any competitiveness and regarded 
more as ‘teaching situations’ in elderly peoples’ care homes (Hazan 1990:187). I 
contend that the same principle of inequality through work and leisure may extend 
throughout the spectrum of old people’s activities. Included within this spectrum 
of activities in Western industrial society is amateurism which is, for Stebbins, the 
rank to which the person in retirement is able or expected to return.
The activities of amateurs are clearly problematic in their confusion of
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the ideals of work and play and thus take on some of the same limitations 
confronted by dependents in their everyday struggles against the symbolic 
violence of industrial society that limits their access to, and participation in, work 
and leisure. These limitations underscore the wider public’s judgements of that 
which is amateur as of only tangential relevance to their collective lives (if it is 
granted recognition at all), as marginal to their everyday socio-cultural existence. 
As Hockey and James explain:
‘The structural marginality of yoimg, elderly and disabled people is tlius 
reflected in the kinds of ‘work’ they do. Conceptually, their work is seen 
as ‘marginal’ in that it occupies a liminal position, halfway between the 
spheres of work and leisure. And it is this attribute which enables such 
work to be seen as beneficial for the person, rather than for society as a 
whole, individualising their marginality’ (1993:147).
The ideals attached to work and play in Western society - work as 
beneficial to society, play as beneficial to the individual - is actually reversed for 
the amateur. As the above quote suggests, interstitial forms of ‘work’ are often 
devalued by being ascribed a purely personal significance. They are not regarded 
as having much contribution to society or economy. As a form of leisure, 
amateurism also fails to meet the expectation of personal gratification as an end in 
itself; this would seem to imply in Stebbins’s discourse the individual 
consumption of mass leisure which, he argues, may be a dangerous contributor to 
the moral atomisation of modern life. Amateur activities, on the other hand, have a 
‘salutary effect on the commonweal’ (1979:268); they tend to have a social rather
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than personal ethos; they are cohesive and contributory.
Consumptive leisure, active leisure, suburban leisure
To further understand the contemporary decentredness of amateurs and 
amateurism it is necessary, finally, to consider another aspect of mainstream 
social life in the west, the experience of the suburb.
Recent work by social historians studying modern urban forms have put 
forward the premise that time and space are not naturally occurring phenomena 
but are socio-culturally mediated within specific urban milieux. In the case of the 
industrial city, the collective temporal rhythms and spatial patterns of the urban 
conurbation can be traced historically to the central importance of work and the 
struggles of social classes for increased personal time apart from the workplace, 
the designation of a certain portion of free-time as ‘leisure time’. The historical 
culmination of this socio-culturally-shaped aspiration for separate work and 
leisure time is the modem suburb. The suburb is thus closely connected to 
Western industrial society’s symbolic construction of the life course, analysed 
above, in that it arises from the same intensified conditions of industrial 
production that gave on to the superior cultural value of independent adulthood. 
Indeed, cultural constructs such as age, generation and family composition have 
been recognised as important factors in the emergence of the suburb. The 
relationship between the suburb as a spatial and temporal reality and the 
conditions of production has been such that, I argue, it has actually formed into a 
system of time and space by which some ways of spending time or using space are 
seen as normal while others are treated as an illegitimate use of time in the suburb.
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Historians and social scientists seem to be agreed on the processes of 
labour migration of which the suburb was the eventual conclusion in Britain 
(though there is no necessary linearity to such trajectories, rather, more of a 
cyclical formation). The stages in this ecology seem to be marked, at every turn, 
by certain epochal shifts which had socio-cultural as well as economic 
ramifications. The historical insights of Hockey and James once again bring these 
shifts into focus. Thus, for these authors, the move from the country to the city in 
the search for industrial work initially defined men, women and children as 
workers in contradistinction to the elderly who were left behind in the village 
community. The weak and elderly were progressively left behind, literally and 
figuratively, in this major national economic reorientation. The marginalisation of 
the elderly began then with the shift in British economic production from the rural 
to the urban and, in a sense, the super-exploitation of a rural workforce by an 
industrial bourgeoisie located in the burgeoning cities (1993:51-2). In the course 
of time, however, a split occurs in this urban workforce. It was only as ‘the child’ 
became defined through political legislation in the late nineteenth centuiy, and 
with it the permanent removal of children from the workplace, that pressures were 
put on women to stay at home as carers of the designated class of dependents. By 
this time, ‘the family forms appropriated from an earlier aristocracy had 
permeated throughout the entire class structure, providing a model both for the 
factory worker as well as his employer’ (1993:54). This shift had also given 
political support to the man as ‘breadwinner’, creating the domestic arrangement 
that formed the accepted model for future political, economic and social change in 
post-war Britain even though it meant, for a time at least, the subjection of an 
exclusively male workforce to the brutal regimes of industrial labour.
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It was only after the Second World War that the family arrangements 
which were once confined to the middle-class and the elite urban fringes became 
both an economic and practical possibility for a wider range of people from 
different class backgiounds. It was the era of the popularisation of the suburban 
ideal, or, more accurately, the historical moment when tliese aspirations came to 
fruition for the majority of British society through state capitulation in the form of 
changes in work legislation.
Such is the relationship between production and suburbanism, argues 
Gary Cross, that ‘[w]e need to bring time and the work experience into the spatial 
meaning of the suburb’ (1997:112). He suggests that it is necessary to analyse 
how the struggles for improvements in work led to the emergence of leisure for 
the working classes in the 1940s and 1950s but especially how this translated into 
the social and cultural life of the modern phenomenon, the popular suburb.
Suburbs and gender-specificity
As Cross argues, the suburban neighbourhood is the result of the social 
organisation of time and space around the experience of the autonomous adult 
male in contemporary industiial society. It has their own partial experience built 
into its spatial forms and rhythms of life; it rests on their socio-cultural 
relationship to the ideals of leisuie and work. Within the suburb, as throughout all 
forms of society, the continuity of humanly experienced time is regulated by a set 
of artificial constructs which break up into functionally distinct units. According 
to Cross:
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‘while the day measures cycles of work and bodily rest, the week sets 
patterns of public obligation and private autonomy. It regulates the 
assembling and disassembling of groups - defines social relations in 
rituals of inward and outward movement from the market’ (1997:112).
The central focus of Cross’s analysis is the historical specificity of the 
suburban weekend and its designation of time for regenerative leisure. These 
temporal constructs are essential to the maintenance of an economic order both in 
terms of ensuring the continuity of production and desirability of consumption:
‘Without the routine of the waged working week, the freedom of 
weekend consumption is economically impossible and psychologically 
meaningless. The weekend thus both relieved and reinforced 
commitments to the working week’ (1997:118).
The suburb is a place where human lives are punctuated by the activities 
of production and consumption. But, argues Cross, it is masculine forms of play 
that take priority over others during the weekend as evidenced by the redefining of 
certain domestic pursuits as suited to men. Commenting on the gendered activities 
that take place during the suburban weekend. Cross realises that ‘the twentieth- 
century suburban weekend has been a male construct’ (1997:116), supported by 
the family wage and, more importantly, made meaningful in terms of the 
masculine division of work and leisure:
‘The pains of weekday labour gave breadwinners permission to enjoy
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weekend leisure and work schedules structured those ‘sacred’ moments 
of freedom’ (1997:117).
This argument supports that of Hockey and James that leisure and work 
are mutually defined only for those central to Western society’s systems of 
classification; through the introduction of the family wage and the gradual change 
in domestic arrangement, men have come to assume the central position with 
regard to the mutual ideals of work and play. The qualitative experience of the 
suburban weekend may have changed for men and women in paid employment 
but Cross’s thesis provides a plausible reason to suspect that the strengthening of 
the work ethic over the past two decades has had a qualitative effect on the leisure 
experiences of more marginal groups such that they become less able to assert 
their autonomy and personhood in socially acceptable ways.
The qualitative experience of leisure is the crucial factor here; who can 
benefit from it and at what time, that is, who can derive a sense of social 
recognition from it. For some members of society, the choice of how and where to 
spend leisure time is felt as a natural one and is expected, if not guaranteed, to 
produce satisfaction - the socially instituted effect. In Cross’s analysis, this is the 
worker, probably male, who has fought for the right to recognise himself as an 
autonomous social being through leisure or has inherited this right bequeathed to 
him by his male antecedents. For other members of society, the choice of leisure 
activity may be constrained through latent discrimination, and ordinaiy forms of 
play experienced as unsatisfying and unnatural; this is likely to be the case with 
the socially vulnerable. Symbolically, tliis has the effect of refusing social 
personhood to the vulnerable, not by actively imposing on them an alien regime of
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leisure to which they must conform, as Hockey and James (1993) contend, but by 
presenting them with certain possibilities of leisure inscribed in the material face 
of the city itself which they must confront with awkwardness and alienation on a 
daily (or weekly, or weekendly) basis.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to understand amateurism in its contemporary socio­
cultural context within Western society. I have also sought to present a dialogue 
between three seemingly distinct areas of debate, combining them together in an 
act of free-ranging generalism of my own; the pronouncements of Wilcken, 
Grimshaw and Hart, the study by Robert Stebbins, and Hockey and James’ 
analyses. All three approaches can be linked by the common theme of marginality, 
that privileged position from which social worlds (of academicism, of work and 
leisure) can be viewed from askance (and even creatively re-rendered). In 
particular I have considered how amateurs may be seen as people who have 
undergone a process of marginalisation, a displacement by which their form of 
participation (part-time, passionate, excessive) has become more widely adopted 
as a term of disparagement; that the position of the amateur is open to historical 
variability.
Firstly, the amateur has been placed within the historical development of 
ideas and research practices in social anthropology; it is seen as coming into its 
own as a key influence on the contemporaiy critical intellectual within 
anthropology. The amateur, according to this argument, is in need of being 
reintegrated into styles of contemporary anthropological thought and action rather
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than defensively separated from the professional strand of the discipline. The early 
professional anthropologist would aggressively excise all that was ‘amateurish’ 
from their discursive practices in their aping of the natural sciences. Some 
contemporary anthropologists now feel that the present moment befits a return of 
the amateur from those spaces in which it tacitly dwelt. It is a feeling that has also 
been matched from the point of view of popular culture and its nostalgic reverence 
for the non-professional. The values placed on amateurs and professionals are thus 
historically-specifrc such that it is possible to have recourse to meanings of the 
amateur embedded in the past for strategic purposes, for example, wishing to 
return to an era of moral and political superiority as expressed through the figure 
of the amateur in an age of declining reverence for professionalism.
The second approach places the amateur within the development of 
Western socio-economic institutions and attempts to clearly identify the figure as 
a distinct empirical entity. This is the approach of Richard Stebbins who identified 
the amateur as a structural anomaly in a world of increasing distinction between 
work and play, where the rigours of work are matched by a committed leisurely 
abandon, often in the privacy of the home. The amateur, as defined by Stebbins, is 
only meaningful in terms of specifically Western classes of age and activity. This 
view complements well the work in anthropology on marginal people as 
symbolically anomalous.
The third approach extends this interpretation, then, into the analysis of 
the development of cultural attitudes to dependency and autonomy, age and 
agency. At the purely practical level, work has come to be identified with the 
autonomous, usually male, adult sustained by the kind of domestic arrangement 
found enshrined in the physical form of the modem suburb. At the discursive
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level, this arrangement can be seen to be supported by western ideologies as a 
response to a culturally-specific attitude to death and the inexorable signs of 
bodily decline characteristic of the aged. Amateurism lies ‘betwixt and between’ 
the above pattern of work and leisure in Western society; it is an anomalous and 
thus devalued class of activity. Among socially vulnerable people in society it is a 
confirmation of their displacement from the sources of personhood and a potential 
permanent state outside of the main institutions of work and leisure. To reiterate, 
persons are formed through acts of leisure and acts of leisure mould ideal types of 
persons. Amateurism is that form of leisure which produces marginal rather than 
ideal persons. In this sense, amateurs at least have something in common with 
children and the aged.
The final feature of the amateur which I have touched on implicitly in 
this chapter is the relationship of amateurs, historically-speaking, to ideals of the 
individual in Western society. I have sought to consider how the amateur has been 
represented as in conflict with certain dominant ideas of the Western self as 
created during the twentieth century. One idea of the individual has emerged from 
the stmggle of (male) workers to assert their personal autonomy thiough free time 
away from the workplace. This type of individual takes shape through the debate 
over quality of life which culminated in the emergence of the suburb. Further, the 
amateur, with their social ethos and work-like practices, is awkward to understand 
in relation to either the self-gratifying, consumptive individual or the increasingly 
productive individual which has emerged under recent processes of 
modernisation. Modernisation theory, that Western discourse of domination which 
gained ascendancy in the post-war years, states that rationality and technology are 
the principle bases for social and economic progress, empowering the individual
115
through increased levels of technical virtuosity and sustaining progress through a 
future-oriented world-view. The amateur, by comparison, is defined as less 
productive and less career-oriented by virtue of their marginalisation from the 
social statuses which enable the individual to be conceived of in terms of 
movement rather than stasis, purpose rather tlian anomie. The individual consumer 
may be seen as underlying new forms of leisure activity in the twentieth century, 
for example, the theme park such as those in North America and the Asian-Pacific 
Rim, which are intended to encourage a sense of complete self-abandomnent in 
pleasure, in contrast to the stresses and strains of the public world of work 
(Hendry 2000). In such a situation under which the individual has emerged as a 
key ideal of Western discourse, the amateur has remained as a consistent if not 
important figure of public debate, although one not frequently spoken of until 
recently within academic anthropology.
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CHAPTER 4
Narrative pathways: Some themes in the writing of urban social reality
Lucy Jones has lived all her life, along with her family, in the metropolitan Essex 
town of Romford, working both within and outwith its boundaries. She recounts a 
story of self-sufficiency and of a solid and reliable familial bond. Indeed, her 
parents built their own retirement house in the outlying suburb of Collier Row and 
she remembers her mother’s romantic yet ironic description of this scene of 
labouring, as each night her mother, father and disabled uncle, injured during 
military conflict, were together occupied in ‘making breeze blocks in the 
moonlight’. Not all personal stories, admittedly, are as imaginatively heightened 
as this image suggests, and many are composed of more prosaic moments of 
ordinary experience, lives of momentary intensities strung together with moments 
of ‘non-being’ (Woolf 1985). What personal stories can convey are lives 
composed of private intensities clothed in prosaic speech. Without looking 
beyond the prosaic speech, the story-telling experience (unlike other established 
literary gemes) can lack the heightened intensity that would draw attention to its 
generic boundaries, though it is, of course, not inconceivable that the performance 
of this kind of literary document may be accompanied by certain sensory 
embellishments.
The care which Lucy takes to establish her authoritative understandings 
of the town in which she grew up, has worked and continues to live (in which she 
has experienced her key ‘moments of being’) through evoking the longevity of
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her family background in the town, I wish to interpret as more than an accidental 
and abberant feature of her discourse; rather, it is one that is deliberate and 
conventional. I derive the theorizing behind this assertion from Ruth Finnegan’s 
anthropological study of urban story-telling. Tales o f the City (1998), which I will 
briefly introduce here.
Purposiveness and conventionality are rarely terms that urban 
sociologists tend to associate with personal life stories of the kind that I collected 
and came across during the course of fieldwork in Romford. Indeed, Finnegan 
points out that ordinary life stories of urban dwellers rarely even attract the 
attention of urban sociologists and anthropologists, despite being, in her words, a 
‘forum in which the city is experienced’ for many of these dwellers (1998:124). 
Few analysts, it seems, may ever get beyond the banality of the surface detail. The 
seeming banality of these personal stories is relatively straightforward to explain, 
whereas the empirical complexity and local, particularistic detail of actual lives 
continually confounds the conventional idiom in terms of which many social 
scientists represent the reality they observe and endeavor to explain; that is, an 
unequivocal discourse of generalisable types. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in 
later chapters, these apparent ‘universal types’ of social science are more 
subjective than they may at first sight appear; they are not so much descriptive 
concepts as heuristic tools, according to Gusfield (1975), artifacts at the mercy of 
individual imaginations and ideological-cum-intellectual agendas \
The seeming banality of the content of the life stories, such as those 
recounted here, conceals a point of far wider importance which relates to the 
formal structure of these stories. Argues Finnegan, even the life stories of
‘ This is why it is important to bear in mind, following Gusfield (1975), that even ‘scientific truth- 
making’ is an act of narrative thinking in the social sciences (also cf. Gusfield 1981).
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‘ordinary’ urban dwellers are governed by certain formal conventions which 
largely remain intrinsic to the actual process of story-telling, but which 
nevertheless are sufficiently shared to make social communication viable, to 
delineate, in other words, a contractual space whereby a world of common 
understandings is established. However, concrete speakers never merely passively 
reproduce the meanings carried by these forms of speech, but actively and 
creatively transform them in the contexts of their individual lives and the 
situations in which they are dialogically brought to life. By gaining control over 
these forms, individuals are seen to be capable of shaping their own experience, 
for it is forms that mediate our experiences of our lives and our worlds (Rapport: 
‘Fonns mediate the human experience of the world: the human world is formally 
constituted’ (1994:255)). Urban story-telling is one context, then, in which this act 
of world-making takes place. This indeed points to a general characteristic of 
Finnegan’s intellectual agenda, especially her fieldwork in Bletchley and the 
British new town of Milton Keynes (cf. also Finnegan 1989). Who is to say that 
the forms arising from the expressive arts, from story-telling or musical 
performance, whether carried out by the experienced professional or the amateur, 
are less valuable in constructing a human world, less epistemologically useful to 
the analyst, than, say, political or economic forms?
The contributions of Finnegan’s approach to personal stories on the city 
in Tales o f the City are thus many: she manages to replace a transparent 
immersion in speech with discrimination of the formal characteristics of a distinct 
genre, pattern where there was arbritrariness, and, crucially, artistry where there 
was formerly the naturalness of speech. But Finnegan also seeks to describe in 
this work how, through urban stoiy-telling, individuals are capable of gaining
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control over the meaning of their lives, and thus also their selves. They can be 
seen to admit an individual ‘writing’ of urban social reality in Romford.
Narrative pathways
To engage in socially meaningful forms of expression, such as in the case of 
personal life stories, it is necessary to have ready to hand a stock of reliable and 
culturally acceptable discursive forms that limit the extent to which speakers have 
to invent their modes of communication purely for the occasion of use on an ad 
hoc basis. The metaphor of the ‘pathway’ is one that Finnegan employs to 
analyse, not personal stories, but the underlying structure giving continuity to 
amateur music-making in the city, specifically in her case her field site of Milton 
Keynes. However, the same principle can be applied to the analysis of that other 
field of human creativity, story-telling, and in particular life stories. The figure of 
the pathway can also be applied to the analysis of stories: the elucidation of 
structure or pattern within what at first may be dismissed as formless, aberrant 
expressive activity, a means of conceptualizing verbal forms as somehow prior to, 
and thus beyond, personal experience, while at the same time using a figurative 
device that manages to eschew any tendency to reifying these ‘prior’ institutional 
forms, to attribute to them a spurious ontological separateness from those 
individual beings who travel along them^. It might be said of the discursive forms 
of life stories that, like paths, they ‘are not random or created from nothing each 
time by individual practitioners’ but represent linguistically ‘a series of familiar 
and -  by their followers -  taken-for-granted routes through what might otherwise 
have been the impersonal wilderness of urban life, paths which people shared with
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others in a predictable yet personal fashion’ (Finnegan 1989:306). Further, like 
actual paths in the physical world, the experiential paths along which people 
recalling and imposing reflexive scrutiny on their lives may cognitively travel 
cannot be ‘permanent in the sense of being changeless, nor could they survive 
witliout people treading and constantly re-forming them’ (1989:306). Here is a 
means of delineating constancy and form (while avoiding rigidity and reification) 
amidst the seeming flux and fractured expression of personal experience.
The form that personal stories take, though, has to be to some extent 
determined by local circumstances, by those experiences, events, places, people, 
trajectories that belong, for the tellers as well as listeners, to their world-in- 
common. While some discursive subjects (images, motifs, themes, episodes, plot- 
lines) are universal to such stories, such as the familiar stories of community and 
society as different relational types, others are detennined by the accidents of 
local historical and social circumstances. For instance, Finnegan found that 
residents of a new housing estate in Milton Keynes, Fishermead, favoured 
viewing their lives through the locally familiar and shared experience of moving 
home, of ‘fitting in’ elsewhere, of life centred around the house and its domestic 
affairs, as distinct from choosing to represent experience through the idiom of 
community. A diversity of local experience will thus determine much of what 
resonates in the stories of local lives. It is necessary to impose on the life 
historical material being analysed questions relating to what it is that makes these 
stories locally meaningful, how it is that the recounting of personal and private 
experience is made to resonate among other local subjects.
 ^Cf. Rapport on the idea of‘language as city’, following Wittgenstein (1987:3).
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Personal stories as genre: talking about families
In tlie course of talk about her life, Lucy begins to reflect on the theme of family 
and kinship;
I've always been involved in things within the community but it gets harder and 
harder to get anybody involved. It wasn't too bad originally, people were willing 
to join in and it was quite surprising then how many people I  knew. I f  I  went home 
and talked about it, for example, my father would say, 'Oh, I worked with his 
father', something like that. More and more I  don't meet people that I  know from  
way back. I  feel like a stranger, that's why my parents left. Then the local council 
put the ring road in and my father soon realised that the town he knew had gone. 
They said Romford in their early days was a small country town, so they went 
back in 1970 to a small country town in Dorset. The arrangements there suited 
them, they were very happy there. You know, a lot o f people who moved out aren't 
but it worked because my parents were o f semi-rural background. There is still a 
sense o f community in these places so it suited them very well. Before they moved 
from Romford, they felt isolated and I  can sympathise with that very much; the 
town they knew had died and they were among strangers.
[]
Well now, my father's family - let me work this out - my grandmother's brother 
had a fish shop in South Street and great aunt Edith, who I  think must have been 
granny's sister, had a sweet shop next door, Baldwin's, and cousin Irene, and I  
don't know what cousin she is, there must have been a male Baldwin somewhere.
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married Michael Pole who started the Romford Greyhound Stadium, so the 
commerce o f the town was very much part o f my family. My dentist at one time 
was the son o f the woman who had the hat shop next to great uncle Bert's fish 
shop. You know, it all fitted together, we all knew one another. In fact, even until 
recently I  changed to another dentist who was still part o f the family circle he 
knew everybody, he knew some o f  my cousins and I  h'lew his history. I  remember 
that his grandfather was killed when a bomb hit the surgery during the war. There 
used to be a sense o f  belonging in Romford but it's completely gone now.
[]
There are very few independent shop keepers left now. Let me give you an 
example o f  what I  mean. I  worked at Oldchurch [Hospital] as secretary to a 
consultant. We wanted to build an extension to the occupational therapy 
department. The health service wouldn 7 pay for it so the consultant said that 
we 11 raise the money. But, he said, i f  I  wanted to do this in the 1950s, I  would 
have gone straight to Leslie Stone, who owned Stones, what is now Debenhams, to 
head the subscription list and it then would have gone round to all the shop 
keepers, and eventually we'd have got our money. But you wouldn 1 be able to do 
that nowadays because you 're dealing with a faceless manager. And he was right 
actually, not that I  actually knew Leslie Stone by sight, he was one o f the 'great 
men now gone. It's just a faceless manager in Debenhams. It's lost any meaning 
and the same goes for all the shops... the problem is, everything is run now by 
managers not by shop owners. But at the human level, i f  you want help with 
anything like a subscription you get less because they have to go back to central 
office for the charity fund. Whereas the owner o f the shop might have given you 
£500, now the big shops will only give you £100. So it makes it that much harder
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because you're always struggling with small donations. Fund-raising is 
diabolical in this area.
This choice of theme -  the family - is echoed by Walter, a retired 
probation officer from Glasgow but now living on the ‘new’ estate of Harold Hill; 
this is from a recorded interview with Walter by a member of the Romford and 
District Historical Society. Here Walter recalls the development of his career and 
its impact on his family life:
WALTER: My wife at that time, she was a Londoner and she was a school 
teacher, the headmistress, but unfortunately that marriage collapsed, the saddest 
day o f my life when that happened. She was a very strong character and she 
influenced me. I  never thought about it, she said she knew a little about the 
probation service so she suggested that I  should, 1 should have a go at that. I  had 
a safe job at the Temperance Movement, I took the risk and came down to 
London.
INTERVIEWER: Did you regret it?
W: Never, never. Best day's work 1 ever did.
I; Wljen did your wife, er, your marriage break up?
W: 1952, when I  was 50. Very, very sad.
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I: Very sad.
W: Oh, 1 was very upset by that.
I: Were there any children by that marriage?
W: Oh yes. n e r e ’s a daughter.
I: Oh, that's a pity. 19... er, 1957 did you say?
W: The war was largely responsible because when my child, our child, was born 
she was only a year old when the war broke out and evacuation started and all the 
rest o f it, and that upset things, that contributed to upsetting the apple cart.
I: Your wife was evacuated as welTl
W: O f course, my daughter was only a year old you see. We went out to 
Woodhampstead and Harpingdon, sometimes we were up in Yorkshire, 
sometimes we were up in Lancashire, oh, it was a very, very trying time, very 
trying time and my wife was very ambitious. She was a teacher and she came back 
after the war and taught in Sevenkings [in east London] and then she became a 
headmistress in a school in Dagenham and I  think that made life very difficult for  
her. She was a career lady. There was nothing nasty about it, it was just a 
question of...
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I; Divided interests. A question o f  divided intey'ests.
W: And I  think she was a wee bit surprised at me making such a success o f my 
job. You see I  was invited to become a senior probation officer but I  didn 7 apply 
for it. They were building a new department and they wanted me to take o f it. O f 
course, that was when probation was beginning to get used much more widely.
The theme of family and kinship is continued by Walter:
W: Oh, I  can see where I've made mistakes. But, when you've been insecure you 
see... my Muriel always pointed out to me, she said, your insecurity started when 
you were born without a mother and, o f  course, I've never been able to benefit 
from having a mother's care. I  had a step-mother. She was very good in many 
ways but she wasn 7 a real mother and she had six children o f her own. I  had six 
siblings, four brothers and two sisters. My father and step-mother were very, very 
good people but dogged by the bad social system we had.
I: In what way?
W: Unemployment. My father never got a job after the war. He was 50 when he 
was de-mobilised, demobilised in 1919. He was born in... in 1869. And he had a 
struggle all the years after the war, he had a hard struggle back there... with the 
unemployment and shortage o f money and a growing family. It used to be a big 
worry. But there you are. Do you know Edinburgh?
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1:1 *ve only been once,
W: Lovely city but dreadful poverty there as well. I  remember 1 used to go round 
the shops at midnight on a Saturday night, the shops were still open, things were 
sold o ff cheaply you know. You got a bag o f biscuits for a penny, all that sort o f  
thing. Oh, the struggle, and the drugs too. As for the slums, Edinburgh has one o f  
the worst slums, Edinburgh and Glasgow are the worst slums I ’ve ever seen, and 
still are the worst slums. Glasgow has the worst slums in Europe, those tenement 
flats, three storeys up, dreadful things.
I: And the Gorbals.
W: Those all contributed to me being a tee-totaller.
I: And yet you reacted that way and many others didn V, they became part o f the 
same system didn 7 they.
W: Yes, but I  was fortunate in having parents. And my religion. Religion must 
have played a part. The Band of Hope was against the drink, you were warned 
against it, definitely.
Kin are often deployed as a familiar embodiment of continuity in 
personal narratives, a quality without which it would be impossible to identify the 
narrative as such. Kinship provides a starting point for the story’s events, and, like
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the institution itself, provides a permanent base for the plot to return to, or to 
depart from. In short, the theme of family provides a number of possible ways of 
giving generic shape to particularistic details of a personal life story (Finnegan 
1998:98). This is what Lucy achieves in her narrative when she refers to her 
family; if it is the case that parents and other close kin are conventionally looked 
on to impart something to their progenitors, as a particular cultural expectation of 
the family, then Lucy recognizes her family’s legacy to be in the fonn of symbolic 
capital, the capacity to look at the world from a certain world-view which, despite 
recent attacks on it, she still holds dear to her. The legacy from Walter’s family is 
perhaps similar; he at least registers that his decisions to take certain pathways in 
his life take their inspiration from the support of members of his family, even as 
he registers his deep sadness at his eventual inability to keep his conjugal family 
together and make their interests converge.
Besides people, especially kin, there are a number of other abstract 
entities that Walter can draw on to give the story of his life some resonant moral 
depth. The sense of an ‘explanatoiy framework’, binding together the events told 
in Walter’s story with any one of a number of recognized moral plots in British 
culture, is particularly explicit in Walter’s story: religion plays an important part 
in his life story, a key means of explaining moral continuity in people’s lives, but 
also (more uniquely for Walter) an interest in the Labour movement as he proudly 
recalls the famous politicians that he once greeted. Interestingly, Walter does not 
merely reproduce, in a passive manner, the familiar meanings surrounding the 
theme of religion and the part it plays in British lives. Rather, he embodies the 
theme in his own unique way, humorously identifying himself as an ‘eccentric’ 
and anomalous figure on the margins of the local religious scene, following his
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loss of faith:
WATER: /  had some very happy times in the Temperance Movement but as far as 
religion's concerned. I'm religious in a sort o f unorthodox way, but I  cannot 
accept, I  mean I 'd  be hypocritical i f  I  accepted some o f the things I  used to 
oppose. I  used to go to the Scottish Church in London.
I: Where abouts is that?
W: Tottenham Court, just round the corner from Covent Garden. Very nice 
people, but I  felt a bit o f a hypocrite going. I  couldn 't conscientiously subscribe to 
all that they proclaimed so I  don't go to anything now. But I  enjoy the Sunday 
service on the television [laughter]. Emotionally I'm very fond o f the church, but 
intellectually I  can Y accept it.
I: And then you go to the Society of Friends with your wife?
W: Sometimes, yes. Not regularly but I  go when I  have a special meeting on. Oh, I  
know the Quakers, I  used to know all the Quakers in Scotland at one point. Oh, 
they 're a very nice crowd. I  can't accept all that they do, you see I  was a sort o f  
loner. Yesterday, I  was with a church crowd, the local parish church, I'm very 
pally with the minister and his wife, they all accept me as a sort of. I ’m a sort o f  
strange character.
Besides family and religion as important influences on the shape of his
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life, Walter also points out the agentive influence of ‘the city’ and, in particular its 
social conditions of ‘poverty’ and ‘unemployment’, as are common in many life 
stories. These are all forces, it seems, that gave his life its recognizable shape, 
embodied in the forms of the probation service.
Kin are not the only protagonists to feature in Lucy’s account of her life. 
Rather, reading beneath the text of Lucy’s account, it is possible that Lucy 
mobilizes the abstract notion of ‘community’, and projects onto it a certain 
agentive force, to give the account of her life a necessary ‘explanatory 
framework’ of her own. In other words, Lucy uses ‘community’ to denote a 
familiar and expected pathway in British culture, the shape a certain kind of life 
may be expected to take, but, moreover, one which carries with it a moral 
undertone. It is this which enables the witness to Lucy’s story to assimilate her 
unique personality to an a priori cultural persona. Here is the familiar career path 
of the community worker, or stalwart of the community, and ‘core’ member (cf. 
Strathem 1981), whose participation in public life may be expected to take a 
certain direction; usually, work in the public sector, rather than the more atomistic 
private sector, and an active interest and involvement in the voluntary sector or 
other ‘front line services’. Indeed, this is what Lucy shows in her story through 
recoimting her family’s connections with the economic life of the town during a 
period when the ethos of commercial life embraced, rather than held at length, the 
local people that it served. Lucy tlius gives a moral undertone to the themes of the 
town centre and local shops which appear in her story. Her recounting of the local 
shops in Romford town centie strongly resonates in the British public imagination 
with attributes and scenes that are thought to belong to the national essence, in 
particular the self-reliance and friendly intimacy of the village comer shop and
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shop owner. This anachronistic category of local entrepreneur is seen by Lucy as 
embodying an ethos of co-operation, the informal arbiters of a moral code and a 
social conscience in the days before welfare was provided from a central 
bureaucracy. When her father was made redundant, she recalls above, the needs of 
Lucy’s family were taken up by other members of the family who also owned 
local businesses in the town.
Nor can Lucy’s stress on the town centre and the local shops in her life 
be seen as an aberrant or purely accidental feature of her self-expression. It is true 
that Lucy is merely describing a set of circumstances (her being bom into a 
Romford family with close relations to a world of local commerce) over which 
she could exercise no control, and so she is not tiying deliberately to orchestrate a 
fit between subjective experience and objective expectations and ‘play up to’ the 
life history genre; but, nevertheless, this can certainly be interpreted as a locally 
familiar way of giving pattern to experience. It would be familiar to her, and 
others within the town, from that other popular local genre, the reminiscence, with 
its conventionalized settings of the town centre and the obsession with local 
shops, their owners and locations. The town centre and its infrastmcture of local 
shops are predominant features of such local stories published by local amateur 
associations in pamphlets with titles such as ‘Old Romford’ and the ‘Romford 
Record’, as well as in the reminiscence columns of the local newspaper, the 
Romford Recorder. Take for example this passage taken from a ‘lecture’ by J B 
Talbot, published in the Essex Times in 1869, wiitten in a characteristically 
peripatetic style. It begins;
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‘Imagine a walk from Hare Street to the West End of the town where 
Gore Pond skirts the London Road...Genteel houses -  trees in front. 
Boarding school -  Miss Youles. Up passage -  Townsend the Constable. 
Then the sausage maker’s shop with the elder Nicholls in view, with 
Collis, Yeoman, Pullover, Belcher discussing whether Bonaparte will 
invade. Bull, Swan, King’s Head and other inns in view. Figes the 
chemist, short and dumpy, Hayward the wine-shop and victualler. 
Delamere in his white apron. The Old Cage is now on the right, and 
behind, the basket-maker. There are pig-pens in front of the houses. 
These ugly pig pens directly in front are a nuisance and ought to be burnt 
up at once, and the shambles on the right ought to share the same fate. 
Behind them stands the old Parish Church of St. Edward and adjoining, 
the attractive shops of Bulwer the linen-draper, Laypold the confectioner 
with the “Lamb” snugly ensconced in the corner. Passing on the little 
company stop for a moment to look at Collier’s beautiful iromnongery 
shop and Attwell’s the watchmaker.’
‘Place’ and places are also recurring motifs in the genre of local 
reminiscence, though their treatment in this genre remains neutral compared with 
the similar evocation of such motifs in the life story genre. In personal stories, 
tellers are far more likely to involve the motifs of particular ‘places’, usually with 
some kind of biographical connection with the author, in a widely predominant 
plot-line which centres around the slow social death of the town through over­
development. This is usually told in such a way as to evoke the moral undertone 
of a loss of community, construed in its relational sense as a ‘focus for social
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interaction and support’ (Finnegan 1998:124). Thus, there is an implicit 
assumption to these tales that the ‘social death’ of the town includes, to a great 
extent, tlie loss of those particular familiar sites that could mobilize the 
community both physically as well as mobilizing its resources toward the end of 
the common good. Indeed, Lucy’s story is a good expression of this. Her story 
explicitly connects the motif of planning and the dramatis personae of planners 
and bureaucratic officials with those people Lucy could recognize and associate 
with, and, along with them, any sense the town had of a ‘mechanical solidarity’. 
What was left was a different kind of social organization than that of a ‘small 
town’ within which Lucy’s parents grew up and so, as Lucy tells us, they moved 
to a small town in Dorset when the council began building the ring road system, 
presaging for the town possibly a more organic future.
The reminiscences do tend to be less vocal than life stories when it 
comes to the critique of urban space and its impact on the lives of its inhabitants, 
but such reminiscences are not themselves institutionally averse to such active 
evaluation. There does tend to be a tacit acceptance built into reminiscences and 
reminiscing that the modern brings with it a slow and inexorable decline toward 
social death for towns, and there are explicit exceptions to the rule. One article 
written for the amateur publication Romford Record was titled ‘How the Old 
Place Has Changed!’, alongside an entry with the title ‘Memories of Happy 
Times’, and, also in the same publication, a poem is reproduced lamenting ‘the 
closing of the cattle market and increasing traffic and development coming to the 
old town’:
133
Ghosts of the pigs in the pig pound.
Shadows of the sheep in the fold.
Phantoms of the farmers in the Public,
Spectres of the market days of old.
Vanquished by the venom of the neons,
Scattered by the charge of bus and car.
Cowering at the onset of the telly.
Stifled by the stench of oil and tar.
Gone is the lure of the Market;
Forlorn is the empty cattle pen,
Romford at night is a ghost town 
Haunted by the vanished husbandmen.^
The idea of ‘tradition’ vanquished by ‘modernity’ is a conventional one. 
But in general there is a sense of descriptive neutrality about the treatment of 
places in local reminiscences, compared with life stories. This is not to say that 
life stories always conform to the narrative schemata of the academy, with their 
many pessimistic stories of the eclipse of traditional community and onset of 
modern ills. As Finnegan discovered, ordinary actors are capable of taking up 
opposed narrative schemata, and creatively refashioning them into taxonomic sets 
that are different from those that operate in the academy; local residents, 
reflecting on their lives in Milton Keynes (the town of ‘three million trees’), 
would frequently bring together the usually antithetical notions of ‘city’ and
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‘nature’ in their naiTatives (Finnegan 1998:160).
It is almost as though the critical evaluations people make toward the 
urban environment in the context of talking about their lives relies for its sense on 
the teller remaining in situ, close to the immediate situation they are describing 
and with which the being of the teller is bound; on the other hand, the immediacy 
of the relation between individual being and place, between the teller and the 
experience of urban changes that threatens to overwhelm them, is lost and 
flattened by the passing of time built into reminiscences, thus enabling the person 
doing the reminiscing to create a defensive distance between themselves and the 
events and produce a more felicitous account of events: ‘happy times’ indeed. All 
this seems to point intentionally toward an interpretation of narrative as ‘doing 
something more’, to modes of speech as more than just their referential function 
(indeed, a particular narrative of this thesis). I explore this further below, but first 
I will introduce some aspects of the life stoiy of another key informant. Les; by 
now, the conventional structuring devices of life stories will be evident in his 
particular nanative, features such as family, urban place and its evaluation, and 
planners and planning.
The amateur pathway
Les was another key informant whom I contacted about his involvement with the 
local amateur history society and participation in the life of the community and, 
like Lucy, Les chose to embellish his account with details of his personal 
experience and a coherent sense of a life histoiy. A major way of framing this 
history was through the device of narrating the many, and in some ways diverse.
 ^W. Pearce, written in 1956.
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pathways that his life course has taken. To give life such a unity and moral depth 
in this way can hardly be viewed as unique but of common occurrence in personal 
stories of British lives. But what is strikingly personal about Les’ chosen 
pathways is the way in which they are represented as having taken place beyond 
the influence of primary social actors in his life (and even to some extent beyond 
a realm of hegemonic cultural values); many of these pathways, in other words, 
tend to centre around the notion of the personal preoccupation, of a sense of a life 
driven by its author’s belief in their ovm individuality and self-determination. 
This itself is arguably not a device unique to Les’ narrative but one that is 
common to many instances of personal stories in Britain. On the one hand, then, 
Finnegan stresses that this is a conventional form of self-expression. The personal 
pre-occupation draws on particular values, attitudes, themes, motifs which, while 
relating to the particular setting of an individual life, has a currency far beyond it, 
embedding the merely temporal within a seemingly more permanent scheme; ‘A 
consuming interest like music, sport or religious adherence’ she argues, ‘may 
function as the continuing thread of a life-story -  effectively integrating themes in 
that, however personal to the individual, these are recognized value-laden 
pathways in our culture’ (Finnegan 1998:103). But even here, where there only 
appears to be the conventional with little room for individual expression. Les’ 
story evidences a personal creativity. For the personal pre-occupation, a 
particularly important pathway leading to his present moment of being, is for Les 
his striving to become an amateur. True, Les has designs on transcending this 
status, on making his preoccupation with local and militaiy history into something 
more permanent, more economically reliable and socially acceptable, in short 
more professional, not to say pedagogically grounded in orthodox academia and
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less autodidactic. But so far his efforts have mainly taken place within amateur 
circles, though interacting occasionally with a professional audience (cf. Stebbins 
1979; Finnegan 1989:15), and so here I analyse his interest in local history as 
being that of an amateur.
As Finnegan goes on to qualify on the issue of personal preoccupations 
as a narrative device, the less culturally recognized interests may require extra 
justificatory activity from the narrator for this ‘explanatory framework’ to work, 
and to be worked. An act of cultural translation is necessary. Given Stebbins’s 
sociological definition of the amateur discussed in the previous chapter, where a 
gap is thought to exist between the understanding of the liminal amateur and the 
world of socio-cultural values associated with the ‘mainstream’, where the 
personal preoccupations evoked in life stories are those belonging to an amateur 
activity, like local history, the narrator’s efforts at cultural translation are 
enlarged. This, I suggest, could be the case with Les.
Les Moore chose to begin his account of a life journey with an 
explanation of how he believed his enduring interest in local history, as a 
relatively esoteric pursuit, first came to be formed:
/  first became interested in local history, or it was brought to my attention, when I  
was in the junior school... The school had four houses and you had to belong to 
one, either Marks, Harvey, Mildmay or Erswick, and they represented Lords o f  
the Manor locally in the borough o f Barking and Dagenham. Marks was named 
after the manor house directly north o f where I  lived about three quarters o f  a 
mile and the moat and the old barn is still there. I  can remember one day we had 
a visit to the barn. We walked up from the school, it was only about ten minutes.
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fifteen minutes walk due north o f Warren [Secondary Modern] School and we 
went in and had a look at this barn and all its different wooden frames. /  can even 
remember the marks o f the men who made it put on the timbers ...Later, I  used to 
go up there with some friends o f mine, Vd say this was about the middish '50s, on 
my little 17" wheel Phillips bike [laughs] and we went to the gun site because my 
father used to be a homeguard gunner at that site. We used to play soldiers and 
things like that, it was really an adventure. In the '60s, we went up there on our 
bigger bicycles and used the handle-bars as launching vessels for small rockets 
and we used to watch newts and things swimming around in the ponds which were 
actual bomb holes. The same with the allotments that my father had: we used to 
put all the rubbish into these big holes in the ground and he told me that they 
were made by German bombers in WWII trying to hit the gun site. North of, and 
almost adjacent to, the gun site, I  remember, there's a huge mound and this was a 
Victorian rubbish tip. We went up there and had a dig around a few times and we 
found all sorts o f things. I  can remember once one o f the boys found what they 
call a cod bottle that had a glass ball in it, we were quite amazed. Other little jars 
and so forths have come to the light...There were quite a few old gentlemen that 
interested me, especially when we went to the allotment. I  can remember that it 
was quite rural ...ifyou stood at the top o f the road, there was a great deal o f the 
countryside to see, there was hardly anything there. Nothing on Marks Gate 
estate except the two farms. Rose Lane Gates and so forth. We used to go and 
have a play over there as well... There was a guy on the allotments who used to be 
in a factory. He used to tell me about some o f the buildings in and around the 
area that he worked on and also further out into Essex and other people used to 
tell me what they did. Even First World War period, sometimes before the First
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World War. And there was an old gentleman who lived just along from me a 
couple o f  doors away who I  used to love going in to talk to. He was in his, I  
suppose, late seventies at the time and he worked at Lloyds at some time as an 
usher but he was a former sea-going man who had some sort o f  ticket. He sailed 
before the mast. He used to tell me o f all sorts o f things that went on around the 
place because his hobby was local history and he was another person I  would 
imagine had facilitated my early interest in the subject.
The last line from this passage, where Les works out within his 
imagination one of the sources that ‘facilitated [his] early interest in the subject’ 
of local history, explicitly indicated one of the underlying conventional devices 
for organizing experience within this genre, the explanatory framework dwelling 
on ‘continuity from the past’ (Finnegan 1998:101). In life stories, moments of 
being never arise outside of a particular context relating to the past (cf. Rapport 
1994); in this case, Les’ stimulating conversations with a fonner serviceman and 
neighbour, as well as the scenes of his early childhood play where he frames 
himself and his friends encountering historical material. Here is a very different 
plot-line from that employed by Lucy, in whose story the family and the symbolic 
capital that they imparted to her (a world-view oriented to the world at large) 
formed the main embodiments of continuity, explaining how she came to arrive at 
her present moment of being. If anything, Les tiies to depart from this model in 
his story, to give the explanatory framework of continuity with the past a different 
content, one distanced from his parents and based around extra-familial 
friendships. Further, this departure can be seen to confirm another ‘value-laden 
pathway in our culture’, what Fimiegan has tenned the ‘individual T, or the self­
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determined life course. Les is showing in the above episodes how he made of the 
diverse contexts of his primary milieu a personal enviromnent for learning, with 
only himself as the unifying element between them.
Far from its lack of strategic importance in Les’ personal stories, the 
family and kinship are here used as vehicles for Les to put to use in justifying his 
choice of an esoteric, seemingly aberrant direction in life, to become an amateur 
local historian. To begin with, there is the sense that his parents never really 
understood his interest in local history and possibly resented him choosing it. Les 
says of his father, for example;
My father would never record for me but unfortunately he recorded for the people 
next door when I  was doing a project... It was extremely difficult for my mother 
and myself and he didn't want to give any interviews and he did for the people 
next door, which was a shame. But he was an interesting guy, he worked in the 
Central Line tunnel at Ilford and was an absolutely brilliant engineer. Eventually, 
he went to work for his brother in Wiltshire. But my father was a top flight 
production engineer. You could talk to him about making things and machine 
tools but it was just unfortunate that he just did not have any interest in historical 
matters. He tried to put me o ff local history, sometimes, I  think, because he 
couldn't be bothered me asking him questions so in the end I just got used to the 
fact o f delving into things myself and getting liaisons with people who were 
interested in local history and picking up on certain subjects
Due to the reticence of his family, and the less than stimulating environment he
According to Stebbins, the modem amateur, or the amateur per se, is ‘defined by his daily 
associates as weird, quaint, or immoral’ and is subsequently ‘pushed to a marginal position with
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found in his childhood home, it can be imagined that Les locates the source of his 
historical interests in the public sphere of the community; he has always been an 
active researcher, perhaps a historical field researcher taking his cues for research 
from a social context. Like that other ‘public intellectual’, eschewing the world of 
private fantasies for the domain of active engagement with fellow urbanites, the 
19*^  century Parisian figure of the flaneur. Les has always sought out a particular 
kind of ‘atmosphere’ for his researches, one that depends not on modernist urban 
predictability in the city, but on the serendipity of chance encounters:
No, it's getting more difficult to do research You couldn't come in here and 
neither could I  and try and ask any o f  these questions because most o f them do not 
want to know. It's probably the wrong time o f day anyway...but I  can't for the life 
o f me imagine you can get any history ofpubs from people in here or much on the 
history o f Romford...this is not the right atmosphere anymore. We're only here 
because we've met before, you've asked me to come and talk to you, simple as 
that. But there wouldn't in the wildest imagination be any time you could see me 
sat here and come over and say 'Do you know anything about Romford's history?' 
and so forth, so that's where it drops down. And that was another thing, when I  
grew up as a child, there were always plenty o f elderly people around who had 
lots o f time for you. You know, they would answer your questions but they don't 
seem to nowadays unless it's going to benefit them. They say, 'Well, are you going 
to buy us a few beers?', or 'Will I  have my name down in your work?', 'Can you 
send me a copy o f the work?'. Obviously, they don't realise that dissertations cost, 
money, that you can't possibly send them a copy o f your dissertation.
respect to them’ (1979:262).
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It can be imagined that what Les is finding increasingly is a decline in those 
conditions whereby contemplative understanding manifests itself in the realm of 
practice, and far less people are likely or willing to talk about their historical 
experiences in public. He tells me:
When it come to local history you're likely to get, in conversation, i f  you sat down 
on a bench out there in South Street-cum-North Street, somebody sat there, an 
elderly person, you could say, 'Oh, I  remember when so and so was there, God, 
hasn't it changed this place!' and you might gel an interesting conversation. Or, 
they might say, 'Oh, I  don't remember' and that was it, finish. I  don't know 
whether this is based on utter disgust by the individual in the fact, well, what's the 
point in talking, they'll only pull this down tomorrow anyway. But how do you 
instill enthusiasm in people in their own environment? It's very, very difficult...a 
lot o f  people, they cannot be bothered talking.
This, for Les, is nothing short of a minor tragedy, and perhaps symptomatic too of 
a wider underlying malaise in contemporary society. It has its expression in 
practice, in people’s behaviour toward others, whether open and receptive or 
closed-in and atomistic: the decline of those for whom part of their public 
comportment is to learn, to cultivate the instrmnents of speech, and, on top of 
these, to engage with others through the instruments of perception that such 
speech allows. These instruments amount to an autodidactic awareness of urban 
space, a concern over what happens to that space but, as Les is led to despairingly 
ask, ‘how do you instill enthusiasm in people in their own environment?’. As Les 
further complains:
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They will not go to evening class or anything like that. Most o f the time they'll just 
sit down and watch TV and that's it. Television has probably done a great deal to 
kill o ff people's interest in their own local history^.
At the exact opposite pole, then, to the set of practices that Les engages in (a 
projecting of contemplative awareness into the public realm of practice where 
facts can be sought out) lies the set of practices surrounding the family, and its 
central focus in many instances, the television. Indeed, through his story. Les 
makes clear that he rejects the habitus of the private home, rejected his own 
experience of a working class private home, for an anomalous position 
somewhere between -  the complementarity of thinking and doing. Rather, for 
Les, the family home fosters a habitus that neither encourages contemplative 
awareness (manifested in cultivation of the instnnnents of speech) nor, through its 
principle practice of television-watching, does it encourage much ‘doing’ beyond 
this sedentary activity. It seems to be the exact contrast to the set of practices that 
Les has built his life around, a bringing together of thinking (about history) 
through practical involvement. As Les says about his parents:
my parents were never interested in local history at all, they were never interested 
in any real hobbies, they, um, just, um, worked and perhaps read the Daily Mirror 
and that was it [...] I  was quite a prolific reader but I  never used to readfiction, I  
was always interested in the true fact books, and I  read about quite a lot o f things
 ^Cf. Stebbins (1979:271): ‘Most critical, however, is the fact that amateurs are marginal to the 
institution of leisure itself... [modem amateurs] implicitly or explicitly reject many of the values, 
attitudes, and patterns of behavior that constitute its core. Like marginal people eveiywhere they 
therefore lack key institutional supports for their goals and for their personal group ways of
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in general, like buildings, I  was quite interested in old buildings and ships, that 
kind o f thing, and it progressed from there. Whenever 1 could, /  would go to 
museums, have a look at things.
What is striking about Les’ depiction here of his parents’ pastimes is not only 
their crudity, but the terseness with which he delivers his portrayal; in both this 
and the above description of television watching. Les uses the tenn ‘and that 
[wa]s it’ seemingly as a way of denying depth and complexity to these activities. 
What Les is repeating here is perhaps what Bourdieu refers to as:
‘the extraordinary realism of the working class [stemming] from the 
closure effect of the homogeneity of the directly experienced social 
world. There is no other possible language, no other life-style, no other 
form of kinship relation; the universe of possibles is closed’ (1984: 381; 
italics in original).
Yet, this is an aspect of the universe that Les is striving to escape. Les, as has 
been shown, seeks ways of bringing contemplative, reflexive awareness into the 
realm of practice, and this is something that he can see as uniquely his own, but, 
importantly, also distinct from that habitus that is associated with the home (was 
associated with his home). It gives Les something he can marshal against the way 
of life of his parents which itself has now become the social norm; it provides Les 
with something that he can found a positive identity around. This is where Les 
finally manages to justify what is often regarded as an esoteric pathway in 
Western culture, the social status of the amateur. In depicting his amateurism, or
reaching them’.
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autodidactic activities, in the way that he does. Les seems to suggest that in 
actuality the liminal behaviour of the amateur is more contributory, in social 
terms, than bland conformity to society’s norms, embedded in the form of an 
ordinary domestic lifestyle, and in particular his parents’ way of life. Finally, and 
ironically, in this sense, his parents are embodiments of continuity, providing an 
explanatory framework for Les’ personal story.
As a theoretical aside here, before moving onto a discussion of the final 
account, I want to briefly re-examine the underlying principles and assumption of 
applying a narrative-centred approach to analysing personal experiences of the 
city, I hinted in the introduction of the potential problems of an approach that 
reduced all urban worlds to their symbolic, that is representational, dimensions, 
and that what is left out of such investigations are those aspects of reality that are 
non-representational and anti-discursive. Policing the Cartesian opposition of 
mind (the symbolic/representational) and body (the practical/pragmatic) has, 
recent consensus has supposed, resulted in a favouring of the cognitive within 
socio-cultural anthropology which, once it is exposed, demonstrates the flaws in 
its conceptions of culture. It may be possible however, as some theorists have 
recently suggested (e.g. Jackson 2002; Charlesworth 2000b), to leave aside the 
representational in favour of a pragmatic imderstanding of stories and story-telling 
discourse. The argument, in short, of the pragmatist understanding of story-telling 
discourse is that the study of narratives need not be the exclusive province of 
those who take a symbol-centred approach to the conception of culture, with all 
that this implies in terms of the now much weakened stance toward 
representational theories of meaning in anthropology, and the opening up of the 
discipline to the consideration of practice and the multi-modality of human
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communication (Finnegan 2002).
It is not that the language of story-telling is only descriptive and 
referential; indeed, as is exemplified above {a la Finnegan and Gusfield), it is 
frequently evaluative, heuristic, ideological. But, for Jackson, story-telling also 
has convincing pragmatic effects:
‘For story-telling does not necessarily help us understand the world 
conceptually or cognitively; rather, it seems to work at a “protolingustic” 
level, changing our experience of events that have befallen us by 
symbolically re-stiucturing them’ (2002:16).
It is in this sense that the personal writing and re-writing of social 
realities, (‘symbolically re-structuring’ worlds in crisis through the device of 
story-telling) seeks to reassure the author of their ability to control events, at least 
render tliem meaningful to themselves. Indeed, this may be why stoiy-telling in 
the city, and the multifarious stories of the city as a recognizable genre, is so 
popular, and why those whose lives have been changed by urban circumstances 
(by top-heavy bureaucracy, by organizations located outside of local community, 
by the seemingly autonomous workings of malign entities such as ‘modem 
society’ and ‘modern civilisation’, even by alien and foreign Others) have 
recourse to express themselves, and organize their lives, through story-telling. I 
feel that the adequacy of a narrative-cum-representational approach is limited by 
its failure also to acknowledge the practical worlds in which individual urban 
subjects are involved and inexorably embedded. The alternative approach, which 
aims to replace ‘the conscious-subject linguistically constituting experience’ with
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‘that totality of being that language and sense emerge from’ (Charlesworth 
2000b:63) as a totalizing approach to urban experience, does offer an effective 
reminder of the contribution of pre-linguistic experiences in shaping discourse on 
the contemporary British city. BoiTowing from such an understanding means 
refusal to reject the individual’s everyday practical encounters with a world that 
has changed to such an extent over the course even of a single lifetime that, to 
some speakers, it no longer seems to nurture the individual but fosters a deep 
sense of insecurity, doubt and displacement. There are many instances where such 
crises become manifested in people’s speech about their home towns, when they 
speak about feeling like ‘strangers’ in their own communities (like Lucy) or being 
isolated (as in the story to come). Rather than anthropologists focusing on 
naiTatives that speak of strangerhood and isolation as typical characteristics of the 
city as so many resources for organizing experience ‘conceptually or cognitively’, 
it is a matter of doing justice to the existential as well as the merely stylistic 
motivations behind statements about towns and cities no longer possessing a sense 
of ‘community’, of not knowing people, of being unable to feel at home, of 
feeling unsafe in public places and a deep disgust toward the urban environment 
and its people whose comportment seems to absorb so many of its negative 
characteristics. The last word here may be left with Charlesworth who, observing 
working class speech in the post-mining town, remarked that:
‘what the individuals said emerged ftom a primordial understanding, 
from coping with changes affecting their affective responses, and the 
words described how these changes break through to, and disturb, 
consciousness’ (2000b:81).
147
The body in the city: the insidious stress of modernity
In conversation with Oliver, a librarian coming up to retirement age and the 
author of local history books, the succession of topics comes back, once again, to 
the hoary local subject of families, this time through a discussion of 
reminiscences. This is something about which Oliver has his own ideas:
I  think [reminiscences are] important in relating you to the wider issues o f history 
because i f  you look at it, it is very hard to see sometimes these trends unless you 
see them, as I say, like myself, you see the town change dramatically. I  had the 
goodfortune to see it from more or less the beginning o f the new shopping city, so 
you knew what had happened. When I  came in 1967, it could have been probably 
1939. A little bit changed, one or two American influences were coming in, but 
these people who produce the reminiscences have spent a lifetime in Romford, it 
was when life was more personal. Today that is a problem people are struggling 
against always in wanting leisure time. It's because they realize they've lost family 
life. It's not quite the family and morality that the previous government spoke 
about which you need to bring back. Well, people don't actually know their own 
families now, they work so hard. There's that problem isn't there and also all this, 
you know, all these ideas o f Plazas and Costas and all that is a way o f thinking 
through the idea o f spending more time with the family. We're always hearing o f  
politicians and people who've lost their jobs say that aren't we? People who are 
older understand this because they remember quite clearly family life. I  mean, 
there are still people I  know who have sort o f families, I  mean extended families.
148
It's really the Mediterranean concept we're bringing back to Romford o f actually 
knowing your cousins. I  mean, how many people around here know their cousins 
or uncles to any great extent. After the War things went pretty much back to how 
they were be.fore the War for quite a few years until the youth revolution o f the 
1960s. That is, people used to come visit because you didn't have much leisure 
time. It was a different sort o f working thing, you seemed to work long hours but 
somehow you used every bit o f  your leisure time, people visited each other in their 
houses and you had the front room and on Sunday it was got ready and the aunts 
all came and you actually talked about your family^. You knew some o f your 
family history first hand. Now people often have to have to struggle a bit to 
contact aunts and uncles and get their birth certificates so that you can follow 
their family history. But perhaps people began to realise the importance o f family 
after going to the Mediterranean and going to other areas where there are still 
extensive family groups and that is what's driving the leisure and pleasure 
industry in Romford isn't it, going out with sort ofpeople in your own family and 
with friends and relatives. Everybody's family actually includes people who are 
not really your family but they are very close friends. Again, that is another 
element in places like Romford: there are a lot o f young professionals who are 
probably living and eating on their own. There was that survey the other day 
wasn't there which said that about 70% o f people are having their evening meals 
in cities on their own. I  suspect some o f them will now be coming out and meeting 
other people. Some people do live very lonely professional lives now, that is 
another aspect o f it.
Cf. Young and Willmott on patterns of visiting relatives in housing estates on the outskirts of 
London during the 1950s (1957:137).
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First, these thoughts on the family may be compared to those of Lucy and 
Les, In addition, then, to the family having turned into a shrine of silence, with 
people unwilling to engage each other in contemplative conversation but just 
sitting in front of television-sets, lacking the motivation to go outside and think 
for themselves (think as they are doing), or society as a network of families with 
ties in common which are breaking up as towns are massifying, there is here the 
problem of the family declining in size. The contemporary problem, it seems to 
Oliver, is that relatives are becoming estranged from one another, just another 
extension of the estrangement of the modern British city. At best, all that may be 
left is the conjugal family (denying people the rich and extensive family 
experiences they may have had in the past) but, at worst, there is the atomism of 
single-person households. Not only is this a problem for Oliver; Les too remarked 
how researchers like himself are now filling in the gaps in historical knowledge 
left by fragmenting, geographically dispersed families. Histoiy carries 
connotations of a lost togetherness.
The problem, it seems, is that people these days are having to spend 
longer hours working which detracts from the amount of time they would like to 
spend with their families. Their commitments to the time regimes of the work 
society are experienced as being antagonistic to the private time of family life; as 
Oliver puts it ‘people don’t actually know their own families now, they work so 
hard’. While there was still a work ethic, before the Second World War, and in the 
years immediately after it, nevertheless people still managed to foster their 
familial ties and maintain large families. It is as though it was easier to strike a 
balance between ‘long working hours’ and ‘your leisure time’, and people would 
actually take time to visit relatives’ houses, reserve relatives special space (such
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as the front-room on Sundays), talk about family history, and sustain interaction 
with relatives who now seem peripheral, like aunts. Indeed, such is the lack of a 
proper balance between work and leisure/family time in the present, that the home 
is no longer the arena for contact with a past through those kin who once acted as 
the arbiters of family history, as Firth (1970) defines them in his ethnography of 
middle class families in London. Families have a tendency to be selective about 
who they commit to memory and who cannot be ‘known’. That some kin can get 
dropped off ‘the mental genealogical map’ is confirmation that the ties of ‘the 
family’ are not immutable, fixed in nature, but must be continually maintained to 
ensure that they remain more than just tenuously linked to social memory. Indeed, 
ties must be continuously supported through affirmation else kinship relations can 
quickly go cold, obsolete and forgotten. For kinship ties to remain meaningful 
they require the active work of continual reaffirmation. For relatives to become 
‘unknown’ to each other is a form of social death that is the genealogical 
equivalent to Les’ observation of relatives dying off in his area.
It is Oliver’s belief, then, that an improper balance between work and 
leisure is having an unhealthy effect on institutions like the family in 
contemporary urban society. But he is beginning now to notice changes in town 
centres that seem to indicate people’s sudden cognizance of the problems with 
their families. What Oliver liked to call the ‘Costa del South Street’, a sudden 
rush of continental-style restaiuants, outdoor seating, and coffee bars appearing 
alongside the pie-and-mash shops in the busy eating and entertaimnent ‘zone’ of 
the town, can be put down to, he believes, an awareness of spending more time 
with families. People are turning to coffee shops as a means of playing out their 
fantasies of spending more leisure time in family groups.
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What this reading of events by Oliver admits to is a pervasive, and 
invasive, experience of stress in the modem British city. Here is modem society 
absorbing of social energy, such that people are increasingly being divorced from 
their family life by long working hours, not ‘knowing’ who their relatives are due 
to over-working, and culminating in the unhealthiness of lonely professionals 
‘having their evening meals in cities on their own’. In that the effect of modem 
conditions on the individual may be a form of strain that is not direct and definite 
but diffuse, cumulative, even euphemistic, located in social stmctures as well as in 
the body, this type of stress from modemity may be temied ‘insidious’, according 
to the dual categorization of stress provided by Landy (1977); for Landy, stress 
must be recognized as an interdisciplinary problem, manifesting itself along a 
scale from the individual and psychic, to the familial, to the socio-cultural 
(1977:312).
The theme of the (stressed) body in the city is one that also appears in 
Lucy’s story. To end on a note from Lucy:
partly it's the London commuter problem that the people with the get-up~an-go 
are working hard on their careers, they make a long exhausting journey in and to 
come back at night and they 're simply tired in the evenings, they simply don't 
want to go out. O f all things, the Southend Historical Society, which has been 
going nearly 80 years, has just folded, it's gone because nobody's got the energy 
to run it [...] this is the trouble, and people are working longer hours which 
means it only leaves the old people. They think they've struggled their guts out all 
their lives and are not working anymore, that's the trouble, but it is particularly
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bad in this area. I think it is the whole o f  the east side ofLondon. ^
Conclusion: the writing of urban social reality
I began this chapter by mentioning the ordinaiy register of personal stories. The 
manner in which generic boundaries of life stories are defined differ from those 
genres of communication that have traditionally been granted ethnographic 
importance by the anthropologist, and I mentioned above a few possible reasons 
why such a genie may have escaped ethnographic attention. Personal life stories, 
involving the narrating of a life career through the city, do not benefit from the 
unambiguous indicators of heightened expression of a genre such as oral poetry 
(Finnegan 1976, 1977). But, nevertheless, as Finnegan confirms, there is an 
implicit artistry involved in seemingly the most natural and artless, the least 
‘italicized’, forms of commimication and self-expression. That is to say that these 
putatively ‘artless’ forms of communication (fluid rather than structured, 
accidental rather than deliberately intentioned) are actually conventionally 
structured on closer inspection. Agents competent in the forms have been 
acculturated into these conventions through a process of tacit learning such that 
their reproduction (and proper interpretation) is almost second-nature to them. In 
addition, there are the different interpretative contexts in which the social 
exchange partakes. While some of these lingusitic competencies are locally 
acquired, such as the exchange of themes relating to the ‘social death’ of a 
particular town through specific local experiences of planning, others may have 
currency beyond the confines of the local, such as the popularity of the conflicting
As Charlesworth’s work shows, a change in the nature of the socio-economicaUy mediated space 
around the self, even though it may not be directly threatening to physical integrity, often does
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paradigms of community and society; others accrue more personal significance 
from the individual experience of the narrator who creatively transforms their 
world through symbolically re-structuring it in the act of story-telling (Finnegan 
1977:274/.
Among these narrative ‘pathways’, along which life history narrators 
may cognitively travel to make sense of each other’s stories, one which held 
particular resonance for the narrators in Romford was the theme of the family, and 
in particular the human struggles of keeping the family together (amidst changes 
in urban scale, amidst war, amidst the conflicting commitments of leisure and 
work, amidst death of relatives, amidst their apathy toward other members). 
Remaining in the same geographical area of London-Essex, this particular story­
line, of the pressures on the structure of the family in the city, is one of the 
principle concerns to be identified with Michael Yoimg and Peter Willmott’s 
classic sociological work of the 1950s, Family and Kinship (and it is to this study 
that I turn in Chapter 6).
Earlier in this chapter I felt justified in referring to personal stories as a 
kind of literary document. Indeed, a case may be made for just such a designation: 
there is a certain enduring institutionality to these stories which the teller may or 
may not be consciously aware of, they give recognizable shape to experience, and 
their performance involves the following of certain identifiable stylistic (and thus 
‘literaiy’) conventions. Writing is now discussed in the academy, not in its 
previous naturalistic terms, but as the orchestration of a generic fit between 
different types of conventional practice. In the case of personal stories, life is not 
originally experienced in the form in which it is finally conveyed to the narrator’s
have effects that show up on the phenomenal body (2000a:/?av.s7w, 2000b:/>a.ss7w),
 ^Cf. Rapport (1987) on the city as a sliding-scale of meaningfid agreements and disagreements.
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audience; there is a moment of translation into a different set of conventional 
categories -  a symbolic structuring of experience. In the kind of discourse I have 
examined here can be seen a way of transposing the stylistic attributes of 
‘personal stories’ about the city onto ordinaiy experience. This itself is an act of 
‘writing’, the writing of British urban social reality.
alignments and divergences, around the theme of violence.
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CHAPTERS
Energetic moments and sociological stock-taking: Narratives of the 1960s 
I: The social discourse of the 1960s
In an article on British civil society, Peter Loizos (1996) has put forward the 
suggestion for the sociological usefulness of civic institutions, looking to take the 
civic ideal beyond its original conception by the classical political thinkers. The 
problem of civic society in liberal democracies, he reflects, is the problem of the 
disjuncture between the individual and the collective, as his opening question 
demonstrates:
‘How does an ordinary citizen answer with certainty questions about the 
quality of civic life, questions which go beyond how far his or her 
particular pay cheque will stretch?’ (1996:50).
The problem of civic society for Loizos, in other words, inheres in the possibility 
of moving from a sense of personal experience to an understanding of collective 
life, and it is one that threatens the very coherence, and thus effectiveness, of civic 
debate in liberal democratic societies. Loizos has precise ideas about civil society, 
its definition and conditions of existence, which I would also endorse:
‘I approach civil society as an ideal which points to a complex of 
influential associations which may create themselves within the
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framework of liberal states. These associations are not creatures of the 
state but serve to comment on it and modify it. Civil society can exist 
only while the state tolerates its existence’ (1996:50).
Yet to achieve the aims implicit within the civic ideal, of acting as a check on the 
State as interpretive agent within society, takes a sociological effort, as Loizos has 
argued: a rounded, universalistic understanding of what it is that is the object of 
civic scrutiny, the historic society itself. This requires the facilitation of a coherent 
discourse, for such a debate cannot take place on a purely unorganised, 
particularistic and ad hoc basis, and toward this end it would be useful to have a 
few ‘zones of shared perceptions of the recent past’ (1996:50) so that ‘one could 
wish that amidst all this liberal diversity we had, as a baseline from which to 
disagree, a good shared sense of our recent British past and world histoiy, and 
some rigorous but memorable models of social causation to fall back on’ 
(1996:60). Thus, the kind of knowledge that Loizos would wish for to empower 
civic understanding in Britain would be sufficiently flexible to operate as 
‘cognitive schemata] for thinking about...complex problems ‘all at once” 
(1996:53), without the disadvantages of having to leave out ‘inconvenient 
exceptions’ and certain ‘key relativities’ (1996:52). These, for Loizos, would truly 
be the foundations for independent civic thought, forearming the public against 
the whims of aggressive ideologues, and elevating civic knowledge as a form of 
sociological stock-taking. This kind of sociological stock-taking, as I have 
referred to it here, was the kind of practice that I noticed was going on all the time 
in Romford, in those social fields where the civic voice was heard the loudest 
(such as local newspapers, but also in meetings, and just among the public
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themselves as they carried out other routines across the city), and can no doubt be 
generalised to the British city as a whole. What I am concerned to discuss and 
illustrate here is the conventional discursive bases of such ‘sociological stock­
taking’; how also does narrative enter into the contemporary civic life of towns 
and cities, such as Romford?
The problem in Loizos’s proposal is this: how is it possible to use 
sociological models of how the social world ‘is’ as an objective reality (‘models 
of social causation’, ‘cognitive schemata’) to create judgements on how it ‘ought’ 
to be for those belonging to civil society? Once again, it is Gusfield who provides 
the relevant link between the social scientific tools for making informed sense of 
the quality of life in modern societies and popular knowledge of the social world: 
indeed, he sees ‘the debate over the question of community-society not as a 
scientific discussion of analytic theories but of the quality of contemporary life’ 
(1975:102). Botli knowledges rely on a rhetoric that while appearing objective and 
scientific, conceal a level of personal diversity and utility. Such seemingly 
‘descriptive’ terms, Gusfield suggests, are really attempts to ‘write’ the individual, 
partial experience of the researcher (or citizen) into conventional terms for proper 
generic expression (whether social scientific or popular).
The urban idiom and the 1960s
In popular understandings of the social world, in Romford in particular, one 
decade seems to have generated a social discourse of its own, eliciting much 
excitement, interest and controversy: the 1960s. For popular actors in the town, 
the 1960s was a turning point, or, in civic terms, a moment for sociological stock­
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taking. It is the social legacy of the 1960s that animates much popular discussion 
of the decade. One aspect of this social legacy provokes particular interest in 
Romford, so much so that it has almost become an institutionalised feature of the 
social discourse of the 1960s: the urban idiom. Writing of its counterpart, the inral 
idiom, and the part that it plays in the British nostalgic imagination at the turn of 
the century, McEarchen (2000) has argued that the national media (through 
popular television genres) are one of the main sites where the cultural significance 
surrounding the idea of the rural is reproduced, and representations of the 1960s 
are a means of re-visiting the British cultural hegemony of that decade. But, while 
the national media may be a key site for re-visiting the 1960s in a rural idiom, as 
Finnegan’s work has shown, personal stories can be seen as the site for creating 
and reproducing (and increasingly complexifying) the cultural significance of 
urban ideas. If, as Raymond Williams has suggested, the potency of the rural 
idiom as a nostalgic device has increased in inverse proportion to the actual social 
existence of places that may be recognised as ‘rural’, then Finnegan’s work 
suggests that the cultural significance of urban ideas increases in direct proportion 
to the city’s growth in size; the more people located (even trapped) within its 
many forms, the more people seek to utilise its cultural significance to their own 
advantage.
As a moment for sociological stock-taking, the 1960s is commonly 
represented as pregnant with fixture possibilities (it is what gives the 1960s, 
especially when conveyed in the rural idiom, its nostalgic appeal to a generation 
which saw their lives change on a social scale during the ensuing decades). For 
example, it is only fiom a position of embeddedness in the present that Sheila 
Rowbotham can write:
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‘even as the political and social radicalism of the era was being buried 
deep under the waste deposits of Conservatism, sixties pop culture was 
sent off to rehab. A sanitized ‘sixties’ were to re-emerge, glossily 
packaged as the snap, crackle and pop fun time, to be opened up 
periodically for selective nostalgic peeps on cue: the pill, the miniskirt. 
Swinging London, Revolution in the Streets. As if anything was ever so 
simple’ (2000:xi).
In the discourse of cultural studies, too, Leon Hunt can take stock of the 
1960s and argue that it was a decade of permissiveness and experimentation 
among a bourgeois elite, of which the 1970s working class popular culture was 
the proper heir: in other words, the 1960s was a time when the ‘counter-culture’ 
was safely pursued at the social margins and had not yet touched the social 
mainstream. Conversely, writing from the perspective of the postmodern, ‘post- 
subculturalist’ present, David Muggleton (2000) could already see in the 1960s 
counter-culture an ethos that would provide support for the culture of late 
capitalism so that, from his vantage point of tlie present, such normative values of 
the contemporary social mainstream such as individualism, freedom of self- 
expression, innovation and flexibility can be safely projected back onto the 1960s, 
and the 1960s ‘rehabilitated’ and brought back into the fold.
In civic tenns, there seems to be a broad consensus around the view that 
the 1960s were, if nothing else, a moment of heightened experience: ‘Whatever 
the particular case, the general point is that various stories of ‘how we came to be 
where we are right now’ begin with ‘the Sixties” , Townsley has argued, making
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the ‘trope’ of the 1960s a valuable index of the political world-views of its users 
(Townsely 2001). This heightened intensity, a trait of a moment of being % seems 
to add to its credence as a sociological explanation for changes in the social 
world, adding to its potential civic usefulness and general cognitive value.
Stories of planning in the 1960s
In conversation with Oliver over the comparisons between contemporaiy planning 
and earlier development in Romford, he tells me how he begun to notice that:
things started to go wrong because the planners didn*t necessarily all live in 
Romford themselves. They weren V necessarily local people as in the past, as in 
the 19*^  ^century people did come in from outside with money but the local people 
had a very strong kind o f grip on what was going to happen to the town.
In tlie past, when planning was conducted in situ by local people, it was 
easier to control the rate of development in the town. People often reflect on how 
the townsfolk of the past had much local autonomy, and the historical material 
presented in the second chapter suggests that this was indeed the case, with much 
economic independence fostering commercial growth and an autonomous social 
structure based around the families of local dignitaries. ‘The 1960s’, so memories 
recall, came as a great shock to the townsfolk. It is not imcommon for isolated or 
independent local communities to image themselves in terms of a natural 
integratedness, akin to that foimd in the natural world, and a proper balance
‘ Cf. Rapport (1994:156-89).
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between culture and nature^, and so also there were similar images among the 
local townsfolk of a Tost Romford’, a Romford of local autonomy, where new 
developments (always carried out by those in the community) would always 
succeed in maintaining a proper balance and harmony with the surroundings. It is 
not uncommon, then, in civic discourse, to find the blame for contemporary 
planning ills not placed at the door of the locals but directed at a system that 
placed town planning in the hands of certain extra-local others -  the villainous 
figure of the sinister outsider. For this reason, in local discourse, planning and the 
loss of local community identity are often married, and it is also why the theme of 
‘decline of community’ is often bound in local folk memory with a precise 
historical moment. The 1960s, as Oliver argues, seems to break all previous 
historical precedents in terms of town planning. There was something perhaps 
uniquely unsettling about it. The town development, for Oliver:
has actually been quite violent... Planners in the ‘50s and ‘60s and ‘70s had too 
much power because they had the bomb sites and they still had a lot o f what they 
call ‘back-lots ’ behind the shops. Here was a place with bowling greens and what 
have you but very little o f substance. So obviously it must have seemed a good 
place to start a new Romford in. But in order to take the traffic out -  they 
probably didn't take it far enough out -  things were decided very quickly in the 
end. This is probably because the planners suddenly found ‘we are very powerful 
people ’ back in the ‘60s, ‘everybody believes we know what the future is ‘...So [the 
planners] were confronted with councillors who wanted to get things done 
quickly, told to make a plan and everything happened then very quickly. You see.
Cf. Rapport (1994:138).
162
part o f the problem is that the planners didn Y understand the soul o f Romford. 
And then in about ’65 things really started moving. You’d  get someone like 
Councillor [...] probably, not to mention names, but he was like any other 
councillor who became a leader and a strong person in the Council; he’d go 
straight ahead with an idea, just as he did with the Dolphin Centre, remember? 
New baths were needed for the town and he wanted a new landmark so the 
Dolphin Centre was built^. Really it was built with too much concrete and not 
enough natural elements... Ye.% it was a vigorous time, the 1960s. I think it was 
almost like the Elizabethan Age in a way. Yes, a mini-Elizabethan Age. Everybody 
thought they knew where they were going suddenly.
The unsettling nature of the 1960s planning was not so much that it came 
in by the town’s ‘unguarded’ and thus vulnerable back door, the tabula rasa that 
was civic space of bomb sites and back lots, but the tempo of the planning, fuelled 
by the ideological belief among the officials and planner that they were setting out 
to realise a ‘Brave New World’, one which the local historian commentator 
recognises as partaking in the spirit of that other ‘vigorous time’, the Elizabethan 
Age. Here is a depiction then of the historical development of Romford as a town 
as fuelled by a particular kind of dynamic; towns change, progress through time, 
through sudden energetic moments of intensity, and in this can be seen a parallel 
on the individual level with Woolfs notion of ‘moments of being’. Elizabethan 
England was one example (which has been referred to as Romford’s ‘Golden 
Age’) and the 1960s was another. The urban changes to Romford have a very 
active genesis for townsfolk.
 ^A flag-sliip design project of the 1980s, standing at the entrance to the town, now disused and 
decaying.
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But beyond the particularistic detail of Oliver’s story of the town, it is 
also possible to discern a generalisable plot-line that imbues others’ stories of the 
town centred around the 1960s, as will be shown. This is the plot-line of ‘the little 
people’, ‘the faceless citizen’, oppressed or cast aside by impersonal forces 
(whether a monarch, the State, Capitalism or its particular minions, the 
bourgeoisie and their cohort of greedy officials).
It is this conception and representation of the town’s historical dynamics, 
a progression through sudden energetic moments, that I wish to explore in Lucy’s 
narrative. Further, I will examine how such moments, as instantiated here by the 
1960s, do not just metaphorically possess an energy but also possess the quality of 
epistemological privilege as they are ubiquitously used to fathom patterns within 
longer time frames (whether individual lives or collective histories of 
commimities).
An instance of this is Lucy’s reflection on the demolition of the Romford 
Breweiy site, which had occurred just a few years earlier:
/  think that with the loss o f the brewery, Romford finally lost the last o f any 
individuality it had. The market place, in my opinion, was destroyed years ago.
Again, planning and an individual local identity are closely interwoven themes. 
The events that Lucy is refening to, the ‘destruction’ of tire market place (a 
metonymic expression of the town given its historical importance) can be traced 
back to the ambitious planning developments of the 1960s era. It was at this time, 
Lucy recalls, that a building that was personally meaningful to her and also of
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intrinsic historical importance was pulled down as part of the redevelopment of 
the market place:
1 remember my favourite bookshop -  it was under the new arcade somewhere [ in 
the market place] -  when they dug it out there was just this little hole in the 
ground which had once been the cellar. It should never have been destroyed, that 
building. It went back to about 1400...Yes, they’ve come, they’ve gone! 
[laughter]. I  remember, there were some interesting buildings on that side o f the 
market place but they weren't o f much architectural value but the old bookshop 
was and simply because o f sheer age it ought to have been preserved. They were 
just interesting old buildings down there with nice, typical vernacular 
architecture. They also ripped down the cottages and just left that patch o f green 
at the far end o f the market. Everything’s gone!
That Lucy should be personally moved by so much of the redevelopment 
of the town, its ‘destruction’, its ‘ripping’ of the urban fabric, and thoughtlessness 
with which it was carried out, attests to the importance of time to her existence. 
Indeed, in general, it is not imcommon to hear people professing an intimate 
‘love’ for an aspect of a landscape and a palpable feeling of hurt when it is altered, 
de-contextualised or removed. It is a point also made by Adam:
‘we are temporally extended in time and space. We transcend not just our
present but our historical, socio-cultural and geographical location.
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Moreover, our temporal being expands beyond our personal boundaries 
to significant others and even to strangers’ (1995:14-5
And Jackson further remarks that:
‘subjectivity is not really a fixed attribute of persons, but the product of 
any purposeful and committed activity we enter into with those we love 
and things we value’ (2002: 66)
Thus, there must be a temporal aspect to this subjectivity.
It is necessary, though, to put the market redevelopments in some broader 
context. There was a strong ambivalence among the townsfolk toward the aims of 
the mid-twentieth century planners. Is it true that all of the redevelopments that 
occurred during this time were unwelcome to the townsfolk? As people have had 
time to ratiocinate over the problems of the older townscape, the tangible changes 
that were occurring are from hindsight partially rationalised on the basis of 
consensual agreement. The original ‘planning’ of the town was indeed inadequate 
for an era of increasing car use and road schemes, and it was generally thought 
that having a main road through the centre of a busy marketplace on market day 
was a hazard. Yet, as Lucy’s comment above illustrates, these general 
understandings often raised personal friction when mapped onto the local 
townscape as an enshrinement of personal meanings and stories. On the one hand, 
the means by which the changes were carried out are regarded as enigmatic by 
townsfolk, even though there was knowledge about, and even agreement over, the
Cf. Reed (1999).
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ends to be achieved through redevelopment. The means of execution seemed 
meaningless to local residents, even gratuitous: there was seemingly no purpose to 
the senseless destruction of what were ‘just interesting old buildings’ and places 
evocative of community and personal memories. But all this, as many residents 
realised, was to improve on the safety of tlie town which, like communities 
elsewhere in Britain according to conventional imagery, had grown up piecemeal 
over the centuries, and the rationalisation of urban space was recognised as the 
way to achieve these immediate improvements.
What I am also pointing to here is the contradiction between the local 
shop, say, as the objectification of a middle class discourse of community (Miller 
2001), and the failure of local shops often to actualise this ideology. Looking at 
the journalistic commentaiy from the local press over the proposed 
redevelopments during the 1960s, there is ample empirical evidence that 
contradicted the idyllised image of the local shop as the hub of a putative 
Gemeinschaft-like utopia. It is thus more likely that redevelopments were met 
with an excitement over, and general appetite for, the promises of modernisation, 
cast in present narratives as a villainous protagonist opposed to the ‘hero’ figure 
of community, but in actuality broadly welcomed by townsfolk at the time. Not all 
voices expressed an imqualified acceptance that modernisation would improve on 
extant problems; some were warmly cautious. Take, for example, this ironic 
panegyric to modernisation written by a journalist at the time of the 
redevelopment:
‘Hand me my lute, and I will sing of the bright new Romford to come,
heigh-ho. A town without parallel, east of London./ For redevelopment is
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in the air. All! That magic card with which the wily councillor charms the 
savage beast of the ratepayer... or something./Gone will be the old dirty 
Romford, they say. In its place will rise, like a phoenix from the ashes -  a 
new dirty Romford!/ For verily, to the cynical journalist, it looks as if 
more things in Romford change, the more they stay the same’.
Caution must be exercised in distinguishing between thematic narrative 
and empirical realities. But what the journalist’s ironic panegyric registers is, 
more or less, a sense of continuity with the past, that there are many aspects of it 
that continue to dissatisfy its users, just as it probably did in the past, and this is 
possibly more accurate than the more overt thematic narratives that adopt a more 
nostalgic viewpoint. The conflict between the ideology of local shops as 
community and the failure of local shops always to actualise this ideology in 
concrete reality will be developed in relation to Lucy’s story as it touches on her 
use of local coimnerce as a commimity idiom. Suffice it to say that bureaucracy- 
led modernisation was as much welcomed as it has become demonised in present 
narratives.
Alongside the safety issues, another justification for urban planning in 
Romford is frequently evoked, more by concerned officials than ordinary citizens: 
the threat that Romford might get left behind in the post-war economic boom that 
was sweeping Britain, or, at the very least, the dangers of Romford losing its 
privileged strategic status to competing local towns. There was no choice it 
seemed but to submit (willingly or imwillingly) to market pressures.
A set of proposals were presented to Romford Council’s Building and 
Town Planning and Highways Committees in March 1957 by the County Area
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Fig. 5.1: Part of the Romford ring-road, March 1999.
Planning Officer, L. L. Pritchard, setting in place the genesis of the town centre 
redevelopment scheme, the town’s first town centre. It was originally planned to 
cover a 12 acre area of ‘empty’ land. The plans were eventually redefined by the 
international property investment company Hammersons^ who planned to 
transform Romford town centre into a flag-ship British project, what the local 
media at the time referred to as a ‘housewife’s dream’, or ‘ultra-modern shopping 
utopia’. Local reports record an initial state of uncertainty surrounding the funding 
behind the project, with some landowners unwilling to sell their property. There 
was some panic over the possible consequence of Hammersons ’s threats to pull 
out and relocate to a competing town centre site eager for their patronage and 
investment, and for a while private landowners stalled the deal with their 
negotiators over payment for their land, amidst much concern -  a press headline 
of October 2°  ^ 1959 read ‘Town’s Trading Future Is At Stake’. However, the 
problems were eventually resolved and the plans to build Romford’s first 
shopping centre. The Liberty, went ahead. But that was ‘the 1950s’, a completely 
different story.
One of the first building projects to facilitate the planned economic 
expansion of the town was the ring road system, directing vehicular traffic away 
from the town centre which was to become pedestrianised, bestowing order on 
urban space (fig.5.1). It also marked the first major large-scale change to the 
aesthetics of the town. The 1950s was indeed an anticipative moment, as Lucy 
reflects:
 ^Cf. Miller (1998) for another example of an ethnographic investigation of a Hammersons-fiinded I
project. I
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When they opened the ring road, that was the beginning o f the end in a way. That 
was 1958,1 remember we all went down to see the last bus go through the market! 
[Laughter]. Then again, 1 think most people quite welcomed it. The traffic was 
total hell through the market. Can you imagine the traffic that there is now in 
South Street all trying to get through a crowded market place with people dashing 
backwards and forwards? And the traffic was coming down South Street as well, 
because it turned at the corner into the lower end o f the market place here. It 
really was absolutely wicked! I  think most people were just relieved to get the 
pressure off the shopping area. But in so doing we lost a lot o f the town. [For 
example] Just along here, where Debenhams is now, there used to be a plant 
nursery, a lovely garden...
In this episode can be noted an ambiguity over how Lucy denotes time. 
There is the conventional time reckoning of years: it was 1958. But there is also 
the more subjective denoting of time which has more extensive implications as 
her story of the community develops: the measuring of the town’s historical 
progression in the irregular fonn of a final bus journey to which she herself was a 
witness -  a private moment of being. Lying as it does on the cusp of a new decade 
and new ‘era’, this moment of being becomes a potentially valuable 
epistemological resource for Lucy; immersed in it at the time, it would have been 
characterised by a celebratory atmosphere, but experienced from the present at 
will, it becomes a soured reminder of things to come. As I remarked, for Lucy, the 
closing of the market to redirect vehicular traffic around a ring road encircling the 
town (like a noose) marked the first movement in a series of subsequent major 
changes which threatened the very identity and nature of tlie town. The memory
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of the last bus is made to carry a weight of revelation insofar at it seemed 
emblematic of the extinguishing of multiple signifiers of place and thus of local 
identity.
The imaging of the final bus journey becomes meaning-laden for Lucy in 
a number of ways. It heralds the extinction of the town’s historic ecological form 
approximating to the image of a traditional community (such that roads and their 
traffic once had to negotiate its piecemeal form rather than building urban forms 
around the road network, forcing the human to conform to the economic), making 
it possible to image road schemes signifying the social death of enclosed 
communities. Indeed, roads, by their very nature, may bring unwanted others into 
the town and allow life-blood to drain out. The damage done to the physical 
integrity of the market place, an important local social institution and collective 
signifier of place, was especially inauspicious: Lucy is aware of how its historical 
institutions would continue to be interfered with and even knocked down to make 
way for modern buildings designed to suit the requirements of outside stores at 
the expense of the town’s traditional shop-keeper. But there is also change to the 
archaic rhythms of community life, a more haphazard mode of existence where 
three kinds of traffic converge -  the traffic of public transport, the traffic of people 
and the traffic of capital. Their rational separation would seem to herald the 
instatement of modernist town planning as the new paradigm, with all manner of 
disciplinary devices that may be employed under its aegis making the experience 
of the town centre a lot less exciting and more ‘urbanoid’. Also on the theme of a 
suspicion of modernisation, there is the threat of encroaching development. After 
all, what would be the limits to these engineering tendencies, and are they 
terminal? It seems logical that to begin interfering at the symbolic heart of the
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community reveals a tacit agenda to move into all other areas of the local social 
body, like a modernising cancer. That event in 1958 was indeed for Lucy a 
pregnant moment, extending beyond itself. In short, Lucy’s memory of seeing the 
last bus enabled her to delineate a precise temporal boundaiy (separating a ‘before 
then’ from a ‘thereafter’) in terms of which she could measure the changes to the 
town and British society per se over the ensuing decades. From the perspective of 
this story, for Lucy, the future can be seen as offering much of the same, a 
sameness of which the impoverishment of present space is the immutable 
paradigm.
Here, then, is one of those contexts in which ‘the 1960s’ (and also to 
some extent ‘the 1950s’) is thrown into relief for the purposes of sociological 
elucidation, though in a folk rather than an academic idiom, providing an 
illustration of one of those ‘zones of shared perceptions’ which Loizos treats as 
fundamental to the cohesion and comprehensiveness of the discourse of a civil 
society. Looking now at Lucy’s own version of this moment, there are highlighted 
a number of characteristics that are commonly reproduced in the discourse of this 
decade that lead to shared agreement on its momentous, or transformatory, events. 
The point that is reiterated is that the social world became other during this 
moment in a multiplicity of ways.
First, there are stories of the sensory otherness of the communities 
engendered during this period, an otherness that is frequently construed as 
unwelcome. It is a theme on which Lucy draws in constructing her version of the 
past:
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As under all other councils during the early 1960s, there was mass vandalism and 
we lost so much o f the town, everywhere did. It was just then that the old 
vernacular architecture went [,..j. Now, practically nothing o f the old town is 
standing.
Second, the 1950s and 1960s, as an often-told academic story, 
emphasises a sustained intervention in the fabric of traditional, often working 
class, communities. The particular regional focus of these academic stories, like 
the regional focus of Lucy’s own story, begins in East London and then moves on 
to the surrounding area of suburban Essex (Young and Willmott 1957, Willmott 
and Young 1960, Willmott 1963). There were the first stirrings during this period 
of a sense that economic strategies were being re-oriented on a nationwide scale 
toward consumption, but no longer the small-scale consumption of family 
businesses. ‘Symbolic of this was the disappearance of the comer shop’, Phil 
Cohen writes in his classic academic commentary on the effects of ‘planning 
blight’ on working class East London communities shortly after the Second World 
War, and he continues, ‘where these were not demolished by redevelopment they 
were replaced by larger supennarkets, often owned by large combines’ (1980:82). 
The theme of local shops as a possible material manifestation of the community is 
a popular feature of local reminiscences, as was discussed in Chapter 4. The 
narrative theme of shopping, which also plays on images of the lost idyll of local 
community, is also well utilised in Lucy’s reflections. As was seen above, the 
local authority, developers and other agencies were involved in the realisation of 
their new vision for the town centre at this time, the flag-ship Liberty project -  a 
fully enclosed, modem pedestrian shopping area, and Lucy can infer that:
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During the 1960s, I  suppose, the rate o f  pace changed. Some things worked and 
some didn V. There was a lot o f controversy over Liberty One, a lot ofpeople were 
not happy about that. 1 personally am not sure either because it has always 
attracted a lot o f people, but i t ’s a dead area really... The 1960s was all shop, 
shop, shop, it was the era o f shopping really.
Third, in addition to sensory otherness and interference in the community 
fabric, Lucy also associates with the 1960s a general feeling that a new and 
‘modern’ world had been engendered, as she considers:
There was social change all round in many ways. The world was obviously 
completely different then to what my parents knew. I  was brought up on the dole. 
Well, my father was a builder who went banh'upt. He was unemployed for a 
couple o f years in the late ‘30s ‘til the relatives at the fish shop found him a Job 
and then he managed one o f  their little outlying shops ‘til they wanted that closed 
and then someone else in the family spoke to Michael Pole and my father went to 
the [Romford] dog track. So from virtually the ‘30s ‘til after the War, my father 
was working within the family. I  personally don’t know what would have 
happened to us otherwise.
This gives an indication of some of the socio-economic shifts within the 
British city that Lucy is capable of elucidating by framing a specific moment of 
the past. Not all stories of the same decade will reproduce the same cultural 
contents, and Lucy’s story is as much a personal as it is a regional one. Given
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Lucy’s familial background in commerce, and the professed closeness of 
economic activity to the historical essence of the town, it can be expected that her 
most important ‘moments of being’ would be those formed around the 
commercial heart of the community. It also may be expected that her story of the 
decline of the local commimity in which she underwent so many of her early 
formative experiences should be weighted toward the effects of urban 
restructuring on local commerce. It is these local economic institutions that 
comprised a social network which until recently provided a sense of security and 
continuity in her life, and in general provided continuity among the experiences of 
local people past and present. As has been seen, there is an enduring interest in 
local shops and trades among the local population, and the market in particular is 
another ingredient of the continuity of experience among and between 
generations. More shall be said about the market below. But with the removal of 
these institutions or with the terminal interference in their workings, the common 
experiences of local commerce as one of the cornerstones of local cultural life has 
been eroded, and there has been a concomitant decline in the social fabric of the 
town, as Lucy seems to indicate. Lucy now knows less people, and those with 
whom she does have contact are less intimate, sometimes even openly hostile 
toward her. Yet there does still seem to be a society in Romford on which Lucy 
can comment; the routine of sociality does not seem to have disappeared. Lucy’s 
story is also one of cultural decline in the town through the giadual decline of its 
local economic base.
Indeed, in his ethnographic study of a post-mining town, Charlesworth 
(2000b) reflects on similar issues, concluding that the erosion of local cultural 
contexts, such as those established around the routine of labour, has the effect of
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hollowing out the local social structure; like the deserted monuments of a previous 
way of life, only a skeletal structure of the previous human organisation remains 
in place, as individuals go through the bodily motions but with no real fulfilment 
of anything approximating to a viable social contact between individuals.
But how did this decline come about? Further highligliting the notion of 
the 1960s as an energetic moment, there is the sense in Lucy’s story of Romford 
undergoing two different rates of historical progression. While one is normative, 
the other, characterising the 1960s, seems to depart from this norm. Thus, 
Romford is depicted by Lucy as a pleasant English market town, a hybrid of 
country and town, in a natural state of grovrth and development up until a specific 
moment of intervention by the local planning agencies when its growth was 
forcefully accelerated or intensified. The gr owth of Romford which was instigated 
at this time, Lucy explained to me, was in her view an unnatural process in the 
sense that it arose from a specific context of ‘struggle’ with an advancing regional 
Other, the neighbouring town of Ilford. Romford and Ilford, she believed, always 
did have a certain rivalry:
/  walked out o f school, I  couldn’t stand any more... how old was I? I  must have 
been 18, 17, and trained as a librarian in Ilford -  not in Romford. Ilford’s change 
has come a bit later than Romford’s I  think. There has always been a rivalry 
between them. Romford was fighting to get ahead in the area because, i f  we 
remember rightly, the Abercrombie Plan — one o f the vast development plans for 
the whole o f  South East England -  had put Ilford as the main shopping centre and 
Romford was determined to fight it. Under the old charter, they could prevent 
anyone from opening a street market [within a fixed area into which Ilford fell].
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There was one opened in Lay Street in Ilford and they successfully put a stop to 
that. The [Romford council] started building here frantically to get the lead on 
Ilford, and they did. Ilford fought back with the Exchange. Well, this was in the 
late ‘50s, early ‘60s, I  can Y quite remember when this development plan was 
brought in, probably in the '50s i f  Em right that the market place closed to ti'offic 
in 1958. But it was a deliberate policy to develop Romford as a shopping centre to 
cut Ilford's throat... it was a war, and o f course [Romford council] always used 
the markets charter to prevent any market from opening within the statutory 62 
miles which they always say is the length you can drive a sheep, but it's actually 
two leagues... So Romford decided to cut the ground from under [Ilford's] feet and 
got permission to start the Liberty [One] development.
This extract gives a sense of the curious complexities and almost 
monstrous contradictions of a town in the midst of a significant transition. It 
accentuates the pace of this transition by bringing into the same frame two 
antithetical images of human social progress, the contrasting images of sheep 
(hinting at the town’s country roots) and state-of-the-art shopping centres (a 
signifier of the town’s modem future). It seems ironic that during this dynamic, 
transitional moment, the ‘pre-modem’ was utilised by authorities as a way of 
justifying the bolstering of the town’s ‘modern’ infrastmcture. By doing so it 
undermines any absolute ontological division between the ‘modern’ and tlie ‘pre­
modern’, useful categories which, allowing one to eclipse the other in official 
discourse, the town would image itself heading into a brave new age of economic 
competitiveness.
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Two plot-lines: the failure of modernisation plans and the vanquished 
underdog
In the social discourse on the 1960s, one theme is sometimes given prominence -  
the idea of the precariousness of local place. For historians, the threat that 
modernity presents to the traditional and the historic is totalising, creating a sense 
of disenchantment with the urban environment that can only be recaptured 
through exercising the imagination (Reed 1999). For individual narrators such as 
Lucy, who think of themselves as one-time cultural arbiters, the loss is in terms of 
valuable memories of community for its inhabitants. For Lucy, the 1960s were a 
time to reflect on, envisage, reconstruct the category of ‘the local’. But this is not 
in the traditional fonn of local community idyll, an isolated entity looking inward 
into itself. Lucy herself takes the view that certain changes can be traced to this 
time which also engendered the notion of the ‘extra-local’, a sense of an ‘out- 
there’ which dramatically thr ows into relief the outlines of the specifically local, 
causing ‘the local’ to come out of itself and confront its specificity at the same 
time that the ‘other’ threatens to engulf that very diversity.
The identity of the extra-local, of course, has no absolute fonn; it is 
determined by the specificity of historical or geo-political factors and varies with 
the conventional expectations of the genre in which it is utilised. ‘The local’ is a 
unity that can define itself in relation to a category of otherness capable of 
adopting a number of relative forms. Unlike the grand epic or global proportions 
in terms of which globalisation theories construe alterity, much favoured by 
academics, the category of extra-local most frequently talked about in Romford in 
relation to the 1960s is that of ‘the national’; in Lucy’s story, and those of others.
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it takes the particular fonn of the sudden arrival of national multiple retailers and 
their competition with local commerce and trades. For Lucy, their relationship 
seems meaningful in terms of a model of ‘corporate colonialism’. This imposes a 
narrative framework on local consumption that resonates widely among 
townsfolk.
Unlike the multi-ethnic area of Ilford, Romford did not experience the 
same levels of post-colonial immigrant settlement comparable to other areas in 
inner London following the Second World War and the independence of former 
British colonies, such that contact between the domestic white population and the 
formerly colonised could engender a discourse in which ‘die local’ was articulated 
against ‘the international’ (although there have been recent attempts to introduce 
just such a contrast in local extremist discourse*’). Rather, in Romford nanatives, 
the local and the national, the small-scale and the large-scale, seem more 
important polar experiences, shaped by the arrival of finns such as British Hoine 
Stores (BHS) and C&A, both national stores, into the now newly-developed flag­
ship shopping centre. Many older locals point to these multiple national retailers 
as the agents responsible for a significant transformation in the town.
But this, of course, was not the whole story. Above, I quoted from Phil 
Cohen’s classic academic story of ‘planning blight’ in London’s East End during 
the 1950s, part of a critical academic narrative on the failures of modernisation 
plans in the city; here it is useful to quote that passage more fully before 
comparing it against Lucy’s personal rendering of this stoiy;
 ^Eg. through literature distributed by the BNP (British Nationalist Party) during election 
campaigns, encoding warning of threats from ethnic diversity in the form of local towns -  such as 
Ilford, home to an immigrant population and closer to the more ethnically diverse inner London 
boroughs.
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‘Symbolic of [the loss of traditional industries] was the disappearance of 
the corner shop; where these were not demolished by redevelopment they 
were replaced by large supermarkets, often owned by large combines. 
Even where comer shops were offered places in the redeveloped area, 
often they could not afford the high rents. There was a gradual 
polarization in the structure of the labour force: on the one side, the 
highly specialized, skilled and well-paid jobs associated with the new 
technology and the high-growth sectors that employed them; on the 
other, the routine, dead-end, low-paid and unskilled jobs associated with 
the labour-intensive sectors, especially the service industries... More and 
more people, young and old, had to travel out of the community to their 
jobs, and some eventually moved out to live elsewhere, where suitable 
work was to be found ’ (1980:80).
Modernisation in urban areas forcing up rents on business, effectively eradicating 
traditional sectors of the economy in East London to ensure that only the large- 
scale newcomers will survive, splitting the local economy and eventually leading 
to new domicilary patterns: this is a story which echoes much in Lucy’s narrative. 
For example,
LUCY: ...of course the developers o f the Liberty brought Gamages in from 
Holborn as the anchor store and they failed  -  British Home Stores is there now — 
they had a shop on the market place. One o f the effects qfThe Liberty was to take 
attention away from the market place because my relatives sold out to the South 
Street shop for a huge price and took a smaller property in the market and that
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really didn Y do, too much competition from the stores. Both my relatives then had 
reached retirement age so they both pulled out and one or two other shops did 
and British Home Stores were on the market place so, when Gamages failed, they 
took over the store from them. And then, o f  course -  that stall’s cursed! It always 
was -  Keddies came from South End to try it, in the old British Home Stores spot 
between the bank and... the arcade. Keddies, from South End, they went down the 
pan completely. I  was never sure whether it was the Romford venture which broke 
them but they were too up-market, that was what killed them I  think. Stores come 
in and some o f them misjudge the market...
IAN: Did the Romford businesses know their market better? Did that give them 
advantage over the others?
LUCY : Well, yes, I  think the local firms did know their market better. But then 
you see, one by one all the local firms have faded out. We've got all the nationals 
coming in one way and another but then they’ve done their market research better 
I  suppose, they seemed able to cling on. Marks and Spencers has expanded 
hugely.
IAN: How far, though, do you think this kind o f friendship between the retailers 
and the local customers, who knew each other personally, gave local firms an 
advantage?
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LUCY: Yes, it gave them an advantage [...] yes, well, when the owner or his 
relatives are running the shop, there’s a continual feedback, the customers say 
something, you'd tell so and so...
IAN: When did the era ofpredominantly local firms end?
LUCY: I  think it was the opening ofYh.Q Liberty that really did it, then the shops 
in South Street and the market lost out to the new development...
IAN: Because The Liberty was attracting more customers?
LUCY : /  think so, yes, but that was what really finished it. It was on the drift 
originally as the older people were retiring o f course, and the other problem - a 
lot o f short term leases... fell out... they were gone by the ‘80s. [...].Yes, there are 
a good many complicated reasons why [things] changed. Looking back on it, I  
think this business o f taking 50 year leases on properties in the late ‘20s, early 
‘30s, was significant, so that by the late ‘70s, early ‘80s, they've all fallen in. It is 
that both a generation has run out and the prices have gone up too much. You 
know, businesses which were only just holding on, gave in then.
The experiences narrated here of the small-scale family business 
‘finishing o ff under the pressure of competition from the larger-scale national 
combines, which were brought in to front the redeveloped town centre scheme, as 
well as the more personally-informed story of ‘rough spots’ for business and 
Romford being a difficult place to set up livelihood, will resonate strongly with
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other townsfolk. It tells a stoiy, elaborated in its classic sociological fonn in the 
paper by Phil Cohen, of how modernisation does not always achieve the laudable 
aims of those behind it. Despite the depth of experience which Lucy brings to the 
story, which may be unusual for a local townsperson, I find that the words she 
uses -  and also the themes, images and phraseological constructions she draws on 
-  form part of a local repositoiy of meanings, making them recognisable and 
resonant. These personal experiences also fit into broader narrative plots on place, 
focusing especially on the eclipse of the traditional, fetishised notion of 
‘community’, usually through the plot-line of the arduous struggles facing 
communities in the modern era in maintaining that which is distinctive to them 
alone amidst increased pressures from outside of the local frame; this is also 
something recorded by the academic and has been the object of much recent 
ethnographic attention.
In sum, the discourse on the locale during the 1960s is a discourse of 
self-consciousness: of a town having to come out of itself through contact with 
erstwhile distant others. Though the precise lineaments of ‘the local’ may not 
have powerfully surfaced in peoples’ consciousness before this momentous, 
energetic moment according to this story line, they were undoubtedly to be 
thrown into sharp relief during the 1960s first through competitive contact with a 
regional Other -  Ilford -  and finally through the hegemony of the national Other -  
the large combines with their modern attitudes to consumption. But, to give the 
story Lucy tells a wider currency, there is also hint of another familiar plot-line. 
Hers is a story of the passing of things local, and in this, there is a tone of 
resignation in her lament for a world in which this is seemingly part of the natural 
order. It is as though these things local (economic, social, cultural as they may be)
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belong to a wider moral universe in which they play the part of the vanquished 
underdog, always having to fight against the odds (sometimes to their own avail) 
with a superior opponent, in this case the villainous figure of ‘mass consumption’.
Local identity and The Market
Another critical moment for local identity, and thus the viability of Romford to 
sustain a sense of itself as place, came in 1967 with the decision to put an end to 
the selling of livestock in the market place. It is immediately clear from discourse 
in the town, among those who were old enough to remember, that the livestock 
market days were experientially intense -  at the time it seems, as well as in 
hindsight. This frequently animated the imaginations of townsfolk and outside 
visitors alike and that for this reason tlie market days marked out Romford as a 
distinctive place and part of a festive itinerary. What is of interest here is Lucy’s 
use of her thorough and regular use of the rural idiom, of Romford as a ‘country 
town’, when conceptualising the changes that took place toward the late ‘60s:
The loss o f the livestock market was something that totally changed Romford from  
a country town into a town-town, you know what 1 mean, a purely city-town. 
[Romford market] was actually one o f the leading livestock inarkets; there was 
Romford and there was Chelmsford, and I  remember they used to do the market 
reports on the radio as they always did, Romford was always mentioned. But, you 
know, the increasing trouble was that livestock and traffic don 7 mix. It is great 
fun when a cow escapes and makes a r un for it, or better still a pig, pigs are better 
still at dodging, you have a hell o f fun with a pig tearing around among the
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traffic! Yes, well, I  remember the town being like that with all the pig pens, well, 
stock pens, they weren Y all pigs [...] oh yes, it was totally rural, most o f the stalls 
within the market were vegetables, you know, local grown stuff. The character o f  
the market's changed completely since the livestock went. I  suppose that, looking 
back, 1 have to say, the ending o f the livestock market is what changed Romford 
totally. It stopped being a country town then. The opening o f  a ring road just 
finished it o ff [...].
Though there may be private relief among townsfolk surrounding the 
conveniences of modernisation, there is still occasional nostalgia within local 
stories for the excitement and diversity, ‘the helter-skelter, and the constant buzz 
of joking conversation' (Geertz 1960:49), of life in urban milieux before the 
arrival of its more urbanoid successors; indeed, sometimes this is registered in 
hazy, idyllic childhood memory. The anomaly of livestock in the town centre 
often captures this sense of interest and excitement benignly within local stories; 
other stories, of accidents with traffic going through a busy market place, 
represent the more malign aspects of life before the ring-road allowed for the 
pedestrianisation of the market place. However, the suggestion is contained within 
Lucy's story that the unpredictability of livestock contributed to an exciting 
atmosphere of urban diversity, and that its eventual termination transformed 
Romford into a more homogeneous town (just anotlier ‘city-town'). There is also 
a powerful argument relating to the identity of the town here: without a livestock 
market to distinguish it (and without all tliose other institutions which townsfolk 
could call their own), there was nothing to prevent it from being wholly absorbed 
into the blandness of those places which market-based societies produce. As one
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of the fates to succumb this previously descript place, her parents moved back to a 
social Avorld where they could feel ‘at home’, a country town in Dorset.
In addition to all this uniformity, the market is no longer what it was for 
Lucy as even the reputation of market traders for high quality goods has fallen 
casualty to the greater proximity of the mass consumer stores. Townsfolk often 
now take a critical attitude toward the market which is seen to have ‘gone 
downhill’ and diversified into tlie selling of cheap high street clothing, the kind of 
goods available from any national budget clothes store in the countiy, piled up 
densely in market stalls, some still in their mass packaging. The specialisms of the 
market have confined and, as a result,
the market is full o f rubbish! And it's getting worse, it really is. There always was 
a fair choice o f fruit and vegetables and some stalls will do you down but 
increasingly you 're just getting store-loads o f tat!.
There is a strong sense throughout Lucy’s story that the market is thus no longer 
the site of the local and authentic, a significant embodiment of experiential 
continuity in the town. One way of measuring this decline is througli observing its 
inclusion of festive itineraries. At one time, Romford market was a destination for 
consumers outside of the area who came to enjoy its reputation, perhaps 
somewhat manufactured in contemporary reminiscences, for festive excitement 
and theatrical entertainment, and town centre managers still rely on the wider 
consumer spending that such visits generate during national holidays. Now, Lucy 
expresses her incredulity at the willingness of people from outside of Romford to 
make the seasonal coach trips to the marketplace, suggesting lamentably that even
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the inauthentic can have the appeal of authenticity when contrasted against 
mundane time and space:
It's the ‘grass is always greener ’ attitude I  suppose. To the visitors it's probably a 
day out! The coaches don’t come in like they used to... it's getting too tatty, there 
isn't the interest there once was. We used to get a lot o f coaches in. I  would say 
there are considerably less today than there were even five years ago '.
Cross-generic borrowings
Expressed in the material that I have presented so far has been the idea of cross­
generic borrowings: of plot-lines, models, categories and metaphors from one 
story-genre appearing in another; what Giddens might call a ‘double 
hermeneutic’. Thus, Cappetti (1993) sees the literature and sociology of 1930s 
Chicago as a fonn of ‘internal expatriation’ (1993:15), so that the practitioners of 
each became ‘etlinographers of home’, whether it was the middle class sociologist 
who travelled into the ‘other’ moral and cultural world of the urban poor, or the 
urban poor who turned themselves into observers and recorders -  writers -  of 
their own realities. She finds Chicago literary writers of the 1930s (James T. 
Farrell, Nelson Algren, Richard Wright) indebted to the urban sociology of that 
city from the 1910s and 1920s. Like their colonial contemporaries in anthropology 
elsewhere in the world, ‘sociologists and novelists contributed to and worked both 
within and against a well-established tradition: the representation of “others” 
within the West’ (1993:16): in other words, sociologists and novelists can be seen 
partaking of the same imagination of the social others who at the time were
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entering American shores and populating cities (the gang member (Thrasher 
1927), the immigrant (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918-9), the female delinquent 
(Thomas 1923), the Afro-American). Here, then, is found the popular acceptance 
of sociological models from the academy into the sense-making apparatus of the 
public (indeed, I would say that something similar is evidenced in Romford where 
a relatively local academic tradition, the ICS, provides locals, such as Lucy, with 
at least the basic outlines of a set of structures with which to make sense of 
realities encompassing, but also stretching beyond, the local. In short, Cappetti 
finds that ‘sociologists and novelists worked in close intellectual proximity’, 
leading to the collapsing of ‘epistemological and disciplinary distinctions’ 
between them (1993:19).
Similarly, Finnegan believes it is possible, and necessary, to consider the 
relationship between story-genres, not the story-genre in isolation, such that 
arguments about the precedence of a particular story (that the academic plot-line 
came before its popular version, for example) make little sense of the actual 
complexity of cross-generic borrowings. ‘Academic’ and ‘popular’ stories are not, 
for Finnegan, epistemologically distinct:
‘the tellers of and listeners to the stories are all in a sense both implicated 
in the drama they portray and involved in theorising through their 
narrative’ (1998:170).
A further instance of such cross-generic borrowing is given below.
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Lucy and the Romford tapestry
Continuity is an important defining characteristic of the classical model of the 
folk-community. It contributes a sense of coherence to a community, enabling 
feelings of belonging then to flourish, expressed thi‘ough manifold collective 
symbolic forms. Local history provides an important symbolic resource for 
establishing, recognising and expressing coherence thiough its ready-to-hand 
images of temporal continuity. Allegories of the loss of that which is communal, 
local or folksy, such as there is evidence in Lucy’s story, depict a social condition 
where people no longer care about their distinctive past, or where the collective 
text of the past no longer has the ability to sanction the existence of a coherent 
localised community. This collective ‘text’ is given a concrete fonn by Lucy in 
the shape of her proposal for a town embroidery to mark the turning-point of the 
millennium.
A while before this, in the late 1990s, there was a convergence of two 
opportunities to celebrate continuity with the past: the 750^' anniversary of the 
market charter had arrived in 1997, coinciding with the 50^ anniversary of the 
Harold Hill estate project. This was a situation that had not been fully exploited, 
Lucy complained:
I  felt they could have done a lot better with the 750^ anniversary o f the market, 
given this town a boost somehow. There again it's this lack o f  community feeling, 
nobody will do anything. I  tried to start something five years before because I  
reckoned you needed five years, that's the main reason I  went on the committee o f  
the Historical Society actually, to try to push them to get things going. 1 had a
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theoryf we could take a leaf out o f Maldon 's book and we could do an embroidery 
about the town and I  got it worked out and the lady who runs the embroiderers ' 
guild said she'd organise the work but she'd have nothing to do with the design. 
She advised the only thing you could do was run a design competition. I  agreed 
and tried to get it started but I  can Y do it on my own, I  thought, I've got to have 
publicity. So I  approached the Romford Recorder but I  couldn Y get them going, 
mostly because Alan Humphreys, the editor, was so deeply involved in this war 
with Gordon Donald, you know, the leader o f the council, I  mean he got out o f  
control, he just took over the paper completely. [So] I  was very smitten with the 
Maldon embroidery... I  don't know how Maldon got it started but they got this 
idea o f doing a quilt, an embroidery, just to celebrate the history o f  Maldon, a 
thousand years since the battle. It's about 7lb, six foot long I  think, it's a beautiful 
thing. Surely in a town o f this size, I  thought, where there's quite an active 
embroiderers ' guild, I  really thought that was something that could be done, that 
would get people together. But the Romford Recorder was not prepared to give 
me publicity. All I  wanted them to do was to write a short article to try an ' get 
things going and the answer I  got back was, T f you write it youself, we 7/ publish 
it ', so I  wrote it and they didn Y publish it! [Immitating the ‘voice ' o f the 
newspaper] ‘Thank you, we 're not interested! '. You know, you can only push 
people so far. Nobody had noticed [the 750^ anniversary o f the market], that's 
the silly thing. I  stood up one day at the Historical Society meeting and said, 
‘What are we doing for 1997? ', and they looked at me! I  said, ‘Like it's 750 years 
after 1237',and somebody said, ‘Oh, the market!'. Even [...], who is the local 
expert on the market, hadn Y noticed the significance o f the date, it's crazy, it 
really is!... Wlmt made me scream, it was the 750*^ ' anniversary o f the market the
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same year as the 50^ ^^  anniversary o f the Harold Hill estate, you could have put the 
two together as a sort of, you know, continuity o f history but no, nobody would do 
anything. Well, they 're too busy playing their own internal power politics within 
the council to bother about what’s happening in the world at large, you know, 
there's too much infighting within the council... they're all too busy scoring their 
own party political points to really get down to anything that matters to the 
community.
This extract focuses on Lucy’s subjective feelings of disempowemient, frustration 
and disillusionment (contributing, we can imagine, to the anonymity and 
alienation of the citified town), as conveyed throughout in continual expressions 
of exasperation at other peoples’ ignorance and self-interest, their seeming 
eschewal of the notion of things local or folksy as a common heritage: indeed, this 
is a general pattern of meaning throughout Lucy’s story. The key motif in this 
episode is the text, but tied to this is the theme of community which again occui s 
in the emphasis on Romford as a distinct entity with its own history, and in the 
motivational intentions of the embroidery which is intended to bring together the 
entire community in awe and pride as well as communal recognition; to bring 
townsfolk out of themselves at least for the duration of this historical turning- 
point. It is also a text that is intended to say something about her personally- 
gained experiences of the politics of civil society and indeed bureaucracy -  in 
modern society, those mediating structures between an idea and its practical 
implementation. The motif of text takes on a multiplicity of fonns -  the pictorial 
(but no less narrative) ‘text’ of the embroidery, the literary text of the local 
newspaper article Lucy was invited to write in support for the embroidery, and the
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literary-ciim-verbalised ‘text’ of local politicking between political rivals in which 
the idea of the embroidery was side-lined.
As I have consistently argued, sociological categories, many of which are 
no longer the exclusive preserve of academic specialists but enjoy currency in 
social worlds beyond the academy, are made sense of partially in terms of moral 
archetypes, and I earlier suggested that the underdog theme (with not only its 
behavioural prescriptiveness but open-ended plot-lines) is one possible pervasive 
type. Its popularity is perhaps even a measure of its adaptability to shifting 
sociological tastes: while sometimes the underdog remains inferior to their more 
powerful oppressors and is destined to be vanquished, there is always left open the 
possibility of victory for the underdog against their erstwhile aggressors (whether 
the State, a Leviathan, capitalism, modernity, bureaucracy, along with their 
various minions). One plot-line that has gained particular recognition amidst its 
family of related story-lines first emerges in early twentieth century European 
literature and it is possible to apprehend traces of it in various locals’ 
constructions. Its originator, the Jewish Czech writer Franz Kafka (1883-1924), 
elaborates this story-line in particular in two novels. The Trial (1925) and The 
Castle (1926). As Lechte comments:
‘[Kafka’s] wiitings -  in which an enigmatic, skeletal world has 
apparently been created -  have touched a nerve in the life as lived in 
modem, industrial society. The nihilism of a society without God, the 
hyper-rationalism of bureaucratic domination, which strangles the 
innocent in its web, and the end of all idealism -  including perhaps, the 
end of causality along with all first principle -  is sketched out. Here in
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Kafka’s oeuvre is an allegory of a society without any particular end, but 
which is assuredly destined to come to an end in a material sense’ 
(1994:242).
In narratives of the rational-legal order of social life, as Hariman (1995) 
explains in relation to the writing of Franz Kafka, the idea of the script or text, the 
seeking out of patterned meaning witliin a seemingly absurd milieu, is prominent, 
arriving at an exegesis of Kafka’s novels as ‘proto-ethnomethodological’. Indeed, 
this theory is exploited by Kafka for its comedic effect (Hariman describes 
Kafka’s The Castle as ‘a comedy of manners’), exposing the bureaucratic habitus 
as ‘gestic theatre’; while elsewhere in Kafka’s oeuvre, notably The Trial, this 
searching for common sense understanding by which the outsider (here, Joseph 
K.) can gain entry to and possible purchase on the structures of the bureaucratic 
world as a set of readable actions results in tragedy. This resonates with much in 
Lucy’s personal experiences of bureaucracy, of having to deal with a rational- 
legal order that closes her out -  indeed, more systematically, closes out ordinary 
people on a daily basis in contemporary urban enviromnents such that its 
inhabitants communicate a deep distmst and dislike of local officials. Her voice is 
lost on those who are only intent on listening to tlieir own. This would explain the 
meanings that Lucy communicates above and elsewhere in the interstices of her 
narrative of what has befallen Romford, not always explicitly stated but 
paralinguistically carried in the tone of her speech and in her demeanor: her 
frustrations at operating within modem life, its inertia, its failure to move to her 
projects, caused partly by the arrogance of the people she encounters. The tragedy 
in Lucy’s case is perhaps the reverse of the characters in Kafka’s novels; tliat for
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Lucy, the answers, the meanings, are already brought to bear on her participation 
in the closed world of officaldom, rather than something she has to work out 
(however unsuccessfully) amidst her encounters with the official world. She 
unfortunately is well aware of the ‘games’ of politics, that politics is a jolly good 
game (that is, if you are winning, if you happen to be a player), and that it consists 
in routine symbolic exchanges, such as the sniping between an editor and civic 
leader across the sheets of a local newspaper. Lucy is able to explain her own lack 
of voice on the basis of these insights -  she recognises that she cannot have 
influence unless she can engage in these routines, and that she cannot engage in 
these routines through her lack of relation to the main protagonists. There was 
also a certain symbolic poverty to Lucy’s idea to create an embroidery of 
Romford history which she partly uses to explain the failure of her efforts: 
thematically, it stood for ‘community’ rather than ‘politics’, the communal rather 
than the associational, and the collective rather than the personal agenda. There is, 
then, a reflexive distance in this allegorical tale of confrontation and frustration, a 
sense of defeatism and cynicism; the events are all narrated as if they were bound 
to fail, as if an unliappy ending was inexorable.
I failed to escape noticing a private sadness amidst the telling of her stoiy 
of the inexorable decline of things local and folksy, with its strong hints of the 
grand-narrative of historical progress from the folk to the urban, the communal to 
the association. This emerged again and again in her narrative. I suspect that it is 
not quite what Charlesworth wrote when he considered reflexivity among the 
working class, but there are some resonances, that:
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‘the ones who have somehow managed to develop a sensitive and 
enquiring relation to human life suffer quite deeply and in many ways for 
doing so. And this, if one lives among working class people, is what 
indicts their condition: those people who develop a human relation to the 
world, who are thoughtful, sensitive -  for want of a better concept -  
‘non-alienated’, are, at best frustrated and, at worst, miserable’ 
(2000b:151).
This ‘sensitive and enquiring relation’ brings the argument back to sociological 
stock-taking, the discussion of which opened this chapter.
Conclusion
It is not the regular morphology of times that I have chosen to look at in 
examining ‘the 1960s’ in the discourse of folk memory in Romford; that 
townsfolk plot the historical progression of their town in regular imits of time with 
no one unit containing a greater intrinsic significance to any other. The words of 
Lucy, Oliver and many other townsfolk, give onto discourse in which it is 
suggested that towns move forward in bursts of imagination and creativity, and 
‘the 1960s’ was just such a moment: ideologically creative, vital, possessing an 
unusual if  illusory clarity. It is a matter of evaluative emphasis whether such 
moments turn out to be less constructive than destructive. But whatever the 
version of this theme, one constant seems to be that social worlds are reinvented 
at these moments and they can possess much usefulness to the folk who construe 
them in making sociological sense of all that was to come both before and after.
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Lucy, for example, uses ‘the 1960s’ to create a civic narrative, a set of 
oppositional meanings to those of the State whose allies and their minions she is 
highly critical of. There were many instances in her story of the usefulness of this 
energetic moment for sociological stock-taking. Thus, she recognises local society 
changing along with British society as a whole during another vital time, the 
1980s:
a friend o f mine who's a fairly sophisticated international dabbler in politics says 
that Margaret Thatcher was the most marvellous leader o f men. He always 
thought the British middle classes were public spirited, you know, well organised, 
delighted, but he believes now they’ve become as selfish as everybody else. To 
change a generation and an entire social class like that, Thatcher must have had 
something! I  don ’/ think it's wholly her fault but when she said there's no such 
thing as society^ she was definitely expressing the spirit o f  the times.
And as Lucy further generalises, this time connoting a liberal progressivism that 
became popular diuing the 1960s:
Is it crime or is it the fear o f crime? I  remember going back to the ‘50s, we were 
young and on the town, a friend o f mine who lived over in Dagenham wouldn’t 
even come through to Romford’s South Street at night! I f  you'd suggest getting a 
bus in South Street she'd say, ‘Oh no!'. Well, I  thought, what’s the problem? As 
long as you behave yourself discreetly. She lived over by the Merry Fiddlers pub 
in Dagenham and I wouldn’t set foot there after dark but she’d say ‘No, it’s 
perfectly alright, as long as you behave yourself decently and know your own
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place \ But there is increasingly uncontrolled behaviour throughout society now. 
Nobody seems to have any self-control these days -  i f  it annoys you, lash out! I  
call it the ‘ toddler ification ’ o f society. Everyone seems to be going through life in 
a permanent state o f toddler tantrum, nobody has any se lf control... Dr Spock has 
a lot to answer for, letting children do their own thing. Yes, this increasingly 
child-centred ideology, teachers telling children, ‘You have rights, don’t let 
anybody force you into doing anything you don’t want to! ’. I t ’s ridiculous, we all 
have to do things we don’t want to in the broader interest o f society. It's excessive 
freedom in some ways isn’t it? You can only have true freedom when everybody 
has complete self-control, that’s what I  think. You can’t have freedom to do just 
everything you want to because there are society’s demands to consider, but 
w e’ve lost that. I ’ve come to the conclusion that the only thing I  can do is behave 
as selfishly, as badly as everyone else, but I  feel guilty about it. Occasionally I  
push somebody out o f the way [laughter].
In some ways, Lucy’s story of Britain in the 1960s is a conventional one 
exhibiting a conventional narrative structure. But institutionality is not all that can 
be seen to be present within it. I would argue that, above all, this is Lucy’s story 
and that a different teller, even drawing on the same repositoiy of story-telling 
resources would inevitably produce a very different account. There is here 
reproduced a set of culturally significant ideas conventionally couched in the 
idiom of ‘the urban’ as distinct from the ‘folk’: with the emergence of the 
unambiguously urban (the ‘town-town’, as distinct from the country town) comes 
impersonalism, heterogeneity, formality, competition over statuses, massification, 
anonymity, physical sameness -  in short, the decline of all that is local and folk.
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But from among all those meaningful resources available to her, local and global, 
she picks and chooses between those that are best tailored to her personal 
circumstances. The self is in effect a protagonist in what seems to be a story about 
local community: Lucy as the individual who favours certain buildings in the 
town and who is hurt to see them ‘destroyed’ and ‘ruined’; the self who was 
‘there’ when the last bus travelled through the market place and who was the 
authoritative witness, over many long years, to the ambivalent changes affecting 
the small-scale family run business; finally, there is the agent who feels the anger 
and frustration at others’ lack of interest in local folkways in a world which has 
seemingly made them anachronistic. In this way, Lucy is capable of creating her 
own social world into a personal bricolage.
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H: Moments of being and the existential force of narrative 
Life stories: standard time and mythical time
A short detour into Virginia Woolfs theories on her autobiographical writing will 
be necessary here so as to highlight an aspect of the personal dimensions to the 
psychology and sociology of remembering the past -  that individuals impart their 
own order to their lives and do so, not wholly through recourse to the impersonal 
time references available to them (which themselves betray an arbitrary logic), but 
through their manipulative framing of previous moments of their existence. This 
they do in accord witli their own cognitive agendas as artefacts of their individual 
life histories, as further ethnographic work has persuasively demonstrated 
(Rapport 1994), not in accordance with determinations of impersonal, collective 
forces. The concept of moments of being thus stands in potential opposition to, 
and offers a critical perspective on, the insights of cognitive sociologists such as 
Zerubavel who, in Social Mindscapes (1997), writes that ‘[n]ot only the content of 
our memories but also the way we mentally “place” them in the past is affected by 
our social environmenf and selects as evidence of this the mental habit of using 
‘unmistakably impersonal temporal reference frameworks for dating even 
absolutely personal events in our own pasf (1997:100).
In one of her autobiogiaphical writings (‘A Sketch of the Past’), 
published posthumously alongside other autobiographical works under the 
collective title Moments o f Being (1985), Virginia Woolf draws from her
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memories of the past a methodological framework for autobiographical writing 
that would bring together the recollection of her personal memories and her style 
of writing novels. The main insight of this work is that any individual life consists 
of moments of greater or lesser significance, which she calls moments of being 
and non-being. The moments of non-being are simply the ‘woolly stuffing’ 
characteristic of quotidian life, of little or no enduring consequence. Thus, Woolf 
writes of the immersion in everyday life that it is ‘embedded in a kind of non­
descript cotton wool... A great part of every day is not lived consciously. One 
walks, eats, sees things, deals with what has to be done; the broken vacuum 
cleaner; ordering dinner; writing orders to Mabel; washing; cooking dinner; 
bookbinding’ (1985:70).
The moment of being, by comparison, is of much greater rarity and 
indeterminacy and its significance to the individual is more enduring. Through the 
recollection of Woolfs own private ‘exceptional moments’ (1985:71), a sense of 
agentive personal possession always emerges in relation to these moments which 
Woolf seeks to explain in terms of her own literary practice as a novelist. It is 
here, then, that life merges with art, the construal of personal life experience with 
the archetypal structure of the novel, with its initial indeterminacy and complexity 
leading eventually to a final resolution of the opened plot-lines, a satisfying 
conclusion, a governing pattern; and the person behind this pattern, orchestrating 
its intricate structure, is the same as the subject of the narrative so that 
‘individuals make their lives into stories, stories which they then tell themselves’ 
(Rapport 1994:187). Such symbolic re-ordering of lives -  akin to what occurs in 
the novel -  is personally empowering (Jackson 2002).
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If along with Barbara Adam, it can be said that ‘time-frame generated by 
seconds, minutes, hours, days are characterized by invariance, context- 
independence and precision’ (1995:24), then the conventional representation of 
personal lives purely in these terms is at best to dwell on the superficial and, at 
worst, to collude actively in the denial of that individual’s agency: as one 
commentator has written from this perspective, ‘The significance and resonance 
of the experience of time is personally variable and not appreciable in terms of its 
external measurable proportion’ (Rapport 1994:158-9). There have been a number 
of critiques of standard Western time reckoning, not least from Adam in 
Timewatch (1985). Here she argues that Western abstract, standardised time is 
merely an artefact of disciplinary practices in Western industrialised society, a 
form of power that extends back to the institutionalisation of Benedictine time 
which has even come to imbue the social activity of secular society centuries later 
as it makes itself felt as a natural norm. The dangers of viewing personal lives in 
the West in terms of standardised time, some analysts have pointed out, is that it 
thieatens to extend the disciplinaiy powers of Society into private moments of 
being, thus eradicating true interpretive agency for the individual. The disciplinary 
functions of time are recognised by Zerubavel, for example; discussing the social 
importance of time, he argues that time is a means by which people in society may 
legitimate their identity to others, or perhaps signify their difference from them 
(suggesting the diversity in the experience of time across the social spectrmn must 
be inteipreted in terms of deviance from an accepted standard norm, not the 
richness and potential resourcefulness of Adam’s argument). Thus, the popularity 
of standard time can be attributed, not to any essential feature of the natural world, 
but to the spread of Western technological influence and the practices it helped to
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engender. In adopting ‘clock-time’, Adam has suggested, it is commonly believed 
that ‘the West’ has eradicated all traces of the physical, biological and cultural for 
its time reckoning. However, this is impossible, as the language of time in the 
West further suggests. Take, for example, the category of ‘timing’. According to 
Adam:
‘If Western time really were characterized exclusively, or even 
predominantly, by the linear quality of clock and calendar time, then any 
reference to ‘good’ and ‘bad times’ would be meaningless...Whilst the 
existence of clock time facilitates context independence and global 
standardization, decisions about the timing of even the most habitual 
actions are made on a unique basis and with reference to a particular 
context’ (1985:22).
When all its manifestations are taken into accoimt, time (in all hiunan societies, 
not just the West) is truly multiple, variant, context-specific, imprecise, and its 
language equivocal.
Some of these problems with hegemonic Western time have already 
come to the explicit attention of the methodologist in those disciplines who deal 
with the concrete experiences of human subjectivities. Those historians who 
engage with life histories have noted facing difficulties with the exact 
chronologies of History’s disciplinary time. This, once again, can only be 
explained by the equivocal nature of time in human society. Thus, personal and 
private lives often exhibit their own time conveyed through a subjective language
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of myth. In a passage contrasting history with the study of myth, Samuel and 
Thompson write;
‘Historians deal, by preference, with ‘hard’ realities -  family, work, and 
home; politics and government; church and chapel. We cleave to precise 
locations, dateable periods, delimitable fields of study. Our chronologies 
are marked in numbered years rather than the succession o f generations 
or lost golden ages. We are happier dealing with aggregates then with 
images, with functional interests rather than with fantasy selves’ (1990:1; 
my italics).
This insight captures the futility of representing narratives of personal lives as a 
progression in institutionalised units of time -  months, years, decades -  while 
bypassing the myths -  lost community, corrupt society -  that give individual lives 
their characteristic sense of progression. At the very least, this is a position that 
eschews the objective determination of personal biographies, and as such it has 
much to contribute to the interdisciplinary understanding of narrative as a site for 
the creation and reproduction of self. Indeed, Samuel and Thompson bring 
psychoanalytically inspired life history approaches (the inevitability of distortion 
and irregularity in the narrative of personal memory a la the discoveries of 
Sigmund Freud) into broad agreement with the insights of literature (e.g. Virginia 
Woolf) and, as has been shown, those of a recent literaiy-inspired anthropology. 
What these authors suggest is that conventional routine time is fine for analysing 
abstract historical patterns but, when it comes to the appreciation of human 
subjectivities, the highly unpredictable, irregular temporality of ‘myths’ and
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‘images’ begins to take precedence. People construe their lives in accordance with 
‘golden ages’, ‘prelapsarian eras’, lapsed presents, ‘community’ and ‘society’, and 
much more besides.
As argued here, especially through Woolfs insights into the personal 
psychology of remembering the past, a cognitive sociology and even conventional 
historiogiaphy that conceptualises lives in terms of fixed  temporal frames 
consisting o f formal and impersonal units, in short a standard time (Zerubavel), 
has severe limitations when it comes to considering actual human subjectivities. 
Not least, such a view fails to admit the multiplicity of time in human societies, as 
Adams seeks to appreciate. What such singular and formal approaches to time 
seem unable to appreciate is the manipulation of individual significant moments 
by actors themselves as they symbolically re-structure (write) their lives and 
attempt to create out of them some kind of order and meaning that is satisfying to 
themselves.
In sum, through individual moments of being, the time of a life can be 
reclaimed from the alienation of its institutional expression. Conventional time 
reckoning may be a convenient tool, but is by no means the only one available 
either to authors themselves as individuals or to society as a whole. The point I 
have been supporting is that human lives, unlike objects belonging to the 
objective natural world, are of a nature that leaves them irreducible to abstract and 
rational forms of time reckoning; clearly, as Adams remarks, over matters of time 
‘complexity reigns supreme’ (1985:24).
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Bodies, time and agency
‘[S]tories and storytelling may, more than any other form of art or 
artifice, provide crucial insights into the human struggle to overcome the 
felt opposition between two coimterpointed realms of symbolic 
determinacy and power, the first focussed on the self and the lifeworld 
with which it most intimately and immediately identifies, the second 
focussed on the not-self, and on all that is considered foreign, inimical, 
and unfamiliar to oneself (Jackson 2002: 35).
‘My Sixties began far away from any recognisable markers’ (Rowbotham
2000:1).
As for Rowbotham, it is not a fonnal system of time reckoning, those 
‘recognisable markers’, that Les uses to introduce his experiences of the 1960s, 
but a moment of youthful being:
the last pub on the left as you walk through the marketplace the old Pig and 
Pound pub, but one o f  my favourite pubs was the King’s Head, that's now gone 
too. The King's Head was an extremely important place to myself and my friends 
in the latter sixties when we were sort o f  able to drink [laughter]. I  passed my 
driving test when I  was seventeen when I  was at Birkenhead and I  was the only 
one with a fu ll driving licence and my friend bought a 4 litre 1949 Bentley SS 
[laughter]. We used to ride around in that with L plates on and wearing crushed 
velvet trousers from Carnaby Street and Kings Road and stuff like that and it was.
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it was really fun. I  mean, the King's Head hod a great deal o f  music, musical 
entertainment in the means o f groups and so forth, some big groups played there.
Here is Les construing his corporeal subjectivity in a specific way during a 
moment of his life, imagining this as a moment of freedom and choice over self. 
With a car, Les and his friends are not limited by time or physical distance; riding 
around the town gives them a sense of control, of self-regulation, over their own 
movements and activities. They may choose to exercise agency over their own 
bodies through underage drinking, and, as the fashionable men about town, they 
exercise choice over how their bodies are displayed in public (this choice itself an 
embodiment of the Bohemian self expression of 1960s counter culture). In short. 
Les constmes his bodily self, and the selves of his friends, at a moment in time 
when it confidently occupied its world, a point in time when he was ontologically 
secure enough to experiment with socio-cultural expectations or to step outside 
conventional frameworks of meaning. Through his body. Les thus imagines 
himself exercising control over the extent to which he wishes his bodily self to be 
inscribed with conventional socio-cultural meanings.
Life narrative, then, often draws on such moments of individual being, 
moments which are difficult if  not impossible to categorise in formal, standardised 
terms. Yet, it has been suggested, such moments are not necessarily for public 
display but for private consumption, their purpose not for communicating to 
others a formal chronology, but the achievement of existential ends. Rather than 
finding time (in its standardised guise) an alienating framework within which to 
construe the moments of a life, too distant and impersonal, moments of being 
assert individual control over time; they succeed in giving it an individual
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colouration. The ability to stand back from time is strategically important for the 
self as it finds itself in certain conditions, it has recently been theorised; it is an 
important existential attribute of story-telling in general. ‘To tell a story is to 
immediately put a distance between oneself and the events with which the story is 
concerned’, Michael Jackson has found (2002:186), and in so doing, ‘[a] degree 
of agency is recovered, a version of the truth is contrived, a balance restablished 
[sic] between our need to determine the world to the same extent that it is felt to 
determine us’.
Feeling that life circumstances are out of control, believing that events 
are suppressive of individual agency, feeling that the choice of a pathways 
through life are detennined or the ones that you are on leave no room for personal 
intention, stories are important sites for reasserting lost or diminished agency, 
even if the means for achieving this are fantastic. Certain patterns of events 
occurred in Les story that suggested to me that his life-project has been concerned 
in no small part with fostering and protecting, realising and rescuing, a sense of 
individual agency amidst conditions which are unfavourable to it, and that it is no 
coincidence that Les has chosen to surround himself with lives in their objectified 
textual form -  with life histories he has recorded for local histoiy projects, with 
documentation of all kinds, with his own life self-recorded using an audio 
recorder.
What is there in Les’ story that suggested a need for him to get his life 
back on track, to recover, as in the Jackson quotation above, a proper balance 
between the realms of the self and non-self, so that the non-self does not threaten 
to completely consume the self? I detail a selection of examples below.
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Life back on the tracks
i) realignment:
After retiring from the Navy with ill-health, an illness that was to remain with 
him, Les entered an ‘experiential trough’ (Rapport 1994:168), meandering 
between different projects. As Les reveals:
I  was made redundant in 1982 and up until that point I  hadn V done a great deal 
as such but in 19801 went for an interview with the Mass Observation Archive at 
the University o f Sussex under the auspice o f Professor David Pocock and had a 
chat with him. I  was aware o f the M.O. and the work they were doing, I  had a 
couple o f copies o f this magazine called Camera and 1 by chance came across 
photography. Photography was something I  started round about 1973 when I  
bought a Practica Super TL with a 50mm lens. I  think it cost £49 including the 
batteries and a free film and the case. Well, 1 went up to London to get that from a 
shop in Holborn that has long since departed but my parents, again, especially my 
father, M>ere never interested in anything like that. 1 used to take photographs o f  
things and I  went o ff with various girlfriends to various locations, took 
photographs o f historical things and so forth. But when 1 was made redundant Pd  
had more time. I ’d  been to see Professor Pocock -1981 was when M.O. started 
up again -  and we were getting, I  think it was, three notices a year to write on 
various subjects which basically covered things which would allude to local 
history shall we say: the way people act, it was a socialogical-cum-
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anthropological process. I  did have a copy o f a book that was originally published 
by the Seven Dials Press that was called The Pub and The People and one o f the 
things I  started noticing were the pubs shutting down... Sussex University is where 
Tom Harrison Mass Observation Archive is and that’s who I  was writing for  
between 1981 and somewhere around '88. In 1988 1 was going into freelance 
journalism with a friend o f mine who owned a magazine called Motorboats 
yioxAhly ...and r d  always been interested in boats. I  went along with him and we 
did boat-testing, gear-testing and things like that...
The fluid direction of Les’ life in this momentary trough could be 
described in Jackson’s terms as a ‘broken journey’ (2002:33-36). However, there 
came a moment in the early 1990s when, as Les intimates in his own words 
below, he began to repair the ‘broken journey’ of his life after redundancy from 
the workplace. This is couched in the form of a strategy of ‘realigning’:
I  started realigning my life in 1993 when I  did an access course and from there 1 
successfully applied and got in first hit with Oxford Brooks [University]. I  spent 
three years there, got a BA honours and applied to Kings College London and Tm  
now sitting my finals in May, that’s two months time, for the Department o f War 
Studies MA. This has been an ongoing thing for three years because unfortunately 
I ’ve had health problems again which has been a bit o f a nuisance but my father 
died in November 1998, just over a day before my 50^  ^birthday and I  hadn’t had 
a car up until then but I ’ve taken over his car and I ’m able to get around a lot 
more and I  help Oliver out with two o f his books. There’s one in particular which 
was dangerously in need o f photographs or it would be abandoned so I  get
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around with that. Taking photographs for him was very interesting. They 're 
coming out well. Fm one o f the old school where I  use manual cameras, none o f 
these autofocus cameras.
ii) ‘legitimate’ scholarship;
His decision to re-enter education, first through doing an access course and then 
embarking on a higher education degiee, is the reaction of Les to a sense of 
dissatisfaction with his previously misaligned life. When coming across an 
expression such as ‘I started realigning my life’, it is easy to by-pass it as the glib 
rhetorical expression of the advocate of the so-called ‘me-generation’ to which 
Lucy’s story also eludes, so ubiquitous have such expressions become in 
contemporary culture; what is perhaps too often overlooked in such easy 
dismissals are the private existential grounds from which such an expression 
emerges. Beyond the clichegenic, what this expression is denoting in the passage 
above is the self-conscious assumption of a life-project as the antidote to an 
intimately-felt ontological malaise in Les’ life, caused, not least, by the erratic and 
fragmented pattern of his life post-redundancy. Such a period is characterised by 
Les as empty, an experiential trough. Fonnal education as an accepted career 
structure, it may be argued, is a culturally familiar idiom or collection of idioms 
for ‘writing’ a version of the personal life story genre -  indeed, Lucy also evokes 
the idiom of school experience when she talks of how she ‘walked out of school’, 
and school experiences commonly appear in life stories as something about which 
the author harbours regret, tracing their present circumstances to the experience of
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excess at school. Already in the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of 
amateurism as an unorthodox career structure, and there appears to be signs of 
agreement in Les’ decision to choose the more conventional sh ucture of fonnal 
education, an awareness, perhaps, that his amateur enthusiasm (enriching as it 
may be) is put to better use if submitted to the rigours of professional practice. 
Looking at his verbal practice, on the other hand, there can still be found many 
traces of his amateur enthusiasm for local history (not an institutionalised 
academic discipline but still generally considered the province of the amateur). 
Dwelling on aspects of the environment or on one general topic. Les’ 
conversation might suddenly career off into an excited discussion of an aspect of 
local history, almost as though his passion was impossible to contain within the 
order imposed by conventional linear narrative:
Well, i f  we 're talking about the Romford History Society, I  suppose it was my 
friendship with Oliver that was the starting-point. 1 met him many years ago when 
he was the senior research librarian at Romford Library and he used to say to me, 
'Oh, I'm trying to find out this, that and the other ', and I  would reply, 77/ have a 
look for you Oliver', because I  had quite a collection o f books on ships and the 
sea and now I've got even more o f a collection. I'm putting up shelves for them, 
hundreds o f these books there are. I've got I  suppose nearly 2000 books at home, 
quite a lot o f them are in cardboard boxes. There are still some in boxes from 
when I  left Oxford after my BA honours degree in 1997. No, there M>as another 
chap known locally to me, Eric Dinnis, they used to call him 'Mr Chadwelll 
Heath ' and he was a really interesting guy but he never actually wrote anything. 
He's got a lot o f  slides. He died two or three years ago now, maybe three or four.
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and he never wrote any books. He was a lay preacher at the small church in 
Wange Road, Chadwell Heath, called the Wange Chapel and this was part o f the 
Plymouth Brethren which the Ilford Fathers came from over near my aunt.
That was something else that caught my eye because when my aunt lived 
in Broomfield Road in Chadwell Heath -  that was her parents ' home -  they had 
the wedding ceremony and then they came back there for the wedding breakfast 
afterwards. I  used to visit her and her mother quite often, her mother and father, 
sorry, and their back gate opened onto what was recorded as the smallest 
cemetery in the world. It has three bodies in it and one grave was to Francis 
Glenny who was the last vicar and the man who built up the Plymouth Brethren at 
the house. It was a house-cum-church at the corner o f Station Road and 
Broomfield Road. Well, Eric had a lot o f information on those kind o f things. He 
had information going back to about the 13^  ^ century concerning the layout o f  
Chadwell Heath and so forth. I  had taken quite a great deal o f interest in the 
White Horse public house in the High Road. One o f my friends, I  met her many 
years ago, was Eva Hart, one o f the survivors from  The Titanic, and it was her 
father who laid out the gardens o f  the Wliite Horse and there’s some really nice 
photographs o f the Whalebone library and the pub itself I  traced the pub back to 
about 1580. Some o f the licencees were taken to task for 'ye drunken behaviour ’ 
and its patrons ran an illegal skittle alley or something like that [laughter]. It 
came into history, Chadwell Heath, with the Roman Road. In actual fact, the front 
o f the White Horse pub is the back, and the back by the church is the Roman 
alignment that went up to Chelmsford and Colchester and then Harwich, so it was 
a question ofpicking up bits and pieces all the time...
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There is no order governing these expressions of amateur enthusiasm, moving as 
they do between different time periods (from the present, to Les’ childhood in the 
1950s and 1960s, to the thirteenth century, to the early twentietli century, to the 
1580s, and finally to Roman Britain), between historical actors and sites of 
historic significance. The reasons for this movement are clear. It can be said that 
amateurism speaks from a different source of inspiration -  a love, a passion -  that 
is antithetical to order, a value which is more associated with the contemporary 
worlds of academicism, bureaucracy and excellence. ‘Aligning’ himself more 
toward this world in recent years, rather then the world of the amateur (enriching 
yet nevertheless disorganised), Les finds an existential strategy for dealing with 
the malaise of his previously misaligned life. Yet, 1 feel that amateurism is not 
something that Les feels he can, or wishes to, leave behind him. He finds his 
amateur enthusiasm for local history entrenched, and still he tells me he likes to 
practise local history while participating in the academy as a military historian, 
combining in his life a confusing array of projects both professional and amateur. 
It is as though he still preserves a space in his life where he is looking into the 
academy from its excessive margins^.
Being able to satisfy his existential need for more regimented historical 
practice, submitting himself to the rigours of syllabuses, assessments, learning 
requirements, academic canons, scholarly conventions, educational timetables and 
the like, it is almost as though Les is satisfied to carry on with his own projects on 
the side-lines to his academic work, balancing both the order of academism and
 ^Cf. Bourdieu on the petit-bourgeois autodidact (1984:328); ‘Because he has not acquired his 
culture in the legitimate order established by the educational system, the autodidact constantly 
betrays, by liis very anxiety about the right classification, the arbitrariness of his classifications and 
therefore of lus knowledge -  a collection of unstrung pearls, accumulated in the course of an 
uncharted exploration, unchecked by the institutionalised, standardized stages and obstacles, the 
curricula and progressions which make scholastic culture a ranked and ranking set of 
interdependent levels and forms of knowledge’.
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the passion of amateurism. He can profess satisfaction with his present situation, 
having been successful in realigning his life, as he has inherited a car and, like the 
moment of being from his 1960s youth, he can return to the town to explore his 
interests. Listening to Les’ story, I was left with the feeling that his narrative had a 
satisfying ending, that it ended on an ‘experiential peak’ (Rapport 1994:168). 
Having perceived himself to have lost some agency through redundancy and 
through ill-health, his is now an agentive narrative in which he seems in control of 
his circumstances.
Looking at the images he creates of his body-out-of-place, things could 
have been rendered much differently. Les could have directed more attention to 
his disabled body, speaking of it in terms of victimhood. Speaking of similar 
dislocating experiences, Jackson writes that:
‘Shame is a transgression, deliberate or inadvertent, that causes one to 
stand out from the crowd, a sore thumb, a misfit, an undesired reminder 
of something collectively repressed, an object of the gaze of others, 
arrested and ostracised, possessing no will or reality of one’s own. For 
one so shamed at home, there can thereafter be no place to stand except 
elsewhere, in exile, among others who are equally anomalous’ 
(2002:187).
So it could be that Les might have chosen to communicate a stoiy of how, in a 
corporeal sense, he failed to get his life ‘back on track’. It has been suggested by 
Higgens and Coen (2000), in relation to their fieldwork among transvestite
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prostitutes, the urban poor and los discapacitados^ of Oaxaca, Mexico, that the 
idiom of victimhood among the disadvantaged or socially marginalized, rather 
than being the sign of their disadvantage, can be a positive resource for valued 
self-identity. Victimhood truly belongs to them, and is sometimes the only domain 
over which they can exercise anything more than a limited agency. It becomes a 
property of their own, to deny or to embrace at their personal will.
Summation
To put down into words the story of a life as Les has done in this instance is to 
gain some hold or purchase over it, to enable the author to work thr ough, perhaps 
over many different occasions, those misfortunes, traumas, tragedies or simply 
socio-historical givens in the context of a story focused on the self. I felt through 
talking to Les that he was familiar with revisiting his life in this way; he was 
certainly familiar with visiting and revisiting the lives of those he took a historical 
interest in through his penchant for oral history, and, as I mentioned earlier. Les 
also recorded my interviewing of him. From what I gathered from his life. Les has 
had to spend much time working out his own path amidst reticence and ignorance 
from others. The revisiting of his own life, in the form of his own recording of his 
speech, at least gives concrete affirmation to his selfhood. Indeed, I would say 
along with Jackson (2002:185) that storytelling is still needed as the affirmation of 
experience in a world where it is still generally held that experience has lost its 
credibility and value.
Spanish; people with disabilities.
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Individual moments of being have a similar meta-experiential quality by 
putting a distance between the speaker and the event being narrated. Returning to 
the moment of Les’ youthfulness in the 1960s, what that moment felt like at the 
time can be separated from the significance it later held for him. Now, looking 
back on the 1960s, Les believes that ‘there were lots of interesting things 
around...but unfortunately the council have progressively destroyed lots of 
buildings which is a great shame’, and this for him was a momentous time: ‘I 
think it was perhaps the giadual destruction of Romford itself that initiated my 
interest in local history and I’ve been looking into it for some time’. That in itself 
for Les is an agentive story.
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CHAPTER 6
The story of a sociological classic text, Young and Willmott’s Family and
Kimhip in East London
In the previous two chapters on the story-telling of Lucy and Les, I have sought to 
make sense of ‘writing’ as a mode of ordering local experience, in verbal rather 
than written form. The ordering occurs in such a way that the cultural forms 
through which ‘the local’ is spoken are subject to novel use by the individual 
speakers. I ought to be able then to compare these ‘writings’ of social experience 
on the edge of London with the writing of social reality in a sociological text. 
Young and Willmott’s analysis of urban migration to the London fringe in the 
1950s, and still be able to derive some sense from their meeting. The logic of their 
authorship ought, in both cases, to be commensurate, and it is this that I wish to 
highlight in this chapter. However, it is the practice of writing that I wish to 
concentrate on in my reading of Young and Willmott’s text, the creation of a 
literary work, rather than take the written for granted in the authorless expression 
of ‘social fact’. That is, I present an argument for viewing Young and Willmott as 
academic story-tellers, using certain literary resources latent within their culture to 
spin a familiar narrative of the city for heightened literary effect. The reason that 
the autliors do this, I will argue, lay in the nature of the audience they wished to 
reach, an audience of non-specialists and one not familiar with the uses of 
conventional academic prose (factual and unequivocal). First, however, I briefly 
outline some of the theoretic background to this approach to sociological texts.
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The production of a literary artifact
I intend to use as the starting-point for my own (inexorably partial) reading of 
Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s ethnographic work on East London, Family 
and Kinship in East London (1957)% the authors’ methodological disclaimer:
‘the extent to which the final account is a personal interpretation, shaped 
and coloured by our own interests and sympathies, predispositions and 
unconscious prejudices, should be bom in mind by the reader’
(1957:211).
Such a statement on authorial selectivity may now seem unremarkable within the 
context of postmodern insight into the knowledge practices of the social scientist. 
My approach here is different, however. Through borrowing from the socio­
culturally oriented narratological perspective of Ruth Finnegan and the 
‘sociological irony’ of Patrick Gusfield (1981:186-95), my emphasis shall be 
placed on ‘how’ the urban texts of these sociologists came to be ‘shaped and 
coloured by [their] own interests and sympathies, predispositions and unconscious 
prejudices’, taking such an insight to be normative rather than exceptional to the 
making of tmth claims. To reiterate on the narratological approach to scientific 
texts with its aim of exploring the language games that make up the scientific 
fonn of life: the facticity that characterizes the academic scientific genre is not so 
much a self-evident revealing of truth as a constmct achieved through literary (i.e.
 ^The discussion will mainly draw from Family and Kinship in East London, abbreviated here to 
Family and Kinship, thou^ I also mention its British companion work, Fatnily and Class in a
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narrative) devices; emphasis is here given not so much to knowledge per se as 
‘what speech-acts scientific utterances and inscriptions typically are used to 
perform’ (Harré 1990:81); the audience is moved as much as they are persuaded 
by the presentation of ‘fact’ -  scientific speech-acts generate trust stemming from 
the presenter’s participation in an esoteric ‘community of saints’ (Harré 1990:82); 
personal perspectives are instituted as universal ‘facts’ and ‘laws’, sets of 
collective rules and practices instituted as paradigmatic truths (Latom* and 
Woolgar 1979; also Kuhn 1970).
The mode of analysis deployed here, which places emphasis on the 
temporal, also redresses the tendency to examine the events described in Young 
and Willmott’s study exclusively within their spatial context; for example, the 
spatial resettlement of sections of a population into types of environment 
conceptualised as distinct types of social ‘spaces’^ , the changing of a British urban 
‘landscape’. These types of account, which ostensibly include discourse on the 
‘village’ in anthropology and the ‘community’ in sociological studies, have had a 
tendency to map patterns of social interaction between discrete, private 
individuals onto ‘bounded’ geographical space. Alternatively, the village and 
community could more appropriately be viewed as idioms within a temporal 
context of narrative, not concrete entities tied to geographical space (Strathern 
\9%\\passim). Granted, the sites in which Young and Willmott conducted their 
fieldwork refer in tlieir discourse to distinct types of places, but what is more
London Suburb (1960), where appropriate.
 ^What I am attempting to do here for the two sites examined by Young and Willmott -  which 1 
shall summarise throughout as the borough and the estate -  is comparable to Mark Harris’s fusion 
of time and space among Amazonian fisheipeople. As he writes (from a phenomenological 
standpoint); ‘[for the fisherpeople] the river is more than an object or a geographic aspect of the 
world. It expresses not just place but cliaiige. The liver is a period of movement between one place 
and another and one time and another’ (2001 ; 15). The example of the river is here apt insofar as 
movement is a central theme in Young and Willmott’s study, and in this thesis -  the movement of 
migration, of ideational and generational changes within the working class, of movement from the
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significant to their study, perhaps, is not only the historical background to these 
places -  that they were fonned in and through time - but their importance as 
temporal co-ordinates in a narrative of human social progress. The spatial and the 
temporal, represent an inherent duality in the community model.
The inexorability of the fîeldworker’s subjective selection and 
organization of radically ‘other’ cultural experiences is now held as an axiomatic 
feature of the fieldwork experience as elucidated by anthropologists. In agreement 
with Geertz that an authorial signature is present in the interpretation of an ‘other’ 
reality even as fieldwork unfolds as a ‘text’, A. P. Cohen argues that, during 
ethnographic fieldwork, so also in
‘ordinary life we do not defer sense-making, we do not hold stimuli in 
one figurative hand, oiu interpretive models in the other, and only bring 
them together in an explicit manner under controlled conditions. We 
begin the struggle to render stimuli intelligible even as we experience 
them. Under ordinary circumstances we have no choice in the matter. 
The combined forces of our personal experience and of our compulsion 
to make things understandable to ourselves are irresistible’ (1987a: 15).
There are suggestions in Young and Willmott’s study of the prolonged 
and immediate encounter with ‘the unfamiliar’ and, I argue, in the struggle to 
render this alien stimulus intelligible, the authors had recourse to a background of 
cultural understanding -  a series of narrative templates -  through which this 
experience could be adjudged and assimilated to what was already familiar to 
them. Though the experience of the estate was new to Young and Willmott, and
‘old’ to the ‘new’ institution.
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so needed to be slotted into existing sociological categories and personal schemata 
of perception, the housing estate was foremost a new experience even for those 
who settled there during the 1950s from the inner city. In this sense, the actions 
and experiences of these respondents are framed in terms of the pioneer tale (cf. 
Finnegan 1998:147-8),
The bracketing {epoche) of the authors’ subjectivity in their statement 
above is interesting for the generic context in which it appears -  a section at the 
end of the study called ‘How the Research was Done’ -  in that this is the 
conventional space within which the author as subject is warranted to appear in 
the classic scientific report. The scientific study, apart from the sectionalisation of 
the authorial voice, employs various rhetorical devices through which authorial 
subjectivity is suppressed (cf Gusfield 1981). It shall be assumed throughout this 
discussion that Young and Willmott, true to genre, wished to maintain the 
impression, or as they would no doubt have seen it, actuality, of scientific 
objectivity and factuality as a condition for engaging as serious players in the 
public debate over planning. However, a little more needs to be said about this as 
a literary strategy before introducing the text itself.
The question of literary style (and so of Yoimg and Willmott as literary 
stylists) was closely tied with the problem of the communication of ideas for the 
founding members of the nascent Institute of Community Studies, in Bethnal 
Green in London, the influential institute from which Young and Willmott 
produced their work, and of which Peter Willmott retrospectively writes (1985)^. 
As Willmott himself affirms, these were an academically marginal group of 
people who were mostly, if not all, outside the mainstream academic discipline of 
sociology, then also at a nascent stage in the academy. These were not
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conventionally trained social scientists, though many of them came to take up 
academic posts, and their audience was not intended to be academic. Rather, 
taking advantage of their marginality from those sites where grand social theory 
was most stringently enforced, the aim of their body of work was to conect the 
‘structural blindesses’ of those in control of policy:
‘certainly the initial aim was to find out -  and commimicate to others -  
more about the needs and aspirations of working class people. And that 
seemed to us to require methods of research and styles of presentation 
different from those commonly used by sociologists, academic ones in 
particular’ (Willmott 1985:138).
The work of Young and Willmott, and others writing from the Institute, was thus 
in part conceived as a self-conscious literary project, the premise from which my 
arguments here precede. This is further confinned by Willmott:
‘Our first rule was to avoid jargon, to insist that when technical words 
were used they had first to be defined in lay language. But as well as 
clarity we sought vitality. One value of the case material and the 
quotations from informants, in addition to the extra enlightenment they 
provided, was their ability to humanize and enliven the text. The aim 
was, while making the exposition readable, also to convey a sense of the 
lives and concerns of real people...We recognized therefore that a 
report’s impact largely depended upon the extent to which it was noticed, 
discussed, criticized and endorsed in the newspapers and weekly
 ^Cf. Kent (1981:137-45).
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journals, rather than upon it being actually read by large numbers of
people’ (1985:142).
Thus, the use of the subject’s voice was intended to give vitality to the 
ethnographic account, to aspire toward an ethnographic naturalism (Spencer 
1990:152-4) for the purpose of reaching and convincing a wide state and civic 
audience. Their aim was not the institutionalization of ‘fact’ (the formulation of 
generalisable hypotheses certainly, but the instituting of certain ‘facts’ would 
come later) so much as the imperative to inform. Theirs was a pedagogic mission 
to give ethnographic expression to ordinary life in Britain’s changing local 
communities during the 1950s and 1960s.
Background to the text
Family and Kinship has come to be viewed as a classic document on the social 
history of the working class in East London during the 1950s, a moment that, with 
hindsight, occupies an important -  indeed cuspoidal -  place in accounts of social 
developments in postwar Britain as a whole. This moment covers patterns and 
phenomena which continue to preoccupy theorists of modernity and 
postmodernity within the social science disciplines. To this extent, there are 
remarkably prescient passages in the study. The shifts in economy and society 
which had been observed in East London at that time were matched by ideational 
change which was generational in origin, indeed took change as the principle 
value and idea: ‘Our time has its own values’ (1957:165), Young and Willmott 
came to write, meaning that ‘[t]he virtues of movement, from one area to another.
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from one job to another, from one set of beliefs to another, may be stressed more 
than the virtues of stability, tradition, and community, and where the new is 
praised and the old reproved’. The task of Young and Willmott was thus to 
embark on an ethnographic description of transitory ways of life, setting out to 
account for not only older patterns but also the newer ones at a moment when 
British society was becoming increasingly unsettled in the sense of the increasing 
challenges to a ‘stable’ mode of existence and its attendant collective identities. It 
is around these issues that I believe Young and Willmott create discussion. The 
issues they raise have resonance within the postmodern moment as writers have 
sought to extend the significance of the transitory to the general condition of 
social life.
Before going on to highlight some of the similarities between Yoimg and 
Willmott’s sociological narrative and the personal ones of my local acquaintances, 
I first need to mention some evident dissimilarities. The narrative perspective of 
Young and Willmott’s work differs from the retrospective stance of my 
informants in Romford given the prospective and even pro-active stance taken by 
the authors; that is. Young and Willmott locate themselves at a moment of change, 
a nascent period, one characterized by the uncertainty surrounding the 
consequences of policies and programmes of post-war social intervention. This 
moment of change concerned the emergence of new purpose-built communities 
on the Essex-London periphery into which the long-term residents of the older 
and insanitary urban ‘slums’ in inner city London were encouraged to relocate. 
This enterprise of social engineering promised to create an unusual convergence 
between, on tlie one hand, the traditional institution of the family and, on the other 
hand, the modem estates, between the elementary structures of social life and the
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man-made environment. The motive behind the process of migration is described 
in terms of a to-and-fro between the two sites -  the movements of kin with their 
stories of discovering and convenience, their constant physical and cognitive 
journeying between the two sites - such that neither site should be viewed in 
isolation from the other but seen as interrelated time-spaces; this is further 
illustrative of the closing down of boundaries (geographical and social) that the 
authors revealed as symptomatic of the era. What was significant about this 
moment of urban migration was that the social horizons of those who had lived in 
the inner city were expanding at an unprecedented rate such that more Londoners 
were becoming aware of the erstwhile ‘Siberias’, places to which previous ‘other, 
imknown people [were] banished’ (1957:124), located at the edges of the 
metropolis.
From this brief background I wish to emphasise some of the parallels 
between this study of the late 1950s and the town of Romford in the late twentieth 
century. There is a narrative overlap between the migration experiences of Young 
and Willmott’s informants and those of people in Romford, which 
demographically is regarded as comprising many of the migrants from this 
London exodus who made their way, for example, into the new housing scheme of 
Harold Wood in Romford, and into the surrounding areas of metropolitan Essex. 
Indeed, geographically, Romford is linked to London by the expanse of urban 
development that has built up from its historic core. Romford, then, is not a great 
step away from the East London of Young and Willmott’s study. But, more 
importantly, there are commonalities in narrative content between my informants 
in Romford and the East Londoners in Young and Willmott’s study -  the eternal 
conflict between human-defined commimity and architecturally-defined
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community -  which suggests that such preoccupation with the built environment, 
or narrative of place, is a regional token of verbal exchange.
A diversity of temporal frames
The two main sociological concepts deployed throughout the text, the family and 
the estate, come to imply a temporal order, as Yoimg and Willmott seek to explain 
in the very opening line of their Introduction;
‘This book is about the effect of one of the newest upon one of the oldest 
of our social institutions. The new is the housing estate, hundreds of 
which have been built since the war... The old institution is the family’ 
(1957:11).
Developments in post-war urban policy and its effect on migiatory 
patterns provide a further contextualising temporal frame for the study, as the 
authors tell an official story of human ecology in the British city:
‘In the last century [i.e. 1800s] people moved into the cities; in this [i.e. 
1900s] they have been moving steadily out again, towards the 
coimtryside from which their ancestors came. The middle class led the 
exodus in the inner suburbs; the working class of London and other large 
cities followed by jumping over the earlier settlers into the outer ring of 
municipal estates... It has been official policy to move people out of the 
cities; and we felt it would help in assessment of this policy if more were
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known about its effects upon family life’ (1957:11).
The process of migration, told through the personal testimony of individual 
migrants, allows for the expression of another important time-scale in the study; 
the process of migration does not just imply an event of sudden upheaval or an 
aspirational transition from one physical space to another, but presents the 
travellers themselves with the temporal co-ordinates for organizing their 
experience into a narrative form. So it is that Young and Willmott get their 
informants to speak in their own voice about their experiences of urban migration. 
They are encouraged to describe, evaluate and compare the socially-shaped 
temporal patterns of their everyday lives in the estate and in the borough with 
Young and Willmott using this to methodological effect. In addition, through 
quoting large sections of first-hand material abstracted from interviews with their 
samples and other sources. Young and Willmott can persuasively bolster their 
authoritative narrative through creating an impression of ethnogiaphic naturalism 
such that their premises appear solidly grounded in empirical observation of the 
type that only an ethnographer who has travelled ‘there’ could have collected. 
This strategy of naturalist ethnography is perhaps unusual for social scientific 
approaches to the city, which are more often oriented toward abstract categories of 
urban reality (Finnegan 1998:20); however. Young and Willmott move closer 
toward this generalized rhetoric in their conclusions on regional urban policy 
through invoking the privileged moral position of ‘the folk’ as a whole, as will be 
discussed later.
There are thus a multiplicity of time-scales in the report, each of varying 
lengths and related to different levels of social analysis, which are frequently the
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preserve of different genres of communication on the city. The time-frame 
employed in the case of individual stories of migration is inevitably short 
compared to the longer evolutionary time-frame used to discuss the human 
ecology of the city.
Even larger than these time-franies are those of the social or historical 
grand narratives. A further defining feature of narrative is the resonant yet elusive 
‘plot-line’; according to Finnegan’s classification of the elementary features of 
narrative. Without a clear plot-line, a narrative cannot possess that sense of 
allegorical resonance that is necessary to identify it as embodying a ‘story’. But 
how is the plot-line deployed in the sociological text of Young and Willmott? I 
believe that an answer is provided in the authors’ own narrative of how the study 
came about.
Family and Kinship took shape through the authors’ discovery of a 
sociological anomaly in the industrial working class district of Bethnal Green: the 
existence of a seemingly stable community comprising an orderly set of structures 
of social existence. These are elucidated in two forms, as the extended family and 
the wider neighbourhood unit, which could be accessed from a multiplicity of 
directions through familial links. Everyday social existence to a great extent rested 
on the elemental bonds of the family. As Harris has pointed out (1994:50), 
American sociologists, influenced by an evolutionary agenda tinged with 
Romanticism for the pre-industrial and pre-modem, had previously denied the 
existence within the urban milieu of ‘the ancient family’, as Young and Willmott 
describe it (1957:11). This form of family organization Young and Willmott go on 
to refer to as ‘the wider family of the past’. Such temporal reference again arises 
when Young and Willmott equate an agricultural way of life (part of ‘our’ past.
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thus evoking an evolutionary time-frame) with the so-called ‘primitive’ societies 
that still exist in the present, resulting in the reproduction of features that are 
conventionally attributed to the non-West as archaically Other (Fabian 1983). 
Describing ‘the ancient family’. Young and Willmott write:
‘We were least prepared for what we found in the borough [i.e. Bethnal 
Green]. The wider family of the past has, according to many sociologists, 
shrunk in modern times to a smaller body, The ancient family consisted 
not only of parents and their children but also of uncles and aunts, 
nephews and nieces, cousins and grandparents. Kindred were bound 
together thioughout their lives in a comprehensive system of mutual 
rights and duties, which were almost as binding in the agricultural society 
of our own past as in some of the surviving primitive societies studied by 
anthropologists. But as a result of the social changes set in motion by the 
Industrial Revolution, relatives have, we are told, become separated from 
each other’ (1957:11-12).
This short passage gives an insight into Young and Willmott’s schema of 
human history, with the ‘agricultural society’ of the presumably European past 
consisting of a system of kinship obligations and entitlements -  comparing this to 
the now mainly discredited portrayal of the ‘kinship polity’ among non-Western 
peoples. The implicit evolutionary assumption in this passage is thus that the 
centrality of kinship to the wider social structure has declined nonnatively among 
people in industrial urban societies. It was against this idea that social life in 
Bethnal Green stood out as a temporal anomaly.
229
That such societies still persisted at the core of the metropolis, the engine- 
room of industrial production, was a challenging prospect. It questioned 
prevailing academic assumptions about the sociological distinctiveness of the 
urban and the rural domains, especially as propagated through the writings of the 
Chicago School of urban sociologists (cf. Hannerz 1980:19-59), to say notliing of 
the ‘denial of coevalness’ (Fabian 1983) underlying representations of the 
primitive from the vantage of the modem. However, as shown above through 
Young and Willmott’s assumptions regarding the primitive/agricultural/rural as 
against the modem/industrial/urban, these are conceptual distinctions which the 
authors clearly feel are helpful in keeping separate and intact. Insight into the 
prevalence of the wider family in the city was challenging not least of all to the 
moral order into which the urban and the rural had come to be conventionally 
integrated. In other words. Young and Willmott’s interest in this sociological 
anomaly was provoked by its apparent contrast to the popular, not to say 
academic, plot-line of urban life that posited life in the city as a tragic and 
inexorable descent toward a state of disorder and corruption, a mode of existence 
that has deviated from the lifeways of the folk, coherent, unitary and closer-to- 
nature. As the authors reflect:
‘[Our impression of Bethnal Green] was rather different from a popular 
view of what a modern metropolis is like. Bethnal Green is not so much a 
crowd of individuals -  restless, lonely, rootless -  as an orderly 
community based on family and neighbourhood groupings’ (1960:7).
Intriguingly, these are the very social characteristics which are associated
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with the rural, or pre-industrial, idyll; they represent, that is, primary or elemental 
societal relations. The privilege given to such an elemental state of existence is 
implied through the contrast ideally operating in the reader’s mind between 
elemental community and urban anomie, as in the above passage, and the reader is 
implicitly expected to share the same cultural assumptions related to each form of 
social life as the authors themselves. So it was that a sociological problematic was 
bom.
It is my argument however that Young and Willmott do not waver from 
or attempt to negate this familiar plot-line of urban or modern society as a cormpt 
state of existence (at least in the European West) but rather seek to confirm it by 
displacing it onto an empty and ambiguous time-space: the ‘alien stimuli’ talked 
about by Cohen, the emergent experience of the housing estate which had recently 
appeared on the British social scene. Much sociological attention was given to the 
social phenomenon of estates as they became an increasingly popular strategy for 
social improvement in Britain in the twenteith century. Though sometimes little 
associational life existed on estates, as it proved too difficult to sustain, and they 
were peripheral to urban formations, they represented convenient conceptual 
spaces on which to deposit interpretations of advanced social life of the type 
nonnatively categorized by ‘the city’. Here is ‘the estate’, the new social 
institution, as the sociological refuge of a familiar plot-line, a narrative pathway 
(Finnegan 1998:172) by which individuals in the city can make sense of their 
socio-cultural lives. The borough, or ‘urban village’, here functions as the analogy 
of our own pre-modem past, with the orthodox view of the proper separation of 
‘urban’ and ‘village’ lurking tacitly in the backgroimd.
As argued above, the two sites of Greenleigh and Bethnal Green clearly
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represented separate temporal categories for Young and Willmott, not just distinct 
spatial categories. The text is rife with temporal referents. Greenleigh was the 
‘new’ social institution, the artificial enviromnent that represented the ‘futuie’ of 
British social life, whereas in Bethnal Green, in the author’s view, the ‘old’ 
institution of kinship still provided a stable foundation for local social life (thus it 
was ‘out of place’ in their schema of European social evolution). In Bethnal Green 
could be found a mode of existence commensurate to that which anthropologists 
once constructed in their analyses of ‘primitive societies’.
Both the urban village and the estate begin to read in the study not as real 
places -  though clearly they were -  but as tokens in a wider meta-narrative of 
social evolution. As categories, they bear the dichotomous hallmarks of the idioms 
used in debates over the evolution of human society. A dualistic relationship 
begins to emerge between the two sites (Bethnal Green and Greenleigh) to which 
the categories are linked (the urban village and the estate), such that they become 
locked together in a proliferation of mutual ‘conceptual’ oppositions. Indeed, this 
is the pattern of representation to be found throughout the report. So, the fixity 
and stability that characterizes the social structure and everyday experience of the 
urban village, as has already been mentioned, is predictably mirrored by the 
ephemerality and fluidity of organisational structure and commonplace 
experiences in the estate. It may thus be expected that an individual in the urban 
village would behave toward others as ‘rounded’ individuals, fostering a sense of 
security in meetings with others, while an individual in the privatized estate would 
behave toward others, whom they hardly recognize as individuals at all, with 
feelings of anxiety and insecurity underscored with a deep sense of loneliness. In 
other words, the two types of social organisation would be seen to lead to
232
differing patterns of sociality, and the individual as participant in the specific field 
of interaction -  borough or estate - would be expected to manage their self- 
identity differently in each situation. It is possible to discern over the course of the 
report how certain fields of interaction, and certain ideas of self, are transformed 
into objects of nostalgia. This must occur in accordance with die logic of types of 
social organisation first propounded by Ferdinand Toennies (1955 [1887]), the 
twin nineteentli century notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Community 
and Association.
Gemeinschaft roughly translates into the anthropological-cum- 
sociological category of ’Community', a mode of social organisation consisting of 
immediate and ascribed relations between members of elementary social groups, 
such as kinship units. By contrast, Gesellschaft, or ‘Association’, interposes 
complex, instrumental structures between subjects and results in organisational 
structures that are more fluid and transitory as agents are freed from their inherited 
statuses within the community, and by implication the life trajectories, ascribed to 
them within such milieux. It is in terms of these analytic categories that the 
Bethnal Green community and Greenleigh society can be counterposed as distinct 
fields of interaction.
Borough and estate, authentic and inauthentic selves
One of the main features attributed to Bethnal Green is the prevalence of 
immediate social contacts between locals. Public space is the social arena within 
which actors get to ‘know’ each other as distinct personalities at first-hand. 
Importantly, then, the public is that domain within which the garnering and
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exchange of knowledge about personalities and relationships emerges, a constant 
defining feature of small-scale community life. The family, according to Young 
and Willmott’s observation, has a crucial part to play in creating and sustaining 
the knowledge of others in the community. Rather than performing the function of 
closeting off individuals from the wider society, the institution of kinship actually 
prevents the isolation of the individual in the community by acting as ‘a go- 
between with other people in tlie district’ (1957:104). Take this passage for 
example:
‘Most people have therefore had time to get to know plenty of other local 
inhabitants. They share the same background. The people they see when 
they go out for a walk are people they played with as children. ‘I’ve 
always known Frank and Barney,’ said Mr Sykes. ‘We was kids together. 
We knew each other fi’om so high. We were all in the same street’. They 
are the people they went to school with. ‘It’s friendly here, ’according to 
Mrs Warner. ‘You can’t hardly ever go out without meeting someone 
you know. Often it’s someone you were at school with.’ They are people 
they knew at the youth club, fellow members of a teen-age gang, or 
boxing opponents. They have the associations of a lifetime in common. If 
they are brought up from childhood with someone, tliey may not 
necessarily like him, they certainly ‘know’ him. If they live in the same 
street for long they cannot help getting to know people whom they see 
everyday, talk to and hear about in endless conversations’ (1957:105).
What emerges from this description is the insight that this mode of social
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formation has implications for the type of identity an individual is able to maintain 
within its boundaries. Access to the above ‘knowledge’ about any specific 
individual means that they can never escape their ‘true’ or essential identity 
among those with whom they grew up, and Young and Willmott suggest that this 
cumulative knowledge gives others within the conimimity a certain purchase over 
the individual, serving simultaneously to protect the internal cohesion of the group 
and minimize the hannful acquisition of status. Of this type of community, it is 
assumed that:
‘it is almost impossible to ‘put on airs’ or to claim any superiority just 
because you earn more or spend more than your neighbour. Your 
neighbour remembers you as a boy, and knows that your aunt is no better 
than she should be, and will ‘take you down a peg’ if you become 
‘toffee-nosed’. The network of personal relationships acts as a check on 
the acquisitiveness of local people’ (1957:113).
In contrast to the borough, where interactions occurred between people 
who had some sense of each other’s authentic identities and subsequently ‘took 
each other very much for granted’ (1960:112) at the socio-cultural level, the estate 
imposed a way of life which required the systematic manipulation of identity 
behind practices of consumption. The transfonnation in peoples’ interactions 
toward each other after migration is indeed striking and forms a distinctive 
pattern. An ethos of hostility pervades estate life, as many of the migrants 
describe, and mutual helpfulness (such as the lending of domestic goods) is often 
met with incredulity from the receiver as a result of negative experiences in the
235
past. The result is not so much the complete loss of co-ordinates of social 
identification as their reduction to the singular and superficial, an especially 
problematic aspect of modem life embodied by the estate. As Young and 
Willmott write:
'In Bethnal Green it is not easy to give a man a single status, because he 
has so many; he has, in addition to the status of citizen, a low status as 
scholar, high as a darts-player, low as a bargainer, and high as a story 
teller. In Greenleigh, he has something much more nearly approaching 
one status because something much more nearly approaching one 
criterion is used: his possessions' (1957:162-3).
Opposing disciplinary metaphors are here used to characterize how the 
other is perceived in the two sites: if material possessions are the ‘measure’ of a 
man or woman in the estate, reducing the individual personality to those 
proportions which can be regularised, tlien the inhabitant of the urban village is 
much more akin to a ‘life portrait’, conveying the subtlety of interpretation and 
depth of insight into the unique personality that could be expected from an artistic 
genre. The borough represents a repository of certain shared ideals attached to self 
in Western society as the debate concerning how the self may be viewed in 
different types of social arrangement intersect with an evaluative discourse 
surrounding the loss of authentic lifeways and identities.
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The social pathology of suburbia: a narrative construct?
If the borough represents an important repository of moral narratives of 
contemporary existence, then so too does the estate in Young and Willmott’s 
corpus. They regard the estate as a repository space in a very literal way that 
implies a subtle critique of urban public policy toward re-settlement and the 
affective dimensions of this coercive movement. An important aspect of the socio­
cultural experience of the estate are the kinds of personal affective states which 
arise among settlers, some of which point to psychosis as a possible outcome of 
estate life; as an outcome, in other words, of being deposited in an alien social 
environment devoid of the supportive structures of a vital society. Though Young 
and Willmott choose not to unite these expressions into any coherent narrative 
order on estate life, there was a regularity among respondent’s answers to 
questions about how they felt toward and within the housing estate:
Tt is the loneliness she dislikes the most -  and the ‘quietness’ which she 
thinks will in time ‘send people off their heads’ (p. 132).
‘It’s like being in a box to die out here’ (p. 133).
‘When I first came [... ] I cried for weeks, it was so lonely’ (p. 122).
‘When I first came I felt I had done a crime [...] it was so bare. I felt 
terrible’ (p. 133).
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The authors themselves observe a ‘sense of loss’ (p. 133) among their 
informants, mainly women coping with time on their own (often not ‘o f  their 
own) and wrenched from the mother-daughter dyad, and Young and Willmott 
themselves admit to ‘the strains of the new life’ (p. 146). All of these reactions 
seem to testify to a radical change in the orientation of these migrants to their 
social milieu; their comments refer to a certain state of being in the estate, the 
thrownness of life, set against a different and contrastive ontological mode 
characterized by the secure co-ordinates of existence present in their home milieu. 
It is hardly surprising then that many settlers regarded the estates as deficient in 
meaning or that frequent visits home to the borough formed a regular pattern to 
their social lives.
It could be argued that the affective reactions detailed above were 
provoked not by any inherent quality of the estate itself but by the process of 
migration and the resulting social structure of the migratory group; indeed, the 
logic of Young and Willmott’s argument in Family and Kinship seems to point 
toward the psychically destructive effects of moving away from the extended 
family as the nucleus of support. However, the feelings of these migrants would 
also appear to be consistent with a literary caricature of suburban life, also cited 
by Young and Willmott, which lays stress on its monotonous uniformity -  the 
lack of mental stimuli - as the root of a social pathology of suburban life. Lexical 
repetition of the word ‘each’ is used to convey this factual impression to the 
reader:
‘Built since the war to a single plan, it is all of one piece. Though the
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Council has mixed different types of houses, row upon row look 
practically identical, each beside a concrete road, each enclosed by a 
fence, each with its little patch of flower garden at front and larger patch 
of vegetable garden at back, each with expansive front windows covered 
over with net curtains; all built owned, and guarded by a single 
responsible landlord’ (1957:121).
Comparisons
The narrative implied in the comparison of these two distinct patterns of sociality 
is the loss of an authentic or true self entailed by movement between these two 
types of social formation. This is represented in the dramatic form of a tragedy, 
the tragic loss of authentic personality. Elsewhere in their collaborative canon, 
there is evidence of a belief in this loss of true identity and an understanding of its 
social and moral contexts. In the companion work. Family and Class in a London 
Suburb, focused on the mixed-class suburb of Woodford, Yoimg and Willmott 
contrast the mistrust of the working class housing estate with the apparent 
conviviality of the middle class suburb:
Tn Woodford relations are not so easy going [compared to Bethnal 
Green]. Standards are harsher. A newcomer to a street -  and, of course, 
there are far more ‘newcomers’ in the suburb than Bethnal Green -  will 
not necessarily be accepted into a neighbourhood group. She has to show 
how she is worthy of it, be the right sort of person, have a decently 
furnished home of her own, speak with the right accent, be neatly
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dressed, enjoy living in Woodford but not so much that she would greatly 
mind moving, have a readiness to engage in conversation, and, above all, 
be rather extroverted, able to march out and meet people without being 
too shy about it. Sociability becomes a sort of profession. To get on well, 
people have to some extent to put on a front of bonhomie, and maybe 
leave out some part of their personality in the process. They have to 
conform...Maybe uniformity is one of the prices we have to pay for 
sociability in a more mobile society’ (1960:112).
Here, the apparent convergence betw^een the conviviality of relations in 
both the ‘static’ community (Bethnal Green) and the ‘mobile’ society of the 
suburb (Woodford), a feature of social life absent for the mainly working class 
housing estate, is explained away in tenns of the class status of inhabitants of the 
suburb who have typically managed to ‘professionalise’ their patterns of 
sociability. But the moral order is affinned once again by emphasising that such 
interaction is only pretence, denying the authenticity of the neighbourly persona 
presented in the social circle of the suburban neighbourhood. In the suburbs, 
sociability is an inauthentic form of sociality, the true price of a mobile society. 
The final line in tlie above quotation (‘Maybe uniformity is one of tlie prices we 
have to pay for sociability in a more mobile society’) shares with the audience a 
set of assumptions about the direction of social change in contemporary (i.e. 
advancing) society, a certain informed consensus, that living in the present world 
implies a gieater tendency toward mobility and instability than previously was the 
case.
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The real and unreal city
The similarity between Young and Willmott’s conceptualization of the borough 
and the estate and theories of literary discourse are striking. The theories of 
Walter Ong and E.M. Forster with regard to the modern narrative form provides a 
framework of comparison across disciplinary divides; they also bring into focus 
questions of urban reality and unreality which are foremost in T.S. Eliot’s writings 
on the city.
According to Ong (1982), the narrative forms of pre-modem (oral) and 
modern (literate) societies afforded distinct vantage points on the nature of the 
character constructed within these forms of discourse. This distinction may be 
understood, for Ong (borrowing Forsterian terms), in terms of an evolutionaiy 
transition between the ‘flat’ and the ‘roimd’ character. The significant innovation 
in this history of narrative forms comes with what he calls the ‘technologizing of 
the word, the invention of literacy, but new heights are reached with the invention 
in the modern era of the novel (reaching its apotheosis in the detective genre) and 
the complex, rounded characters which appeared within its intricate structures. In 
short, the novel is thought to foster the kind of literary subject whose complex 
consciousness, or many-sided personality, was made fully transparent to the 
author and could be conveyed to the reader of the text. Thus, it was argued by E. 
M. Forster, in theorising the nature of novelistic prose, that the novel gave onto a 
superior version of subjective reality and that this was connected to the control the 
novelist asserted over the narrative. As Rapport comments on Forster’s thoughts 
about the novel:
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Tor people in a novel are met through the pen of the novelist who knows 
them completely. He may pretend not to, but if he wishes the novelist can 
expose his characters completely: he is their creator as well as their 
narrator (1994:218-9).
What is unique and superior about this form of modem narrative, 
summarises Rapport {a la Forster) is that is gives onto an appreciation of ‘the 
wholeness of action, thought, and spirit’ (1994:223) adhering in the individual. 
Such is the nature of this artistic, God-like knowledge, that through it ‘one finds 
not only the transcendent individual but also a transcendence of the individual by 
something of general humanity’ (1994:225). Should such individual knowledge be 
accessible imiversally within a community, it can be supposed, tlien it would 
approximate in anthropological terms to a communitas, to which the closest form 
of society achievable in everyday life is the community, approximating to 
Gemeinschaft. Taking Young and Willmott’s model of the borough as an 
example, it was possible for other members of the community to apprehend, 
however ephemerally, a glimmer of the private personality of certain individual 
acquaintances, even if complete openness was never a possibility; as the above 
quotation about the individual as a life portrait in Bethnal Green suggests, there is 
an appreciation of hiunan complexity in social relations within the community 
which could lead to the mutual appreciation of human individuality among 
friends, family and neighbours. Contractually-based societies, on the other hand, 
do not facilitate such insight into the reality of the other, the transcendent truth of 
their inner being, and so remain superficial in the level of the knowledge which it 
affords of its members. Here is a level of social reality, and also a type of social
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organization, where superficial public life is carried out, and it is this public life 
which the inhabitants of the modem housing estate were forced to negotiate after 
moving to the outskirts of the city: a socio-cultural world of hostile strangers, 
fleeting traffic relations and superficial conviviality.
The borough can be interpreted as one instance where urban life fosters 
appreciation of the ‘real’ life of the individual, the ‘real city’. In contrast, the 
estate of Greenleigh represents, to borrow from the poetic language of T.S. Eliot 
in The Wasteland (1925), an ‘unreal city’, with its lonely, spectral figures and 
impoverished social interaction:
'Unreal City,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death liad undone so many.
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled.
And each man fixed his eyes upon his feet'.
It could be imagined that this would not make an unfitting description of 
life in the housing estate.
Representational motives
The view I have been arguing here, that Young and Willmott’s body of work 
ought to be considered from a point of view of literaiy  ^writing, may appear to 
contradict the positivist shift the authors are credited with achieving. Through
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such a positivist approach, according to Chris Harris (1994), it was possible for 
Young and Willmott to shift their focus away from 'fictional' depictions of the 
urban working class community which dominated the discourse on this stratum of 
society toward a more systematic elicitation of 'fact', enabling them to avoid 
reification and offer a less irrational treatment of the working class; that is, they 
refused to approach the working class with the a priori assumption of their 
inherent proclivities toward pathological behaviour, as frequently characterized 
their treatment prior to Young and Willmott’s research. The kind of strategy used 
to de-pathologise the inner city working class Harris dubs ‘anthropological’. It 
consists of a set of assumptions which took into consideration ‘’the normal’ rather 
than the deviant’ (1994:49), the prevalence of rule-bound behaviour rather than 
the lurid excesses of the literary imagination. The position I have adopted has 
aimed to outline the rhetorical strategies involved in this anthropological-cum- 
empirical turn, while I disagree with Harris for his separation of fact and fiction. 
This is not to dismiss the factual groimds of Young and Willmott’s study as 
simply made up or the work of fantasy but, along with Geertz, to recognize a 
discursive space between fact and fiction within which all ethnographic writing 
belongs and that possesses an integrity of its own, that of ‘faction’ (Rapport 
\99A'passim).
Having sought to consider ‘how’ Young and Willmott have arrived at 
their factional accoimt, I will examine at greater length the political context in 
which their work was written, thus addressing the question of ‘why’ it was 
embarked on. Such a question behoves a scrutiny of Young and Willmott’s 
attitude to and background in urban policy and planning, and again questions arise 
as to the moral order presupposed by these writers. As Harris believes. Young and
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Willmott’s work was never intended to be treated within a policy vacuum but 
embedded within it was a distinctly pro-active stance. The issue of adaptation, the 
problematic of maintaining normalcy, is placed within tlie specific context of 
urban re-location:
‘To institute, through sliun clearance and relocation to peripheral estates, 
a major change in the environment of a functioning social mechanism 
was to risk severe breakdown unless the environmental intervention was 
of a kind to ensure that the new environment was at least as likely to 
promote the viability of the family as the old’ (Harris 1994:49).
Toward the end of Family and Kinship, it is noticeable how Young and 
Willmott exercise a shift in rhetoric from the individual voices of the preceding 
chapters to a language of generalisability and social fact. It is now ‘people’ rather 
than individuals who are placed in a privileged moral position within this 
discourse. In addition, the notion of authentic ‘commimity’ is introduced and 
discussed as an unquestioned abstract good (a veritable ‘God-word’ (Cranston 
1953)) to be defended and preserved in the face of plans to build entire 
communities from scratch in which to re-house unsettled populations. Successive 
authorities and bureaucracies believed that they could do this by creating new 
towns or housing estates with the community element built in as an intrinsic part 
of the urban fabric -  the community centre or the town centre plaza. However, 
this raises objections from Young and Willmott. If a ‘community’ is not its 
physical form, then how could such an entity be accounted for? The answer is 
given in collectivist terms:
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‘The sense of loyalty to each other amongst the inhabitants of a place like 
Bethnal Green... is due far more to ties of kinship and friendship which 
connect the people of one household to the people of another. In such a 
district community spirit does not have to be fostered, it is already there’ 
(1957:198-9; italics in original).
The idea that a feeling of community ‘is already there’ within bounded 
geographical areas, so that communities cannot be straightforwardly uprooted or 
built anew through public policy, constructs this potent concept in such a way that 
it ought to be taken-for-granted; communities are naturally there, found in certain 
places sui generis. The impression given is of a social entity greater than the sum 
of its parts as is consistent with prevailing sociological orthodoxies. Through 
lending support in a public way to this discourse on community. Young and 
Willmott hoped to influence the course of socially engineered change in cities.
A further answer to the question of ‘why’ the study was conducted, apart 
from the need to harness the sociologist’s knowledge in assessing the impact of 
urban re-location, lies in the generational changes Young and Willmott observed 
which brought with them an ideational shift away from collectivity toward 
individuality, away from the fixity of folk life toward the flux of urbanity. The 
nostalgic search for continuity may feed back into this context of changed values. 
Faced with changing conditions, the ‘discovery’ of a fixed community would be 
consoling while at the same time inviting fears of its transience. Recent 
anthropological critiques of ethnographic field sites have brought into question the 
empirical reality of the ideal-typical community at any point in human history.
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showing them to be elaborate anthropological fictions (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; 
see Gusfield, below).
The fascination with the twin concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
has been enduring: it is noted by Hannerz how ‘[notions of folk-urban] seem 
simply to have been frozen, passively incorporated into the quotidian belief 
systems of social scientists’ (180:65). The reasons for this can perhaps be traced 
back to their historical point of origin in the classic formulations of the nineteenth 
centuiy. Their use contains a historical baggage of fear and anxiety in the face of 
social change embodied in the emergent, and thus still ambiguous, forces of 
urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratization. As Robert Nisbet writes, 
‘[the concepts of Gemeinschaft and GeseUschaft\ may be regarded as 
epitomisations of the conflict between tradition... and the new order, its outlines 
still unclear and as often the cause of anxiety as of elation and hope’ (cited in Bell 
and Newby 1971:25). These resonant feelings have become incorporated as part 
of the historical meanings accompanying the use of these as particular speech 
tokens, making ‘Community’ and ‘Society’ an especially relevant set of tools with 
which to shape and articulate the threat to contemporary social patterns, and a 
suitable means to frame the authors’ anxiety over such demise.
However, I do not wish to deny the empirical reality of ‘community’ as it 
has specifically come to be understood and used by sociologists and 
anthropologists. That is, I do not deny the actual existence of communities in their 
narrower sense which I would define, along with the measures outlined by 
anthropologist Edmimd Leach (1967), as a cohesive group among whom there is a 
predominance of ascribed statuses (preferably of a kinship type), supported by 
long-tenn residence in a fixed area and with limited separation of work and leisure
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both in tenns of space and personnel (though the separation of work and leisure, it 
would seem to me, is a relative issue). Clearly, Yoimg and Willmott accurately 
record having witnessed this kind of communal habitation in parts of London 
during the 1950s. But ‘community’ has had a wider history of usage than this 
narrow definition. The empirical reality that sociologists refer to as a ‘community’ 
must be kept separate from its wider cultural significance as an idea. In social 
scientific writing even, as the quotation above from Nisbet has suggested, the idea 
of ‘community’ or the ‘folk’ (along with their counterparts ‘society’ and ‘urban’) 
have come to function as metaphorical idioms, as Gusfield argues in his 
deconstruction of the terms as ideological concepts. Thus, ‘community’ has come 
to be a tenn used not so much for its referential or descriptive effect, as for its 
capacity as a heuristic device used to order the personal preoccupations of 
individual authors, their predelictions for certain grand narratives of society and 
history. It is a point also made forcefully by Bell and Newby in their classic 
analysis of community studies. For the classic nineteenth century sociologists, 
they argue,
‘the ties of the community, real or imagined, came from... images of the 
good life. Community was thus used as a means of invidious comparison 
with contemporarily exemplified society, yet community, consisting as it 
did of what the particular writer believed it ought to consist of, was 
capable of encompassing any number of possible contradictory values 
which each saw fit to include. This amorphous quality allowed an endless 
array of social thinkers to unite in their praise of community, no matter 
how diverse their interpretations of it might be. Overlying this positive
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evaluation of community, there was frequently a pervading posture of 
nostalgia -  of praising the past to blame the present -  and the two themes 
combined when present ‘society’ was criticized with reference to past 
‘community” (1971:22).
‘The trouble with community’ (Amit and Rapport 2002; cf. Cohen 2002), then, is 
that it has consistently shown the potentiality to become what Readings has 
termed ‘de-referentialized’"^ (1996:17) as it begins to mean all things to all people.
It is not that have I tried to make a case here for Young and Willmott as 
‘bad’ social scientists willfully distorting and exaggerating the ‘truth’ (in spite of 
their humility and their motives) to populist effect; rather, it is to attribute to their 
work a different disciplinary lineage than that which is conventionally accorded 
them. It may be the case that Young and Willmott added to their texts certain 
narrative devices for the purpose of rhetorical persuasiveness. The people they 
wished to persuade, furthermore, were those most likely to be able to marshal 
their resources in support of the authors’ proposals (and Willmott’s comments on 
the Institute seem to suggest that he did not consider academic sociologists among 
this group).
A final note on sociological irony
It is to Gusfield to whom I turn for justification in carrying out such a
What Readings means by the idea o f‘de-referentialization’ is that ideas such as ‘culture’ and 
‘excellence’, with reference to Universities, ‘no longer have specific referents; they no longer refer 
to a specific set of things or ideas’ (1996:17). As Readings illustrates; ‘In the age of Cultural 
Studies, culture becomes merely one object among others for the system to deal with’ (1996:17-8). 
Similarly, Anthony Cohen (2002) has pointed out the ubiquitous, sometimes absurd, use of the 
term community on which he has extensively written, for example in describing aspects of the 
non-human world.
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deconstruction of Young and Willmott’s text, and the academic genre of 
community studies as a whole. For Gusfield, irony is an important resource for the 
analyst as it reveals the partiality of all truths: as he writes ‘the reflexive irony of 
the sociologist is here a means to penetrate the veil of the apolitical’ (1981:195). 
A very similar sentiment was expressed by Fernandez and Taylor-Huber writing 
on irony in anthiopology two decades later:
‘the world is full of poweidul persons and projects that take themselves 
and their responsibilities so seriously as to be repressive (whether 
intentionally or not) in minor or major degree. Here irony can perform an 
important and, in the end, responsible task of parodying the absolutist 
impulse and mocking master narratives held militantly’ (2001:263).
The exposing of truth as a speech act - Harré’s project mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter - is one move in the direction of Gusfield’s sociological 
irony. Of course, it is more difficult for the scholar working within the social field 
of human life to defend their position of impartiality than the neutral scientist 
working toward solving public problems within the laboratory, even though the 
laboratory is also one of the sites where the public ‘problem’ is ‘constructed’ not 
discovered. I have to a certain extent set up a straw person in delineating the 
position of Young and Willmott. The writers themselves readily accepted their 
prejudices and how their preconceptions informed their work but insisted that this 
contamination could be minimised through a proper methodological balance. But 
insofar as having a standpoint implies assuming the authority or legitimacy to 
impose it, as the writers above acknowledge, then the construction of that
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authority ought to be subjected to ironic attention, in other words to de­
construction, lest it be taken at face value as truth, or even gain paradigmatic 
status (Kuhn 1970). This is especially justified in the case of the sociologists 
Young and Willmott whose work exhibits what Fernandez and Taylor-Huber have 
phrased as ‘master narratives held militantly’ -  the twin concepts of Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft, the folk and the urban.
All this seems rather academic, however, if as Gusfield suggests there is 
something inexorable about the literality of scientific genres, such that questions 
of language always threaten to return from beneath the surface of objective fact; 
the task, or responsibility, of the sociologist or anthropologist is to help this 
process along as far as possible -  in a sense, to become traffickers in tropes. Here 
is captured in metaphorical language by Gusfield a more conflictual interpretation 
of the relationship between literality and fact, rhetoric and truth, than I have 
proposed above but one which provides a fitting insight into the discussion:
‘Art and Rlietoric have not been sent into perpetual exile to live outside 
the walls of Science and Knowledge. With or without passport, they steal 
back into tlie havens of clinical and antiseptic scholarship and operate 
from underground stations to lead forays into the headquarters of the 
enemy’ (1981:93).
These points aside, where Young and Willmott were at their most 
prescient, however, was in their vision of a narrative of a social world increasingly 
dominated by the principles of planning, architecture and design, and the 
subsequent marginalisation of the person within this modem reconfiguration of
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urban space. As these forces impacted on peoples’ lives, they aggregated into 
themes which still form the background to the personal stories of those who knew 
at first hand the experiences in terms of which Young and Willmott ‘wrote’ urban 
social reality.
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CHAPTER?
‘Independent arbiter of taste in brick and stone’: the creative and
imaginative in John Betjeman and his connection to anthropology
The approach I seek in this chapter on John Betjeman’s vision of the planned 
enviromnent is one of giving social and cultural context to this author’s word and 
to his world. In other words, this is not a biographic account of the life of a literary 
figure. My interpretation of Betjeman’s vision is intended as a personal attempt to 
restore his words (and images) to the socio-cultural world from which they are 
derived. It is thus an attempt to appropriate his perspective as an ethnographic 
resource on English socio-cultural reality which is not necessarily debarred from 
anthropological treatment by virtue of its being perceived as lying within the 
academic purview of literary studies. Indeed, as Rapport (1994) has discussed, 
there is a long history of borrowings between literature and anthropology such that 
their antithesis may not be regarded as absolute but merely a historical accident of 
strategic origins. Toward this end, James Clifford has attempted to define the 
effort to render experience of a socio-cultural reality from a standpoint of 
participation as the only minimum requirement of an ‘ethnography’. As he writes 
of the poet Williams Carlos Williams:
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‘Seen more generally [ethnography] is simply diverse ways of thinking 
and writing about a culture from a standpoint of participant observation. 
In this expanded sense a poet like Williams is an ethnographer’ (1988:9)^
It is on these terms that I would wish Betjeman’s work be regarded as 
ethnographic, as a statement of ‘faction’ (Geertz 1988). Equally, then, Betjeman’s 
situated work on the British milieux amongst which he felt himself at home may 
be regarded as ethnographic, though originally poetic or journalistic in intent, and 
his reflections on these contexts may in turn be considered as ‘writings’ of English 
social reality in an expanded sense. Tlnough his acts of ‘writing’ English social 
and architectural realities, I will argue, Betjeman can be seen as engaged in more 
than a neutral descriptive act. He may simultaneously be seen as transforming the 
social worlds in which English actors dwelt by providing his audiences witli the 
imaginative resources by which to better conceptualise the possibilities of existing 
in ‘other’, though already familiar, symbolic worlds. The wish of Betjeman was 
always to deconstruct the putative givenness of an existent architectural world, to 
undermine its absoluteness, and it will be seen how this is achieved, through the 
use of ironic commentary, a device used to expose and challenge -  playfully if not 
sometimes maliciously -  the imdue hegemony and hubris of those he regarded as 
exercising authority, and authorship, over current worlds of Englishness. A brief 
description needs to be drawn here outlining tlie ‘world’ against which I see 
Betjeman as continually ‘writing’.
It may be stated that Betjeman was a close observer of the social 
conditions of Britain during the twentieth century, a nation-state that he perceived
 ^Cf. Rapport; ‘[the social novelist is] a writer intent on publishing stories concernedwith detailed 
and prolonged observation and comment on the manners and mores o f a social milieu in which he 
is at the same time a participant ' (1994:67; italics in original).
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was sacrificing all the softness of the small-scale society, the Gemeinschaft, to the 
hard realities of providing for the social and physical needs of the masses through 
socialist-inspired grand projects, a world of ‘homes fit for heroes’. But caring for 
such necessities came at a price. He stood against a world that was becoming not 
so much conventionalised as increasingly regimented and systematised, 
collectivised and massified -  like some kind of ‘planned ant’s nest’ as Betjeman 
came to put it. He became most familiar, then, for his antipathy toward progress, 
planning, technology, the rule of the masses (insofar as this displaced ‘taste’ for 
good architecture). The world around him, he repeatedly observes, was being 
massified at an unprecedented rate in human history and his contributions on this 
historic theme add to the literary strand of the debate among his twentieth centur>  ^
contemporaries on the actual and potential effects of a mass culture and society -  a 
fear of the impact of massification on civic vitality, the independence of the 
populace, as well as the vitality of indigenous cultural traditions. Indeed, much of 
Betjeman’s work is addressed to the central theme of mass society and culture; the 
loss of vitality thiough the gradual hegemony of a collectivised form of life. The 
specific vital capacity that most concerned Betjeman, and with which he is most 
closely associated, is the human creation of authentic place; in other words, he was 
concerned that, under the impact of planning on a mass scale, the necessity to 
build artificial environments that expressed a sense of place was overwhelming; 
Betjeman realised that the only true appreciation of place was that which subsisted 
within it. Like E. M, Forster, John Betjeman was not only situated within the 
social milieu about which he wrote, but simultaneously addressed himself to it; 
and just as Rapport considered this to be the source of Forster’s polyphony and 
‘anthropology’ (1994:71-2), so too does Betjeman sometimes speak with a
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prescriptive, rather than merely descriptive, voice about his social milieu and the 
crisis of its massification from a situated stand-point.
Finally, it is not so much ‘place’ that I go on to identify in Betjeman’s 
writings, if by this is meant an objective entity, but more a concern for the 
importance of ‘emplacement’ (Lovell 1998) -  if the geographic domain is 
primarily lived as meaningful socio-cultural place before it is reified in abstract 
form by an academic discipline such as geography or a field such as topography, 
shorn of its irregular local meanings by a view of space as isotropic, then 
Betjeman possessed a distinctive phenomenology of the environment: a love for 
places, an almost amatory affinity for them, which he conveyed through a process 
of traversing, and recording his experiencing of, the British landscape. It is this 
process of journeying which became the focus for his social-cum-topographical 
reportage -  he is known for journeying between worlds of conventionality, from 
the visual to the written, from the poetic to the vernacular. It is in this thematising 
of movement that I draw below a parallel with the creative process of ‘writing’, 
and, by extension, the anthropological enterprise conceived as a process of writing 
the conventions of English social worlds (cL Rapport l99Apassim).
I also seek to highlight and explain how Betjeman sought to create for 
himself a discursive space as a popular writer. The popularity of Betjeman as a 
writer and public figure can be understood insofar as the public found in Betjeman 
a vicarious voice for their own: here was someone who shared their amatory 
sensibilities toward place, their antipathy toward planning and the moral 
luiscrupulousness of the planner, the bankruptcy of civil society, their patriotism 
and pragmatism -  in short, a fellow writer of English social reality. The idea of 
Betjeman as a vicarious mouthpiece -  a marginalised position to be in -leads to
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my considering him as a ‘folk writer’, (a la Mikhail Bakhtin) one who identifies 
with ‘popular’ rather than ‘official’ sensibilities. However, in claiming that 
Betjeman was the vicarious mouthpiece for a series of popular ideas about the 
planned environment, I do not claim that Betjeman’s experiences and those of his 
popular audience were ever entirely commensurate. Indeed, Betjeman spoke from 
a privileged gentlemanly position, whose ‘natural’ moral and social superiority he 
could see eroded by planning, while the popular actor spoke from a context of 
immediate encounter with the urban and suburban present. This vicariousness is 
also partly the reason for Betjeman as my choice of example; having listened first 
to local acquaintances in Romford rally against the planned environment, I only 
later came to realise that Betjeman had already championed this vision, aspects of 
which seemed also to resonate with that of sociologists Young and Willmott (I 
must confess that this is the limit of my identification with Betjeman^). There are 
other parallels between Betjeman and Young and Willmott, which is perhaps 
surprising given the contrast in idiom. Both believed in the importance of a public 
and a planning profession that were educated about the environment around them. 
As I have already suggested, Yoimg and Willmott have reflected on how theirs 
was a pedagogic mission to inform, and in this they are at one with John 
Betjeman.
As a starting-point into the discussion, let me paraphrase Bakhtin writing 
on the topic of Renaissance folk writing. In those passages where I write
 ^Thus, my efforts here to incorporate Betjeman’s ‘anthropology’ into my own is also an act of 
writing out of myself just as if Betjeman were any other anthropological informant or foreign 
social actor.
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‘Betjeman’, Bakhtin is actually referring to the central focus of his work, the 
writer Rabelais^:
‘[Betjeman’sJ basic goal was to destroy the official picture of events. He 
strove to take a new look at them, to interpret the tragedy or comedy they 
represented from the point of view of the laughing chorus of the 
marketplace. He summoned all the resources of sober popular imagery in 
order to break up official lies and the narrow seriousness dictated by the 
ruling classes. [Betjeman] did not implicitly believe in what his time 
“said and imagined about itself’; he strove to disclose its true meaning for 
the people, the people who grow and are immortal.
While destroying the official conception of his time and of 
contemporary events, [Betjeman] did not seek, of course, to submit them 
to a scholarly analysis. He did not speak in the conceptual language but in 
the tongue of popular comic images. While breaking up false seriousness, 
false historic pathos, he prepared the soil for a new seriousness and for a 
new historic pathos’ (1968:439).
As 1 said, there is much in this quotation that I could find to support my 
personal interpretation of Betjeman’s achievements and vision: as Betjeman’s 
commentators and critics have noted, he found much discomfort in the 
bureaucratic tongue, with its ‘narrow’ and ‘false’ seriousness, and in contrast to 
this often presented his own ‘sober popular imagery’ to his reading and listening 
public, in those moments when he did not prefer to speak in ‘the tongue of popular
 ^Cf. Bakhtin, M., Rabelais and His World {196%). The work examines the historically over- 
determined nature of Rabelais’s word, thus bringing a diachronic approach to the study of 
medieval genres of folk writing of wliich Rabelais was an exemplar.
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comic imagery’. But, perhaps above all, Betjeman is most familiarly known for his 
distrust of the official rhetoric of self-presentation: ‘the official conception of his 
time and of contemporary events’, consisting of what he saw as ‘official lies’. 
Indeed, he had a deep antipathy for what Bakhtin came to call the idea, the 
illusion, of monologic authority, which he saw as vested in the instruments of 
local authority and the planner; he could break down their challenge by acting as a 
reminder of the ontological priority of the folk, ‘the people who grow and are 
immortal’. Further, there is Betjeman’s amateurish refusal to submit current social 
conditions to ‘scholarly analysis’"^. In short, Bakhtin offers a description of a 
persona who stands in antithesis to that which is systemic; someone who, thiough 
personal imaginative and creative capabilities, saw througli the opacity of the 
given order into the possibilities of a world that was radically ‘other’.
I; Betjeman and his word
If there is one master-theme underlying Betjeman’s creative efforts, and one 
drawn from the fimd of general ideas then in circulation, then it is 
‘collectivisation’. It is introduced here at length by one of Betjeman’s
As commentators on Betjeman frequently point out, the intellectualising of experts seemed 
foreign to him, endearing Wm to those who recognise mar kets for their own forms of symbolic 
capital outside of the scholarly institution. Thus, Derek Stanford has written of Beijcman: ‘There is 
none of the terrifying terminology, which keeps the layman at arms’ length, in these studies. 
‘Experts’, as Mr Betjeman writes, ‘are short-sighted, probably from studying details for so long, 
they live in museums, they are a little scmfy, a little dirty, very precise and very damning of every 
other expert. They have that wonderful gist of turning life into death, interest into ashes. The only 
vitality visible to them is the heartiness of their contempt for the enquiring layman. Then they 
flower, then they love to dazzle him with words and with reference. And that enquiring layman, 
who might be you or I, is sent home abashed” (1961:145). Making a further distinction in relation 
to Betjeman: ‘The expert and the enthusiast must not be mistaken.for, one another.. The. enthusiast 
welcomes the amateur, the tyro. He wishes to share, to communicate his passion. He seeks to 
arouse interest, to present the significant, to withhold confusing detail. All that he offers is 
positively slant. He locates his subject in a field of humane culture. Such, in brief, is Mr Betjeman 
as an investigator of architectural forms, a free-hand historian of period-styles, and independent 
arbiter of taste in brick and stone’ (1961:154) .
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contemporaries, the conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott. Thus 
‘collectivism’ as Oakeshott and no doubt others saw it during the early turbulent 
years of tlie twentieth century, was clearly an ideology ‘o f  the moment:
‘Collectivism in the modem world has several synonyms: it stands for a 
managed society, and its other titles are communism, national socialism, 
socialism, economic democracy and central planning. But we will 
continue to call it collectivism, this being the least emotive of names. And 
we will assume that the problem of imposing a collectivist organization 
upon a society which enjoys a high degree of freedom has been 
successfully solved -  that is, we will assume that the necessary 
contemporary consensus has been achieved...
To be brief, collectivism and freedom are real alternatives -  if 
we choose one we cannot have the other. And collectivism can be 
imposed upon a society educated in a love of freedom with an appearance 
of not destroying continuity, only if men forget their love of liberty’ 
(1962:50-3; italics in original).
This generalised ‘culture’ of collectivism is found reflected in tlie official 
discourses of the self-representation of British nationhood, especially following 
the Second World War when, as Oakeshott points out, the consensus for 
collectivism had already been achieved in a zero-sum fashion. And as Baklitin 
himself was aware, there are always alter-culture voices dwelling in the margins. 
There are always voices in society which are willing to challenge the official, or 
‘centripetal’, self-conceptions of the present moment, that which any specific
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moment ‘”sa[ys] and imagine[s] about itself” , in such a way that the present 
moment no longer seems so absolute. In the context of the rapid changes of the 
twentieth century, I find a candidate for this mode of challenge in John Betjeman, 
who recognised that the self-representation of Britain was of a nation that was 
proudly if blindly modernising, collectivising, massifying, through blocks of flats, 
road schemes, modernist buildings. It was such ‘collectivism’ that provided the 
grand nanative context for many of Betjeman’s views, I would argue, just as his 
artistic predecessors such as Oscar Wilde wi ote at the turn of the century under the 
sign of ‘contagion’ and the mutability of boundaries (Ceuppens 1997). Rather, the 
early decades of the twentieth centuiy were calling for a new leitmotif, and it was 
Betjeman who responded to it. He had a life-long antipathy to monologic entities 
like ‘Collectivism’ or ‘Socialism’ insofar as they provided a language for his own 
and others’ social experience of England. Thus, Betjeman sought solace for this 
not in the symbols of the twentieth century but in those of an earlier era.^
If Betjeman styled himself as a temporally displaced figure, then this was 
perhaps a feature consonant with the general displacement of authority that 
occurred during the fm  de siecle and arguably continued throughout the twentieth 
century through further social movements. The twentieth century gave rise to a 
series of movements designed to undermine and de-stabilise male bourgeois 
subjectivity, which, as Ceuppens points out, found its position already weakened 
as a result of the politics of alterity that marked the fm  de siecle, in particular the 
workerism of socialist ideology, the anti-paternalism of Bohemianism, and the 
first generation feminist critique of tlie Suffragette movement. By the time 
Betjeman was writing and gaining voice, then, the world-views and subject
 ^Cf. Forster (1972[1951];54): 1 belong to the fag-end of Victorian liberalism, and can look back 
to an age whose challenges were moderate in their tone, and the cloud on whose horizon was no 
bigger than a man’s hand’.
261
positions of the male bourgeois now seemed less absolute, came to speak less for 
the whole, if they were not entirely supplanted altogether as the voice of the 
burgeoning lower middle and working classes. It is interesting to view the 
developments of the twentieth century during the inter-war and post-war years as 
giving renewed direction to the processes of change already begun in the fm  de 
siecle of bringing into the open, and thereby questioning, the tacit authority of 
male bourgeois experience^. Seen from the perspective of its most distinctive 
achievements, there was much in the inter-war, and post-war years to support a 
challenge to the erstwhile secure subject position of the bourgeois male: during 
this time, the socio-economic doctrine of socialism was in ascendancy, put into 
concrete fonn by a post-Second World War Labour government intent to put in 
place a welfare structure for the country, in other words privileging a working 
class ‘other’; the continued strength of local planning and local councils; lower 
middle class suburbia; the grand plan; the compression of national space through 
road scheme programmes; militarism as the logistic support, and a source of 
inspiration, for social and economic change in the post-war era,
Betjeman and the dialogic
Born in Highgate, London, in 1906 into a moneyed family (the son of Ernest, a 
family businessman, and Mabel Bess), John Betjeman was first educated at Byron 
House Montessori School, followed by Highgate Junior School, and two further
 ^Indeed, Readings claims the same for the grand narrative of the University. He writes: ‘None of 
us can now seriously assume ourselves to be the centred subject of a narrative of University 
education. Feminism is exemplary here for its mtroduction of a radical awareness of gender 
difference, as are analyses that call attention to the ways in which bodies are differently marked by 
race. Both are targeted by the old guard, because they remind them that no individual professor 
can embody the University, since that body would still be gendered and racially marked rather 
than universal’ (1996:10; italics in original).
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public schools (Dragon School, Oxford and Marlborough College, Wiltshire) 
before ending his educational career, unsuccessfully, at Magdalen College, 
Oxford. As well as publishing a number of successful volumes of poetry (in 
addition to a volume of prose and a collection of letters posthumously by his 
daughter Candida Lycett Green), Betjeman was also a television and radio 
broadcaster for the BBC, journal editor, guide-book writer and illustrator, publicist 
(for Shell Oil company), worked for the UK Press Attache in Ireland, was an 
architectural adviser and poet laureate. He died in Trebetherick on 19^  ^May 1984.
Here I introduce Betjeman on a number of themes key to understanding 
his standpoint on contemporary British life:
Local councils', for Betjeman, the local authority, in their response to the 
enviromnent, emblematised the harsh necessities of twentieth century life. It is 
questionable that Betjeman ever desired to reconcile the attitude he held toward 
his British milieux with the hard realities of the ‘new economy’, unlike his 
contemporary E. M. Forster. In answering ‘the challenge of our time’, Forster 
came to recognise the need to adopt a relative approach to both planning for the 
body and planning for the ‘world of the spirit’: that you ought to have planning for 
one, the physical, but not the other, the spiritual, such that his credo is ‘We want 
the New Economy with the Old Morality’ (1972[1951]:56). While Forster came to 
appreciate that ‘to feed and house millions, might call for an ‘-ism’ such as 
socialism about which nineteenth-century wariness is now misplaced’ (Rapport 
1994:60), Betjeman could not bring himself to share this sentiment. For this 
reason, Betjeman’s views can seem dogmatic and politically conservative when
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placed alongside those of his contemporaries who sympathised with the socialist
project, or at least came to accept it as realpolitik:
T think the attitude of the local council... to the English country may be 
taken as representative of the twentieth [century]. The twentieth century, 
for which the local council stands, sees England not as landscape, but as 
material for drainage schemes, slum clearance, rating, road 
improvements, and site valuations; the eighteenth century...sees England 
in terns of parks, landscape, trees, prospects, and noble buildings. The 
local council cannot believe that anything short of a direct material 
benefit to the community can be of any use’ (1938).
Thus, for Betjeman, there was much at stake in the new economy of planning:
‘England is far too varied and delicate in her building materials to have 
standardised designs plumped down in her towns regardless of local 
scale, colour and texture. I think it must have been tliis inhuman, 
standardising attitude to our beautiful country which resulted some years 
ago in the Royal Fine Art Commission choosing some of the less hideous 
designs of concrete standard and passing them, if not approving 
them...Now the point of all tliis has been to show that England’s street 
architecture is full of variety. Indeed, England’s beauty is in her variety. 
In no other country can you travel so quickly from one sort of scenery to 
another. Before the war there was a disastrous tendency to try and make 
all our towns look the same. Burton, the Tailor-of-Taste, Stones’ Radios,
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Dorothy Perkins and Woolworths for examples did not care so much 
where they were, as that you should know who they were. There may be a 
commercial argument to justify the desecration that commerce has 
wrought in our old towns. But there is no justification for a non­
commercial public authority spoiling what remains to us of this once 
beautiful country. More damage has been done since the war by lighting 
authorities to our landscape than ever was done by Gernian bombs or 
greedy commercialism’ (1953).
‘Today it is impossible to get away from buildings. Their importance 
increases with the disappearance of rural scenery. Rapidly every 
inhabitable part of the world is becoming industrialised, and communities 
which formerly possessed a creative art of their own, by coming into 
contact with the rest of the world, imbibe another culture -  the culture of 
industrialisation. Nor should we despair that there is no longer a city 
which is unexplored, no longer a country replete with eighteenth-century 
towns of mellow houses and spacious streets, nor even an island of 
medieval towers and fortresses that is not stmng across with wires and 
scarred with tarmac roads. Only the swamps and thick tropical forests 
remain and on them it is impossible to build. We have prepared and 
planned the world beyond recognition, and can hardly be blamed for not 
turning our attention to the rubbish heap’ (1931).
War, militarism and nationhood. It has been pointed out by one of Betjeman’s
commentators, Leena Kore Schroder, that Betjeman’s was an ‘uneasy allegiance
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to British militarism’; in particular, she believes, ‘it is an antipathy to the 
necessary assimilation of all idiosyncratic practice and expression to a monologic 
system of audiority and rank’ (1998:29). Ironically, Betjeman believed that war 
could be a domestic force for good in that it encouraged awareness of the internal 
diversity of England. There was thus a positive experience to be gained from what 
could otherwise be seen as a legitimation for the collectivisation of society and 
economy^:
‘The title of this talk might lead you to think tliat I was going to make 
some sort of political comment. But I’m afraid you will be disappointed. I 
don’t know anything about politics. Instead I am going to talk about some 
of the pleasant things I have discovered as a result of this war, and 
observations about things, sceneiy and people in these islands...I wonder 
how many people will find themselves specialists, as a result of this war, 
in subjects which the war has drawn to their attention -  fr esh water fishes, 
astronomy, cow parsley, lichens, architecture, planning, geology, building 
materials, patent manures, marsh plants, refuse, trees, cloud fonnations, 
winds, tides, seaweed, rhododendrons -  all subjects which we never 
bothered about when we had not the time, but which have now, one or 
other of them, forced themselves on our attention’ (1940).
Cf. Oakeshott (1962:56); ‘There is a potential gain, if it can be hawested, for a society with a 
libertarian tradition, in the successive shocks of mobilization and demobilization. And just as a 
civilian will fight better (for he has something to figlit for) if in the intemls of peace he is 
permitted to be a civilian (and not kept bumming around in an industrial army), so an economy 
which is, in peace, allowed to stretch itself and flex its limbs will be found, when it is mobilized 
for wai; to possess superior stamina to one kept permanently mobilized’.
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Motorism: the increasing use of motor-cars was depicted by Betjeman as a self- 
defeating activity;
‘We look nervously at the sky, fearing what might fall out of it. We 
ignore the earth at our feet where a monster is growing bigger, noisier and 
smellier everyday. The roads of England are at present more congested 
than anywhere in the world and within ten years are likely to have twice 
as much traffic...Everyone has a pedestrian side to him. He likes to stand 
on a footbridge and see shoals of minnows in a clear stream. He would 
like walking between colleges in Oxford and Cambridge or in the closes 
of our cathedrals, noticing how the sun strikes the mouldings of 
weathered stone if only he could see them without a foreground of motor 
cars...Personally I think that uncontrolled motor traffic is the enemy of 
the most important side of our nature. The motor is only a means to find 
peace. It is too fraught with anxiety and too confining to be peace itself 
(1962).
‘If we have many motor cars, we must pay the price not only in tax and 
the cost of the car but also in scenery which motors are intended to take 
us to see’ (1937).
The local idyll: characteristic of Betjeman’s corpus is his professed antipathy to 
monologic definitions of nationhood, preferring to capture in his work its 
irreducible diversity. England’s essence lies, if anywhere, in its ‘essential’
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complexity, echoing his earlier comment that ‘England’s beauty is in her variety’. 
His is an England that consists of:
‘hundreds and hundreds of place names of hundreds and hundreds of 
unspoiled places with stone churches, heavily ticking church clocks, 
modest post offices, creeper-clad wardens’ cottages, rusty croquet hoops 
on rectoiy lawns, swinging inn signs and well-stocked gardens where 
brick paths lead through thyme and vegetables. To think of the names is 
to feel better: Huish Champflower, Whitchurch Canonicorum, Willingale 
Spain, Bourton-on-the-Hill, Iweme Minster, Piddlethrenthide, South 
Molton, Wotton, Norton, Evenlode, Fairford, Canon’s Ashby, Bag 
Enderby, Kingston Bagpuize’ (1943).
Here is an explanation of Betjeman’s word as polyphonic; his word (and 
the world it gives onto) is social, not stemming from any singular authority. This 
at first glance seems incongruous with what it presented in the final quotation 
above, the partial vision of a countied elite, instituted and passed off as universal. 
But not so, according to Schroder. In the Shell Guides as well as his poetry, 
Betjeman sought to authorise to his audience a particular vision of Englishness but 
one that was dialogic, not monologic:
‘If Betjeman’s Englishness can be given material form [then the] 
awareness of that identity is produced through cultural diversity. His 
motive lacks both the objective inquiry of the architectural historian and 
the subjective emotionalism of the nostalgic dreamer. Betjeman’s
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perception o f England is always grounded in a fully socialised
dialogism..,His impulse is not to project and preserve a unified sense of
Englishness impacted in a monolithic national nostalgia, but to pursue 
and foreground its diversity’ (1998:17).
The ‘ideological structuring of Englishness’ (1998:16) is indeed laid bear in 
Schroder’s reading of Betjeman’s choice of locations for his poetry, the
‘heterotopian’ site a la Foucault (arterial roads, the peripheral commuter-belt, 
railway lines, the seaside) which amounts to ‘more an idea about space’ than its 
actual concrete manifestations. Through it Betjeman is said to have created a sense 
of Englishness, of English space, that was inherently ambivalent, continually re­
made, beyond closure by any single authorial definition. Indeed, this was 
something that was latent in the place names he was fond of subverting, exposing 
their ‘barely-contained energies’ (1998:18) in surrealist fashion. Thus,
‘heteroglossia’ is an important tool for grasping the characteristically ambivalent 
register of Betjeman’s poetry and imagery according to Schroder,
Referring to Betjeman’s famous poem ‘Howto Get On In Society’, which 
consists simply of ‘the speaking human voice’, as well as other poems in his 
oeuvre, Schroder elucidates how for Betjeman (like Bakhtin) individuals dwell in 
linguistic worlds that for them possess the qualities of a ‘social artefact’, of words 
as forms that already carry the load of previous social usages to which their 
current utilisation must necessarily address itself. Meanings call out to other 
meanings in an ‘ultimately imstable linguistic model’ (1998:26). As Bakhtin 
writes, in an oft-quoted passage:
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‘All words have the taste of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a 
particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day 
and hour’ (1981:293).
It is explained by Schroder how Betjeman ‘consciously allows for its own 
discourse to become dated’, in ‘How To Get On In Society’, a poem which 
consciously sits on ‘the ideological thresholds between addresser, addressee, 
listener and reader’ in its abutting of the voices of different social classes (it was 
also printed as a competition inviting entrants to complete it, further supporting 
Schroder’s thesis); his corpus eschews progressive nairatives, undermining official 
conceptions of change. That ‘[wjords are never neutral on Betjeman’s tongue nor 
in his hands’ (1998:19) is given expression in his typography, styling himself as 
an amateur typographer. For example, the front cover for the 1970 re-print of 
Ghastly Good Taste [1933] is a prime illustration of Betjeman’s attention to 
meaning in the detail of tlie physical appearance of his work (fig. 7.1), an attention 
that Schroder would claim is again ideological in origin (even assuming complete 
authorship over the presentation of the Shell Guides for reasons, however, that 
were more pragmatic than socially aware (1994[ 1933]: 126)). In the ‘Introduction’, 
Betjeman writes of the original publication:
‘The best things about it are the fancy cover, which I designed myself 
from display types found in the capacious nineteenth-century premises of 
Stevens, Shanks & Sons, 89 Southwark Street, type founders. In their 
collections they discovered for me the little railway train and the founts 
which in descending order are Ultra Bodoni, Argentine, Bodoni, Rustic. I
270
have an idea that the sans-serif outline capitals in which the word 
‘Illustration’ is written, is a Grotesque. The black letter for ‘Mr 
Fleetwood-Hesketh’ is Westminster. The text of the book is in modem 
face, because most of the books on architecture in the early thirties were 
printed in a sans-serif a long way after Gill, and to print a book of this 
size and to use an italic running commentary at the top of each right-hand 
page was hopelessly old-fashioned. Display types were usually sans-serif 
and title-page and cover had to be pure and empty-looking, and nothing 
quite in the middle, so as to show that it was up to date’ 
(1970[1933]:xiii).
There is a self-conscious awareness of the potential polyvocality of all 
aspects of his stylistic presentation, then, not just the words. In sum, for Schroder:
‘Betjeman’s awareness of style and register allows for a dialogic and 
intertextual understanding of the ideological conflicts present in all fonns 
of social and cultural expression... language is heteroglossically inflected 
in ways that are not merely stylistic, but more importantly, are also borne 
[sic] out of ideological positions of socially and politically identified 
groups and individuals’ (1998:21-3).
This is a reading of Betjeman’s constructions of Englisliness, identifying him as a 
personality defining Englishness to an English audience, but one which takes its 
inspiration from Bakhtin’s tlieoiy of dialogics^. I personally find this interpretation
Cf. Baklitin (1988[1981]:151).
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and comparison a persuasive one, and, in addition, one that I would hope has some 
further mileage to it in terms of the utility of the ideas in Bakhtin’s corpus.
I wish to shift the focus of my analysis of Betjeman’s word away from 
dialogics, although that still remains important, toward another concept of 
Bakhtin’s, folk genres of humour, to see to what extent this affords useful insight 
into Betjeman’s vision of English worlds. To do so it is necessary to return here to 
the issue of Betjeman’s critical reception in his time. While Betjeman had a public 
following who heaped praises on his work, his literary work has tended to have 
left a legacy of criticism regarding its seriousness: that here was a poet intent on 
humourising the world around him, whose choice of topic was esoterically 
mundane and vernacular rather than appropriately metaphysical (in other words, 
here was an unpleasant confrontation with English life represented in a sobering 
clarity). Laugliter, lightness, the vernacular: these are themes which Bakhtin has 
also claimed belong to the aesthetic culture of the folk, and are terms which are 
out of place in the social universe designed to support the values of the ruling elite 
(of which Betjeman has more to say later). The denigration of Betjeman’s word 
thus reflects a wider cultural and historical pattern in Western systems of 
governance and knowledge. It can be argued that the low value placed in Western 
culture on the phenomenon of laughter follows the pattern of centuries of rational 
epistemological hegemony whereby laughter, belonging to a previous time in 
European history, is surpassed by reason as the instrument for discerning truths. In 
addition, laughter, rather than giving onto a different world of values, tends to be 
passed off as a phenomenon more associated with the body than with cognitive 
functions which, given that the body has represented a blind spot in European 
philosophical thought until only recently, is perhaps further reason for its devalued
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status^. However, through his own explorations of laughter and its genres, Bakhtin 
identifies a separate universe of the folk that has remained hidden to the eyes of a 
literary tradition that takes its inspiration from the orderly worlds of the ruling 
elite.
But it is not order that is fetishised in the world of the folk. To evoke the 
dichotomous anthropological terms of Mary Douglas (1966), folk genres of 
laughter disclose not so much a logic of control through the imposition of order as 
its subversion in anomaly and ambivalence. A question surely also remains as to 
what extent contemporary parodie genres also partake of the ambivalence that is 
an aspect of the potency of folk laughter. Nevertheless, the generally devalued 
status of laughter and its genres in the European world post-Enlightenment and 
post-Descartes, suggests possible grounds for the range of responses from 
Betjeman’s reading public, from warm engagement, to ambivalent acceptance, to 
his critical dismissal, examples of which are discussed below.
As a sympathetic critic, Patrick Taylor-Martin, has observed, the response 
to Betjeman’s corpus has tended to focus on his anomaly, such that Betjeman can 
be seen as exercising a ‘polluting’ influence over those who would admit to 
enjoying reading him: those intellectually inclined toward ‘high’ literature who, in 
engaging with his work, could be expected to gain a feeling of ‘naughtiness’ from 
‘slumming’ around in a vernacular space far distanced from their usual 
‘cultivated’ universe of referents^^. As Taylor-Martin has put it:
For Mary Douglas (1975), laughter is indeed pre-eminently a form of corporeal practice involved 
in tacit communication.
If critical opinion does not have Betjeman down as generically low, then he is certainly seen as 
positively unaccomplished. Cf. Sansom’s review of Hillier’s biography of Betjeman, John 
Betjeman: New Fame, New Love (2002): ‘If there is one pleasure available to manldnd it’s doing 
what we’re not supposed to do -  playing, fiddling, mooching, galooting and otherwise tickling our 
fancies. This explains, for example, why people come home early, or stay out all night long, why 
we sleep in, sleep over, drink to excess, write, read or publish literary criticism, and commit crime.
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Tntellectuals who admire Beljeman are sometimes rather puzzled by the 
fact. Certainly, he is accomplished and enjoyable; but he remains, for 
them at least, an enigma: ‘unique’, ‘unclassifiable’, ‘no one quite like 
him’ are words they use to describe him. In admitting to enjoyment of his 
verse they are conscious of a certain robust perversity in themselves; they 
imagine they are slumming, like the gourmet who says he also likes fish 
and chips’ (1983:177).
I find it interesting how tacit class references are often used to evaluate 
Betjeman’s poetry. Thus, it is assumed, there are a range of objects suitable for 
poetic treatment, from the entirely proper to the entirely improper, which are 
placed along a class spectrum -  from objects of classical antiquity of the Greco- 
Roman world (expected to be visited by those on the elite nineteenth century 
Grand Tour) to British ‘fish and chips’ (of the working class). Thus, those who 
tend to approach Betjeman do so partly out of awareness of class distinction, that 
to read Betjeman and to become immersed in his imaginative universe is to take a 
holiday in a different, and lower, class habitus, where objects of philosophical 
reflection are replaced by those of sensuous immediacy. There is also no doubt 
that such typical readers are seduced (and entertained) by the ambiguity of 
Betjeman’s word which (and this is the crucial point) combines the high poetic 
fonn with low immediate content -  that he chose poetry as a channel through 
which to depict the British seaside or a provincial motorway, the heterotopic and 
vernacular, rather than the distant sites of metaphysical speculation.
It certainly helps explain why Bevis Hillier has wiitten an enormous biography of a dead English 
minor poet’ (2003:27).
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That Betjeman chose not to seek capital out of exploiting the references 
of high art by adopting a preference for the vernacular is a point frequently made 
of Betjeman’s corpus, especially when he is ubiquitously compared to those who 
entertain a higher reputation for intellectual thought and poetic excellence. For 
instance, Taylor-Martin defensively points out the allusiveness and difficulty of T. 
S. Eliot’s poetry, feted by the literary critic as a form of poetry that requires the 
exclusive interpretive skills of the intellectual. In contrast, Betjeman is ever 
associated with social inclusivity and accessibility to the reading public. The 
argument applied by Taylor-Martin is that Beljeman’s infoimality, and the 
closeness of his poetic referents, does not necessarily denote an inherently lower 
form of art. Rather, the measures for discriminating and classifying ‘high’ and 
‘low’ art are themselves a cultural arbitrary; the problem with such measurements, 
then, is that they merely generate the impression of absolute difference. There is 
nothing inherently wrong in conservative poetic /brm, argues Taylor-Martin, by 
which he denotes a fonn that eschews the experimentalism of modernist poetry 
which encloses around it a small interpretive community of intellectuals. There 
may be some merit to such a view. However, such an argument I find excessively 
narrow in its concentration on form and, as a consequence of which, sets up an 
unfortunate distinction between experimentalism and conservatism in the 
discussion of Betjeman, with Betjeman himself essentialised as a conservative 
poet. By highlighting both the form of Betjeman’s poetry and the type of content 
that infused it, it is possible, I suggest, to liberate Betjeman from this narrow 
classification as a conservative writer, and possibly even to read into his poetic 
project a creative potentiality -  that there is no such thing as (essentially) 
conservative and (essentially) creative or experimental poets, but that all are
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equally ‘strong’ creative agents (Bloom 1975). Certainly, it is Betjeman’s creative 
and distinctly individual voice that I would highlight that emerged throughout his 
writings, and other textual productions, a creative agency that is lost in the narrow 
classification of Betjeman as poetically static, in the vaunting, that is, of the 
essentially conservative fonn of his traditional poetry. I will explain here the 
grounds for this argument through a return to Bakhtin’s ideas on the carnivalesque 
as genre and practice, and through a discussion on creativity in anthropology as it 
pertains to individual agents.
For the editors of Creativity/Anthropology (Lavie et a l 1993), creativity 
may be defined as ‘human activities that transform existing cultural practices in a 
manner that a community or certain of its members find of value’ (1993:5); in 
other words, it is the upturning of existing instituted cultural practices, through the 
untrammelled agency of an individual with the capacity to rise beyond the 
strictures of current practice to conceive of them, and the world, anew. Through 
their practice new social worlds are invented, instituted and, in cyclical fashion, 
possibly even deposed. The periodic cyclic regeneration of structures is identified 
by Bakhtin as one of the effects of folk rites de passage, such as festival and 
carnival. There is further creativity in the gemes of parody and profanity uttered 
during folk festival as existing official, sacred forms of language are infused with 
new and vital meanings. A parodie performance can be imaged whereby, 
outwardly, the form of a language or action is mimetic -  it appears superficially to 
mirror its socially normative usage. But the audience is left in no doubt of the 
performance as parody and thus are able to draw a distinction between form and 
content, looking to the content for meanings that are unconventional or non­
nonnative in intent. I suggest that the reception to Betjeman’s word may have
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been fundamentally similar. With Betjeman’s verse, the form itself is part of the 
message: that here is communicated a refusal to treat the poetic as a specialised 
medium. If the poetic is a medium usually associated with the communication of 
transcendent ideas, with the extra-ordinary or extra-empirical (the ‘foreign’, 
intellectualist, ‘experimental’ poetry that Taylor-Martin critiques), then it is now 
being used as a vehicle for vernacular meaning. This is a creativity that acts on 
and finally transforms the genre in which Betjeman worked^ \  The reader is left 
with no doubt that the origin of this creative act of poetic reinvention lies in 
Betjeman himself as it is his voice, his subjective point of view, that comes out 
most clearly in this novel use of form.
This is an interpretation that some may not find in the corpus itself, that 
takes its inspiration and support from the familiarity (in terms of Bakhtin’s ideas) 
of the cultural patterns reflected ubiquitously in the commentary on his work. 
Thus, I am willing to accept that this does not exhaust all possible readings of his 
corpus, and potential flexibility strikes me as a significant feature of his continuing 
legacy. Others may co-opt his corpus for the exploration of their own agendas. For 
these others, as I have already mentioned, Betjeman simply represented a homely 
and closeted space amidst a world of global cultural flows, a space that in itself 
was capable of carrying meaning in accordance with tlie agenda tliat the particular 
interpreter wished to read into it. So, for Taylor-Martin, Betjeman was a home- 
spun poet who stood for accessibility and purity (both stylistic and nationalistic) as 
expressed in his ‘clarity of diction rather than cloudy obscurity’ as well as his 
‘poems about ordinary and personal experience rather than poems about other 
poets or ‘abroad’, formal conservatism rather than technical experiment’
Besides James Clifford, mentioned in the introduction, there have been other attempts by 
anthropologists to claim poets for the ethnographic record; e.g. James Fernandez on Ceferino 
Suarez, a rural Spanish versifier (1993).
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(1983:178), Another is Betjeman as a renascent nationalist, or ‘Little Englander’, 
and I will return to this reading below. But my interpretation parts from all of 
these.
I have above attempted to lay out the argument for Betjeman to be 
viewed as a ‘folk’ author, as the category is understood by Bakhtin, and that in 
doing so it is necessary to recognise the resonance of Betjeman’s public persona as 
well as his word. The antithesis of the ‘priestly’ and the ‘jesterly’ cultures, as Jung 
(1998) dichotomises, is well displayed in Timothy MowTs (2000) illustration to 
his book on the contrastive architectural sensibilities of John Betjeman and his 
contemporary, the architectural historian Niklaus Pevsner (fig. 7.2). Both of the 
photographs immediately strike the viewer as images of excess: Pevsner is 
presented standing behind an excessively high pile of books, emphasising literacy 
as the symbol of his official seriousness. In contrast, the emphasis of Betjeman’s 
photograph is his excessive, phenomenal body, thrown back in a comportment that 
reveals the permeation of the limits between the (inner) body and the (outer) 
world, the focus of contemplation of grotesque liminal sacra. This familiar 
imageiy does not exhaust the interpretive possibilities in terms of which the 
relationship between their different sensibilities may be construed. It is possible to 
draw out of Betjeman’s words, images and persona support for his personal 
creative agency, and I find this in preference to surrendering the meanings behind 
his corpus to a single static set of cultural archetypes.
As Bakhtin has shown, then, there is precedence in European literary 
history to the writer whose work signifies a break with the conventionalised 
register of a specific genre, thereby inventively taking the audience, and the 
medium itself, beyond -  bringing them out of their unconscious immersion and
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unquestioning acceptance of the singular viewpoint of officialdom. Behind 
Bakhtin’s critique of the hegemony of the ‘one’ authority, his ‘monologism’, is the 
assumption that such power could only be achieved and sustained through a denial 
of ontological priority: in his work on carnival, Bakhtin comments on the 
reification of the official life such that it somehow seems to have life independent 
of unofficial life, the ‘social substrate’ that, in actuality, keeps it in existence.
It was during the 1930s and 1940s that Betjeman started to become 
known to the public through his broadcasting work. This was a time when the 
ontological reality of the masses was already beginning to surface witli the popular 
spread of mass technologies such as television and the motorcar. The professional 
cultural elite of the state broadcaster, the BBC, would no longer have been able to 
assure themselves they spoke on behalf of the masses. Indeed, Betjeman was a 
pioneer in television broadcasting, working repeatedly for the BBC, and later 
independent television, and through it, was capable of countering their 
professionalism with the presentation of his own gentlemanly persona able 
reassuringly to evoke a sense of the elemental. Perhaps this is the reason why so 
much comment on Betjeman takes on the register of close friendship as though his 
commentators are engaged not so much in a critical as in a personal dialogue. 
Wliat I stress here, however, is tliat the historical moment in which Betjeman was 
working (the 1930s and 1940s) draws attention to Betjeman as a conduit through 
which the ontological priority of the ordinary person at that time found expression. 
Given these arguments for seeing Betjeman as a conduit, the voice, of the ordinary 
person, there is a need to re-evaluate the association between Betjeman, his 
laughter, and the comic word, bringing into focus the range of ironic device used 
throughout his corpus. They ought not to be interpreted as an insignificant aspect
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of the personality cult surrounding him; nor should they be dismissed as a mere 
aspect of his personal psychology; less so should they be taken as evidence of the 
lowness of the genre through which he chose to express himself. Rather, there are 
meanings to his work that may not necessarily be immanent in his life, that 
perhaps he was not even consciously aware of, but that from a certain temporal 
remove appear to confoim to a certain pattern of institutionality: that is, there are 
deeper cultural foundations to Betjeman’s type of word that come to be expressed 
through associations with ‘the laughter of the people’. I find that in his eclectic 
endeavours Betjeman occupies that anti-structural discursive space laid out by the 
folk writer. But I would also suggest that there is an object of far more serious 
intent in Beljeman’s work than his usual categorisation as a humourist would 
allow. I go on now to explore Betjeman’s ironic observations on the false 
assumption of authority prevalent among local councillors, architects and 
planners.
H; Betjeman, architecture and the environment
Throughout his life, Betjeman was preoccupied with documenting and celebrating 
the diversity of England’s authentic placeness, wishing to protect it from the 
designs of those in authority who would destroy its organic growth. For Betjeman 
these were people who, through their participation in tlie massification of 
contemporary society and the harshness of the new socialist economy, would not 
recognise tlie ‘softness’ of British milieux if it were to stare them in the face. Such 
feeling for place, as I stated in the introduction, was taken as innate by Betjeman, 
a imiversal attribute that did not need to be culturally acquired. I do not want to
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explore this fully just yet. All I wish to say here is that Betjeman considered 
emplacement to be a universal bond inherent in everyone that drew them, 
phenomenally, to a natural apprehension of place and, if they were not intent on 
making a fetish of innovation, conservatively to engage in its protection. This 
innatist perspective is found throughout Ghastly Good Taste, the irony of its 
argument being that an architectural sense is something that is already found in the 
ordinary person as much as being tire object of professional expertise. Recalling 
the pedagogic mission of Young and Willmott, Betjeman writes:
‘this book is written for two reasons. Primarily, to dissuade the average 
man from the belief that he knows nothing about architecture, and 
secondly to dissuade the average architect from continuing in his 
profession. In order to accomplish the first task, I opened with an 
apostrophe which anyone can read without feeling abashed at his abysmal 
ignorance. To accomplish the second task I brouglit the word ‘taste’ into 
the title of my book as a sure draw for the average architect who always 
considers himself a practical man of it. But both tasks will have failed, for 
the work is not a novel which will please the average man, and not 
enough wrapped up in technical terms for the average architect. Today 
with regard to architecture the average man is a fool and the average 
architect is a snob’ (1970[1933].T2)^^.
Ghastly Good Taste is also an extremely rich text in terms of analysing Betjeman’s specific 
ideas on mass culture. It is Betjeman’s confirmation of the key premise of the mass society and 
culture thesis: tlie recent decline of civic cultural vitality (tlie sub-title of the book is 'a depressing 
story of the rise and fall of English architecture’). As in the quotation, niassified man, or ‘average 
man’ (cf. Nietzsche’s pessimistic ‘common man’, ‘mass man’, or ‘mediocre man’, cited in 
Swingewood (1977)) is addressed as one of the subjects of Betjeman’s cultural discourse, the 
consciousness of whom is entirely determined by the mass cultural fonns currently in circulation 
in mass society -  in this case, the novel. This belief that indiwduals are the mere dupes of the mass 
culture industry, is, of course, one of the key features of mass society/culture arguments. Given
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The figure of the ‘average man’ pervades this passage as well as the argument of 
the book which is one of connection. That is, the ordinary person and the 
architectural expert are equally knowledgable actors. They may use different 
idioms for different purposes, one novelistic, the other scholarly, but nevertheless 
they occupy common groimd in their ‘averageness’: the ordinary person knows 
enough of architecture already simply through their living, tactily, within 
architecturally-shaped worlds, while the expert, seeking to leave behind the realm 
of the social in which knowledge is learnt, has a tendency to ignore their own 
social mediocrity. The chaotic malaise that has taken over the English 
environment, with buildings going up willy-nilly, would not be possible without 
the ‘growth of ignorance’ among the ordinary public, that is, their denial of 
expertise toward the planned environment. In this, both parties have had a hand to 
the detriment of proper planning. As Betjeman writes:
‘Although he lives in a hideous suburb, surrounded by it, walking through 
it to his office, although he works in an ill-ventilated closet of polished 
mahogany and bevelled glass where the decoration is continually sticking
this premise, the pedagogic aim of Betjeman’s work is to awake the ‘average man’ from the deep 
slumber of their current cognitive passivity so that they may achieve a clearer realisation of the 
decline of English culture in its built fonn. Much of the fault regarding this decline is attributed to 
the ‘Middle Class’ or petit-bourgoisie (as distinct from the intellectualist ‘Upper Class’), which, 
for Betjeman, is the social class that represents industrialism; the argument of the book focuses on 
this petit-bourgeois break with cultural vitality. By contrast, English architecture was at its most 
vital under Christendom, ‘when all Europe was united in an age of faith’ (1970[1933]: 19), rather 
than under the influence of industrialism with its individualist ethos. Cultural vitality, for 
Betjeman, needs then to be invested in a higher spiritual force, Christendom, or at least a secular 
community of belief, rather than a profane social class. As Betjeman argues: ‘Not until it is united 
in belief will its architecture regain coherence. That union cannot come until a return of 
Christendom. Whether that Christendom will be a Union of Soviet Republics, a League of 
Socialistic Nations or an Ecclesiastical Union, it is not for me to say. I only know, like everyone 
else, that we are changing in a rapid and terrifying manner to some new form of civilisation which 
will demand new architectural expression’ (1970[1933]:21) -  indeed, precisely that against which 
Betjeman stood. He seems to be offering concessions here for the sake of preserving aesthetic 
unity.
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into him, worrying his eyesight, still he does not notice architecture. 
Nature is kind. She causes her creatures to adapt themselves to their 
surroundings; to certain fish in the deepest parts of the ocean she gives 
enormous eyes which are able to pierce the darkness of the watery deep. 
To the town-dweller to-day she has given a kind of eye which makes him 
blind to the blatant ugliness by which he is surrounded. She has affected 
his critical reasoning powers and his eyesight’ (1970[1933] 13-4).
Neither are the professionals involved in building and planning exempt 
from this particular critique, but are themselves brought ‘back down to earth’, to 
the averageness of the social realm. Though the architect may have some 
expertise, and likes to think of himself as having some superior claim over his 
minions, he is still an ‘average man’. He does not move in a world apart for the 
ordinary individual. The tendency to translate the world of the average into what 
phenomenologists refer to as the tacit social realm, the ordinary life-world, is a 
powerful one: ‘Because he is an average man, the average architect is blind and 
subject to those laws of nature which I have already mentioned’ But there is 
another argument here. It is that the organisational life of contractual society, with 
its stratifications and division, will always hamper the organic growth of place. 
Indeed, here Betjeman adopts the voice of the social satirist, combining the 
position of the commentator with that of the immersed actor. His plea carries 
echoes of Forster’s aphorism, ‘Only connect’, transposing it into the world of 
architecture and planning:
I feel there is a dual evaluation of mediocrity here: on the one hand, the ‘average man’ as blind 
to the force of the environment around them (the mass societal dupe), and, on the other hand, the 
‘average man’ who is valued by Betjeman in virtue of their occupying that realm of sense, the tacit 
social realm, that is the foundation of the ‘good life’, the reason for which I expand on later in the 
chapter.
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‘[sjnobbery would not have existed between builder and engineer and 
architect. They would all have been one man. As it is, they are all 
different men, each with a vague idea of the other’s trade, and each 
attempting to be ajack-of-all-trades’ (1970[1933]:15).
each striving to connect but failing. As Betjeman continues with irony:
Tt is in the hands of these inspired gentlemen, whose fei^vour runs away 
with them, whose discontent with the present situation causes them to be 
almost mad with idealism, whose anxiety to build Jemsalem has 
expressed itself in their white-hot excitement, it is in the hands of tliese 
gentleman, dear readers, that the noble service of architecture lies. That 
uninspired underling with the pince-nez and the celluloid cuffs, that top- 
hole lad who once went to the Forty-Three when he was a student at the 
Architectural Association, that gentlemanly person who gets himself up 
as a tactful compromise between a major-general and a business man -  
those three know, of course, all about economics, engineering, town- 
planning, the history of art, and sanitation; they are sufficiently 
imaginative to weld their knowledge into a coherent whole; they are 
sufficiently devoid of petty jealousy to be able to co-operate with others 
with the same ideas. They are madly keen to get to work to save the 
world’ (1970[1933]:16).
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Here is Betjeman, as social satirist, relying on the significata and schemata of the 
British class system to deliver his portrayal of the interactions between builders, 
engineers and architects (the ‘underling’, ‘prince-nez’, ‘celluloid cuffs’, the ‘top- 
hole lad’, ‘Forty-Three’, the ‘gentlemanly person’), bringing to it an awareness of 
the social prejudices that make for ‘snobbery’ between the different strata of the 
building process. Here are not just separate functions, in other words, but different 
social statuses. It is this awareness of the intricacies of social relations that 
Betjeman introduces to the scene. In short, in this description of the planning 
process is found a tableau of British society; a social universe of divisions and 
‘petty jealousies’, each caught up in their ‘relativistic confusion’, to the detriment 
of place. What comes out, above all, is the denigration of the so-called expert, 
their failure finally to escape their social mediocrity.
A similar ironic enterprise can be seen elsewhere in Betjeman’s corpus, 
though it came out most clearly in his radio broadcasts and his architectural 
journalism. The irony occurs in those moments when the epistemic hegemony of 
the professional and the expert is exposed and thereby undermined, when the 
monologism of their authority and the monovocality of the discourse on 
environment is revealed and the ‘experts’ are laid bare as ‘average’. He narrates a 
vernacular world epistemologically turned upside down and inside out, and where 
the knowledge practices of the professional, monumental, objective, seemingly 
above the vagaries of personal circumstance, are exposed as resting on the 
unsteady foundations of personal hubris. It leads to the overall impression that, in 
Betjeman’s ideal English community, the amateur would be king for a lifetime. 
Two radio broadcasts bear out this suggestion.
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In one broadcast, posthumously titled ‘The Country Town’, Betjeman 
bemoans the modernity that has arrived in English local communities on the back 
of bureaucratic incompetence while arguing for the integrity of a civil society that 
acts as an alternative guardian of national and local heritage. At the forefront of 
Betjeman’s critique is the executive figure of the local councillor who, along with 
their cohort of professional architects, are the agents responsible for design and 
decision-making. The irony with which Betjeman, perhaps indulgently, reveals the 
hubris of the local politician discloses, at the same time, a sense of foreboding at 
what this could potentially mean for the future of English towns and villages. 
Here, Betjeman ironically questions the absoluteness of the verities on which the 
British administrative system rests, a foundation of which is an assuied belief in 
the competent decision-making of the local councillor. However, Betjeman argues 
that, despite their incumbency, the English local councillor:
‘can’t understand acts of parliament and legal and technical language. He 
can’t read an architect’s plan or imagine a so-called ‘improvement’. So he 
records his vote on the same side as his friends and leaves it at that. As a 
result of his vote a whole town may be mined’ (1997:92).
To illustrate his argument, Betjeman invents an idyllic mral English scene in the 
fictitious country town of ‘Mudminster’ where the ‘old minster rose grey among 
the elms and willows...grew beside the sinuous river’. Then, Betjeman invites the 
audience to displace themselves into the present scene:
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‘Transport yourself to Mudminster today. If you stand on the same hill, 
you’ll see pink roofs and few elms, for the elms have got elm disease and 
the Council is too keen on money to plant any more trees; the large pink 
roof of a cinema against the Minster, and the town will have seemed to 
stretch for two or three miles in each direction along tlie main roads. 
Houses like pieces of cake, like toothpaste, spread out in ribbons along 
the roads. Stand in the middle of the town and you’ll get an impression of 
throbbing motor cars, a blue mist of petrol, a shindy of hooters drowning 
the minster and the loudspeaker from a wireless shop blaring across the 
tarmac’ (1997:90).
As its name indicates, Mudminster is nicely illustrative of his thesis: it is an idyll 
partially engulfed in a landslide of planned improvements. What Betjeman brings 
to attention here is the wrecklessness of leaving officials in control of the 
environment of towns and villages; while their offices would, on the surface, 
appear to be an indication of some expertise, beneath this level they were probably 
out of their depth. Some kind of intervention thus needs to be made -  if they were 
left to themselves, they would assume all control by themselves and tins would be 
to the detriment of people and environment.
There are issues to point out here I suggest regarding genre, idiom and 
tenor. ‘The Country Town’ was not delivered as an abstract disquisition on the 
inadequacies of local political structures in England, nor does it reference, in an 
abstract manner, the ideological belief in Progress or sociological grand narrative. 
By pointing out the pragmatics of local planning, the way that planning ideas are 
conceived, disseminated and executed, through institutions at the most
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commonplace level, Betjeman is engaging in a dialogue with the public in terms 
that are of immediate significance to them. In other words, he tries to bring home 
to them the importance of good local planning througli the idioms familiar to 
ordinary people as they are found embedded in their daily life-worlds, rather than 
through a specialised abstract vocabulary. It is a task that involves the re­
embedding of the planning process; whereas the process of plaiming may be 
conceived of in the abstract, driven by an impersonal discourse of progress and 
modernisation, what surfaces here is this discourse in its concrete, phenomenal 
aspect -  planning as mediated through the personal vagaries of its individual 
exponents, the local councillors. There are echoes here of Betjeman’s critique of 
professional architects as ‘average individualists’ rather than as reified 
‘professionals’. Similarly, the local councillor is shown that he too is rooted in the 
ordinary world like ‘one of us’. All of these observations seem to suggest that the 
dynamics of environmental change cannot be conceived or controlled at the 
abstract level, but demands appreciation of the personal circumstances of ‘average 
individualists’ who are responsible for their completion in concrete form^ .^ This is 
the voice of Betjeman as translator: by putting abstract issues in immediate terms, 
Betjeman translates for his audience the ideals of planning and modernisation into 
a more experientially immediate discourse on ‘things that matter’ to them, or 
rather, on a moral level, things that ought to matter to them: here is also 
Betjeman’s belief in the moral integrity of civil society as the guardians of cultural 
vitality.
Thus, planners have something in common with the scholar -  an objective view of the world. I 
am reminded in this reading of Betjeman, which emphasises his disillusionment with the position 
of the scholar and planner, of the phenomenological critique of objective knowledge which itself 
depends heavily on an ironic move (Jackson 1986:8). For other instances of the ubiquity of irony 
in Western paradigms of thought see Fernandez and Taylor Huber (2001).
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In their comprehensive analysis of irony, Fernandez and Taylor Huber 
(2001) note an ‘irony of privileged understanding’ built into the traditional 
anthropological relationship between etlinographer and native informant on which 
the epistemology of the discipline rests. Something similar can be claimed here for 
the relationship between the ordinary actor (the ‘average man’) and their political 
superiors: the verity of superior knowledges and superior competences cannot be 
allowed to remain unchallenged, as Betjeman seeks to illustrate in tlie broadcast:
‘But there’s no use in a local council having these [advisory] powers if it 
has neither the intelligence nor wish to use them. The Mayor of Exeter 
among his many wise remarks said, ‘I should like to think that the 
average citizen was genuinely concerned with the preservation of our 
ancient buildings and the design of tlie new ones. But I’m afraid he 
doesn’t usually give it a second thought’. This is only too true. Mr 
Barnes, a Salisbury resident, said ‘In all my nine years as a ratepayer. I’ve 
never voted in a municipal election because there has never been more 
than one candidate in any ward in which I have been living’. So there is 
another handicap to local councils -  a complete lack of public interest in 
local govermnent. Disinterested and keen people are left to fight with 
ignorance, apathy and, sometimes, corruption. It is you who are listening 
tonight who will have to pay for this inefficiency. You’ll pay not only in 
high rates, but in your national heritage. Get on the local council, force an 
election, if you have time for the work. Save England from bad local
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government; save our old towns, our stately Georgian streets, build 
worthy new towns in the right place’ (1997:93)^^.
Once again, irony manifests itself, not in an inability to understand, but in the 
sphere of action. It has been seen how, ironically, the display of incompetence 
among local councillors undermines their pretensions to professionalism and 
shows them to have little more than an ‘amateurish’ grasp over matters; lacking in 
the necessary expertise, they are condemned to play the ‘amateur’ to the 
architect’s ‘professional’. Likewise, civic action always has bitter-sweet, ironic (as 
well as empowering) connotations, as the politician’s hegemonic grasp over 
expertise is shown to crumble through the independent action of the citizenry; the 
‘amateur’ - the active citizen - then finds legitimate space for the implementation 
of their own imderstanding and practices.
There is thus a unity to the manifold objects of Betjeman’s critiques, the 
bureaucratic structures, the generalised realities that they promote, the dominant 
meta-narratives animating social change guided by their absolutist ideas, the 
dogmatisms of planning and modernisation, the institutions and instituted agents 
behind the production of the environment, the present culture of official 
seriousness; all come under a phenomenologically-directed scrutiny for their blind 
faith, or for their positing of a spurious metaphysical reality and ontological 
priority. I cannot help noticing throughout Betjeman’s corpus a belief in the reality 
and vitality of English civil society above these abstract derivations. There is a 
sense in his writings that he believed in civic society as the harbourer of real life, 
and institutions such as local councils, planning authorities, the centralised state -
Thus, Betjeman himself uses ordinary people as a vicarious mouthpiece for Ins own sentiments.
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instruments of a new socialist economy - could never be anything more than the 
abstract caricatures of this commonweal English civil society, in short, cannot be 
reduced to any secondary level of authority, for Betjeman, indeed cannot be 
reduced to any singular identity as Schrôder has averred, and so must be allowed 
to stand on its own.
Summation
Much has been written of late on the relationship between anthropology and 
literature, more fruitful relations have been discussed than their mutual exclusion. 
What has emerged from the reassessment of their relationship has been a 
discovery of the literary -  the personal, the imaginative and the creative -  in 
anthropological writing. Social anthropology was a discipline from which, it has 
been assumed for much of its professional life, the literary has been expunged. I 
wish this interpretation of John Betjeman’s corpus to contribute to such a literary 
anthropology. Just as anthropologists are emerging as writers of social reality, so I 
have also set out to argue that Betjeman was equally a ‘writer’ (and ‘righter’) of 
English social worlds; he was deeply concerned with the social conditions around 
him to the extent of incorporating them into his literary work -  he was parasitic on 
the cultural materials of his day. The engagement of English literary writers with 
their socio-cultural milieux has certainly not been exceptional. During the 
nineteenth century, it has been pointed out, the English literary writer carried the 
mantle of realist social critic. The vestiges of this responsibility can be seen 
carried through into the 20* century both in his poetic writings and on the 
substantial margins of his literary life, in his work as a campaigner for topography
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and the kind of human life allowed to subsist within it. In his broadcasts and 
journalistic writings in particular, Betjeman allowed his social views on the 
collectivising and massifying of English social worlds during the twentieth 
century full expression. He found much to dissatisfy him in the world about which 
he wrote, and was fondest of visiting and championing those places where the 
illusory authority of an increasingly centralised governance could be most clearly 
seen to dissolve; here were implanned places about which it was impossible to 
speak with a single voice. This polyvocality, or non-essentialism, is crucial to 
understanding Betjeman’s stance toward the environment. Throughout his life, he 
demonstrated an antipathy toward monologic authority of the centralised state and 
their various minions -  Councils, Councillors, Planners, Speculators, Architects -  
not least for the violence they cause to the liveliness of English social experience.
This was a poetics of imagining the cunent world as ‘other’. The vision 
that Betjeman put fbiivard was frequently indirect, through poetry, television and 
radio broadcasts, and print journalism, photography, illustration, as well as guide 
books. Whether it was inviting radio audiences to enter into imaginative visions of 
home or simply enabling them to entertain the possibility of an improved world 
beyond the current, his were always imaginative worlds, and it could be argued 
that it is his displacement, cognitive or physical, that allowed him poetically to 
construe the current world as other. Indeed, Betjeman was a figure appreciated for 
his movement, identified as a key author behind the Shell Guides. In a letter to 
Jack Beddington, Publicity Director for Shell, with whom he authored the series of 
guides, Betjeman admitted how he was particularly suited to the genre, how he 
‘hate[d] urban life’, and could really see himself as ‘cut out for archaeology, 
make-up and photography’, a genre suited to someone like himself who ‘know[s]
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England pretty well’ (1994[1933]; 125). In the letter, he confesses to wanting to 
‘escape the shackles of the Architectural Press’ and, through the guide genre, 
embark on becoming a freelance journalist travelling between sites and imagining 
himself set down in these places. Indeed, he would later come to review one 
project for the guide, a visit to Devon, as a ‘wonderful feat of the imagination’ 
(1994[1935];148). I would suggest, then, that Betjeman has something in common 
with that other travel writer (and founder of scientific ethnography) Bronislaw 
Malinowski. According to Thornton (1985), in staking out a discursive space for 
the new scientific discipline of etlinography, Malinowski turned to the nineteenth 
century gem e of travel writing and its central figure, the journey, for this means of 
placing in perspective his own process of discovery. The journey that Malinowski 
undertook to the Trobriand Islands, and the native journeying he observed while 
there, was not purely referential but ‘rich in narrative potential’ (1985:7). Such a 
technique of describing a journey to a foreign place would certainly have struck a 
chord with those familiar with this literary genre, with its romantic visual 
evocations of exotic milieux and their equally exotic incumbents. In particular, 
Thornton observes how Malinowski employed narrative techniques derived from a 
‘Conradian representational universe’ (1985:14) and the imagery of Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough (1922). Indeed, the imagination was of such importance to 
Malinowski that in the displacement of journeying he found a convincing form for 
his functionalist sociology of primitive society.
Though this would suggest that the relationship between literature and 
anthropology has been fruitful (such as Schapera’s (1977) use of the novels of 
Jane Austen to gain ethnographic knowledge about English kinship behaviour; 
also Handler and Segal (1990)), there has been a history of miscommimication
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between the genres, as Rosemaiy Firth points out (1984). Reviewing the popular 
genre of the fieldwork novel. Firth notes the use of the ethnographer and their 
fieldwork as a device through which to enter into an exotic cultural universe 
essentially different from the West; much of this literature is used to support the 
denial of coevalness between the West and the exotic subjects of fiction. 
Returning to the literaiy writing of Betjeman, where I find him particularly 
creative is in his novel use of the poetic idiom to address characteristically prosaic 
moments of experience, the vernacular worlds in which English people lived. Here 
is Betjeman as a poet who is self-consciously different firom his contemporaries. In 
a letter to C. S. Lewis, who taught him at Oxford and whom Betjeman despised, 
Betjeman describes Lewis’ approach to poetry as philosophical, metaphysical, 
abstract; ‘something I do not understand,’ he confesses. While Lewis berated 
Betjeman’s lack of literary style, Betjeman points out that this is merely a case of 
stylistic differences: though Lewis’ approach may be intellectualisé ‘[mjine is 
visual’ (1994[1939]:251). He goes on to demand that Spenser, about whom Lewis 
was critical but who Betjeman felt possessed ‘amazing powers of topographical 
description’, could only be properly appreciated ‘when one has visited the 
neighbourhood’. In addition to Betjeman’s novel use of poetic form, in using it to 
express popular* meanings, there is, then, Betjeman’s creativity as a writer who 
translated the visual for the written medium.
I suspect that this response to Lewis expresses Betjeman’s distaste for the 
academic systématiser. As was indicated earlier in relation to Pevsner, this is the 
figure with whom Betjeman is most often contrasted. The contrast is brought out 
in Lewis’ and Betjeman’s different responses to place, for Betjeman. While 
Lewis’ position within the elite University has blinded him to his sensuous
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surroundings, ‘reading philology in surroundings which you did not appreciate’, it 
was always Betjeman’s ambition to ‘become a don and read English Literature to 
the accompaniment of lovely surroundings’ (1994[1939]:251), Betjeman, on the 
other hand, is open to apprehending a milieu in its full aesthetic immediacy. His 
approach to place was one of edifying apprehension ratlier than systematic 
dissection, to borrow a distinction from Rorty (1980:357-72) -  he preferred to take 
it all in sensuously, through visiting, rather than search within his experience of 
place for some confirmation of an a priori system or theory. Thus, Betjeman
‘was wonderfully free from theoretical knowledge, a man with no “isms”. 
One earnest student asked Betjeman to explain his theory of architecture 
“systematically”. As the poet recounted: “I could not remember what my 
theory had been. On the spur of the moment I had decided to judge 
architecture by the criterion of the Seven Deadly Sins. It seemed as good 
as anything else, though Lust was a bit difficult’ (Adams 2002:12).
But it is precisely in relation to urban planning that Betjeman’s 
sensibilities, as an edifying observer of British socio-cultural milieux, found 
fullest expression: for to plan the British environment is not only to visit on it 
something that is ‘other’ to its true nature, for Betjeman, but to hollow out its 
essential vitality and leave it wrecked. However, Betjeman echoes the use of a 
metaphor of sexual violence to describe this process. As he writes in the Foreword 
to Amery and Cruickshank’s The Rape o f Britain (1975):
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‘This is a devastating book. In my mind’s ear I can hear the smooth tones 
of the committee man explaining why the roads must go where they do 
regai dless of die humble old town they bisect. In my mind’s eye I can see 
the swish perspective tricked up by the architect’s firm to dazzle the local 
councillors. I see the tailored models walking past the plate glass, bent 
foiward against a strong breeze. Round the corner I see senior citizens 
and youtli representatives sipping Cinzano under a striped umbrella in the 
hot sunshine which always lends a Costa Brava look to architectural 
drawings. I hear words like ‘complex’, ‘conurbation’, ‘precinct’, 
‘pedestrianisation’ and that other couple of words which mean total 
destruction, ‘comprehensive development’. Places cease to have names, 
they become areas with a number. Houses become housing, human scale 
is abandoned...If there is some street or old shop in the market square, 
dock, factoiy or warehouse, barn or garden wall which you have passed 
often and taken for granted, do not expect to see it still there next week. 
Because it is not listed, because it is ‘of no historic interest’, the 
bulldozers will be in and part of your background will have gone for ever. 
As I look through this book I think that it is not only the developer who is 
to blame for tlie rape of Britain but also tlie ‘yes-man’ who wants to be on 
good terms with his committee, the architect who is his own public 
relations officer’ (Foreword 1975).
Did Betjeman ever succeed in fully consummating his vision for other 
social realities? Intimations of the kind of social realities that Betjeman favoured 
may indeed be found in the late twentieth centuiy, a moment when England can be
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seen to have recovered from its earlier experimentation with grand Socialist 
projects and was engaging in a renascent interest in its own vernacular life. As 
Taylor-Martin could write at the beginning of the 1980s:
Tf Betjeman is a conservative it is because he genuinely wishes to 
conserve something which he thinks valuable: the sense of community 
and belonging rather than urban alienation; each town and city with its 
unique character rather than anonymous jungles of glass and concrete; a 
countryside with hedgerows rather than barbed-wire dividing fields; pubs 
with natural beer rather than mass-produced keg. Betjeman is a 
reactionary in that he distrusts progress and believes that change is, more 
often than not, for the worse. He hates big business and the profit-motive 
with as much fervour as any Marxist...Nor are his beliefs shared only by 
the reactionary, the middle-aged, the middle-brow and the middle-class. 
In the sense that we support the aims of the Victorian Society, camp out 
on the roofs of scheduled buildings threatened by developers, join 
conservation groups, care about the environment, prefer the little streets 
of houses with their own gardens to the bleak high-risers, pay to ride in 
steam trains, drink real ale, buy fresh-baked bread, we are all 
reactionaries now’ (1983:13-4).
Here is Betjeman as creative persona, whose efforts at transforming 
existing practices gained some social esteem; at least it can be said that the 
saliency of his vision has been rediscovered for a new historical, political and 
socio-cultural audience and made to fit their attitudes and values. But what kind of
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audience is this? His fetish for local life in its vernacular aspect is reinvented for a 
renascent nationalism, or Little Englandism. Indeed, it has been pointed out how 
Betjeman’s word has come to stand for the ‘purity’ of conservative fonn, to be 
defended against unwelcome ‘experimental’ foreign influences. This is perhaps 
symptomatic of attempts to revise Betjeman, or the world for which he stood, for a 
renascent particularistic agenda, one that retreats from the global setting into an 
appreciation of local diversities. Little Englandism, argues Samuel (1989), was by 
the 1980s ubiquitous in English culture; here is seen ‘splendid isolation’ passing 
from the political into the cultural domain. Like Betjeman holding theory in 
disregard, and his supporters extolling the virtues of his earthiness, the world that 
Betjeman stood for was gaining some hold: reliable and solid, forthright and 
straightforward, insular and homespun, grounded and pure (Samuel 1989:1).
The irony of such late twentieth century Little Englandism is, however, 
that the experience of the local and the folksy is no longer authentic but 
decontextualised from its original settings and coalesced into a postmodern 
pastiche of Englishness to be experienced, or consumed, by the visitor of the 
heritage site or the urban high street; a world, formally stiffened, where Betjeman 
visits Baudrillard. Such an ironic version of Englishness would be far from 
Betjeman’s own ideal. The reading I have put forward opposes such static 
conservatism, regarding it as too simplistic. Rather it is the creative in Betjeman 
that I have highlighted, his daringness to construe the current order as other than it 
was portrayed in official discourse, a figure who, through the manifold mediums 
in which he allowed his imagination to be exercised, wrote and re-wrote English 
urban and peri-urban social reality and in so doing put the mediums through which 
he was ‘writing’ to novel use.
298
CHAPTERS
Conclusion: Imagination, the city and the realpolitische
In this conclusion, I wish to return to the debate I set up in the Introduction 
between humanistic literary accounts of social reality, on the one hand, and cities 
as particular kinds of social spaces, on the other (that is, I focused on some studies 
which presented the city as an intersubjective realm of corporeal practices where, 
amidst the harshness of social and economic conditions, the body is given 
precedence over representation). I begin with a personal note on one of these 
studies. What interests Charlesworth (20QQib\passim) is the human body as it is 
marked at every moment of its existence by that key theme in British social life -  
class. He seeks to give recognition to class, arguing that just at the moment when 
it has become an unavoidable reality for many, the ‘baby’ of class has been 
thrown out with the ‘bathwater’ of essentialism; academics have washed their 
hands of it. Indeed, Charlesworth’s thesis has encapsulated for me many of the 
aspects of liberal humanism and postmodernism that I foimd hard to work witli, 
even though I have worked with both of these doctrines in my thesis. This strikes 
me as being the problem; how is it possible to work with postmodernism in the 
city? Postmodernism seems to deny the essential reality of the city and so also to 
deny the kind of experience the town embodied for Charlesworth’s infonnants; 
postmodernism, then, clearly did not do justice to the experience of these working 
class infonnants. But also I found a postmodern emphasis on the self and 
language difficult to reconcile with the collective experience of these working 
class informants; these were people who did not live in a representational
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universe, and, as such, were condemned by the dominant social habitus to lead 
lives imprisoned within the parameters of their brute bodies. Even though I find 
ideas about individuality convincing, such as the inviolability of personal 
consciousness, it is difficult to talk of a fulfilling individual existence under the 
circumstances that I consider Charlesworth faithfully to have recounted. So I 
arrived at the position that any anthropology had to do some kind of justice to 
phenomenal existence but also that representational theories of meaning alone are 
not enough.
I find a similar questioning put more directly by Michael Jackson (while 
arguing in defence of a pragmatics of story-telling): ‘we are led to ask what power 
storytelling has, after people’s needs for food, shelter, medicine, and asylmn are 
met, to help mend broken lives’ (2002:34). The invitation implicit in this question, 
it becomes apparent through a further reading of Jackson, is to question some of 
the understandings generally held about ‘language’ and the ‘world’, about the 
commonplace view of their mutual separateness, that language, unlike say 
physical tools, is inherently incapable of manipulating human realities, or, at least, 
is less effective at i t \  It is this kind of deconstructive exercise that I wish to bring 
to the discussions and summaries in the Conclusion. As Jackson himself avers, the 
anthropological use of the concept of ‘writing’, in the guise of story-telling, does 
not have to mean that stories are isomorphic with lives. To argue this is not as 
some critics of literary turns in the human sciences have allowed themselves to 
believe, to fetishise the idea of writing, to confuse the ideas of ‘creativity’ with a 
leisurely witlidrawal from the ‘real’ world of politico-economic necessity and to 
accuse literaiy anthropology of tacitly generalising a bourgeois world-view that is
* Cf. Basso (1990).
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offensive to those ideologically less disposed to accepting individualism, or of 
retreating from historic societies altogether. It is perhaps, rather, a matter of 
deconstructing the ethnocentrism in the arguments of these critics: the illusion, the 
narrow-mindedness, in the idea that ‘the arts’, as the sphere to which the literary 
must belong, is an impractical domain that is incapable of having any real effect 
on human life worlds (an assumption that Finnegan effectively dispels in her work 
on local musical practice in the city). When ‘the arts’ are reified in this way, their 
wider social significance, or epistemic usefulness, is lost.
Mainly in this chapter, I wish to pick up on the question of a postmodern 
approach to the city. Could it still be useful, or possible, to have a postmodern 
approach to the city that centralises the imaginative, creative and poetic and yet 
answers to the practical conditions of class-based urban lives? I set out here, then, 
an approach that brings in literary anthropology on the one hand, and a necessary 
appreciation of personal ontology on the other. To turn first of all to a literary 
anthropological approach to genres of writing English social reality.
Imagination as an instrument for changing worlds
I have spent time in this thesis examining the discourses through which people 
speak of their lives and their perceptions of place in Romford, suggesting that 
what is occurring even here is akin to anthropological writing. The life stories of 
Lucy and Les are both ‘writings’ of social reality from the point of view of a 
participant within it and so, like anthropological writing, what is found here is a 
‘language-world’. What I understand by this term is the active marshalling of 
forms for the creation of orderly worlds, and here this is achieved through
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conventionalised verbal forms used by Lucy and Les. I would then assert that 
these are people who are practised in the construction of their own personal 
language-worlds. Despite the lack of formality of the language of ordinary speech, 
their tellings nevertheless evidenced a form of practised artistry -  they conveyed 
their selves and their views of place in conventionally stylised ways. I described 
this in terms of how each teller cognitively travelled down fixed ‘narrative 
pathways’. But rather than constraining individual sense, according to Finnegan, 
they rely for their continued existence on individual sense-making^. Though 
pathways are well-beaten, then, they can also be effective vehicles of personal 
story-telling through naiTators, like Lucy, combining them into a personal 
bricolage, by choosing which pathways to travel and on what occasion of story­
telling. Of all the possible story-lines which would make sense of her stoiy^  of her 
life, as an agent of the commimity in which she grew up, Lucy chooses between 
those available both locally and generically to suit her own circumstances and 
persona. Tlnoughout much of her story, Lucy identified herself as the agent of 
community, of the champion of a traditional narrative of community, and a more 
locally-specific story of commerce, setting herself up against current adulterated 
forms of social life. For Lucy, verbal forms are told in the context of her personal 
life for the purpose, at the same time, of making sense to the wider community to 
whom she speaks.
Thus, while Lucy is more likely to frame her story in terms of the 
community, given her family’s involvement in local business, this is not the 
chosen strategy of Les. For Les, that his story is an agentive one is less a matter of
Cf. SchefFeiin (1997:195-6).
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his personal bricolage than a central theme that his stoiy ‘wears on the surface’ -  
this is Les displaying his self to himself as well as to others.
Through their tellings, both Lucy and Les, in tlieir own way, work at the 
social environment about which they speak. For Lucy, contradictions in local 
social structures -  structures that may be generalised to British society as a whole 
-  are identified lucidly, and imbued with the story of her personal life (her father 
becoming jobless, her family’s foothold in the town’s commerce, and its gradually 
falling away to big business, her current feelings of the loss of community 
responsibility through the suffocating hegemony of local bureaucracy, and chaos 
on the streets at night) such that, through its resonance, it reaches out to human 
empathy, perhaps even containing the impetus for changing the social reality she 
was discussing.
On the other hand. Les’ narrative is no less resonant, though it does not 
so much seek to highlight wider social structural conflicts in Britain as give an 
accoimt of how he invented himself as an amateur local historian; how, in other 
words, it is possible to overcome the over-determination of his word, and his 
world. However, there was one fundamental way tliat Les’ specific writing of 
British social reality carried its own repercussions, and this was in the way in 
which, through Ms recording of my recording of him (using equipment that he 
pointed out was superior to mine!) he saw the interview as an oppoitunity to 
enlarge the generic language world of local history, one which he was active in 
building up. This became of particular significance later on in our conversation 
when it emerged that Les made a fetish of historical docmnents as a mainstay of 
his research projects; that he promised to furnish me with the bits of our 
conversation I had failed to capture on tape further suggests that for Les such texts
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are subject to continual ratiocination for him. Having achieved some agency for 
himself. Les is now setting about changing the worlds around him through saving 
its historic sites.
In sum, it can be seen that stories have the power of changing realities 
and for this reason they can be feared; language is an instrument for manipulating 
reality. Stories and the world partake of the same formal construction so that what 
is found in stories is a version of the wider world in miniature, and by 
reassembling its forms, there is somehow a reassembling of the wider world.
To argue that Young and Willmott’s Family and Kinship in East 
London, their classic sociological expression of social discontinuity in East 
London between 1953 and 1955, deserves consideration as a literary endeavour on 
behalf of its authors is to eschew an orthodox social scientific reading of the text, 
one that takes the prose style as itself transparent in the process of giving clear 
form to certain social facts regarding the existence of commimity or association 
among social actors in the city. A literary reading of the text, I argued, is made 
possible through authorial disclosure. As I asserted in Chapter 6, Yoimg and 
Willmott naiTate an account of social transition or discontinuity that is self­
consciously subjective and, through the adept exchange of formal convention, 
creative, (though on the margins of formal sociology). What is more, this too is a 
‘writing’ of British social reality, not in the ordinary idiom of everyday speech but 
in the idiom of the empiricist ethnographer. Undermining attempts to ascribe a 
purely social scientific provenance to Young and Willmott’s work, the authors 
themselves mention literary representations of suburbia in the Introduction to their 
later study Family and Class in a London Suburb, taking the social realities 
represented in the literary works as tenets to be built into their own sociological
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world-view, to be put to the test and, if necessary, modified. In other words. 
Young and Willmott themselves make charitable connections between the literary 
and the sociological genres. The same connecting of the two genres can be seen to 
pervade their earlier classic. Family and Kinship.
As a trafficking of experience between two institutional sites, the field 
site and the academy (one split between two further institutions, ‘the family’ and 
‘the estate’ in a clironological sequence), the etlinography of Family and Kinship 
is an inscription, or ‘writing’, of British social reality during a historical period 
that has come to occupy an important place in popular and academic 
imaginations. The first step toward elucidating the creativity of their piece was 
thus to point out how the authors established, rhetorically, a sense of distance and 
movement. This they did through the dual structure of the account, with part one 
focusing on kinship in the ‘urban village’ (Gans 1962) and part two a description 
of ‘families on the move’ to the estate. The sense of distance and movement was 
further achieved through their self-assessment of their own ethnographic 
methodology:
‘Both of us worked either in the borough or on the estate throughout the 
three years in which the research was done. One of us also lived in the 
borough with his own ‘family of marriage’ for most of the time, and both 
his wife and his children, who attended local schools, provided further 
sidelights on the place... As a result of this close connexion with the 
district, we came to know well a number of residents who gave us full 
accounts of their family relationships which helped us to understand and 
assess the information given to us in the formal interviews. We also did
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what we could to check what people told us verbally by personal 
observation in homes, churches, clubs, schools, parks, public houses, and 
street markets’ (1957:13-14).
The creative signature associated with the writings of Young and 
Willmott emerges when they return from their field location and begin to order 
the symbolic realities they encountered in the field into an inscribed account of 
this social world, inscribed through the conventions belonging to the world of 
formalised knowledge to which they professionally belonged. There is a parallel 
here, then, with the process of re-writing, re-ordering, experience while in the 
field. Actual relationships between mums and daughters later becomes the 
‘mothers and daughters’ problematic, and other lived realities are translated into 
the common currency of sociological writing: ‘the kinship network’, ‘the family’, 
‘the economy’, ‘community’, ‘class’ and ‘planning’. The resulting piece can be 
interpreted as a ‘language world’ built up from the conventions of social worlds in 
which and for which they are writing, not to say circulating this information, but, 
as has been pointed out, it remains the subjective interpretation of the authors 
themselves.
Furthermore, this ‘language world’ is identifiable apart from the authors 
who created it, has come to be identified as autonomous as it gradually came to 
accme the status of sociological classic. Like other classics, it has proved that its 
meaning was not finally determined by the authors who created it; given its 
enduring influence, its longevity, it has become subject to continual reinvention 
by those whose worlds it came to re-configure. In and of itself, the ‘language 
world’ has an integrity and has shown itself over time to have a ceitain
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instrumentality. The text, a product of the imaginative and creative activities of its 
authors, refuses stubbornly to remain hermetically sealed off from the ‘hard’ 
material experiences of city life but sets out to be the instruments of acts of world- 
making. Thus, Family and Kinship has entered into other discursive arenas, 
including the popular, as was its original intention of course. Willmott and 
Young’s perceptions of working class community life, including the famous 
fbnnulations sunounding the matiifocal stmctuie of working class culture, 
entered into the policy arena as received ‘social facts’ subsequently acted on by 
agencies as key tenets of their practice, especially in relation to the project of 
council housing.
Clues to the enduring effectiveness of Young and Willmott’s sociological 
creation lie in Peter Willmott’s comments on literaiy style. In retrospect, Willmott 
can be foimd expounding on the problem of communication, in particular the need 
to find a persuasive medium in which to convey the discovery of social facts. In 
the end, the choice they made eschewed the language of positivist sociology. 
Effective communication was achieved by borrowing from genres already in 
circulation outside of the academy, genres in terms of which tlie data could be 
imaginatively enlivened in the minds of a new readership, thereby hopefully 
filtering into practice. The resulting work had a familiar resonance to it, not least 
in terms of its substance, providing sociological support for the ‘comfortable 
conventional wisdom’ (Ravetz 2001:162) that viewed ‘the life of the working 
class’ as static and cohesive.
From the idiom of sociological expression to the vernacular and literary 
idioms combined, it is to John Betjeman as a creative and imaginative writer of 
British social realities that I next turned in Chapter 7. His literary and journalistic
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projects, I argued, involved his marshalling of poetic and imaginative resource to 
unsteady current social enviromnents, literally so according to Schroder (1998), 
by evoking tliose places in his work where the meaning of Englishness was at its 
most vulnerable and equivocal. Indeed, an essential polyvocalism, a resistance to 
any singular definition of English place, was seen as pervading his work and life. 
He was producing at a time when, contrary to the tendencies found in his work, a 
new economy was demanding the collectivisation of social life and the 
environment. Poetically, he challenged the visions in terms of which a 
bureaucratic class would tell us that we should see ourselves as progressing, and 
in so doing gave rise to a unique vision for a preferred British reality that 
subsequently accrued much popular interest and support.
A heroic potential is often ascribed to those who inhabit an ambiguous or 
marginalised social location. Such distance from the norm can only be achieved 
by a figure dwelling in the problematic interstices between symbolic 
classifications, an incumbent of its margins, willing to throw an edificatory 
spanner into the works of the system. Several candidates for such ‘heroism’ offer 
themselves from the canon of critical theory. The figure I eventually chose for my 
purposes here, to shed light on the practices of John Betjeman, is that of the ‘folk 
writer’. There are a number of reasons for this comparison. Running through the 
veins of this cultural tradition and distinctive genre is the life-blood of a cultural 
universe hidden beneath, and potentially antithetical to, the bureaucratic 
world/word of a rigid officialdom. In Europe, according to Bakhtin’s thesis, the 
latter belonged to the political elites which had emerged from tlie middle ages. In 
the twentieth century it is just as likely to have belonged to the rational-legal 
agencies of the state. It has been Bakhtin’s effort, as has been demonstrated, to
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expose the cultural forms of the hidden ‘folk’ universe, the logic of its cultural 
patterns, its emblematic figures and techniques of subversion, and reclaim the 
integrity of it all. In so far as the aim of the folk writer is to document the anti- 
systemic attempts of the lower social strata to expose officialdom’s universe of 
absolutes for what it truly is, a momentary construct, it then echoes a relation 
between the literary world and the political world that Salman Rushdie has also 
commented on in relation to the European novel. The writer and the politician are 
both engaged in competing acts of world-making and this is due to an awareness 
by both that ‘[w]hat has been written...concerns a construction of human 
reality...The piece of literature can thus represent a way of denying the official, 
political version of the truth; while an array of such literary pieces increases the 
aggregate of what it is routine to image in and as the world’ (cited in Amit and 
Rapport 2002:126). I have argued that Betjeman’s poetry, and his entire 
generically rich output, indeed represented ‘a construction of human reality’ that 
he wished to assert as an antithesis to the official, bureaucratic versions of the 
realities he found around him. His was a literaiy vision that directly articulated 
with social realities, indeed this engagement with tire vernacular world became his 
unique literaiy signature, thus confirming Rapport’s assertion that writings need 
not ‘only give on to literaiy concerns; I would read implications in them which are 
also realpolitische, practical and prescriptive’ (2002:128).
Besides tire engagement with issues relating to the ordinariness of 
English experience, there is another literaiy signature (again associated with 
Baklrtin’s idea of the folk writer) that is often mentioned in commentary on Jolm 
Betjeman, his lightness, occasional humour, and clownish persona. His physical 
appearance has emerged as part of his cultic status and this seems particularly
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significant for placing him further within the traditions delineated by Bakhtin. His 
jocularity has been imaged as belly-laughter, demonstrating a release of control 
over the boundaries of his body; he was known to have an abject, ill appearance.
However, the signature of laughter served merely to enhance his ambivalence as a 
writer and, in defensive commentaries on his work, there are frequent demands to 
look beyond the formal features of the light genre for what (perhaps 
paradoxically) is, or ought to be, paradigmatic of English poetry. A more 
anthropological appreciation of his marginality to the canon of English poetry 
may highlight the proximity of laughter to body, which has received an 
epistemologically degraded status compared to the more powerful instruments of 
reason. The privileging afforded to such tools explain the frequent comparisons 
made between Betjeman and his contemporaries such as T. S. Eliot, Auden and 
Philip Larkin, all of whom are regarded as canonical poets with connections to the 
academy either in their lives or in their works.
One such contemporary, Philip Larkin, in reviewing The Collected 
Poems o f John Betjeman (published in 1959), extended his appreciation to 
Betjeman as an exemplary English poet. Here, Larkin heaps praise on Betjeman’s 
language world, ‘a jumble of properties’ that nevertheless achieves the ‘fullness of 
the novel’. Indeed, here is further evidence of the ethnographic in Betjeman. I am 
reminded elsewhere of the ethnographic nature of the social realist novel, in E. M. |
Forster, as well as the ethnographic sense afforded by poetic insight, in Clifford’s 
reading of William Carlos Williams (1988:1-7). Here also is social reality handled 
with subtlety as the reader feels themselves in the presence of a great, possibly 
paradigmatic, writer:
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‘[Betjeman’s later work] finally puts to flight the notion that Betjeman is 
no more than a dealer in a few preciosities such as Anglicanism or 
ghastly good taste^. No doubt the photographs and rubrications of his 
early books helped to foster this view of his work as “amusing” yet 
infantile pastiche...after A Few Late Chrysanthemums we have had to 
accept that what poets are supposed to do Betjeman does...Betjeman 
picks it all up: tlie decay of surviving 19^-centuiy institutions, the decline 
of the church, the altered countryside and ways of living, sub-topia and 
socialism, and all the tiny vivid little manifestations of sadness and 
snobbery and silliness, and with his simple loving enthusiasm transmutes 
it to poetry. He is a subtle poet, but not a sophisticated one. Poetry for 
him is not a moral or sociological gymnastic, but a spontaneous overflow 
of natural feeling which directs his choice of words and informs them 
when found...He is in a best sense a committed writer, whose poems 
spring from what he really feels about real life, and as a result he brings 
back to poetry a sense of dramatic urgency and a jumble of properties it 
had all but lost...its impact has the fullness of a novel...It is my 
considered opinion that it would do no harm to over-estimate Betjeman’s 
poetry for a bit. Of Auden, Thomas, and Betjeman, the latter is the only 
one who is still a positive poetic force" ’^ (Larkin: Guardian, Nov. 19* 
1959).
 ^Referring to Ghastly Good Taste.
Presumably what Larkin is referring to here is a belief that only Betjeman from this distinguished 
cohort has something resembling a viable poetic future, as a testimony to the relative strength of 
liis poeticism; similar praise was heaped on E. M. Forster by Isherwood, who saw in Forster’s 
oeuvre ‘all that is truly worth saving from Hitler’ (cited in Rapport 1994: 271).
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But among the strongest of his signatures is a novel use of poetic form. 
His work brought about a series of unusual and novel correspondences, 
rearranging the categories in tenns of which he and others experienced English 
realities -  Tow’ social experiences (motorways, new towns, suburbia, railway 
stations, the seaside) with the ‘high’ register of poetry, the sensory richness of the 
visual with the constrained forms of the written.
For Charlesworth, the researcher’s personal position within social space 
inevitably has an impact on research outcomes, whether the scholar becomes an 
‘objectifying’ or an ‘involved’ subject (2000:66). So I would also argue here that 
the final shape of any piece of anthropological work reveals the clear tracks of the 
researcher’s own partial perspective. I described in the Introduction how I came to 
discover the connections I have expounded on here between these genres of 
writing reality -  the personal, the sociological, the literary -  and how this process 
of discovery was inevitably partial. As I have said, I started out with the hope of 
interspersing chapters on my local acquaintances with chapters on the way urban 
social life has been ‘written’ in other genres and by other authors, be they from 
sociology, literature, anthropology or art, so long as I could find voices that might 
echo those of my local acquaintances in Romford; and I am going to go on here to 
summarise how the chapters of my work cohere in my mind so that I hear 
inflections of each in the others. So, roughly, in Young and Willmott’s work I 
heard voices of my local acquaintances, as in reading Jolm Betjeman. Between 
Betjeman and Young and Willmott there is conversation too I then discovered; 
similarly, there is dialogue among my acquaintances in Romford and, in 
Betjeman, there is dialogue between the different voices within his own work. All 
these tell me something about British social reality. The aim of my work, then.
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has been a wish to explore what can be known about English peri-urban, twentieth 
century worlds through conversation; how I held them together in my mind in 
conversation.
What I want to do now is to capture some of those moments when I hear 
these three different sets of writers - local acquaintances, sociologists, and poets - 
speaking to each other.
My key acquaintance while in the field, Lucy Jones, would repeatedly 
tell me how Romford used to be a ‘country-town’, with its own individual rural 
lifeways, until the council during the 1960s set about its conversion into a flag­
ship shopping centre to meet the growing demands from the new consumer 
economy. Now she’s finding it harder and harder to find anyone she ‘knows’ 
anymore; all her friends and family left town following its adulteration, or the 
collapse of small family businesses to tlie pressure of national chains of multiple 
retail stores. She is herself left in the ‘town-town’ or ‘city-town’ that Romford has 
become, she tells me -  a place where the previous ethos of friendliness and co­
operation between people has died, where violence, especially among youngsters 
late at night, is ubiquitous. Similar sentiments are echoed by my other key 
acquaintance. Les Moore. Indeed, most older residents of the town believe that 
‘the old place has gone down hill’, that it used to be a nice town but it now just 
looks like ‘a bomb’s hit if. The council should never have pulled down such 
buildings full of local interest, Lucy avers.
I then read some months later after the leaving the field about the 
experiences of residents of East London ‘urban villages’ as they moved to housing 
estates in Essex in the 1950s, and I hear a tale of readjustment to a new life away
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from the security of the family, and an attempt to come to tenns with a new 
physical environment:
Tn Bethnal Green there are noisy people everywhere, large mothers with 
oilskin shopping bags, young mothers in red high-heeled shoes, children 
playing around the stalls of the street markets, neighbours talking to each 
other from one door to another. The suburb is sliced by main roads, and 
the cars and long-distance buses speeding to Southend and Newmarket 
leave only a distant hum in hundreds of empty sideroads. In Bethnal 
Green people are vigorously at home in the streets, their public face 
much the same as their private. In Woodford people seem to be quieter 
and more reser\^ed in public, somehow endorsing Mumford’s description 
of suburbs as the apotheosis of ‘a collective attempt to lead a private 
life” .
And I hear echoes of Lucy’s voice, here and elsewhere, in the words I 
have just quoted above from Willmott and Young (1960:13). Lucy then tells me:
‘everybody in the town works in London now. Forget the world you live 
in, that’s it, come home, forget the world you live in...Romford had an 
identity as a market town but it’s lost it now. It’s just a dormitory. That’s 
the trouble you see; you come here to sleep and to shop and that’s just 
about it. There isn’t much else. People go elsewhere for their 
amusements, not that there are many but that’s a vicious circle’.
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Young and Willmot end Family and Kinship with a discussion of the 
social losses incurred through planning and redevelopment, especially given the 
government policy at the time toward rehousing residents of inner city ‘siiuus’ in 
new towns and council estates.
And again I hear the voices of both Young and Willmott and local 
acquaintances in reading the radio broadcasts of English poet John Betjeman -  
and I especially hear a defence of the small English market town. As Betjeman 
argues;
T think the attitude of the local council... to the English country may be 
taken as representative of the twentieth [centuiy]. The twentieth centuiy, 
for which the local coimcil stands, sees England not as landscape, but as 
material for drainage schemes, slum clearance, rating, road 
improvements, and site valuations: the eighteenth century... sees England 
in terms of parks, landscape, trees, prospects, and noble buildings. The 
local coimcil cannot believe that anything short of a direct material 
benefit to the community can be of any use’ (1938).
It is not only that each author mentioned here is in some way marginal {a 
la the amateur): Les and Lucy to conventional history. Young and Willmott to 
formal sociology, John Betjeman to the English literary canon. I found in the 
genres of all three authors presentations of a similar social environment -  an 
enviromiient that was losing its local specificity through the intervention of 
planning. But also the way that each make sense of English social reality, locate
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the ills of the past, gauge the mood of the present, predict what may happen in the 
future, are fundamentally similar and involve the same logic.
Social discontinuity and change as ontological insecurity
So far in this conclusion, I have reflected on social discontinuity and change in 
Britain from a perspective of the poetics of the individual imagination. However, 
this is not the only modality in which social discontinuity will be experienced. 
The themes of discontinuity and change are not the exclusive preserve of the 
cognitive realm of persons. In addition, for those selves securely anchored within 
familiar space through a personal and social habitus, an anchoring that allows the 
self to take for granted the world around it, any profound structural change 
brought about in the world threatens to throw the self into a condition of profound 
bodily and psychic insecurity, it has been theorised. I wish here to explore the 
extent to which material from Romford, as part of a region that has undergone 
profound seizures such that space has become other to what it was in the past, 
provides a model for these kinds of experience. In short, as is discussed below in 
various recent accounts, discontinuity and change is a threat to the ontological 
security of urban subjects, and this has been seen to raise many problems both 
personally and socially.
Indeed, this was an experience that I found pervasive among local 
townsfolk - the experience that old constancies are now redundant in their new 
milieu, and old certainties have decayed; the progressive othering of social space, 
the sense of outsiderness caused by generational marginalisation, the continual 
confrontation with spaces that are functionally new and unfamiliar, and the threat
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of ‘stranger danger’ -  the immigrant and gangs of violent youths -  giving a 
tangible shape to the sense of displacement and disenchantment among local 
subjects. The phenomenologically-based sociological commentary of 
Charlesworth (2000b) sheds some light on these issues in his discussion of 
‘meaningless contexts’, and Phil Cohen’s work (1999) on tlie ‘urban uncanny’ on 
the Isle of Dogs in East London likewise; finally, Relph’s existentialist discussion 
(1976) of ‘inauthenticity’ and ‘placeness’ as a condition found in modem milieux 
provides further support for the experiences of dis(-)location that I wish to explore 
below. I find each expounding on the common theme of discontinuity and change 
as potentially unsettling to personal being.
I begin here with a reference to the relativity, the unavoidably parochial 
nature, of relations that individuals strike up with their material sunoundings. 
That is, as analysts:
‘[w]e need to have a developed sense of the ways in which human beings 
inhabit the places in which they exist, and realize that the milieux 
through which people come to understanding are cultural-historical 
contexts where things count, or ‘show-up’, in distinct ways, the sense of 
which is carried by the communal practices of one’s immediate group’ 
(2000:16).
Tliis comment testifies to the view that place is a highly significant point 
of reference in the understanding of a people’s cultural universe (cf. Basso 1990), 
and its source is the much-discussed work by Simon Charlesworth, He presents
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one of the most sentimentally powerful and intellectually wieldy^ accounts of the 
emergence of forms of personal suffering at the core of human subjectivity, and of 
the relationship of these subjectivities to the socio-economically impoverished 
worlds of the post-industrial British city. The ideas contained in his writings, 
which probably have resonance beyond the town tliat is the focus of this study, are 
worth further presentation here. There are many insights in his phenomenological 
fiamework that I have foimd directly articulate with the predicament found in 
Romford, and which subsequently rise to the level of conscious discourse in the 
many discourses on Romford that reduce it, inescapably, to its built forms. 
Among these insights is Charlesworth’s attention to the mundane setting of place 
and pronouncements on what happens to the self when changes occur to the 
familiar fabrics of everyday lives in cities. The ruptures and fractures that this 
change brings about, as much as it is inexorably felt at the heart of individual 
lives, also becomes an endemic characteristic of localised working class cultures. 
Change to urban enviromnents, for example through the collapse of a localised 
industry, literally have the power to stop individuals in their tracks. The habits 
that the body has acquired to cope with the practicalities of their milieux are now 
thrown into crisis and gulfs emerge between the generations cleaved apart, as if 
forever, by the historic experience of social and economic change. The body 
comes out of all this, for Charlesworth, as the register of these processes. It is the 
body that comes to signify the shift in social, economic, political, and, what is 
more, moral relations; his is a sociology that suggests that on the body is ‘writ
 ^The basic outline to Charleswoitli’s theories of place, stripped of their clothing in the sociology 
of Bourdieu, aie not controversial and may be endorsed in existential anthropology; the use of 
ideas of Bourdieu do remain contentious, and I lundamentally agree with the arguments that he 
smuggles in a sociological determinism by the back door (or perhaps more accurately through the 
labyrinthine passages of his prose). The same can be argued of Charlesworth as has been argued 
for other ‘cultural reproductionists’ (cf. Jenkins 1983).
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smair these crises of British experience, and it is in the city that these bodies are 
most concentrated, where their coming together in public place is most fully 
orchestrated. But where is place in this gestic theatre? For Charlesworth, place is a 
crucial mediator in these processes. Indeed, for the phenomenologist, place never 
leaves the body. As he writes:
‘Once we recognize, with Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu, that our 
embodiment in the world makes us perceptually and sensuously 
immersed in it in a way that challenges our usual academic thinking 
about these matters, then we can see that in contexts like the one I am 
describing, the decay of the world as it was can mean people being beset 
by the world as a place that comes to inhabit them negatively, as a world 
in which the meaning they are condemned to impregnating posturally, is 
abject, bleak, dark, ugly, unfulfilling and violating’ (2000b:78-9).
The body, then, can be taken as a primary signifier of changes in the 
socio-economic landscape, as mediated through the physical landscape of place; it 
is discontinuity and change codified in the body. This is what made Bourdieu’s 
theory of habitus, an entire social cosmology made flesh, such an attractive 
analytical tool for Charlesworth’s project. At first sight, this would seem an 
inappropriate formula to impose on the material relating to Romford and its 
inhabitants in that their space would seem to be that of a vital, bustling urban 
centre (of course, this has not always been the case) rather than the depressed 
sight familiar to places of heavy indiistiy that have recently fallen into decline. 
After all, Romford, we can imagine, is a place full of people who can construe
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their universe as a representational one, given the relatively higher status of 
Romford as a social space within the East London region (see Chapter 2). But 
though the structural locations of Romford, in the prosperous south of England, 
and Rotherham, in the de-industrialised north, may be different in terms of their 
centrality to British society and economy, I am nevertheless convinced by 
Charlesworth’s description of relations between processes, place and bodily hexis, 
and I believe it makes some sense of realities in Romford. That is, Romford may 
not be the post-mining tovm that Rotherham is, but it has historically had its 
aesthetic crises to deal with, and many of these are linlced to far-reaching political 
and economic decisions that have left many townsfolk feeling redundant, cut off 
from an enviromnent they have learnt to feel at home in.
It is clear that all the time, people in Romford ‘read’ off the space around 
them lessons which they then translate, ‘write’, into articulate narratives of the 
enduring effect of 1960s-designed building on well-being at the turn of the 
century. But what if there is also a circumspect awareness, unmediated by the 
discursive or the figurative, of the deeper lessons of human life taught by the 
material environment that surrounds them in their community? If changes to 
society and the economy, indeed the body politic at large, are encoded in the form 
of bodily hexis, which are then circumspectively read by others in the community, 
then this is confirmed in Lucy’s narrative. The death of one kind of environment, 
traditional and vernacular, and the emergence of another, modem and universal, 
narrated in her account seemed to occur alongside changes in bodily comportment 
and attendant ethos. Coimter-posing the mutual concern of primary relationships -  
an intimacy with others as expressed through practices such as the provision and 
sharing of economic goods, or the mutual warmth of familiarity -  is the kind of
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bodily practice that signifies a personal discreteness belonging to a different kind 
of ‘solidarity’, one that Durkheim has dubbed ‘organic’ and the property of 
contractual, societal relationships. It is significant that Lucy has now come to 
regard a phenomenal reaction - pushing - as the necessary dispositional schema to 
get by in the new order she sees around her.
This link I have outlined here between socio-historical processes, the 
material environment, and the personal body, the three factors lived togetlier as a 
unity enmeshed in a nexus of symbolic violence according to Charlesworth, does 
not just remain a problem at the level of abstract phenomenological discourse. It is 
also a connection seen to be vitally present in the letters columns of the local 
newspaper. Over the ‘problem of littering’, the ideological positions of the left 
and right wings in British political history are read off the body performing a 
basic, almost paradigmatic, act - the dropping of litter onto the street. The above 
argument perhaps explains why an act that is in itself so transient, not to say 
politically insignificant, excites such colourful, disproportionate responses and 
social diagnoses. Take these responses to the littering of Romford from opposite 
sides of the political spectrum, written in response to the ‘Make A Difference 
Day’ anti-litter campaign led by the then local Labour MP, Eileen Gordon. The 
language in each is telling:
A: ‘I believe the rot started a lot earlier with the socially liberal progressives who 
have sent matters backwards in their constant efforts to remove as much authority 
from parents, teachers and the police as they could. Greatly increased litter is only 
one manifestation of a general diminishment in good public behaviour, I'eflected 
in an increase in nasty behaviour between children who have been left to run
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wild, fearless in the knowledge that no discipline will be applied. Naturally the 
problem has run long enough to cause a great increase in littering adults. I believe 
the litter problem will only be solved if  discipline is encouraged from an early 
age... [healthy]populace... like automatons, walk about the streets and travel 
by road and rail with blinkers on, unaware o f the damage they are causing and 
oblivious to the effect o f  their behaviour on others\
Another writer replies in a subsequent letter to the newspaper:
B: ‘The selfish attitude o f the many is a legacy o f the Thatcher years o f  '‘me firs t” 
and “what others? Only by accelerated progiess towards establishing the social 
values that are consistent with good citizenship, and bringing about a revolution in 
attitudes, can we hope to see radical movement towards a society that respects all 
people and their environment... Our first woman Prime Minister changed English 
culture with her “no society” view and monetary policy to match. Communities 
rapidly faced a deteriorating human scene of Dickensian proportions. We are now 
reaping the legacy, the arrogance o f success clashing head-on with the newly 
found arrogance o f those with nothing to lose. Communities are suffering the 
indignity o f violence, street crime and litter, with little humanity and scant regard 
for one another. We, as members of the community, are responsible for allowing 
our general behaviour to sink to such low depths. It requires a national move away 
from the actions that divide andfoster aggressive behaviour]
When this man (B) writes of the ‘clash’ between the Thatcherite 
‘arrogance of success’ and the new ‘arrogance of those with nothing to lose’ he is
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conveying quite a sophisticated insight about different types of subjectivities 
produced by the experience of contemporary modernities. It may be useful here to 
compare it against a study conducted by Phil Cohen in East London into young 
peoples’ symbolic landscapes of safety and danger in the city (1999). His interest 
is in that space where the private imaginary and the public world meet in the lives 
of a group of adolescents growing up in a part of London, the Deptford and the 
Isle of Dogs, known for its racial divisions.
To provide some background to the study: asking the adolescents to 
begin in a familiar place, and imaginatively travel beyond the boundaries of their 
known world, Cohen and his research team used ‘storyworlds’ (boxes using found 
objects and other props to illustrate a basic narrative outline provided by the 
researchers) to allow the adolescents’ imaginations free reign over the material 
landscapes of their local communities. According to Cohen, the familiar locations 
of everyday life became for these youths sites for the exploration of inner psychic 
processes woven around local issues of race, place and identity. These were yoimg 
people disadvantaged by their location in socially vulnerable communities, and 
who routinely experienced themselves as the victims of others’ racialised tear. 
Such experiencing is revealed in their stories: here, psychic life takes on the form 
of local difficulties in changing environments, such as racial violence. Racial 
crime, then, as Cohen argues, also works at a psychic level, denying individuals a 
sense of autonomy by condemning them to tlie abject; such violence is aimed at 
not just causing physical aggression but ontological insecurity. Using the 
storyworld method, Cohen tlius found it was possible to trace a psychic map of 
the young peoples’ local topographies, on which could also be projected issues 
surroimding race, place and belonging in the city. For the theoretical basis to the
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creation of these symbolic landscapes, Cohen turned to psychoanalytic and 
phenomenological studies of the city, developing a notion of the ‘urban uncanny’.
The urban uncaimy, according to Cohen, works by way of the dual nature 
of urban landscapes: everyday contacts with the city take place between the 
visible and the invisible city, between a ‘social topography’ and a ‘psychic 
topology’ (1999:13). The visible city is amenable to objective understanding and 
control, where itineraries are planned and earned out ‘with some anticipation of 
success, or at least redress’ (1999:14). Its counterpart, the invisible city, is of more 
subjective significance, however. The invisible city is where ‘familiar landmarks’ 
are transformed by the imagination, or primary-process thinking, into a landscape 
of private chronotopes (Bakhtin), the ‘keys’ to which, Cohen claims, ‘are not to be 
found anywhere but in the subjects [sic] unconscious’ (1999:14). Thus, Cohen 
speaks of the possibility of the ‘other scenes’ of urban life entering into our 
conscious awareness when we encounter a type of enviromnent that is unfamiliar 
or ‘other’; in these ‘strange’ settings is evoked ‘the absence/presence of 
significant others’, or ‘a sense of déjà vu \ nonetheless arising from a ‘double 
articulation of...public and private imaginaries’ (1999:14). While these ‘holes in 
the urban fabric’ provide a positively ludic space for those who are ‘ontologically 
secure enough and sufficiently confident of their social status to enjoy the 
prospect of the accidental’ (1999:13), such as the flaneur, for the less 
ontologically secure, like Cohen’s yoimg subjects, these sites show up ‘the 
problematic nature of interdicted spaces’ (1999:6). According to Cohen:
‘These places were often described in an ambivalent manner; they were
both fascinating and terrifying, sites for the staging of both adventure and
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horror stories. Places on the border of no go areas were a special object 
of speculation. These liminal spaces -  interzones between safety and 
danger, the known and the unknown -  were where many of the crucial 
issues of identity, belonging and entitlement were symbolically staged’ 
(1999:6).
The no go area, off the beaten track, the ‘new cultural landscaping of 
urban/industrial dereliction’ (1999:14), the ‘non-place’; these are sites that can be 
harnessed and enjoyed by the economically and socially less marginalized; but for 
others, they become the locations of fear, danger and urban poiesis. By capturing 
them in narrative form, Cohen and his research team were providing young people 
with the conditions under which they could explore themes around the urban 
uncanny at the same time as containing its threat; in the real world, without the 
assurance of fiction, the uncanny would become all too real for them.
Interstitial spaces in the city can, then, be utilised in different ways 
depending on the extent of the subject’s integratedness into local and national 
structures; what is one person’s flaneurie is another person’s unacceptable risk. 
And this is where it is possible to return to the comments from the above 
townsfolk in Romford. Here is also discovered the successful cosmopolitan of 
neo-liberal economics, shielded from their environment by a certain security born 
of ‘arrogance’ and ‘success’. Against this, however, but in complementary 
relationship to it, there is the incumbent of the space inhabited by the legacy of 
Thatcherism, similarly protected by their own ‘newly fomid arrogance’. For those 
who have come-to-be within a milieu marked by the legacy of neo-liberalism, 
there is inherent disrespectfulness, an ethos of ‘nothing to lose’, that is not only
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part of bodily comportment in space but is an inextricable part also of the decay of 
urban space and the stoiy it tacitly tells of a world where politicians and other 
local leaders have refused to listen to the voices of the local community. What the 
writer sees in the world that he inhabits are people reciprocating in bodily hexis 
what they apprehend as a lack of concern for them manifested in a decaying 
environment. Such an ethos of apathy and aggression is appropriate to those who 
have not been invested witli anything to gain from the uiban landscape in the first 
place. The above writer (A) may furnish us with a description of the being-in-the- 
world of contemporary urban subjects (like ‘automatons’), and writer (B) concurs 
which his imagery, but how long-lived is this union between subject and world 
likely to be? The link between subject and world can be understood to be most 
tenuous among those with the least ontological security. And what will happen 
when, finally, the fragile bond breaks?
Feeling out of place, apart from the world, invested with a sense of 
outsiderness; such feelings have been associated with the condition surrounding 
ontological vulnerability, which may be caused by any kind of crisis in ‘the 
context of relations in which culture once existed’ (Charlesworth 2000b:81). 
Thus, for the most socially marginal, contacts with urban milieux have been 
described in terms of moments of heightened and intense affect. Writing on this 
condition, Charlesworth records the words of an unemployed person;
‘Ah feel different, especially when Ah g’ [go] aht [out]. Like Ah’ll gu’ 
[go] fo’ a video or sumaht [something] an’ when Ali’m [I’m] the’er All 
feel worried an’ threatened a bit, like, an’ Ah sort’a can’t decide which’t 
t’ ‘ave, then Ah’ll get ‘ome an’ Ah dun’t [don’t] wanna watch it but
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AhTîi boored an’ Ah need sumaht t ’du. So Ah watch it! But Ah dun’t 
enjoy stuff at moment’ (2000b:79),
It is as though people like this speaker are unavoidably awake, frozen in 
consciousness, ‘dreaming with [their] eyes open’ (Cohen 1999:14), looking onto 
the world as if from askance but unable, by virtue of their displacement, to secure 
any meaning from it. Theirs is a condition which forces on them a sobering 
clarity: it as though they are possessed of a unique insight into the reality of social 
life as a game, a set of arbitrary routines from which, nevertheless, they are 
exempted. As Charlesworth, again, describes this condition:
Tt is like being in a familiar enviromnent, in complete darkness, one 
knows the world is there but cannot know it in quite the transparency as 
when it is illuminated’ (2000b:80).
Viewing the world as if from a ‘privileged’ viewpoint, standing beyond it but 
unable to make sense of it, such culturally dispossessed members of the working 
class cannot even benefit from recourse to the ‘urban uncanny’, insofar as the 
urban uncanny casts an ‘other scene’, a layer of meaning, over the world which 
derives from the private psychic operations of the subject. The class of actors 
described here by Charlesworth, ontologically disinvested, are condemned to the 
parameters of their physical being while remorselessly ‘reaching out’, and failing 
to make contact with, the cultural world around them. Theirs is a practically 
meaningless universe. What I have wished simply to point out here is a series of 
parallels with my informants in Romford as they tell me, and each other, how they
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are experiencing their urban world In sum, it is from a position of outsiderness, as 
they feel disenchanted with a landscape over which they can exercise little 
control, either individually or, historically, as a group.
Thus, I would not restrict these experiences just to the working class in 
the post-industrial city, nor to the immigrant in the post-imperial city. The 
experience of being shorn of investment, of always being in the dark about things, 
is a common enough experience among townsfolk in Romford and a common 
enough feature of the stories they tell about place. Indeed, the application of 
Cohen’s ideas of the urban uncanny to sites within the urban landscape of 
Romford that have radically changed their cultural and economic rationales, or 
had them changed for the purpose of creating new economies in sectors of the 
town previously unused, casts interesting light, for example, on why there is a 
disparity between fear of crime and actual criminality in these areas of the town 
centre at night, a zone almost exclusively given over to drinking in pubs and clubs 
where an ethos of youthfulness is celebrated.
What Cohen’s analysis also opens up is the relationship between a 
private phantasy world and tlie concrete world of social topography, arguing that 
the two most commonly meet in interstitial or unfamiliar places; what Augé 
would call non-places. Within such sites, those who feel out-of-place may 
experience the emergence of suppressed fears, or the urban uncanny. Taken to its 
extreme, argues Cohen, the subject can become lost in the generalised fear that 
surround these ambivalent spaces. Of the landscape of safety and danger in 
Romford, one area in particular has received much attention. South Street, 
especially known for its incivility, is a part of the town that has recently been 
engaged in attempts to engineer a different kind of social behaviour among its
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users^. The response of the town centre management and other agencies to 
incivility was to eliminate those sites, the older urban fabric, with which incivility 
had become associated in the public imagination. Through a new cultural 
landscaping, attempts were made to re-enculturate users to adopt a more ‘classy’ 
lifestyle organised along the lines of a continental ‘cafe society’ in the hope that 
this would engender a difference in behaviour, replacing the old ‘spit and 
sawdust’ pubs with a series of secure and ‘up market’ chain bars. However, 
despite this change of aesthetics, the new cultural landscaping of South Street 
further contributed to the emergence of new symbolic sites of risk and danger, not 
the elimination of old ones. How could this be?
It is significant that in Romford a discourse of danger and risk has arisen 
around the late-night activities of South Street; as a non-place, it is the space 
which locals have the most difficulty in assimilating into their narratives of local 
community -  it stands out as a place of ambivalence, with locals unable to read 
into it familiar narratives of belonging. What it has been successful in 
representing, however, is a new order where those who are most likely to hold 
onto tlieir traditional narratives of local belonging, the older townsfolk, feel ‘out
 ^This is a reputation that has reached far beyond the local sphere. For example, an article written 
for The Economist in the US in 2000 chooses Romford’s South Street as its example of how the 
idea o f’24-hour cities’, of the sort encouraged in ‘civilised places for entertainment and 
shopping’, is turning town, centres into ‘alcoholic ghettos for the young’. And, in.less measured 
words, I read a diatribe on the decline of the provincial market town in the New Statesman (1996):
‘as you turn away from the church, a beer bottle explodes at your feet. You look up to see four 
young men swaggering your way. One of them whoops; another makes high-pitched screeching 
sounds, like a distressed seagull. You stand your ground as one of them looks directly at you, his 
eyes glazed and bloodshot. Then he belches beerily into your face. You prepare for the worst 
perhaps, melodramatically, to be beaten within an inch of your life -  but then the group moves on 
without so much as a threatening comment. As they merge into the powdery darkness, you hear 
frrst the sound of more breaking glass, then the seagull’s screech again and then diimken laughter. 
It’s closing time in Bishop’s Stortford, as it is all over the country. The pub crowds are out and 
roaming, driven no doubt to the edge of iirationality by the effects of alcohol and deep, deep 
boredom. 1 picture the scenes which f  imagine takihg place at that veiy moment, as if in grim 
ceremony, in nearly every market town from Merthyr Tydfil in Wales to Barnstaple in Devon: 
scenes of booiishness, broken windows, vomiting and fighting’.
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of place’ -  as a regenerated area, they have come to realise that ‘it is not for us’, 
but for the younger people who use its pubs and clubs. It is an inter-zone where, in 
the darkness of night, the uncanny may potentially surface.
There is an ambiguous aspect to South Street that perhaps helps excite 
possible feelings of the uncanny for those who should not be populating its space, 
and take precautions to avoid it: by day, it is punctuated with the familiar rhythms 
of the economic order of consumption, light, busy and vital, but at night, it is 
given over to youth with their perceived wreckless and unpredictable violence. 
Such new cultural landscaping is thus avoided as tangible incidents of violence, 
narrated through gossip or the local news media, become elaborated into a 
symbolic landscape of danger that those who are less secure about the grounds of 
their subjectivity become afraid to negotiate. Rather, through a powerful 
ontological determinism, ‘an arc of transference between habitation and 
inhabitant’, the site becomes identified entirely with the danger inherent in those 
who are seen as using that space, the yoimg person with their behavioural excess.
Eventually, specific incidents of violence, narrated, as I said, by the 
above genres of gossip and news media, lose their moorings in reality and take on 
the shape of ‘generic’ danger. With this, the atmosphere of generalised fear is 
complete, capturing sometliiiig of the process described here by Cohen:
‘The process of narrativisation also produces a contradictory effect: 
danger is constructed as a fixed if  negative asset of certain populations of 
places, that are thereby rendered into pennanent sites of potential hazard. 
At the same time the practices that translate the principle of 
dangerousness into a tangible threat, become entirely fluid, and
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unpredictable and as such beyond rational calculation or control. It is in 
the gap between generic danger and specific threat, marked by the mise 
en scene of the hazard, tliat the discourse of risk finds its locus and its 
raison d'etre'’ (1999:26).
Such explanation puts into perspective, I feel, the exaggerated strategies that occur 
around the use of town centi e space at night, and the futility of the police efforts 
to put into perspective the ‘real’ incidence of crime. That such efforts have so 
little effect on so many may be largely due to the discourses of risk, mentioned by 
Cohen, which ‘invite us to play safe by imagining our worst fears. One scare story 
it seems is worth any amount of worthy but dull public information films’ 
(1999:27). The discourse of risk, then, has a precise referent, those ‘ontological 
insecurities that have floated free of any concrete determinants’ (1999:26), and the 
only means of escape for the subject from the self-perpetuating state of anxiety 
this engenders is, quite often, through ‘radical denial or suppression’, phobic 
closure or manic risk-taking. These two states are world-making -  phobic closure 
or manic risk-taking either cuts off or accentuates the subject’s actual contact with 
their urban world. The soft-city {a la Raban 1974) melts into the fluidity of 
generic danger where eveiytliiiig seems to be a tlireat to the self. Without a means 
to ‘focus anxiety on an object outside itself, Cohen tells us (1999:27), the subject 
is faced with psychic disintegration.
The threat need not, however, be homespun, such as the excessive youth. 
In Romford, the local news media has been paramount in spreading fears over the 
arrival of an immigrant other, containing the implicit tlireat of a ‘hitherto familiar* 
enviromnent suddenly becom[ing] an unpredictable or illegible place’ (Cohen
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1999:27) for its native populace. In 2000, in particular, following the hijacking of 
a plane by Afghani asylum-seekers at Stanstead Airport in Essex and a swift 
nationwide response by politicians in the run up to local and regional elections, it 
was the national flag that became the focus of local attention (and some national 
attention too): the occasions when it was appropriate and inappropriate to fly it 
over the town hall. The rhetoric that this debate over flag-flying produced had the 
effect of exciting further fears over the entry of asylum-seekers into Britain and 
the corresponding erosion of indigenous British rights and resources, for example 
the right to celebrate national difference and a barely spoken of, but tacitly 
communicated, belief in rights for white British. At the time, such threats, 
invisible as they seemed to me, were clearly translated into fears over the moral 
and physical integrity of the local community and the national body to which it 
belonged. Such claims themselves possess something of a psychic anxiety in that, 
demographically, Romford is an overwhelmingly ‘white’ area (96% are ‘white’ 
while the remaining percentage is spread out relatively thinly over a number of 
minority ethnic groups) and that there seems little likelihood in the near future of 
a large demographic reversal.
So far, then, I have considered the feelings of outsiderness and a 
perceived lack of agency in peoples’ attitudes to the urban landscape. There is one 
further theorist whose work on place seems to put into perspective these 
sensibilities of townsfolk in Romford, Edward Relph. For Relph, the ‘inauthentic 
attitude of placelessness’, characteristic of all those ‘look-alike landscapes’ 
(1976:79), has become the endemic attitude in contemporary urban-industrial 
societies. It is an attitude that makes much sense of complaints about local apathy 
toward urban landscapes in Romford from those, like local historians, for whom
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place is an important part of the local cultural universe. An inauthentic attitude to 
placelessness, according to Relph, is one where there is a lack of awareness at 
either a conscious or an unconscious level of the ‘deep’ and ‘symbolic’ 
significance of places and the ‘identities’ latent within them: the sites that this 
attitude engenders do not contain ‘a genuine belief system encompassing all 
aspects of existence’ (1976:80), as pertained until fairly recently, but belong to an 
existence outside of historical communities (just as Oliver remarked that the 
contemporary planners were not o/ the local community). Of course, for Relph, 
there are caveats; there is still the possibility of finding within even the least 
diverse, permanent and long-lived environments a celebration of ‘authentic’ 
existence (note, for example, the stories that narrate Milton Keynes as a rich and 
vibrant community, despite many narratives to the contrary, according to 
Finnegan {\99%:passim)). ‘Being lived-in confers some authenticity in even the 
most trivial and unrelentingly uniform landscapes’, Relph is willing to accept 
(1976:80). Inauthentic place-making is not unique to the current moment, he adds, 
but what is distinctive about the current moment, however, is the lengths to which 
place-makers have gone to excise ‘the local’ from the landscape.
To speak of the notion of placelessness is also to entertain the idea of 
non-places. Thus, to suggest that ‘we neither experience nor create places with 
more than a superficial and casual involvement’, as Relph asserts (1976:80), is to 
echo Augé’s later notion of non-place, and the super-modernity of which it is a 
part. Non-places are those spaces which are most likely to address us as 
individuals, not as members of a local community. There is no attempts by space 
(non-place) to address its populations at a collective level, nor is there any attempt 
by space to articulate with history other than in moments when it can be
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conveniently commodified. They are spaces through which we are likely to move 
in a blasé manner, indeed are spaces designed to facilitate the movement of bodies 
(airport terminals, motors ways, processing camps for asylum-seekers, housing 
estates for transient families and the like). In short, an inauthentic attitude 
flourishes in such milieux as described by Augé.
Place-making, then, is now more likely to occur outside of the 
community radier than in situ. As described by Relph, this is a situation where 
locals, shorn of their investment in the processes of place-making, absolve 
responsibility for it altogether, and identify, however consciously or 
unconsciously but nevertheless ‘inauthentically’, with the aims of an external 
authority, be it the planner, the businessperson, or, more commonly, the council. 
The will o f an external authority is frequently heard homogenised in people’s 
speech, or, as put by Relph (quoting from Heidegger), Tnauthenticity is expressed 
especially through the “dictatorship of the ‘They’ {das Mann). We take pleasure 
and enjoy ourselves as ‘they’ take pleasure; we read, see, judge literature and art 
as ‘they’ see and judge’” (1976:80).
I feel that my local acquaintances in Romford would feel quite at home 
with these words. Despite their feelings of resignation, they, and others, 
consistently bemoan the external planning of Romford during die 1960s as the 
source of contemporary ills, and that Romford, which used to be great in its 
individuality, was now just like any other city space, its sense of local difference 
inexorably washed away. It comes to the surface in a sense of outsidemess that 
leaves many people feeling, if not a dull apathy, then disempowered and socially 
excluded (excluded and entrapped, Charlesworth would argue) when it comes to 
detennining the shape of their urban landscapes. The processes of local planning
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have left them with a fatalism and a sense of loss of control. This is why it is 
possible to hear many people simply put down social change to the inexorable 
advances of Progress, or some other grand narrative, such as the inevitability of 
organic society in which individual selves are divided by their functional 
separability.
The above analyses are intended to evidence that imagination can indeed 
be world-making -  that the imaginary (the untrue, the false, the phantasic) is not 
necessarily hermetically sealed off from the real, material, ‘hard’ city (indeed, any 
real, material, ‘hard’ milieu’). But neither is the imagination as discussed above 
necessarily always the acts of self-transcendence that the existentialist would have 
us accept. Rather, urban subjects sometimes, and no doubt quite often, imagine 
(phantasise) realities in such a way that tlie worlds they produce from it 
apparently seem to limit their agency -  in the words of Cohen (1999:32), urban 
anxiety and fear limits access to ‘opportunity structures’ that may, for those most 
vulnerable, merely accentuate the problems that surround their social position. On 
the other hand, eschewing imagining the worse, and engaging in stories of rational 
precaution is also world-making; as Cohen has it, such stories not only forewarn 
subjects of risk, they actively ‘forearm’ them against it, affording them with the 
practical resolve to deal with its difficulties.
For the least ontologically secure, however, the soft-city is made more 
malleable by a feeling of generic danger that threatens them with becoming 
overwhelming. Thus, the urban subject’s own imaginative acts actualise the 
worlds they constme by generating a certain set of practices for navigating the 
city, a habitus, organised around its perceived sites of safety and danger. Not all 
habituses will be helpful in realising the resources of opportunity that a city may
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hold, leading sometimes to the illusionary impression that the urban domain is a 
deterministic force beyond the reach of individual intention. Again, as Cohen puts 
it, telling his cultural studies audience what is already familiar to a literary 
anthropological one, it is untrue that ‘phantasy and reality are two separate and 
antithetic domains, each perhaps with their own truths, but nevertheless quite 
incompatible’ (1999:25). Each is confirming of the other. And further, this is also 
not dissimilar and unielated to the process by which, as Bouidieu and his 
followers have argued, the working class subject imaginatively creates his (or her) 
own limited worlds by misrecognising his own stigmatised identity (drawn from 
the social ‘imaginations’ of others who stand in the way of the subject’s access to 
certain markets) as something belonging to his essential nature and thus adopting 
it as the limit of his world. In this way, too, imaginations can be self-confirming, 
and, ultimately, world-making for the subject.
A new dominant discourse of identify?
A final word needs to be said about one further imaginative act of world-making, 
that of local governance. Talldng with people in local governance, especially the 
town centre manager, Gillian Balfe, I was surprised to find what at first sounded 
like a common language of identity among both anthropologists and those, like 
the town centre manager, whose responsibility it was to image the town. It soon 
turned out, however, to be only a superficial meeting. Thus, I found that the 
concept of identity was not only an object of academic speculation, a dominant 
discourse in the contemporary academy, but that it was also being used by those 
in local governance seemingly to organise their efforts at reshaping the urban
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environment of Romford, and it populations. On closer inspection it seemed clear 
that its usage in this local political context owes little to anthropological 
metanarratives - what the anthropologist would conventionally image by identity - 
and more to economic or business imperatives; it would seem that the traditional 
anthropological notion of communal identity was making little headway into the 
semantic domain that is now forming around the dominant discourse of identity in 
the town. Its use is highlighted, for example, in the Romford Town Centre Revised 
Business Strategy, a document used to co-ordinate efforts at economic 
regeneration in the town. To quote from the document:
''Romford Town Centre should develop a strong and distinct identity that 
welcomes visitors.
Romford has developed over a longer period but this is not always 
apparent. Unlike a purpose-built shopping centre it has a genuine 
history. It is also a distinct place, emphasised by the Market. This helps 
counter an often voiced complaint that all town centres seem the same 
because they have the same shops.
Romford needs to develop a positive and welcoming identity that will be 
attractive both to those who regularly visit the town to shop, work or 
whatever and to the occasional visitor. It must do this through:
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o Addressing deficiencies in the existing fabric not only o f streets, 
but o f many o f the 1960s and 1970s structures that are now aging 
poorly
o Encouraging good quality, innovative and distinctive new 
developments that are integrated in the town centre 
o Planting and greening to improve the overall quality o f the 
environment and provide areas for people to pause and relax 
o Ensuring effective cleansing and maintenance so that problems 
are addressed at an early stage and to encourage visitors and all
users o f the town centre to care for the environment in the
centre \
Toward fulfilling these aims, an advertising campaign was devised and Romford 
was attributed its own slogan that framed what was to become Romford’s 
‘identity’; it was eventually decided that Romford is the town that 'has the lo t . 
Despite the optimism of the slogan, it has been necessaiy to conceive of this
identity, Balfe argues, to ensure that Romford attracts, and manages to secure,
economic capital; it speaks, not of any idealistic notion of community, but of the 
realpolitik of organising and managing a town centre at the turn of the century, a 
service economy to be managed. Whether it is liked or not, rich local culture or 
none, these are the harsh realities the town must face or alternatively flounder, it 
was suggested to me. What is more, here was a discourse of identity that was 
esoteric, specific to a group of town plaimers, and, importantly, dominant in term 
of the greater material resourcefulness of its speakers; in short, it was capable for 
these reasons of silencing its more demotic usages, of actualising a certain version
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of reality through the imagination of local governance. For a discourse to be 
dominant, Gerd Bauman (1996:22) has argued, it needs to appeal to the widest 
range of contexts possible through five inherent qualities: an economic conceptual 
make-up; communicative resources bordering on the monopolistic; flexibility of 
application; an ideological plasticity; the capacity to adapt to a broad range of 
institutional purposes.
Aiguably, the discourse of identity has come close to lending itself to 
such dominant usage at the turn of the millennium. It can be seen, for instance, 
how identity is now used in a multiplicity of institutional contexts with diverse 
applications, as is evidenced here. Once reified by the anthropologist, or the 
community-worker, it is no longer the exclusive preserve of local communities 
who conduct their affairs under the aegis of local identity. Insofar as the concept 
of identity is used here by town planners, it is perhaps imique in referring not (at 
least primarily) to the human inhabitants of spaces, but to the spaces themselves. 
It is unusual in that it is a discourse of identity that does not directly address tliose 
about whom it speaks -  note above, for example, the separation made between the 
town’s ‘identity’ and ‘tliose who regularly visit the town to shop, work or 
whatever’.
What is further distinctive about the discourse of identity of town 
planners is the bracketing off of any overt ideological overtones to the term. 
Through references to visitors, shoppers and town centres, the motivations behind 
its use are more economic than overtly ideological; it has one aim in mind, 
economic regeneration. As for the monopolising of communicative resources 
behind the dominant discourse, it is only necessary, as I said, to look to the 
authority of its speakers, incumbents of positions of relative power (compared, for
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example, to Lucy’s frustration at not being heard above the voice of those with 
some conventionalised authority). Indeed, this is often the complaint from 
ordinary local people, that their voice, historically, has not been heard above the 
official conversation over the local landscape. As a result of officialdom’s 
hegemonic control over space, they are able to erect impenetrable rhetorical 
fortresses that close out traffic with ordinary meanings. It is equally the case that 
these ‘fortresses’ are capable of creating their own versions of reality, and 
envisaging identities which those beyond the boundaries of the planning discourse 
are expected to carry. The resulting vision sometimes implies ‘a culture transfer 
amounting to a cultural colonization’ (Ravetz 2001:5), akin to other projects of 
social experimentation implemented during the twentieth century.
What I am suggesting here is that planners take themselves, their own 
cultural aspirations and patterns of economic activity, as tacit Ifames of reference 
in imagining the kind of habitats and inhabitants of Romford in the near future. 
The question, then, is to ask what sense is to be made of anthropological notions 
of local identity, when those currently most dominant in its definition hold to 
views such as:
'town centre management is about understanding what people's aspirations are 
and responding to that ’ (Gillian Balfe).
Thus, the current discourse of identity among local planners, I would suggest, is 
an ideological discourse, not purely an economic one, in that it is most likely to 
appeal to some social actors more than others. Town planning as enterprise, Balfe 
told me, was an exciting one insofar as the planner is in control of sites of great
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significance to human culture, the urbane domain of the town. And, as I 
mentioned earlier, with this discourse of identity, a link is made between social 
behaviour and the space that is being planned (the new locus of identity). 
Speaking of identity in this way, then, gives those adept in the dominant discourse 
licence to speak of the proprieties of moral behaviour with the urban sphere. The 
town centre manager was particularly vocal toward this end, as I illustrate below.
The purpose of town centre management, to adapt two terms of Daniel 
Miller’s (2000:10-11), is to offer opportunities for both localised expansion and 
localised potentiality^. As originally applied to the enculturation of the Internet, 
these two concepts refer to features I also found in Balfe’s views of the purposes 
of town centre management: that is, that town centres were to be designed to offer 
opportunities to realise an old or originary selfliood (localised expansion) or, 
alternatively, they offered resources to think the self as other (localised 
potentiality).
So, when Balfe began to comment to me that:
'you don 7 have to he in Romford very long to discover that many o f the people 
who live here are from the East End o f  London and there's a very strong sense o f  
community that comes from there [...] the other aspect o f identity I suppose is 
Romford Market. 1 started o ff by saying that Romford does have a strong 
character. What we need to do is analyse what that is, I  think, and to grasp that. 
It *s not the cheeky-chirpy East Ender, the one who would make do with, you 
know, the low end o f the market. These people have grown up from that and 
aspired to better things, for example Costa /Cafe/ So we need to understand what
 ^For Daniel Miller, the Internet, as a world-wide medium, otfers opportunities for ‘globalised’ 
expansion and potentiality to localised subjects.
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their aspirations really are and I  think that's how we 're going to stamp an identity 
on the town. People are friendly and open and that's one o f the strengths that we 
need to capitalise on. I  think the café society is a good way o f expressing that. In 
some towns and cities maybe it wouldn't have worked hut it works here, though, 
because people do like to socialise but that's something we really need to work 
on. We 're looking at what we 're selling in Romford: we 're selling friendly society, 
people who have aspirations but who aren't stand-offish, a town centre that 
responds to the needs o f its customers
I find in this utterance an expression of a localised expansion, the realisation, 
through participation in its designed and regulated spaces, of a regional character. 
So that what is afforded by the town centre is what is already there (in the national 
imagination of the planner) in a regulation of the community along tlie lines of an 
economic siipply-and-demand model Then, there are oppoitunities for localised 
potentiality, the possible realisation, within the limited parameters of the town 
centre, of something which the self may become. For instance:
'there are still a lot o f people who regard Romford as a no-go area in the evening 
because o f a fear o f  crime from the pubs and clubs and I think the trick for us is to 
change that way o f thinking and to work with the local operators and with 
residents o f the town to see the town centre as an asset. Some o f them already do; 
some o f the pubs during the day now have quite a good growing trade with elderly 
gents and dog-walkers who will stop o ff for a bargain nip and a pint. But it's 
really to increase opportunities for parts o f the community that normally wouldn 7 
see themselves having anything to do with pubs and clubs, bringing them together
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and offering them more opportunities... We know that kids are going to come into 
town in the evening and some o f  them are going to get drunk so again it is 
necessary to try managing that behaviour and to get them to think a bit more 
elevated about what they ’re doing. Î  think that the fitting out and the kitting out o f 
the pubs that w e’ve seen recently is part o f that; none o f these are spit and 
sawdust joints, these are about quality and class... i t ’s a place where you get 
dressed up to go to, you don’t go out for a fight. So that’s the whole lifestyle thing, 
getting people to think more in terms o f quality in their leisure and work in the 
choices they make
And Balfe goes on to continue:
'I  think w e’ve got a lot to learn from youngsters. A lot o f youngsters wouldn’t be 
seen dead in the sort o f  trainers and T-shirts that I  wear. They 're much more 
conscious o f designer labels and quality... so w e’ve got to take that into account 
as well and I think w e’ve got to work with developers and investors in the town 
centre to make sure that they understand that that’s the generation they’re 
building for ’.
But many do not belong to this generation. And it is in the kind of milieu 
described by Balfe that actors feel their subjectivity to be displaced. Of course, 
there are many, old and young alike, who make the choice to use the services on 
offer in tlie town centre, and undemiine their erstwhile principled rejection of it. 
Hope is also offered to those who might wish to speak other of local social life has 
been given, of course, by Relph (the hegemony of inauthentic placelessness is
343
incomplete) and Finnegan (stories are told of authentic communities in the New 
Town). But also by the imaginative and poetic efforts of the three groups of 
writers in my thesis: the textual practices of Lucy and Les who furnished the 
world with their treatments of its conventionalised forms; similarly Young and 
Willmott through their work at the I.C.S. returned the world anew tlirough their 
marginal sociological investigations, furnishing it with a conception of the 
working class life both traditional and modem; and Betjeman, who during his 
lifetime championed a vision of British reality that carried over into the 
interpretations and actions of a world he had helped to create. None of these 
‘writers’ were ever willing to accept, in their own different ways, the specious 
separation of language and world, imagination and the city.
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Appendix
‘ At first glance, London, like Britain, appears to be an unconventional anthropological 
field site, and an ‘etlmography in London’ an arcane disciplinary focus. Yet, a case for its 
potential centrality can, I feel, be justifiably made. On collecting together etlmographic 
material on London, it becomes evident that anthropological audiences have not 
historically been treated to traditional place-based etluiogiapliy, witli some notable and 
interesting exceptions which have remained marginal to mainstream academic 
investigation. It is also clear that collating an ethnography of/in London is perforce an 
exercise in inter-disciplinarity, as no one discipline has managed to gain an institutional 
foodrold in tliis area; tlius, etlmogiaphy of London appeals to an aiitluopological anti- 
disciplinaiity.
All of die patterns delineating tlie liistoiical cour se of anthr opology in Britain can 
also be seen played out in the ethnographic arena of London. It reveals London, first of 
all, to be a surprisingly well-established field site for ethnographic research. Within the 
first phase of anthropological studies in Britain, the era of tlie sociological genre of 
‘community studies’ fiom the late 1950s-1960s, Cohen has argued (2002:324), tliere were 
several important ‘local area’ studies within London conducted under the auspices of The 
Institute of Community Studies based in Betlmal Green in the East End of London (see 
Willmott 1985 for a reappraisal of tlie Institute): tiiese include, of course, Yoimg and 
Wilhnott’s sociological classic Family and Kinship in East London (1957), on the impact 
of social relocation on working class family arrangements and coimmmily structures, and 
dieh follow-up study Family and Class in a London Suburb (1960), which tests certain 
liypotliesis of tlie original study widiin die mixed social class milieu of suburban 
Woodford. Other research by these authors has focused on the large council estate at 
Dagenham (Willmott 1963); and The Symmetrical Family (Young and Willmott 1973) 
focused attention on work and leisur e in the metr opolitan ar ea. Odier members of die ICS 
went on to produce important work in and on London, focussing once again on family
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life, for example Peter Townsend’s The Family Life o f Old People: An Inquiry in East 
London (1957), and Peter Maiiis’ Widows and iheir Families, published the following 
year. Further, Young and Wilhnott’s work in London set the agenda for an African 
etlmography by Peter Manis wliich attempted to recr eate tire Family and Kinship study, 
resulting in his monograph. Family and Social Change in an Afiican City: A Study o f 
Rehousing in Lagos, published in 1961 -  an example of how the sociology of the working 
class city influenced tlie anthropological study of modernity in Africa. Also to come out 
of tlie ICS was Enid Mill’s Living With Mental Illness: A Study o f East London (1962). 
During the same period as these important studies emerged, anthropologist Raymond 
Firth and his team at the LSE began focusing their etlmographic attention on middle class 
ar eas of London, cuhiiiiiating in works on middle class attitudes to family and relatives 
(Firth 1956, 1970); similarly, Elizabeth Bott (1971), based at the Tavistock Institute, 
conducted work on kinship networks in Britain. What this phase of ethnographic 
investigation in London highlights is a confidence in producing local area studies of parts 
of London. Indeed, one of its most emblematic pieces {Family and Kinship) is an 
argument for the survival of the working class ‘urban village’ within metropolitan 
Gesellschaftliche society. This phase perhaps also established die thematic prism througli 
which London socio-cultural reality would later be viewed; the themes of family, 
relatives, the elderly and dependency. One major theme, that of class, would not fare so 
well.
Of a second generation of anthropologists of Britain, according to Cohen the 
period from the 1970s-1980s when recognisably contemporary antliropological diemes 
began to take hold, work in London is equally well represented. The work being 
conducted in London at this time, like the work being published on British rural locations, 
gravitated around die keynote themes of symbolic construction and identity. Thus, for 
example, there was Abner Cohen’s ground-breaking essay ‘Drama and Politics in the 
Development of a London Carnival’, published in Ronnie Frankenberg’s early collection 
on the ethnography of Britain, Custom and Conflict in British Society (1982). In addition,
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Vea ed Amit published Armenians in London: The Management o f Social Boundaries 
(1989), and Haim Kazan was working in a London Borough among the Jewish elderly in 
a care home, publishing The Limbo People: A Study of the Constitution o f the Time 
Universe Among the Aged in 1980. In publisliing tliis work on a symbolically marginal 
period of the western life course, there is resonance with the themes of earlier phases of 
work on London. In line with earlier thematic rubrics through which life in London has 
been viewed was tire Battersea project into households conducted by Sandr a Walhnan et 
al., culminating in two major publications. Living in South London: Perspectives on 
Battersea 1871-1981 (1982) and Eight London Households (1984). Emergent themes 
such as youth and ethnicity in London were exemplified in Helena Wulff s Twenty Girts, 
wliich was brouglit out in 1988, or Parrninda Bhachu’s study of East African Sikli settlers 
inBrilnin, Twice Migrants (1985).
During the 1990s, there has been a change toward the acceptance of Britain as a 
place in which to carry out ethnographic fieldwork and a growing interest in a wide range 
of postmodern aspects of life to be found within Britain, accordmg to Cohen (2002:325). 
Tliis means that there are no longer any great thematic rubrics or metanarratives 
governing investigations in the disciplinary field; anthropologists no longer study 
‘Britain’, or ‘London’, as such tlirougli a format of local area studies but choose to 
examine experiences which may instantiate a universal humanism. Works based on 
fieldwork in London published during this period include Gerd Bauman’s Contesting 
Culture: Discourses o f Identity in Multi-Ethnic London (1996), on race, edmicity and 
discourses on coimnunity in Soudiall, and work on specific subcultiues, such as tliat of 
lesbian feminists (e.g. Sarah Green’s Urban Amazons: Lesbian Feminism and Beyond in 
the Gender, Sexuality and Identity Battles o f London (1997)). Of late, Daniel Miller has 
carried out fieldwork in shopping centres in North London, in particular Brent Cross and 
Wood Green (e.g. Miller 1998), Adam Reed has walked its streets (2000), and the Centre 
for New Ethnicities Research (CNER) at the University of East London has been 
conducting research firom an etlmographic viewpoint among the multi-ethnic youth of
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London Docklands. As die ethnograpliic landscape of London has changed over die 
course of the previous five decades, so it reveals the breadth, significance and diversity of 
tliis region; work in London exhibits the involvement of some of the main protagonists 
and ethnograpliic iimovators of social science dining die twendedi centuiy, all turning 
their skills to London and its suburban surroundings. It also turned out from collating this 
material that Romford as a field site was situated in close proximity to some of the sites 
of major eduiograpliic studies of Britain, including Dagenham (Willmott) in die east of 
London, and Debden (Gieenleigh in Young and Willmott’s Family and Kinship), and 
Woodford (Willmott and Young) in suburban Essex, not including the studies of one 
village, Ehndon, on die rural Essex/Cambridgeshire border.
Recent contributions to die anthiopology of Britain fiom outside of London that 
have also had an influence on the present study include Charlesworth (2000b) on 
Rotherham, Finnegan (1989, 1998), on Bletchley and Milton Keynes, Other studies in 
urban milieux include Jenkins (1982, 1983) on adolescent boys in a housing estate 
(Belfast), Pnina Werbner (1987) on Pakistani migrants (Manchester), and Kathleen Hall 
(2002) on cultural translations in the eveiyday lives of Sikh youth (Leeds), as well as 
Chai sley (1992) on marriage (Glasgow), and Edwaids (2000) on idioms of relatedness hi 
a Northern English town. I have excluded fiom this list of anthropology at home in 
Britain the significant work, both withm the sub-field and the discipline as a whole, that 
was carried out when anthropologists turned then sights to rural locations in Britain. 
British inral studies has long held a distinguished position as die engine of theoretical 
(not to say ethnograpliic) advancement hi social aiiduopology for several decades. The 
contributions as a whole are too numerous to mention here in full. However, the Essex 
village of ‘Elmdon’ has long been a training groimd for anthropologists seeking to 
practice dieh fieldwork skills abroad. Village, kinship and class were found symbolically 
interwoven by Marilyn Strathern in her 1981 study of Ehndon, Kinship at the Core, 
which partly appropriates the empirical data gathered by Audrey Richards and J Robin 
over die cour se of dieh anduopological careers hi the village (Richar ds and Robhi 1975).
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Tlie same tlieoretical project which threaded thiough Stradieni’s work in Elmdon also 
finds expression in Anthony Cohen’s study of Wlialsay in the Shetlands (1987b), as well 
as his two eailier edited volumes on Britain (1982, 1986). The anthropological tlieme of 
diversity, by now weU established by tlie ‘discoveiy’ of internal diver sity witlmi Britain, 
was elaborated on at the level of the individual in Nigel Rapport’s work in ‘Wanet’ in the 
Cumbrian dales (1993). It is largely within rural Britain, then, that the distinctive 
tlieoretical position that antiiropology at home in Britain has to offer' has liistoiically taken 
shape (see hitroduction in Rapport 2002a).
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